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ABSTRACT 
 
THE PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS CONFRONTING ADVOCACY GROUPS 
IN THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN POST-
TRANSITIONAL AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF KENYA AND 
ZAMBIA   
 
 
By Bonfas Owinga  
 
(Ph.D. Candidate-City, University of London, Department of International Politics) 
 
The primary purpose of this study was to conduct a comparative investigation and systematic 
examination of the constraints confronting advocacy groups in the post-transitional states of Kenya 
and Zambia. The researcher also examined the effects of such constraints on the ability of advocacy 
groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. The constrained 
advocacy sub-sector of civil society in a supposedly democratic political setting is an intriguing 
paradox that is less studied and understood despite advocacy groups’ critical role in the process of 
democratic consolidation. The study employed a domestic politico-institutional approach with a 
comparative and case-oriented, qualitative research design, primarily based on in-depth semi-
structured interviews method of data collection. 
 
The study demonstrated that advocacy groups in the post-transitional states of Kenya and Zambia 
are finding it extremely difficult to adapt to the new political environment. The groups are 
confronting constraints from the uncertainty of the new political environment defined by advocacy 
groups’ internal contradictions and weaknesses, the legacy of authoritarianism, the influence of 
politics, primordialism, and international donor control; all have combined in varying degrees to 
undermine the role of advocacy groups in the process of democratic consolidation.  Deliberate 
state strategies have also led to the ‘closing civic space’ for advocacy groups coupled with popular 
disengagement due to the disillusionment of citizens with advocacy groups’ performance in the 
process of democratic consolidation. Advocacy groups are therefore a microcosm of society rigid 
and not as adaptable as previously portrayed in the literature of civil society studies. The 
contribution of advocacy groups to the process of democratic consolidation is, therefore,  
ambiguous. The study also concludes that domestic actors and institutions are the primary 
determinants of the pace and direction of democratic consolidation, while the state remains the 
most significant actor in the process. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS CONFRONTING ADVOCACY GROUPS 
IN THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN POST-
TRANSITIONAL AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF KENYA AND 
ZAMBIA 
1.1. Introduction 
The primary purpose of this study was to conduct a comparative investigation and 
critical examination of the constraints confronting advocacy groups in the post-transitional 
states of Kenya and Zambia. The researcher also examined the effects of such constraints on 
the ability of advocacy groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation by restraining the exercise of state power, extending and protecting civil liberties 
and political rights, promoting political participation, broadening and democratising public 
policy-making, demanding transparency and public accountability and providing spaces for 
democratic deliberation, among other functions. After more than two decades of 
democratisation in both countries, the democratic spaces and platforms for the activities of 
advocacy groups have expanded exponentially, due to political and institutional reforms. 
Specific changes include the expansion of civil liberties and political rights,1 a relatively free 
press and the establishment of competitive multi-party elections, which have resulted in more 
legitimate regimes2 and created an environment for a potentially vibrant and autonomous civil 
society. However, several empirical studies from a variety of disciplines have demonstrated 
that civil society and, specifically, advocacy groups in African countries are still significantly 
weak, structurally deficient,  fragmented, disorganised, ethnicized and lack autonomy and 
independence (Agbu, 2011; Lynch and Gordon, 2011; Mutua, 2008; Brown and Kaiser, 2007; 
Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).3  
                                                             
 
1 Freedom in the World (2003-2016) surveys have consistently ranked both Kenya and Zambia as “partly free” 
since 2003. These reports are available from www.freedomhouse.org   
2 According to Mainwaring (1992, p.296), a political regime is “a broader concept than government and refers to 
the rules that govern the interactions of major actors in the political system and involves institutionalization, i.e. 
the idea that such rules are widely understood and accepted, and that actors pattern their behaviour accordingly”. 
3 Gyimah-Boadi (2004) argues that the weakness of civil society in Africa is mostly pronounced in the areas of 
public accountability and redressing state-society relations in favour of the latter, creating doubts about its ability 
to mid-wife democratic consolidation. 
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These deficiencies have increased pessimism among scholars of democratisation, 
policymakers, practitioners and ordinary citizens about the ability of advocacy groups to 
effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. Advocacy groups are 
fundamental to the process of democratic consolidation and played a pivotal role in the collapse 
of authoritarian systems in Africa, during the “third wave” (Huntington, 1991) democratisation 
process. They were thus widely regarded as the “prime catalysts” for promoting and sustaining 
democratisation in Africa (Ibrahim, 2015; Dwyer and Zeilig, 2012; Habib and Taylor, 1999; 
Diamond, 1997; Bratton, 1994; Liebenberg, 2000). Additionally, the role of advocacy groups 
in the process of democratic consolidation has become more crucial due to the numerous 
obstacles to democratic consolidation such as poor economic performance, weak bureaucratic 
and political institutions, the persistence of neo-patrimonialism, vast social and economic 
inequalities, lack of national elite consensus on democracy (Whitefield and Mustapha, 2009; 
Villalon and VonDoepp, 2005), fragile democratic values and beliefs (Khadiagala and Nganje, 
2015; Kivuva, 2011) and lingering authoritarian tendencies (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; 
Van Doepp, 1996).4  
It is, therefore, critical to investigate the factors that constrain advocacy groups in a 
supposedly democratic environment and the impact that such constraints have on the ability of 
these groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. The study 
employed a domestic politico-institutional approach5, which posits that institutions, interests 
and strategic behavior of political actors such as advocacy groups shape political outcomes 
within specific contexts (Bratton, 2010; Teorell, 2010; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997) to 
comprehensively achieve these objectives. This framework provides a systematic account of 
the constraints confronting advocacy groups in both Kenya and Zambia as generated by 
political and institutional variables and strategic behaviour of these groups in the process of 
democratic consolidation. The study explores the nature, composition, organisation, strategic 
choices and the complex interaction of advocacy groups with other principal political actors in 
                                                             
 
4 There have also been an increasing level of political repression in many supposedly democratic countries in 
Africa such as Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Togo, Burundi, Niger, 
Mozambique, South Sudan and Zambia. 
5 Other theoretical approaches in comparative democratization include structural theories (Lipset, 1959; Diamond 
1992), social approaches (Moore, 1966; Rueschmeyer et al, 1992), economic models (Haggard and Kaufman, 
1996) and strategic approaches (Diamond 2010; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986) 
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generating both constraints and opportunities for these groups’ in the democratic consolidation. 
The goal here is, therefore, to delve into the experiences of advocacy groups in the post-
transitional environment in both countries to generate a more powerful understanding of the 
political and contextual constraints confronting these groups, thus, making it possible to situate 
their role within the broader and rapidly changing process of democratisation in Africa. The 
study argues that by employing such an eclectic approach, we stand a better chance of 
understanding the pattern of constraints confronting advocacy groups in their quest to support 
the process of democratic consolidation in both countries. The approach is explained in detail 
in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
 It is critical to note that the study of democratic consolidation is a major area of interest 
within the field of comparative politics, specifically the “embryonic sub-disciplines of 
transitology and consolidology”(Schmitter, 2008, p. 14).6 These sub-disciplines help provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the democratisation process with the goal of improving the 
outcomes of contemporary efforts by various actors in supporting both the system and the 
process of democratisation. In recent years, there has been an increased interest in 
consolidology in Africa due to the establishment of more democracies from the late 1980s to 
early 1990s and the need to support these regimes to institutionalize and complete the process 
of democratisation. To place this study firmly within the broader theoretical and contextual 
framework, major theories and themes that are common to most attempts at explaining and 
understanding the process of democratic consolidation are examined. 
1.2. Statement of the Research Problem 
Despite the intriguing paradox of a constrained advocacy sub-sector of civil society in 
a supposedly democratic, supportive and enabling political environment, relatively little 
empirical research has been conducted to qualitatively examine the constraints confronting 
advocacy groups in the post-transitional Africa. Moreover, the effects of such constraints on 
the ability of advocacy groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation are less studied and understood. It must be noted that by the late 1990s, there 
                                                             
 
6 Schmitter (2010) suggests that consolidology promises to be a flourishing academic sub speciality of comparative 
politics 
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were already mounting doubts about the pace and direction of democratisation in Africa. Joseph 
Richard, for instance, described the democratic transitions in Africa in 1991 as a ‘virtual 
miracle’7 (Joseph, 1991). Seven years later, he observed a reverse trend, noting that these 
regimes were building up to variants of ‘virtual democracies,’ emphasising the significance of 
the ‘virtuality’ of ritual and symbols of appearance and presentability in these regimes (Joseph, 
1998, p. 13). These regimes had transformed into autocratic systems, characterised by less 
citizen participation, rigging of elections, weak opposition political parties, executive-
compromised judiciary and legislatures, a controlled press and a neutered civil society. 
According to Joseph (1998, p. 15), Africa had moved from “abertura to political closure.” 
Similarly, Marina Ottaway (1997), in a very realistic assessment of the African democratisation 
process, was sceptical about democratic prospects for most African countries due to power 
struggles and economic crises among other factors. 
Recent studies have also been pessimistic about democratisation prospects in Africa, 
due to the loss of momentum and stagnation (Joseph, 2016; Kivuva, 2011; Diamond, 2009; Van 
de Walle, 2009). The Economic Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 20168, which measures 
democracy in a “thicker”9 fashion, showed that there was only one country categorised as a 
“full democracy” in Sub-Saharan Africa and only nine countries categorised as “flawed 
democracies.” More than a dozen countries were classified as “hybrid regimes,” and the most 
worrying trend was that 23 countries were still categorised as “authoritarian regimes.” 
Similarly, using Freedom House data, Pfeiffer and Englebert (2012) concluded that, “On 
average, African regimes displayed rapid improvements in democracy from 1989 to 1995, 
followed by overall stagnation, after that. In 2011, regime, distribution showed that the 
continent had nine “free” 23 “partly free” and 16 “not-free” countries.” By 2015, Freedom 
House reported that the number of regimes categorised as “free” had remained the same, while 
those categorised as “partly free” had decreased from 23 to 19. The most significant result was 
                                                             
 
7 See Joseph (1991) “Africa: The Rebirth of Political Freedom,” Journal of Democracy 2:11-24 
8Democracy Index (2016): Revenge of the “deplorables,” A report by the Economic Intelligence Unit, available 
from http://felipesahagun.es/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Democracy-Index-2016.pdf. The democracy Index is 
based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political 
participation and political culture. Based on these scores on a range of indicators with these categories, each 
country is then itself classified as one of the four types of regimes: “full democracy,” “flawed democracy,” “hybrid 
regimes,” and “authoritarian regime.” 
9 The EIU uses a more inclusive and wider measure of democracy in their methodology 
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that regimes classified as “not-free” had dramatically increased from 16 in 2011 to 24 in 201510 
representing a 50 percent increase within only four years. 
Several other international reports on the state of democracy in the continent reflect this 
broader trend of democratic stagnation and rollback.11 Sub-Saharan Africa has thus been 
described as “the grey zone region per excellence” (Moller and Skaaning, 2013, p. 5) or the 
“twilight zone” (Diamond 1999b), populated by deeply entrenched “hybrid regimes,” which 
are characterised by a mix of both formal democratic institutions and authoritarian practices 
(Diamond, 2002).12This trend of “democratic stagnation” has been steady for almost two 
decades, and there is no compelling evidence to suggest that it is likely to change soon. While 
the number of African countries holding elections has dramatically increased over the years, 
the quality of those elections has tremendously decreased (Bratton and Posner, 1998) due to the 
emergence of a sophisticated pattern of electoral authoritarianism, where “electoral contests are 
subject to state manipulations so severe, widespread, and systematic that they do not qualify as 
democratic” (Schedler, 2006). Electoral authoritarianism is thus becoming its own stable kind 
of regime on the continent.13 Broadly, these trends are significantly contributing to the shifting 
of opinion from cautious or guarded optimism to open pessimism, regarding the democratic 
prospects in the continent.14 This state of democratic stagnation in Africa has heightened the 
need to examine the specific constraints confronting major political actors such as advocacy 
groups in the process of democratic consolidation - the focus of this study. 
 
                                                             
 
10 Freedom in the World Annual Reports 2011 and 2016, available at https://freedomhouse.org/.  Freedom House 
freedom ratings is an average of political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL). Rating from 1 (most free) to 7 
(least free). Ranked overall as “free” (1.1-2.5);” Partly free” (3.0-5.0) and “Not free” (5.5-7.0) (Freedom House 
2012)  
11 Various Mo Ibrahim Index Reports of African Governance, available from http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/.  
There have been a few cases of democratic breakthroughs in Africa; In Ghana (2016), Nigeria (2015) and 
Malawi (2014)-incumbent Presidents lost in the elections, while in Gambia (2016), Burkina Faso (2014) and 
Coted’Iviore (2011)-incumbents were forced out of office.  
12 Other Scholars have described these types of regimes as “frozen democracies (Rakner, 1999), “feckless 
democracies” (Carothers, 2002) “pseudo-democracies” (Diamond, 2002), “electoral autocracies” (Haynes, 2012), 
“defective democracies” (Merkel, 1999a), “illiberal democracies” (Zakaria, 1997), “delegative” (O’Donnell, 
1994), “multi-party autocracies” (Moller and Skaaning, 2013) among others 
13 See also Van de Walle (2010), O’Donnell (2010) and Diamond (2002) 
14 Specifically shifting of opinion from afro-optimism to afro-pessimism. 
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Secondly, the role of civil society and particularly popular organisations in the process 
of democratisation was accorded less attention in earlier studies, which primarily focused on 
elite predisposition and structural preconditions in explaining the dynamics of the 
democratization processes (Bermeo 1997; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Moore 1966; Lipset 
1959). As Pinkney (2003) has pointed out, most of these studies assumed that most transitions 
involved negotiations between government and opposition elites with the broader society, 
including civil society and the masses, playing a marginal role in the process.15 These studies 
emphasised “elite strategic choices” in the democratization process (Collier, 1999, p. 5). The 
focus of this study on popular organizations is, therefore, timely and brings back into political 
analysis, the role of civil society in the democratization process. Moreover, democratic survival 
has not required such structural requisites dominant in the earlier studies (Schmitter 2010; 
O’Donnell 2010). Additionally, the bulk of previous studies on democratisation in Africa 
primarily focused on the transition process with little attention paid to the process of democratic 
consolidation. Indeed, Young (1998) has pointed out the crucial need to move away from 
“initial transitional dynamics” towards evaluating other aspects of democratisation, including, 
constraints to democratic consolidation and contradictory aspects of the democratization 
process. This position, therefore, informs the focus of this study. 
Thirdly, several scholars have lamented the lack of empirical comparative research and 
case studies on democratisation in Africa (Erdmann and Simutanyi, 2003; Herbst 2001). 
Obadare (2013) for instance, has argued that democratisation studies in Africa have tended to 
be more national rather than comparative and, thereby, providing less knowledge across 
countries. Similarly, Shin (1994) has decried the shallow treatment of democratisation issues 
on the continent. This comparative study, therefore, seeks to fill in both the practical and 
theoretical knowledge gaps identified above, by using Kenya and Zambia as case studies. The 
study aims to answer two fundamental questions: “Why are advocacy groups constrained in the 
post-transitional states of Kenya and Zambia?” and “how have these constraints impacted on 
the ability of advocacy groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation in these countries?.”  
                                                             
 
15 See also O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about 
Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press. 
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The study fundamentally shifts the focus of political analysis and debate from issues of 
democratic transition to problems of democratic consolidation. It employs a combination of a 
comparative and case-oriented qualitative research methodology to give detailed insights and 
contextual relevance to the issues and countries being studied. The methodology is explained 
in detail in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
1.3. The significance of the Study 
The current study investigated and explained the constraints confronting advocacy 
groups in the post-transitional societies of Kenya and Zambia and the impact that such 
constraints have had on the ability of advocacy groups to effectively contribute to the process 
of democratic consolidation. Having midwived the process of democratic transitions, during 
the “third wave” democratisation process, there has been a growing scholarly interest and 
political attention on the power of civil society to transform the state and contribute to the 
process of democratic consolidation. Diamond (1996) has emphasised this point by asserting 
that democratic change in the developing world cannot be comprehended without reference to 
civil society. It is a political reality that cannot be wished away. This contention  is based on 
the fact that “civil society is sovereign” (Bratton 1994, p. 59) and the right of the elite to exercise 
state power depends on popular acceptance,16 a value that is “manufactured by the institutions 
of civil society.” In seeking to explain democratisation in Africa, Harbeson (1994, p 1-2) 
advances this idea by proposing that civil society enables a clearer understanding of the 
interface between society and government. Civil society, he writes, is the “missing key to 
sustained political reform, legitimate states and governments, improved governance, viable 
state-society and state-economy relationships and prevention of the kind of political decay that 
undermined the new African governments a generation ago.” Civil society groups are, 
therefore, indispensable in understanding political change and democratic sustainability in 
developing countries. 
 
 
                                                             
 
16 Popular acceptance of democratic elections is the basis of political legitimacy for a democratic government. 
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The study is also significant since it fundamentally shifts the focus of political analysis 
from issues of civil society and democratic transition, which have dominated political and 
academic discourse in the last two decades in Africa, to problems of democratic consolidation, 
which are still less studied and understood. The study, thus, broadly contributes to the growing 
comparative literature on democratisation studies in Africa and the broader research agenda of 
the relationship between civil society and democratic consolidation. It significantly advances 
our knowledge of civil society and democracy by providing a systematic and excellent in-depth 
understanding of the contingent connections between advocacy groups and the challenges of 
democratic consolidation. This kind of focus represents a critical area of research that has not 
received much attention in democratisation studies. The study could thus inform the 
experiences of advocacy groups in other democratising countries in the developing world and 
offer useful, functional guides to students of comparative democratisation, scholars, 
policymakers, local and international stakeholders, who are keen on gaining a deeper 
understanding of advocacy groups and the process of democratic consolidation in post-
transitional Africa. 
The current study is one of the few studies that systematically investigate and explain 
the constraints confronting popular organisations in the process of democratic consolidation in 
a non-western context. Most studies in this area of research are grounded in the experiences of 
Latin America, Southern, Central, and Eastern European countries.17 Africa has been less 
prominent in this literature, and the few studies, which have relevance to the African context 
have primarily focused on the democratic transition process. The present study, therefore, fills 
a significant gap in the literature of civil society and democratic consolidation by extending this 
area of investigation and debate to the African context. Although the study has an African focus, 
it is of broader relevance to developing countries that are experiencing democratic 
transformation. Specifically, this study contributes to the literature on the two embryonic sub-
disciplines of comparative politics, transitology, and consolidology, which have been in 
evolution since the beginning of the democratisation wave in Southern Europe in 1974.   
                                                             
 
17 See for example the studies by Ekiert and Foa (2017), Howard (2003), Rose (1999), Bernhard (1996), Lomax 
1997, Green (2002), Staniszkis (1999), Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1996), Bernhard and Karakoz (2007) among 
others. 
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In the end, the study helps us gain a better and more insightful understanding of the 
constraints that popular organisations face in the post-transitional dispensation in Africa and 
the effects of such constraints on their effectiveness in the process of democratic consolidation. 
This broader and more comprehensive understanding has significant benefits to advocacy 
groups, activists, scholars and development agencies involved in democracy promotion in 
Africa and other developing regions around the world. This current study is also pioneering 
research that systematically applies the concept of popular disengagement in a horizontal 
dimension to explain the constraints confronting advocacy groups in the post-transitional 
countries of Kenya and Zambia and the impact of disengagement from advocacy groups on 
their ability to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. The concept of 
disengagement has dominated explanations of state-society relations in the continent since the 
1980s as an alternative to state-centric approaches (Migdal, 1988; Azarya 1988; Rothchild and 
Chazan 1988; Azarya and Chazan, 1987) which have been criticised for failing to include 
relevant societal actors and forces, which are critical to the political process.  
Although the concept embraced civil society as a crucial player in the process of 
governance and development, democratization studies in Africa from the perspective of 
disengagement have almost exclusively focused on state-civil society relations (Baker 2001, 
Dicklitch, 1998; Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1995; Assies, 1994; Lewis 1992,) and 
ignored the fact that civil society itself, as a component of society, has its own internal dynamics 
and relations with other components of society. Barkan (1992, p. 6) has emphasized this point 
by noting that studies utilising the concept of disengagement have, “singularly neglected the 
horizontal dimension within society, i.e., the relations among the various constituent actors in 
society.” This study is, therefore, one of the first studies to systematically apply the concept of 
popular disengagement, in its horizontal dimension, as a constraint to advocacy groups and its 
effects on the ability of these groups to contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. 
The study employs social power perspective, which recognizes the variety of cross-cutting 
authorities within society with the state just being one of them (Osaghae, 1995a; Chazan, 
1988a).  
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The concept of popular disengagement has been extremely productive in analysing 
societal responses to state actions and, therefore, could as well be very productive in examining 
individuals’ responses to the actions of their own organisations in a rapidly changing political 
and socio-economic environment as a result of the process of democratisation. The current 
study thus consciously and deliberately seeks to reassert the agency of the individual to the 
center-stage of social change and political analysis in African politics. It focuses on the analysis 
of the views of the citizens and their experiences in the production of knowledge and thus 
recognizes Africans as producers of knowledge in their cultural and political context. The 
intellectual and practical focus on individuals as agencies, who make choices is crucial since 
they are the backbone of political transformation, yet several studies have tended to ignore their 
views and how they exercise agency in political and social processes. The study thus takes the 
level of analysis down to the communities and individuals, who sometimes get unnoticed and 
thus provides knowledge that respects the nuances of the local situation, connect this knowledge 
to the wider process of democratic consolidation and expands the breadth and understanding of 
the social and political expression of popular disengagement through the analysis of the 
dynamics of individual relationships with their own organizations in both Kenya and Zambia 
and how it relates to the process of democratic consolidation. Additionally, employing the 
concept of popular disengagement in a horizontal dimension broadens our understanding of 
social processes within African societies that impact governance, beyond the state and more so, 
elucidates how such processes specifically affect advocacy groups’ effectiveness in the process 
of democratic consolidation. In this specific instance, the study re-orients political analysis 
away from the more visible political processes and towards the invisible dynamics of popular 
disengagement and advocacy groups that otherwise may have a more significant impact on the 
capacity of advocacy groups to influence the process of democratic consolidation. 
The study employs an eclectic approach in the form of domestic politico-institutional 
approach, which immensely contributes to both theory and literature on civil society and 
democratisation in Africa as it emphasises the role of institutions, interests and strategic 
behavior of political actors in shaping political outcomes within specific contexts. The approach 
thus focused on domestic political factors with specific attention to structural and contingency 
dimensions. In other words, advocacy groups are constrained by the political and institutional 
environment in which they find themselves and the strategic choices that they make within such 
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an environment. The employment of this approach is significant to the study of civil society 
and democratic consolidation in several ways. Firstly, it allows for a comprehensive 
understanding of domestic considerations for democratic consolidation, such as domestic 
institutions, strategic choices of political actors and the context shaping the rules of the game 
(Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). It, thus,  focuses explicitly on political actors, who 
fundamentally and ultimately shape, the pace, and the direction of democratic progress 
(Murunga and Nasongo, 2007; Burnell, 2000; Ottaway, 1997; Remmer, 1995, Ake, 1991). 
Additionally, a concern with rules and struggles enables analysts to address a full range of other 
issues that are pertinent to constraints confronting advocacy groups in the process of democratic 
consolidation in the post-transitional dispensation in Kenya and Zambia. Secondly, the 
approach shifts the focus of analysis from concerns with preconditions and agents only driven 
explanations in studying the dynamics of civil society and democratisation to the incorporation 
of the structure into the analysis of agency, which has gained much attention in the recent past. 
The approach, thus, offers us a better chance of an in-depth understanding of the constraints 
confronting one of the major political actors in the process of democratic consolidation and how 
such constraints have impacted on their ability to effectively contribute to the process of 
democratic consolidation.  
Finally, the employment of an empirical-analytical approach with a functional 
perspective (Heinrich, 2010) to civil society in Kenya and Zambia, breaks away from the 
theoretical-normative approaches that have dominated the study of civil society in Africa.  The 
approach has several advantages over the theoretical-normative approaches. Firstly, it views 
civil society as a societal sphere and focuses on the purpose of the activity of advocacy groups 
rather than their form of organisation, which is mostly influenced by cultural and historical 
processes. It is, thus, much more realistic and practical as, it, studies, “what existing civil 
societies are doing” as opposed to “what civil society ought to do.” It examines the features of 
“real civil societies” (Alexander, 1998) as experienced on the ground, where civil society 
performs its functions. Dicklitch, (1998, p. 3) has emphasised this point by stating that, “The 
recent surge of interest in NGO activity in Africa calls for an examination of what role they 
play as opposed to what role they are expected to play in the democratisation process.” The 
empirical-analytical approach, therefore, facilitates the adoption of the concept of civil society 
to a non-western context without the perceived cultural incompatibility of the concept with non-
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western societies. Varshney (2001, p. 369-70) has asserted that in non-western societies, “the 
purpose of the activity rather than the form of the organisation should be the critical test of civic 
life.” The study thus contributes both to the current literature on civil society and comparative 
politics by employing an approach that significantly helps in understanding ‘real civil societies’ 
in Africa and the developing world in a comparative manner. 
The study adopted an innovative combination of case analysis and cross-case 
comparison in a single study, based on semi-structured personal in-depth interviews with both 
key experts and ordinary citizen respondents. This methodology has several advantages. It 
ensured the combination of both “knowledge from above,” and “knowledge from below” 
(Bienen and Herbst 1991; Dwyer and Zeilig, 2012)18 or emic perspective (Monga, 1996), 
leading to comprehensive and more in-depth coverage of the issues under study. This focus, 
therefore, contributes to a growing research agenda dissatisfied with the dominant focus of 
democratisation studies on only elites and institutions. Such top-down approaches have failed 
to capture the contribution and the relationship of local level action to the national processes of 
transformation (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; Robinson, 1994; Mainwaring, 1992). This 
study, therefore, brings back into political analysis, the influence of the local citizenry and local 
actions in the national process of change and the dynamics of the relationship between popular 
organisations and the masses, in the explanations of the constraints confronting advocacy 
groups in post-transitional countries of Kenya and Zambia. This approach is critical since less 
attention has been paid to how African people assess their own issues (Potts and Mutambira, 
1997) and articulate their concerns in their own voices.19 
The combination of case analysis and cross-case comparison in a single study is also 
considered as one of the most reliable means of drawing inferences from case studies 
(Goodrick, 2014; Smith-Hohn, 2010), leading to credible and invaluable insights from a 
comparative standpoint on the constraints confronting advocacy groups in the post-transitional 
countries of Kenya and Zambia and their impact on the ability of these groups to effectively 
contribute to the process of democratic consolidation.  
                                                             
 
18 In some democratization studies “knowledge from above” approaches are also referred to as top-down 
approaches, while knowledge from below approaches are referred as bottom-up approaches. 
19 Ordinary people in Africa are often taken as objects of study rather than subjects of study in much of 
democratisation studies. 
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The study adopted a hybrid approach to the thematic analysis in its interpretation phase 
by combining both deductive (theory-driven) and inductive (data-driven) data analysis methods. 
The deductive method relied on the study’s propositions, while the inductive method captured 
relevant data that did not fit into the framework of the propositions thus ensuring the possibility 
of refinement the theoretical framework. This approach ensured a thorough and comprehensive 
analysis and interpretation of data, thus providing a better and complete understanding of the 
constraints confronting advocacy groups in the post-transitional countries of Kenya and Zambia 
and their impact on the ability of these groups to effectively contribute to the process of 
democratic consolidation. Finally, the current study is a significant attempt to respond to 
scholars, who have lamented the lack of empirical comparative research and case studies on 
democratisation in Africa (Erdman and Simutanyi, 2003; Herbst 2001; Shin, 1994) 
1.4. The scope of the Study 
 
The scope of this study is exclusively limited to finding the correlations between the 
primary constraints confronting advocacy groups in the post-transitional countries of Kenya 
and Zambia and the impact that such constraints have on the ability of advocacy groups to 
effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation from the early 1990s to 2012. 
Several noteworthy events beyond 2012 have also been included in the analysis. The study does 
not aim to develop an overarching theory of democracy, democratisation or democratic 
consolidation. It employs domestic politico-institutional approach, which views institutions, 
interests and strategic behaviour of political actors as the main determinants of political 
outcomes within specific contexts. It thus focuses on the interplay between contingency choices 
of political actors, institutions and contextual settings. The study considers advancing change 
in the direction of democratic consolidation as the desired goal of advocacy groups and other 
political actors in the new political and institutional environment in both countries. 
The study considers objective conditions such as economic development, social 
stratification, poverty and inequality to be correlated with democratic consolidation, but 
insufficient in explaining the prospects for democratic consolidation. It, therefore, focuses on 
evaluating advocacy groups’ strategic choices, interests and mutual interactions with other 
political players under the obtaining political and institutional conditions to understand the 
principal constraints confronting these groups and the impact of such constraints on the ability 
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of these groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. The study 
utilises macro, meso and microdata in its analysis and argues that the constraints confronting 
advocacy groups in both countries are mediated by domestic, structural, cultural and economic 
factors. The study’s propositions provide its structure and further places limits on its scope. 
While appreciating the impact of external factors and actors20 on the role of advocacy groups 
in the process of democratic consolidation, the study, however,  prioritized the roles of domestic 
actors and institutions as critical drivers of the process of democratic consolidation. It contends 
that although international actors and factors played a significant role in the initiation of 
democracy in the selected cases, they only play a secondary, supportive and facilitative role in 
the process of democratic consolidation (Pinkey, 2003). Moreover, the effects of international 
factors on democratic consolidation are mediated by domestic actors. Domestic actors and 
factors, therefore, fundamentally shape the pace and direction of the process of democratic 
consolidation (Burnell, 2000; Ottaway, 1997; Remmer, 1995). 
1.5. Definitions of Major Terms and Concepts 
 
Most of the central concepts at the core of this study, such as civil society, democracy, 
and democratic consolidation among others are highly contested both in academic and 
development discourses and, therefore, subject to permanent “wars of interpretation” (Slater, 
1997, p. 385). In the end, it may not even be necessary to agree on one definition for such 
concepts. Instead, we should recognise and accept the utility of various definitions, depending 
on the context in which they are used.  What is vital is to explicitly specify the perspective and 
orientation in which a concept is employed in any study to ensure conceptual and 
methodological clarity, since empirical results of any scientific research depend on the 
definitions of concepts used (Sartori, 1970) 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
20 Such international factors include international assistance to democratic actors, democratic conditionality, 
training and capacity building of civil society actors, demonstration effects and the increasing emphasis on human 
rights and democracy promotion by international actors. 
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1.5.1. Civil Society 
 
Civil society is one of the most contested concepts in the social sciences with several 
definitions, depending on the perspective and orientation in which the concept is used. This 
study broadly conceived civil society as “the arena between the family, market, and state in 
which people associate to advance their interests” (Heinrich 2010:29). In other words, a 
distinct societal sphere in which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests 
(Anheier 2004; Schwartz and Pharr 2003; Kymlicka 2002; Bratton 1994). It is an intermediary 
space between citizens and the political system, which is populated by a multitude of voluntary 
associations, both formal and informal, representing a wide range of competing and sometimes 
conflicting interests and values. Civil society groups perform various functions in society, 
including, service delivery, monitoring government policies, ensuring public accountability and 
advocacy on behalf of their members and the public (Ibrahim and Hulme 2010; Doyle and Patel 
2008). Civil society has an organic relationship with the state as both produce similar social 
realities constructed in the public realm (Kanyinga 2009). The groups within civil society 
regularly interact with the state but are independent from it (Chazan, 1992). This point is 
emphasized by Diamond (1994, p. 15) when he writes, “Civil society must be autonomous from 
the state, but not alienated from it. It must be watchful but respectful of state authority.” 
However, it must be noted that civil society is also an arena of power relations, struggles, 
exploitation and inequality (Alagappa, 2004, Van Doepp 2000) with contradictory possibilities, 
outcomes, and conflict, which in some cases impede the process of democratization. It is a 
bedrock of heterogeneity and an “ensemble of contradictory social relations” (Shivji 1988)  
This study adopted a broad definition of civil society as outlined above for several 
reasons. Firstly, the definition is suitable for the study’s empirical-analytical framework, which 
has been explained in this chapter and which also treats civil society as a distinct public sphere 
of collective action, separate from the state, the market and the family (Deakin 2001; Linz and 
Stepan 1999). Secondly, the broader definition of civil society applies to a wide range of 
contexts, especially the African context, which is dominated by informal, unorganised social 
groups, and other less institutionalized forms of civil society formations, which institutionalized 
definitions of civil society would not fully capture. The conceptualization of civil society 
adopted for this study, is, also appropriate for a comparative study such as this, since civil 
society in both Kenya and Zambia are usually broadly defined to include Africa’s diverse 
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elements, modes and manifestations of associational life, both formal and informal, as part of 
civil society. Thirdly, the definition does not prescribe the forms of organisations which should 
qualify as civil society, a feature, which is primarily determined by historical and cultural 
processes, but instead defines organisations that belong to civil society in terms of their purpose 
(Heinrich, 2010).  
This perspective is crucial since democratic systems and processes require civil society 
primarily for purely functional reasons.21 Additionally, the adopted definition for this study is 
universal as it avoids equating civil society with a “narrow set of historical phenomena found 
principally in Western Europe, reducing it to a set of values that are culturally determined” 
(Alagappa, 2004). Obadare and Willems (2014) explicitly make this point, when they note that 
African civil society is not a replica of western models but manifest its own historical and social 
conditions. Furthermore, focussing on the nature of activities of civil society groups broadens 
the scope of civil society engagement in the process of democratic consolidation to include, 
individual citizen participation, social movements and other unorganized forms of civic 
engagements.  
 It is important to note that this study views civil society as conceptually and analytically 
distinct from political society, although, in practice, the boundary between the two societies are 
blurred as individuals frequently occupy more than one space and may at times enter and exit 
these spaces. Additionally, most civil society groups and, especially advocacy groups work 
with political parties to achieve shared goals and objectives.  The study, thus, excluded political 
parties from the sphere of civil society, since they properly belong to political society (Hann 
and Dunn 1996; Foley and Edwards, 1996; Tocqueville, 1835), which is “an arena in which the 
polity, specifically arranges itself for political contestation to gain control over public power 
and the state apparatus” (Stepan, 1988, p. 4), while civil society organisations only seek to 
influence the processes and policies of the state. Similarly, Bratton (1994) defines political 
society as the institutions through which societal actors seek to win and exercise state power. 
These institutions openly practice partisan political contestation, whereas civil society groups, 
neither seek to gain nor to exercise state power. Cohen and Arato (1992, p.x) have also captured 
                                                             
 
21 Such functions include checking state power, representing specific constituencies and interests, offering 
alternative policy perspectives and lobbying the government on policy issues among others. 
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this difference between civil and political society when they write, “The political role of civil 
society, in turn, is not directly related to the control or conquest of power, but the generation of 
influence through the life of democratic association and unconstrained discussion in the public 
cultural sphere.”  
1.5.2. Advocacy Groups 
 
Advocacy groups are broadly conceived in this study as “any organisation that seeks to 
influence government policy, but not govern” (Young and Everitt, 2004, p. 5). They are critical 
components of civil society since they are the principal means through which citizens attempt 
to influence public policy. The groups perform this function by providing channels through 
which citizens can voice their preferences, opinions, and views on a range of social, political 
and economic issues. This study deliberately and purposefully chose the term “advocacy 
groups” as opposed to the narrower term “interest groups,” which focuses solely on groups that 
seek to lobby the government to take action that specifically benefits their members. As Young 
and Everitt (2004) have noted, the term advocacy group is a broader term that includes groups 
that seek both selective and collective benefits. This distinction is important from the 
perspective of democracy since policy debates dominated by groups seeking selective benefits 
do not always advance the process of democratic consolidation.22 Moreover, most groups 
selected for this study were “public interest groups” (Berry 1977) claiming to represent the 
public interest, specifically, the advancement of democracy. 
Advocacy groups have high visibility, diversity and exhibit variations in size, agenda, 
and location. Some are membership organisations, while others are non-membership, highly 
professionalised groups with paid staff and permanent offices. The groups also operate at the 
international, national or local levels and pursue varied agenda ranging from environmental 
issues, women's rights to democratisation. Most advocacy groups also research issues linked to 
their advocacy functions. This study mainly focused on national urban-based advocacy groups 
but also included a considerable number of rural advocacy groups, which work to advance 
                                                             
 
22 Pluralists believe that the pursuit of selective benefits by competing groups produces outcomes that approximate 
the public interest, but this is only possible if we assume that all relevant interests are mobilized on equal basis 
and that the government is a neutral arbiter among the groups (Young and Everitt, 2004). This scenario is hardly 
the case in many countries. 
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democratisation in both Kenya and Zambia. The groups employ a variety of strategies and 
tactics to influence public policy, including lobbying government officials, participating in 
formal government forums such as legislative committees, and government-sponsored 
consultation fora, organising demonstrations and protests, writing petitions and engaging in 
civil disobedience among others. 
The selection of advocacy groups as opposed to other types of civil society groups as 
the focus of this study was based on several factors; Firstly, advocacy groups have the most 
substantial and direct role in the process of democratisation and public life (Bratton, 1994; Blair 
1993b). Their democratic potential is derived from their purpose in the democratisation process 
(Warren, 2001). They represent a crucial link between citizens and government and perform 
specific functions that directly support democratic institutions and the democratic process. 
These functions include extending citizens’ rights, promoting political participation and civic 
education, democratising public policy-making, election monitoring, and ensuring political 
accountability and transparency. Additionally, the groups encourage greater use of democratic 
practices among the citizens, advocate and lobby the state for specific policies connected to 
democracy, such as human rights, the rule of law and the strengthening democratic institutions. 
Advocacy groups are, therefore, considered important agents of democratisation (Gyimah-
Boadi, 2004; Diamond, 1999; Ihonvbere, 1997; Chazan, 1994a). In other words, they are the 
democratising component of civil society.   
Secondly, advocacy groups have a unique and sophisticated dualistic relationship with 
the state in their role in the democratisation process. On the one hand, they are expected to 
constructively engage the state to influence public policy-making, a process that has the risk of 
compromising their autonomy and, therefore, reducing their ability for effective representation, 
while on the other hand, they are supposed to act as a countervailing power against state power, 
which involves challenging, opposing and, in some cases, confronting the state (Diamond, 
1994). This type of relationship between advocacy groups and the state is what de Wet (2012) 
describes as being “frenemies.” Advocacy groups must thus balance both roles through trade-
offs between the institutional goals of autonomy and political engagement of influence and 
remain politically relevant, a task which is not easy in the rapidly changing political 
environment of democratization. It is a precarious balance (Foweraker, 1990) that these groups 
must strike to be effective.  
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This study, therefore, views advocacy groups as a unique brand of civil society groups, which 
are the most critical groups within civil society in the process of democratic consolidation and 
thus worth studying to understand and explain the constraints confronting non-state actors in 
the process of democratic consolidation. 
Thirdly, most advocacy groups operating in both Kenya and Zambia, have a wealth of 
experience on the democratisation, having participated in all the previous phases of the process 
since the early 1990s and increasingly becoming important in the process of democratic 
consolidation. They, therefore, offer excellent and cumulative knowledge and experiences that 
are crucial for a study such as this in understanding advocacy groups’ struggles, opportunities, 
and constraints in the process of democratisation. Fourthly, advocacy groups are inadequately 
studied alone as part of civil society, which consists of a plethora of organisations, performing 
various functions in society. The focus on a specific type of civil society group, such as 
advocacy groups, allows for a detailed and comprehensive understanding of that group 
regarding their composition, nature, organisation, content, interaction with the state and other 
significant political players and more importantly their role in the process of democratic 
consolidation. Finally, since the democratic transition in both Kenya and Zambia in the early 
1990s, the number and scope of issues related to democratisation handled by advocacy groups 
have dramatically increased, making the study of these groups essential in understanding their 
experiences and constraints in their contributions to the process of democratic consolidation. 
However, we must be cautious when studying advocacy groups and take into 
consideration the fact that civil society groups have the potential of producing a mixture of 
positive and negative consequences for democracy (Way, 2014; Diamond, 1999; Berman, 
1997; Bermeo, 1997; Mamdani, 1996). Moreover, there is no guarantee that the positives 
produced by civil society groups will always outweigh the negatives (Alagappa 2004). The 
impact of civil society groups in the process of democratisation, therefore, is contingent upon 
their willingness and capacity to support democracy, a process that is limited by cultural, 
economic, legal and political environments. Schmitter (1997, p. 247) explains the positive 
effects that civil society on democracy, but emphasizes this point when he writes, “Civil society, 
however, is not an unmitigated blessing for democracy. It can affect the consolidation and 
subsequent functioning of democracy in some negative ways.” He notes that these 
consequences may include, building a systematically biased distribution of influence into the 
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policy-making process, imposing an elaborate and opaque process of compromise in policy-
making and making the formation of majorities more difficult in cases of several civil societies 
all operating in one territory or polity.  
Additionally, some civil society groups may have the will to support democratisation 
but may lack the capacity or resources to do so (Court et al. 2006; Pollard and Court 2005; 
Makumbe, 1998). Similarly, Hirata (2002) points out that civil society organisations may not 
contribute to the process of democratisation if they lack autonomy from the state, 
accountability, transparency and internal democracy. Their involvement in partisan politics 
may reinforce the creation of a patrimonial state as happened in most African countries. 
Theories of democratic transition have also warned against the dangers of mass mobilisation by 
civil society groups during the transition process (Karl and Schmmiter, 1991). Berman (1997) 
for instance, has demonstrated in her study of Weimar Germany, how a strong civil society 
contributed to the collapse of democracy, leading to the takeover of the country by Nazism. She 
argues that in the context of weak national institutions, the associational activity may enhance 
societal fragmentation, which can undermine the legitimacy of national political institutions 
and democratic development. Additionally, in a recent study, Berman (2003, p. 263) 
demonstrates how the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt triggered a process of 
Islamization “from below” and promoted sharia as the law of the land, therefore, undermining 
the development of democracy.  
Similarly, Ndegwa (1996, p.110) in his study of democratisation and NGOs in Kenya 
found that there is no necessary connection between NGO activity and democratic struggles. 
He concludes that “civil society is not necessarily predisposed to challenging and democratising 
the African state” and asserts that not all organisations within civil society choose to confront 
the state for democratisation purposes, even if they have the potential to do so. Chandhoke 
(1995, p.9) also concludes that “the existence of civil society does not necessarily mean that it 
will always challenge the state, or that it will transgress the boundaries of the political as 
constructed by the state.” The role of civil society in the process of democratisation is, therefore, 
contingent upon many factors, including the role of the state and available political 
opportunities. This study, therefore, adopted a balanced and critical view of the role of advocacy 
groups in the process of democratic consolidation in both Kenya and Zambia in the post-
transitional political and institutional environment. 
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1.5.3. Democracy 
 
Democracy is a contested concept, and scholars, therefore, have to decide on the best 
definition for their purpose and context. On the first level, studies either adopt a procedural 
(Przeworski, 2003; Schumpeter, 1962) or a substantive definition and on the second level, such 
definitions have to either view the concept of democracy as a dichotomous or a continuous 
variable.23The most popular empirical and thicker “process-oriented” definition of democracy 
in political science is offered by Robert Dahl (1971), who defines democracy as a system of 
government, which meets three necessary conditions. Firstly, there must be political 
contestation through free, fair, regular, competitive and meaningful elections for all effective 
positions of government. Secondly, there needs to be an inclusive level of political participation 
in the selection of leaders and policies. In other words, all adults must have an equal right to 
vote and run for political office. Finally, there must be a guarantee of civil liberties and political 
rights, which include the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of the press and 
freedom to form and join organisations such as political parties and civil society groups. A 
democratic country must also have diverse sources of information protected by law, and 
government policies must depend on votes and other expressions of preferences.  
Dahl acknowledges that democracy as a concept is an ideal-type and hardly attainable 
in contemporary societies and, therefore, refers to regimes that meet the above characteristics 
as “polyarchies” (Dahl 1971, p. 8), that is, the real world representation of democracy. Although 
scholars widely use Dahl’s definition of democracy, Ake (2000, p. 10, 1996b) has argued that 
it is a liberal conceptualization of democracy, which emphasizes institutional guarantees, 
focused on individual rather than group claims and replaces government by the people with 
government based on the consent of the people and, therefore, does not apply to the African 
context. As Eboh (1990) has argued, democracy is culturally relative and varies from one 
society to another. Although democratic ideals such as liberty, equality, justice, freedom, the 
rule of law and accountability are universal, democratic practice differs with cultural and 
political societies (Fayemi 2009; Eboh 1990). From that line of argument, Mafeje (2002) has 
                                                             
 
23 Most measures of democracy including the Freedom House Freedom Rating and Democracy Index by the 
Economic Intelligence Unit both view democracy as a continuous variable with varying degrees of democracy 
obtaining in different countries. 
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noted that liberal democracy is a political system and culture that is a product of western 
civilization and unsuitable for the African continent, since it negates humanistic morality based 
on human dignity, equality and liberty and elevates market morality, based on individual 
freedom such as legal and property rights. 
Ake (1996a) believes that genuine democracy in Africa has close affinities to Dahl’s 
conceptualization of democracy, but quite different. He offers a conceptualization of democracy 
which has four key characteristics; Firstly, it is a social democracy, which emphasizes the 
concrete political, social and economic rights of the African people as opposed to a liberal 
democracy, that emphasizes abstract political rights. It is a democracy that invests heavily in 
the improvement of people’s health, education and capacity for democratic citizenship. Ake 
(1990, p. 2) argues that democracy is a sine-qua-non for development in Africa since there is a 
causal relationship between democracy and development. He writes, “There is a definite 
correlation between the lack of democratic practices in African politics and the deteriorating 
economic conditions.24 If governments are not accountable to the people they govern, then they 
are very likely to engage in socio-economic practices which are not responsive to people’s 
needs.” 
 Similarly, it must be noted that the high levels of poverty, inequality and poor standards 
of living primarily drove the demand for democratic change in Africa (Adejumobi, 2002; 
Abrahamsen 2000, Widner 1994) and, therefore, the new democratic governments were first 
and foremost expected by citizens to address economic growth and redistribution of 
development dividends. This point is also emphasized by Wambia-dia-Wamba (1990), who 
argues that democracy in Africa must be viewed as a process of emancipation and meeting the 
needs of the people. Similarly, Ademola (2009) echoes the same point when he argues that 
democracy in Africa must focus on the collective well-being of Africans and instead of equating 
development to modernisation, it should promote shared material and non-material benefits, 
mutual trust, citizen participation in decision making and public accountability. 
 
                                                             
 
24 The causal relationship between democracy and development is debatable and there is no consensus among 
scholars on the same. 
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 Secondly, people must have real decision-making power, beyond the formal consent 
through regular elections. It is a type of democracy with a powerful legislature, judiciary and 
decentralization of power to local democratic formations of governance, where people can 
genuinely participate in governance and decision-making process. Thirdly, it is a kind of 
democracy that must emphasize both individual and collective rights. This perspective is in line 
with most African cultures, which emphasize collective rights, but also recognize individual 
rights. Finally, it is a type of democracy of incorporation, that engenders an inclusive level of 
political participation, equitable access to state resources and ensures special representation in 
the legislatures of mass organizations and marginal groups. 
This study adopted Ake’s conceptualization of democracy since it is the most 
appropriate conceptualization of democracy in Africa for several reasons. Firstly, it is 
substantive and, therefore, appropriate to employ in comparatively evaluating the level of 
democratic consolidation in both Kenya and Zambia. Secondly, it views democracy as a 
continuous variable with the possibility of varying degrees of democracy, which is in line with 
most measures of democracy.25 It must be noted that most African countries such as Kenya and 
Zambia are still undergoing the process of democratic consolidation and, therefore, 
approximate democracy to varying degrees. Moreover, procedural definitions of democracy 
leave little room for analysis of civil society, associational life, social and political struggles 
(Grugel 1999), which are central in Ake’s conceptualization of democracy. Thirdly, it must be 
noted that democratic transitions in Africa in the early 1990s were sold to the people as a process 
that would usher in a type of governance driven by the citizens with the goals of achieving 
social, political and economic needs and expectations of the African people. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
25 Most measures of democracy such as the Freedom House’s Freedom Rating and Democracy Index both view 
democracy as a continuous variable with varying degrees of democracy obtaining in different countries. 
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1.5.4. Pre-Transition, Political Liberalisation, and Democratic Transition 
 
Bratton (1994) has noted that the democratization process occurs in at least four phases, 
which include the pre-transition period, political liberalisation, democratic transition and 
finally, democratic consolidation. He describes the pre-transition as the period in which the 
authoritarian regime is consolidated and faces no significant political challenge. In this phase, 
the regime is in firm control of all political processes and opposition political parties are banned. 
Civil society organisations still exist but are too weak to pose any serious challenge to the 
regime (Cohen and Arato, 1992). This period is also characterised by increasing internal 
pressure on the regime by moderates and international actors outside of government, for reform 
or replacement of the existing system (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). The increasing pressure 
by both domestic and international actors may lead to political liberalisation, which involves 
the authoritarian regime easing up repression and granting citizens some civil liberties and 
political rights, which were previously denied (Mainwaring, 1989). Shin (1994) views this 
process as the decay of authoritarian rule, characterised by uncertainty and unpredictability. It 
may occur due to progressive factions that split state elites (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 
17), the need for the authoritarian regime to relax social terms and broaden the social base of 
ruling elites to strengthen its position (Przeworski, 1991, p. 57) or a response to heightened 
social, political and economic protests and international pressure (Bratton and Van de Walle, 
1997; Cohen and Arato, 1992). Political liberalisation does not necessarily lead to 
democratisation. 
Bratton (1994, p. 10) defines political transition as “the interval between one political 
regime and another” and argues that the critical moment is when the incumbent regime agrees 
to change the rules of political competition to allow for multi-party politics, while O’Donnell 
and Schmitter (1986, p.11-12) argue that democratic transition, begins “at the moment that 
authoritarian rulers announce their intentions to extend significantly, the sphere of protected 
individual and group rights, and are believed” and ends with the “the installation of a 
government chosen on the basis of one competitive election, as long as that election is freely 
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conducted within the matrix of civil liberties and that all the contestants accept the validity of 
the election results”26 (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997, p.13) 
This study, therefore, conceived democratic transition as the process of “moving from 
a non-democratic regime to one that makes significant steps, which the general public accepts 
as real, towards extending rights of all citizens” (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p.10). The 
period is characterised by high levels of uncertainty with no well-delineated interests by 
political actors. In this phase, political elites are not sure of the “identity, resources and 
intentions of those whom they are playing in the transition game” (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 
1986, p. 66) and wrestle with the process and the details of establishing the rules of contestation 
of state power through competitive elections. Political society becomes crucial as political 
parties prepare for competitive elections. The process moves through the negotiation of a new 
system of government and, if successful, ends up with the establishment of a new government 
elected through free and fair elections.  
However, scholars have differed regarding the role of civil society during the political 
transition. While some scholars view the role of civil society as less important during this period 
as political parties take over most political activities and governance issues (O’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986), others view the continued civil society mobilisation as significant in 
pressuring politicians to negotiate and respect the outcomes of such negotiations (Bermeo 1997; 
Collier and Mahoney 1996).  Bratton (1994), for instance, argues that the role of civil society 
becomes more neutral than partisan as they carry out roles such as civic education, electoral 
monitoring, and arbitration between contending political parties. Bermeo (1997) on the other 
hand, has demonstrated that persistent protests keep the transitions moving forward and 
broadens the arena for the democratisation process, a position that supports the cases of 
transitions in most African countries in the early 1990s, where the continued civil society 
mobilization, i.e. democratization from below, gave momentum to the transition negotiations. 
It, is, therefore, crucial to acknowledge the role of popular organizations in the process of 
democratic transition and consolidation in Africa. 
 
                                                             
 
26 In practice this is not necessarily the case. There have been several “partial transitions” in Africa, where the 
regime ends up dealing with both issues of transition and consolidation. 
26 
 
1.5.5. Democratic Consolidation 
 
The concept of democratic consolidation27is central to this study and thus need 
clarification in the way it is used. There are contentious debates in both academic and 
development discourses on what constitutes a consolidated democracy with no clear consensus, 
(Gunther et al. 1995) leading to a variety of definitions and perspectives. The definition of 
democratic consolidation, therefore, highly depends on the perception of the evaluator 
(Encarnacion, 2000). Maximalists definitions tend to include a wide range of requirements 
(Ozbudun 2000), while minimalist’s definitions tend to be oversimplified. According to Bratton 
(1994), democratic consolidation begins when a new government is installed through free and 
fair elections following the collapse of a non-democratic regime. However, it must be noted 
that there is no guarantee that such regimes will progress towards a consolidated democracy. A 
democracy can persist without being consolidated (O’Donnell, 1996), stagnate or progress 
towards consolidation. Moreover, a democratic transition can temporarily overlap with 
democratic consolidation (Gunther et al., 1995, p. 3), a situation, which has been experienced 
in most African countries, which went through “partial democratic transitions” during the “third 
wave” democratisation process. 
Andreas Schedler (1998, p. 92) has advised that one of the best ways to define 
democratic consolidation is to consider “the concrete realities as well as the practical tasks that 
the term is meant to address.” In other words, combine empirical viewpoints and normative 
horizons. The meaning of democratic consolidation, therefore, varies with context, and the 
goals that democracy is supposed to achieve, which depending on each country’s unique 
starting point. In the case of Kenya and Zambia,28 the goal of democratic consolidation is 
progress towards democratic completion or the attainment of full democratic rule. As outlined 
in the conceptualization of democracy in Africa in this chapter, the goals of democracy in the 
African context includes, the achievement of concrete political, social and economic rights, 
through massive investment in the improvement of people’s health, education and capacity for 
                                                             
 
27 Other terms that are synonyms to democratic consolidation include habituation (Rustow, 1970) and 
internalization (Whitehead, 1989) 
28 The two countries hold relatively free and fair competitive elections, have competitive multi-party-political 
systems, universal adult suffrage and significant public access of major political parties to the electorate. 
However, the countries fail to fulfil other features that are essential to democracy such as upholding civil 
liberties and political rights. 
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democratic citizenship since African contemporary economic problems constitute a serious 
impediment to the institutionalization of democracy (Ademola, 2009). Although there is no 
consensus on the positive link between economic growth and the prospects for democratization, 
scholars generally agree that economic growth contributes to democratic consolidation 
(Diamond 1999; Huntington 1993). Democratic consolidation also involves the creation of 
viable, legitimate and democratic institutions such as regular, free, fair and transparent 
elections, the growth of civil society and the establishment of effective legislatures among 
others, to ensure an inclusive level of political participation and equitable access to state 
resources. Additionally, democratic consolidation must also ensure the decentralization of 
power to local level institutions so that people can have real decision-making power through 
these units. Finally, the goal of democratic consolidation in Africa must be to ensure the 
achievement of both collective and individual rights, which underpin the African socio-
economic culture and development. 
Linz and Stepan (1996a, p. 5), holds that a consolidated democracy is one in which 
“democracy is the only game in town.”  In other words, no significant force is working to take 
over power or secede through unconstitutional means and all political forces within the state 
are accustomed to resolving conflicts through laws and the institutions of democracy. The 
authors argue that “democracy becomes routinized and deeply internalized in social, 
institutional and psychological life as well as political calculations for achieving success” (p. 
16). It is a gradual process that leads to democratic practices being firmly established and 
accepted by most relevant actors in society (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). Linz and Stepan 
(1996a) conceptualization of a consolidated democracy is composed of three major dimensions. 
Firstly, the behavioral dimension, which means that no significant actors spend significant 
resources “attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a non-democratic regime or 
turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede from the state’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996a, 
p. 6). Secondly, the attitudinal dimension, which means that a vast majority of public opinion 
regards the democratic procedures and institutions as the most appropriate ones to govern 
society. Political actors perceive these institutions as part of “normal order of things, and social 
relations become social structures” (Schmitter 1988, p. 10).  
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Finally, there is a constitutional dimension, where both governmental and non-
governmental forces become habituated to the resolution of conflicts within the democratic 
procedures and laws (Linz and Stepan 1996a, p. 6). This dimension also means the construction 
of democratic institutions, which include forms of government, political parties, and party 
systems, electoral systems, a guarantee of civil liberties and political rights, legislative bodies, 
state bureaucracy and systems of interest mediation. The authors argue that for the three 
dimensions of democratic consolidation to combine and guarantee democratic status as “the 
only game in town,” five arenas must fulfill specific needs and reinforce one another. These 
include civil society, political society, the rule of law, state apparatus and economic society 
(Linz and Stepan 1996a, p. 7-15). However, it must be noted that democracies are not supposed 
to be completely consolidated in that their rules should institutionalise a degree of “bounded 
uncertainty” and “contingent consent” (Schmitter, 2008, p. 7). Moreover, democratic 
consolidation is reversible and imperfect democracies that are not fully and formally 
institutionalized can endure (O’Donnell 1996)  
1.5.6. Democratisation 
 
The concept of democratisation can be conceived as a roadmap towards democracy that 
involves at least four phases of a single long, unpredictable and complex process. These phases 
are conceptually distinct and include pre-transition, political liberalisation, democratic 
transition and finally, democratic consolidation as explained earlier on in this chapter. However, 
it must be noted that these phases of democratization have neither clear-cut distinctions nor 
linear in practice, but do overlap in most cases. Democratisation is thus the movement from a 
non-democratic regime towards a democratic one. This process is established through the 
expansion of political contestation, civil and political liberties, improvement of citizen social 
and economic conditions and citizen participation in the political process. More specifically, 
O’Donnell and Schmitter, (1986, p. 8) define democratisation as “the process, whereby the rules 
of procedures of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by 
other principles or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and 
obligations or extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen 
participation.” This study adopted the above definition because of its specificity and inclusivity. 
It neatly captures what is otherwise in practice, a complex process that involves the interaction 
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of various actors in all the four phases of the process and the effect of structural factors, elite 
strategic choices, and social, economic and political processes. The argument in favour of 
democratisation is that the dynamic of competitive multi-party elections and guarantee of civil 
liberties and political rights leads to political accountability, and transparency and thus the 
likelihood of good governance and prospects for economic development. 
1.6. Limitations of the Study 
 
The limitations of this study emanated from numerous sources and processes, which 
included the level of funding and the time limits for the study, case selection, data collection 
and analysis and the utility of the research findings. Due to the limited funding and the 
timeframe within which the study was to be conducted, it was not possible to carry out a full 
random selection of respondents for the in-depth personal interviews, using a sampling frame 
based on Census data for the two case studies. The researcher, therefore, relied on purposive 
sampling methods as explained in the methodology section of this dissertation. These types of 
sampling methods are easy to conduct and produce as many likely results as probability 
sampling methods (Buck, 2011; Cumming, 1990). Limitations of funding also affected the 
number, geographical coverage and type of respondents interviewed. However, the researcher 
made every effort to obtain a representative sample that reflected the range of stakeholders and 
views on issues of advocacy groups and democratic consolidation in the selected countries.  
Regarding the case selection, the researcher systematically selected the two cases using 
a theory-driven small-N research process with the primary goal of maximising contrast. The 
study thus applied the “Most Different Systems Design (MDSD)”29 as a case selection process 
based on the differences of civil society formations in Kenya and Zambia and a range of other 
contemporary social, political and economic variables. Selection of more cases would have 
yielded different results and possibly led to different conclusions with different levels of 
generalisation of results. Data collection processes posed several limitations associated with the 
use of semi-structured in-depth interviews as an instrument of data collection. Selection of key 
expert respondents was relatively skewed towards urban-based advocacy groups located in the 
capital cities of both countries. However, this focus was critical for the urban environment is 
                                                             
 
29 See Przeworski and Teune’s (1970) The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: Wiley 
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the “the bedrock of democracy and citizenship”(Isin 2000) and centres of political activism, 
where agitation for political change usually begin.  
Additionally, most national advocacy groups were located in the urban areas, where 
they were easy to access in both countries. Nevertheless, for purposes of representativeness of 
the study, the researcher interviewed a considerable number of advocacy group leaders and 
ordinary citizens from the rural areas in both countries. There was also the cumbersome 
bureaucratic procedure that was needed to obtain permission to conduct fieldwork research in 
Zambia, which took some time before the actual fieldwork could commence. Other limitations 
with data collection processes involved non-responses from some potential interviewees, 
despite numerous follow-ups, unavailability of respondents, inability to turn up for the 
interviews, while some potential respondents flatly refused to be interviewed. None responses 
were mostly experienced with international donor representatives in both Kenya and Zambia, 
who felt that some of the interview questions were politically “sensitive” to their organisations’ 
interests. Additionally, most international donor representatives asked for the interview guide 
well-in-advance of the face-to-face interviews and restricted their responses to the official 
positions of their organisations, while a few others differentiated their individual opinions from 
institutional positions during the interviews. However, for an interview that failed to take place 
due to any of the reasons mentioned above, the researcher found replacements as soon as was 
possible through snowballing sampling. 
 Flexibility in the interview timetable was critical and helped limit delays, cancellations, 
and other scheduling constraints. To ensure accuracy and to minimize the effects of various 
problems associated with data collected through face-to-face in-depth personal interviews,30 the 
researcher conducted rigorous cross-checking and verification of the data gathered to seal the 
gaps, factual inaccuracies and contradictions that may have been in the data. This process took 
place during the fieldwork, and any corrections and verifications made immediately after the 
interviews were conducted. Other efforts employed by the researcher to mitigate the limitations 
of data collection methods, included the design of the interview questions, which were 
                                                             
 
30 Bernard (2006) has identified five general problems inherent in face to face personal in-depth interviews that 
include respondents telling the interviewer what they believed happened rather than what they observed, distorted 
recollection of what happened due to personal prejudices, incorrectly recalling what happened, attempting to 
answer questions they are not qualified to answer to appear relevant and simply lying to mislead the interviewer. 
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standardized and neutral for consistency across the board with only a few changes made to 
target specific groups of respondents such as international donors. The interviews were also 
mostly conducted in the interviewees’ offices, homes, and restaurants, where they were most 
comfortable. The researcher maintained a neutral position regardless of the respondents’ 
ideological leanings and ensured reliability by clearly outlining procedures and processes 
involved in the research process since the quality of comparative qualitative research heavily 
depends on the individual researcher’s range of skills and experience. The researcher took a 
master’s level course on research methods and analysis at City, University of London, besides 
having a solid background in research methods from both undergraduate and graduate levels 
and over ten years of practical fieldwork experience in Africa. All these undertakings provided 
the researcher with the capacity to conduct credible fieldwork research, integrate convergent 
and divergent evidence and critically make sense of evidence and present coherent arguments.  
Regarding data analysis, the study employed a hybrid thematic analysis, which may 
sometimes miss nuanced data (Guest and McQueen, 2012) - a shortcoming whose effect was 
reduced in this study through continuous reading and re-reading of data in the process of data 
analysis. Secondly, because of the nature of doctoral research study, the data were coded, and 
themes identified only by the researcher. However, the analysis was widely discussed with both 
supervisors and their comments, insights, and suggestions used to improve the quality of the 
study. Thirdly, the flexibility of thematic analysis requires that the researcher decides what 
aspects of the data to focus on and which ones to leave out (Braun and Clarke, 2006). However, 
this was not a serious problem for this study since most of the codes were derived from the 
research questions and the theoretical framework, while other codes were generated from the 
data.  
Finally, there were limitations on the level of the utility of research findings. All cases 
are unique and, case studies are valuable since they produce content-dependent knowledge. 
However, the results of the two cases are relatively more generalisable only within the cases 
and to a reasonable extent some African countries with similar social, economic and political 
experiences. Considering the diversity of the continent, sweeping generalisations about the 
constraints confronting advocacy groups and the impact of such constraints on their ability to 
effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation would be misleading. 
Therefore, statements about the implications of the study’s findings beyond the two cases, have 
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to be approached with caution. However, conclusions from this study undoubtedly shed light 
and insights into the dilemmas and constraints confronting advocacy groups in most post-
transitional African states and can inform debates about the problems of democratic 
consolidation. The analytical generalisation is potentially possible since the case study is 
generalisable to the theoretical propositions that were used for the study (Yin, 2014).  If the 
results are shown to support the theory, replication can be claimed. 
1.7. Structure of the dissertation 
 
The overall structure of this dissertation takes the form of seven chapters, including this 
introductory chapter. Chapter 2 is divided into two sections. The first section critically reviews 
the essential literature on the relationship between civil society and democratic consolidation. 
In this task, the chapter reviews the various perspectives on the role of civil society in the 
process of democratization. The chapter advances the argument that there is a positive 
correlation between civil society and democratic consolidation. This section also delves into 
the debate on how best to study civil society in Africa and suggests the employment of an 
empirical-analytical approach as the most effective way of studying “real civil societies” on the 
continent. This approach views civil society as a societal sphere and focuses on the purpose of 
the activity of civil society groups rather than their form of organization.  
The second section of this chapter lays out a detailed overview of the theoretical 
framework, which includes the study’s theoretical approach, the research questions and 
propositions  The section explains the role of the theoretical framework and discusses the 
suitability of the domestic politico-institutional approach for this study and how it guides the 
study in investigating the constraints confronting advocacy groups and their impact on the 
ability of these groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. 
Finally, the section outlines the primary research questions, distills the propositions and 
elaborates on the main arguments of the specific theories that informed each of the propositions 
as they relate to the constraints confronting advocacy groups in the post-transitional political 
and institutional environment in both countries. Chapter 3 presents a comprehensive overview 
of the research design of the comparative study, describes and explains the methods and 
processes used in this investigation. The chapter discusses the rationale and the suitability of 
the comparative and case-oriented qualitative research design as employed by this study.  
33 
 
The second section is dedicated to explaining the case selection, instrumentation, sampling and 
sample size, data collection procedures, data analysis, and interpretation. The chapter concludes 
with a brief discussion of the ethical issues related to this study.  
Together, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present the empirical findings, analysis, and interpretation 
of the primary constraints confronting advocacy groups in Kenya and Zambia and their impact 
on the ability of these groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation. Chapter 4 discusses both the opportunities and constraints confronting advocacy 
groups in the new political environment emanating from the dynamics of the new political and 
institutional context, the strategic choices, interests, behaviour, and interaction of advocacy 
groups with other principal political actors in the process of democratic consolidation. It begins 
by examining the opportunities for advocacy groups brought about by the democratic 
transitions, which have led to relatively open civic spaces, improved civil liberties, and political 
rights, and the establishment of legitimate opposition political parties among others. The 
chapter, then provides an in-depth analysis of the constraints confronting advocacy groups in 
the new political environment in both countries, which have created a three-fold dilemma for 
these groups; re-defining their role in the new political dispensation, crafting new tactics and 
strategies for articulating demands for democratic consolidation and developing a new 
constructive relationship with the new democratic state and other principal political actors such 
as political parties and international donors. The chapter concludes by discussing the 
implications of these findings on the ability of advocacy groups to effectively contribute to the 
process of democratic consolidation.  
Chapter 5 turns the focus of analysis to the primary strategies employed by the newly 
democratic states to deliberately control and restrict the activities of advocacy groups and their 
impact on the ability of these groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation. These strategies include co-optation, the use of NGO legislation, political 
appropriation, selective harassment, and political propaganda. The chapter concludes by 
discussing the implications of these findings on the ability of advocacy groups to effectively 
contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in both countries. Chapter 6 then shifts 
the focus of analysis to the relationship between advocacy groups and their members and 
supporters. The chapter argues that a combination of macro, meso and micro factors related to 
advocacy groups explain the process of popular disengagement from advocacy groups, which 
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is a significant constraint to these groups ability to effectively contribute to the process of 
democratic consolidation. The chapter examines the nature, pattern, forms, and significance of 
popular disengagement from advocacy groups to the process of democratic consolidation in 
both countries and concludes by discussing the implications of popular disengagement to the 
ability of advocacy groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. 
Finally, Chapter 7 draws upon the entire dissertation and summarises the most pertinent results 
that emerge from the study’s two-fold aim of investigating and critically examining the 
constraints confronting advocacy groups in the post-transitional countries of Kenya and Zambia 
and the effects of such constraints on the ability of these groups ability to effectively contribute 
to the process of democratic consolidation. The findings of this study draw on, refines and in 
some instances challenge some arguments advanced in the broader literature on advocacy 
groups and the democratization process. The chapter concludes with suggestions for further 
research on advocacy groups and the process of democratic consolidation in Africa and other 
developing countries. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The concept of civil society has become popular in both academic and development 
discourses for the past three decades. The renewed resurgence of interest and the rapid rise and 
the prominence of the notion of civil society is closely associated with the end of the cold war 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, events which triggered a massive wave 
of protests and demonstrations for democratisation across East and Central Europe. By the late 
1980s, the “third wave” (Huntington 1991) had spread across Africa led by a constellation of 
social movements and civil society organisations, which were part of the pro-democracy 
movements calling for pluralism and democratisation in the continent. Civil society was, 
therefore, regarded as the key to the democratisation process and regained prominence in that 
regard. African countries experiencing democratisation at this time did not exhibit any of the 
structural conditions or “pre-requisites” for the process of democratization as advocated by the 
dominant modernisation theories, leading scholars to explain the “third wave” democratisation 
in Africa using actor-oriented approaches. These approaches further gave civil society a 
prominent role in the process of democratisation (Young, 1999; Bratton, 1994; Shin, 1994; 
Huntington, 1991; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986) and arguably the most powerful concept 
associated with the democratisation process in the continent. Although most contemporary 
studies on democratization and civil society generally assume a positive and causal relationship 
between the two concepts, the relationship remains contentious. 
This chapter explores the debate on the relationship between civil society and 
democracy and provides a detailed theoretical framework for the study. The chapter is divided 
into two sections; the literature review and the theoretical framework. The goal of the literature 
review here is two-fold. Firstly, it critically reviews the essential literature on the relationship 
between civil society and democratic consolidation and specifically focuses on the various 
perspectives on the role of civil society in the process of democratisation. The chapter advances 
the position that there is a positive relationship between civil society and democratic 
consolidation. Secondly, the chapter delves into the discussion on the best way to study civil 
society in Africa and advances an empirical-analytical approach as the most effective way of 
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studying “real civil societies” in the continent. The second section of this chapter lays out the 
theoretical framework, which provides the structure for the study. It explains the main 
theoretical approach to the study, outlines the research questions, distills the research 
propositions and elaborates on the main arguments of the specific theories that inform each of 
the propositions about the constraints confronting advocacy groups in the post-transitional 
countries of Kenya and Zambia. 
2.2. Civil Society and democratic consolidation 
 
Most contemporary studies of civil society and democratisation assume the 
democratising potential of a vibrant civil society and thus view it as a positive influence in the 
process of democratic consolidation without much interrogation and more in-depth analysis. 
Despite such assumptions, the causal link between civil society and the democratisation process 
is not an obvious and conclusive one. It is both a complicated and contested relationship with 
scholars taking different positions on the same. Although there are many useful models in civil 
society literature, which examines the role of civil society in the process of democratization, 
this study adopted the categorisation advanced by Forbrig (2002), which is particularly 
instructive and useful as it categorises the roles of civil society in the process of democratisation 
broadly and by functions linked to democratic consolidation. Its functionalist approach fits well 
with the empirical-analytical approach adopted for this study to examine the constraints 
confronting advocacy groups in both Kenya and Zambia. At the core of this model is the fact 
that the role of civil society in the process of democratic consolidation is based on the specific 
functions that these groups perform to support the democratization process.  
Forbrig’s model categorises civil society roles that support democratisation into five 
significant functions; control of state power, interest mediation, social integration, political 
socialisation, and political leverage. Equally important are the voices of sceptics, who remain 
unconvinced about the causal link between civil society and the process of democratisation. It 
is important to note that scholars who subscribe to the notion that civil society promotes 
democratisation, emphasise that only a vibrant and robust civil society can promote 
democratisation (Ibrahim, 2015; Arato, 2000; Diamond, 1994).  Linz and Stepan (1996a) for 
instance, specify that “the development of a free and lively civil society” is the first necessary 
condition for democratic consolidation. Such a civil society must also have “a necessary degree 
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of independence and autonomy. “Similarly, Tocqueville (1835) emphasises the numerical 
density, self-regulation, and autonomy as necessary characteristics of such a civil society, while 
Putnam (1993) supports the view that the density of civil society is significant for democratic 
development. Diamond (1999) has, therefore, attempted to explain what a “vibrant civil 
society” that would promote democratic consolidation means. He argues that this type of civil 
society meets certain criteria besides its density of associational life. Firstly, it must respect and 
practice democratic tenets, such as transparency, accountability, deliberation, participation, and 
internal democracy. Secondly, the goals and methods of such a civil society must not contain 
“maximalist uncompromising, interest groups or groups with undemocratic goals and methods” 
(Diamond, 1999, p. 228). Thirdly, such a civil society must demonstrate a higher level of 
institutionalisation with the attributes of autonomy from forces outside the organisation, the 
coherence of purpose, and the complexity of organisations. Finally, pluralism must exist both 
within organisations and in the civil society sphere. For Diamond (1994), “a vibrant civil society 
is probably more essential for consolidating and maintaining democracy than initiating it .”  
Additionally, Bratton (1994), has also argued that civil society can play a significant 
role in democratic consolidation only if it is independent, resourceful, well organised and 
ideologically focused. For these scholars, the more developed the institutions of civil society, 
the high chances that they will support democratic consolidation (Arato, 2000). A “vibrant and 
robust” civil society is, therefore, a necessary but insufficient condition for democratic 
consolidation, (Ibrahim, 2015; Linz and Stepan, 1996a; Leyachi 1995; Diamond 1994, 1999; 
Putnam, 2000; Arato, 2000) especially in transitional democracies such as those of Kenya and 
Zambia. It is also important to note that civil society groups’ role in the process of 
democratization is contingent upon several factors, which include; political opportunities, the 
type of regime, the stage of democratisation, and the strength of political society among others.  
The next section of this Chapter discusses the five categories of functions of civil society that 
support democratic consolidation as outlined by Forbrig (2002). 
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2.2.1. The Lockean Function: Control of State power 
 
Liberal scholars consider civil society organizations as vehicles through which citizens 
can challenge the excesses of the state. Civil society groups are, therefore, a crucial 
counterweight to state power. In other words, a bulwark against unbridled state power. Liberals 
consider this function as the most critical function of civil society in modern democracy as it 
relates to the control of the state by society.  Huntington (1984, p.204) has emphasized this 
point by noting that civil society provides “the basis for the limitation of state power, hence for 
the control of the state by society, and hence for democratic political institutions as the most 
effective means of exercising that control.” Similarly, Chazan (1996, p. 282) argues that the 
nurturing of civil society is widely perceived as the most effective means of controlling repeated 
abuses of state power, holding rulers accountable to their citizens and establishing the 
foundation for durable democratic government. In the same liberal tradition, Diamond (1994) 
defines the role of civil society as that of “containing the power of democratic governments, 
checking their potential for abuse and violation of the law and subjecting them to public 
scrutiny.” Overall, civil society groups, therefore, check, monitor and restrain the exercise of 
state power. 
Civil society groups also help guarantee transparency and political accountability, 
virtues that are regarded as the “distinctive hallmark of democracy” (Blair 1993b, p. 7) and can 
force governments to engage in democratic institutional reforms, that create institutions that are 
responsive to the needs of the citizens (Diamond, 1999; Ferguson, 1996;  Bratton 1994). 
Additionally, institutions of civil society protect individual civil liberties and political rights, 
the rule of law and the democratic procedure. The groups provide information to the public and 
may at times mobilise the public through protests and demonstrations to support or oppose 
public or political decisions to achieve the role of restraining state power (Forbrig, 2002). 
Scholars such as Alexis de Tocqueville believe that an independent and well-organised civil 
society is capable of counter-balancing state power and thus ensuring public accountability, 
which is crucial for democratic consolidation. Ndegwa (1996) has characterised this role of 
civil society as “civil society liberalisation thesis,” emphasising the centrality of civil society 
institutions in opposing undemocratic states and at the same time fostering democratisation. 
 
 
50 
 
2.2.2. The Hegelian Function: Interest mediation 
 
The Hegelian function emphasizes civil society role in the process of democratic 
consolidation through structuring various channels for interest aggregation, articulation, 
representation, and mediation, which are critical processes in democratic decision-making. As 
organised groups, they participate in the policy-making process by mediating and representing 
various competing and sometimes conflicting social interests, values, beliefs, norms and 
sectors, especially the poor and marginalised groups, such as women and the youth (Forbrig, 
2002; Diamond, 1999). This role is expected to complement the role of representation by 
political parties and other democratic institutions. With the diminishing capacity of political 
parties to effectively play the role of representation both in the West and the developing 
countries (Manim, 1997), civil society groups role in interests’ aggregation, articulation and 
representation become more critical for the process of democratic consolidation. Additionally, 
civil society groups provide spaces, places, and platforms for democratic deliberations of 
competing and conflicting interests of various social groups and individuals (Diamond, 1999) 
and thus improve the democratic spirit of tolerance, deliberation, and participation. These 
actions go a long way into improving political and social equality, ensuring responsive 
governments and the legitimacy of the democratic process and system (Waylen, 1994). 
However, the representative claim by civil society groups and specifically advocacy 
groups have been contentious within a modern representative democracy. With the increasing 
number of countries struggling with the process of democratic governance and consolidation, 
the debate about the representative role of civil society groups has become more robust in 
Africa. State officials continue to question their representativeness and even their accountability 
processes. Scholars such as Przeworski (2002) argue that the true representatives of the people 
are those elected through regular and contested democratic elections and not civic groups, 
which are guided by particularistic interests. Additionally, advocacy groups have been 
perceived as competing with and, therefore, weakening democratically elected representative 
institutions such as political parties. However, it must be noted that the representative role of 
civil society groups is critical in the process of democratic consolidation and more so in Africa 
where there is widespread “democratic deficit” (Gaventa, 2004; Luckham et al., 2000), and the 
need to support the institutionalization of democracy. 
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Political parties in Africa face numerous problems, including weak organisational 
structures, low ideological variation, tenuous roots in society with high volatility, ethnicisation, 
fragmentation, and persistence of personalistic and clientelist relationships (Ottaway, 1999; 
Van de Walle, 2003; Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005). They are thus ineffective in representing 
various social groups (Randal 2007) besides having weak linkages with organised interests 
(Widner, 1997; Van de Walle and Butler, 1999) and the citizens, leading to poor linkage of 
citizens with the political process and creating a crisis of political representation and 
intermediation (Schmitter, 2001; Skocpol, 2003; Carothers 2005). The emergence of robust 
forms of associational life, such as advocacy groups in the last two decades with the 
democratisation process has helped to fill some of these gaps of representation left by weak 
political parties and other democratic institutions.  
It is important to note that although civil society groups play the role of representation, 
democratically elected officials remain the representatives of society-at-large and should be 
accountable to the citizenry. Civic organisations cannot claim the kind of degree of 
representation by political parties but can claim representation of the public and for the interests 
that are not well represented in the mainstream political institutions and processes. Public 
interest advocacy groups represent issues and agenda that go beyond the self-interest of the 
organisation and its members (Schattschneider, 1960). They appeal to universalistic principles 
and claim “assumed” representation because most of them lack formal membership and do not 
choose their leaders through regular democratic elections. Nevertheless, their role as 
intermediaries between citizens and the state is considered a form of political representation 
(Peruzzotti, 2004) in modern representative democratic governments. Membership advocacy 
groups, on the other hand, speak as representatives of specific constituencies or interests when 
they engage in policy-making and initiatives aimed at making governments politically 
accountable. Advocacy groups, therefore, do not compete with representative institutions such 
as political parties but complement the work of these democratically elected institutions by 
giving voice and expression to constituencies and issues that are overlooked in the mainstream 
political processes. 
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2.2.3. The pluralist function: Social integration 
 
Pluralists mainly view civil society groups’ contribution to democratic development as 
that of ensuring social integration. They integrate individuals into social groups, where they 
have shared beliefs, norms, and values, which shape social identity and have mitigating effects 
on entrenched societal cleavages, which may cause conflicts and instability, both detrimental 
to democratic consolidation. Individuals who join civil society groups with diverse interests, 
values and norms come to share common interests as they get to understand each other and 
deliberate on numerous issues of democratic development. Civil society groups thus bridge 
societal cleavages along diverse interests and values. Pluralists also believe that civil society 
has a moderating effect on both individuals and social groups by way of cross-cutting social 
cleavages. It diffuses the explosive potential of such cleavages and contributes to the integration 
of the whole society (Putnam 1993; Lipset 1969). Social integration is thus critical to the 
process of democratic consolidation. Pluralists also stress the representative role of civil society 
groups, which play a crucial role in agenda setting in democratic politics and influencing policy 
outcomes in favour of the public. Scholars who subscribe to this school of thought view the 
density of civic associations as an indicator of a healthy democracy as these groups guarantee 
that all societal interests will be aggregated and considered in the policymaking process, which 
is the essence of democratic governance.  
However, the pluralists’ assumption overstates the extent to which interests and views 
are represented in the political bargaining process, equality of power of interest groups and the 
neutrality of the state as an arbiter in the policy-making process. Schattschneider (1960) has 
argued that there is no factual basis to demonstrate that all interest groups are potentially equal, 
that the state is a neutral arbiter in the policy process and that all views find themselves 
represented in the policy process. He points out that in most countries, a very narrow slice of 
the population participates actively in the policy process and the level of access to power differ 
considerably within civil society. He concludes by noting that, “The flaw in the pluralist heaven 
is that the chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent. Probably about 90 percent of the people 
cannot get into the pressure system.” This argument points to winners and losers in the policy 
process, where the upper-class groups, which are the most organised with the most resources 
and power have the most significant influence in the policy process. These groups mobilise the 
most consistently and effectively and are most likely to defend the most affluent and powerful 
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against the interests of ordinary citizens (Everitt and Young, 2004). Moreover, the state, like 
any other political actor will pursue its own interests and preferences over preferences favored 
by other policy actors. The state, is, therefore, not a neutral mediator in the policy-making 
process. Despite all these criticisms of pluralism, the contribution of advocacy groups to social 
integration and interest representation in the democratic consolidation process cannot be 
gainsaid. 
2.2.4. The Tocquevillian function: Political socialisation 
 
  Scholars associated with the concept of “social capital” (Hardin, 2002; Fukuyama, 
1995; Putnam, 1993) emphasizes the positive effects that active participation in civil society 
has on individuals, which in turn support the development of democracy (Halpern 2005; 
Fukuyama 2002; Putnam, 2000; Putnam, 1995; 1993; Granovetter 1973; Tocqueville, 1968). 
They view social capital as the “connections among individuals, social networks and the norms 
of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam 2001, p. 19). In other words, 
social networks that cut across various cleavages promote both trust and reciprocity, which are 
critical for democratic development. Specifically, the underlying logic between social capital 
and the development of democracy is that active participation in civil society inculcates skills 
of cooperation and shared responsibility for collective action, besides the development of 
positive civic virtues, attitudes, norms, and values like freedom, equality, tolerance, debate, 
willingness to compromise and respect for opposing views, all of which enhance political 
participation and democratic citizenship (Michel, 2011; Diamond, 1999).  
Similarly, Putnam (1993, p. 90) a proponent of the concept of social capital, views 
belonging to cross-cutting groups with diverse goals and membership as moderating people’s 
attitudes because of group interactions and social pressures. Such values support the democratic 
process. Participation in civil society groups also helps citizens develop political interests with 
the skills and desire to express themselves and hold public officials accountable (Warren, 2009). 
This process leads to deliberation and questioning of public officials for public accountability. 
Finally, participation in civil society groups promotes political efficacy and skills of democratic 
citizenship among citizens, thus ensuring responsive democratic institutions that can address 
societal concerns, needs and interests.  
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In a broader sense, civil societies thus act as “schools of democracy” in which citizens 
learn the values, the skills and the mechanisms of democracy (Tocqueville, 1835). It is a school 
where political interests are stimulated, and citizens learn civic virtues and organisational skills 
that are crucial in the development of democracy. Gareeton, (1989, p.155) argues that by acting 
as “schools of democracy,” civil society “re-inject politics into society.” The groups, therefore, 
act as mechanisms for democratic socialisation, leading to popular participation, which is a 
crucial purpose of advocacy groups in the political process and supports democratic citizenship-
a critical cornerstone of democratic consolidation.  The level and quality of participation of 
citizens in the democratic process is thus an important barometer for democratic consolidation 
and should be a critical goal for advocacy groups in democratising countries such as Kenya and 
Zambia.   
However, the concept of social capital has been criticised on both empirical and 
normative grounds regarding democratic development. Newton (2001) for instance, has 
questioned the empirical link between social and political trust. Using survey research, the 
author found that social and political trust are not closely associated and more so, not even 
associated with membership in voluntary associations. Although Inglehart (1997, p.174) agrees 
that “On the whole, we cannot be sure of the precise causal connection,” between trust and 
democracy, he, however, argues that the preponderance of evidence shows that trust and stable 
democracy are closely linked.  Other scholars have criticised the concept of social capital as 
having been overstretched to explain so much in development and in the process, lost its 
meaning (Robinson et al. 2002; Arrow, 1999). According to this group of scholars, the concept 
is being used to explain almost everything from development to democratisation and has thus 
lost its value. The third group of scholars argues that the concept of social capital has significant 
methodological and normative baggage (Smith and Kulynych, 2002; Solow, 1999; Levi, 1996) 
which makes its use at least questionable and at best misleading. For instance, Hyden (2001, 
p.161) argues that “the notion that social capital is made up of a common currency of civicness 
is both ethnocentric and misleading for policy and governance purposes.” This line of criticism 
is similar to that taken by Encarnacion (2000) and Kasfir (1998) who have both questioned the 
usefulness of the Tocquevillian approach to actual realities of the African context and 
specifically the democratisation process in the continent. 
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 For Encarnacion (2000), the applicability of the Tocquevillian interpretation of the role 
of civil society in most developing countries with poor socio-economic development is 
questionable, while for Kasfir (1998) the Tocquevillian prescriptive nature of the definition of 
civil society precludes most organizations that have been crucial in the process of 
democratization in Africa. He argues that although these groups may lack the civil character 
that supposedly separates civil society organisations from other groups in society, according to 
the Tocquevillian approach, these groups have immensely contributed to the process of 
democratisation in Africa and should not be excluded in studies of civil society and democracy 
in the continent. Finally, Skocpol (1996) argues that the concept puts too much blame on the 
citizens for social problems, thus ignoring the power that is controlled by elites and the state in 
society. Despite all these criticisms and perspectives, the concept of social capital remains a 
useful and powerful concept in explaining democratic development and has had a profound 
influence on civil society and democratisation studies around the World. 
2.2.5. Historical institutionalists 
 
Historical institutionalists emphasize the importance of group or class conflict in 
shaping the development of modern democracy (Skocpol, 2004; Skocpol and Fiorina 1999; 
Gutman 1998; Ertman 1997; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Moore 1966).  They explain the link 
between civil society and democratic consolidation by emphasising the direct political leverage 
or influence on political and economic processes that civil society groups have and achieve 
through lobbying, provision of information, interest aggregation and articulation and 
mobilisation of citizens for political, social and economic causes. Civil society groups can 
positively influence the law and regulation by providing legislators with information, 
viewpoints, and perspectives. Through this process, civil society groups can prevent the state 
from passing laws that are against the interests of their members and the citizenry-at-large. 
Skocpol and Fiorina (1999, p. 15) have noted that “From an institutional perspective, voluntary 
associations matter as sources of popular leverage, not just as facilitators of individual 
participation and generalised social trust.”  Historical institutionalists also emphasise the ability 
of civil society organisations to serve as a self-defense mechanism that protects citizens against 
a potentially intrusive state.  
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The historical institutionalists’ emphasis on the direct political leverage of civil society 
can also be applied at the level of the individual, where voluntary associations are viewed as 
providing spaces and platforms for individuals to express their views and opinions freely and 
to be heard by political authorities.  This line of argument has been advanced by Gutman (1998, 
p.1) who argues that, “Without access to an association that is willing and able to speak up for 
our views and values, we have a very limited ability to be heard by many other people or to 
influence the political process, unless we happen to be rich or famous.” In support of this notion, 
de Tocqueville (1969/1835, p.190) writes, “An association unites the energies of divergent 
minds and vigorously directs them towards a clearly indicated goal.” Membership in 
associations, therefore, gives the members and society direct and tangible benefits because it 
allows citizens to influence processes that directly affect their livelihood.  
In conclusion, Diamond (1994) has summarised the many positive roles that a vibrant 
civil society plays in the process of democratic consolidation. These include checking and 
limiting the power of the state, stimulating political participation, developing a democratic 
culture of tolerance and bargaining, creating additional channels for articulating and 
representing interests, generating cross-cutting cleavages, recruiting and training new political 
leaders, improving the functioning of democratic institutions, enriching the flow of information 
to citizens, among others. According to Diamond, all these functions strengthen and legitimate 
a democratic state, but he warns that a strong civil society does not in itself substitute for strong 
political and legal institutions, which he considers as the foundation for a democratic system. 
For Schmitter (1997), the principal functions of civil society for democratic consolidation 
include aggregating and stabilising expectations, inculcating civic conceptions of interests and 
norms of behaviour, supporting inclusive political processes, reducing the burdens of 
governance, and checking state abuses of power. However, Schmitter (1997) also warns that 
civil society is not an unmitigated blessing for democracy. Certain qualities of civil society may 
make the formation of majorities more difficult, build biases in policy-making processes, lead 
to pork-barrel politics and segment the political community. All these outcomes may be 
detrimental to the process of democratic consolidation. 
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2.2.6. Sceptics 
 
Finally, the last group of scholars remains unconvinced by the validity of the presumed 
causative relationship between civil society and democracy and the beneficial effects of civil 
society to democratic consolidation. They point out that there is no concrete evidence 
demonstrating how the causal mechanism works empirically and that civil society alone is not 
a guarantee for democracy. For this group of scholars, what is most significant for democracy 
is the development of strong political institutions (Armony, 2004; Encarnacion, 2003; 
Carothers, 2000; Rieff, 1999; Berman, 1997; Edwards and Foley, 1997; Newton, 1997; 
Ndegwa, 1996; Levi 1996). These institutions include political parties and governmental 
institutions such as the legislature, the judiciary, and rational-legal bureaucracies. Sceptics 
argue that scholars who believe in the positive link between civil society and democracy treat 
it as if it is the only or the most important factor in democratic consolidation. According to 
these scholars, this is not the case as they hold that significant institutional development is the 
foundation for democratic consolidation. With weak political institutions, even a strong and 
vibrant civil society will not support democracy.   
Following this line of argument, Huntington (1968) contends that too many demands 
too forcefully on the state by civil society groups could undermine the political order upon 
which the state depends and lead to civil war, instability or anarchy. In the same vein, in an 
influential article, Berman (1997) strongly critiques the general assumption that there is a 
necessary link between a vibrant civil society and democracy. She demonstrates how an active 
and vibrant civil society contributed to the collapse of democracy in Weimar Germany in the 
1930s and argued that in this case, weak political institutions were unable to respond to a flurry 
of demands by various civil society groups in the country. Having been disappointed by these 
institutions, civil society decided to work with populist political parties like the Nazi party and 
helped in the mobilisation process that facilitated the rise of the Nazis to power. Berman, 
therefore, concludes that in the context of weak, inefficient and partial national institutions, 
civil society activities may enhance societal fragmentation, and undermine democratic 
development. Further, Berman (2003, p. 263) has also noted that the rise of the Muslim 
Brotherhood to power in Egypt, engineered a process of Islamization “from below” by 
constantly attacking secularism and promoting sharia as the law of the land. Overall, she 
concludes that civil society alone is not a guarantee for democracy. In her view what is more 
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significant for the development of democracy is the establishment of strong political 
institutions. 
Using contrasting democratisation evidence from Spain and Brazil, Encarnacion (2003) 
has demonstrated that the performance of political institutions rather than the configuration of 
civil society determines the consolidation of democratic regimes. In a different study, 
Encarnacion (2000) challenges the notion that civil society could lead a process of democratic 
transformation of formally authoritarian societies and argues that the idea that a robust and 
vibrant civil society is a prerequisite for democratic consolidation is empirically flawed in at 
least two ways. Firstly, he argues that the Tocquevillian interpretation of civil society, which is 
American in character, is incompatible with the socio-economic context of most democratising 
states. Secondly, in the context of “undeveloped political systems, overburdened newly 
democratic governments and highly politicised populations” (Encarnacion 2000, p. 13) a 
vibrant civil society might supersede the ability of government to respond to social demands 
and thus lead to “a crisis of governability and democracy.” The author points out that in cases 
where a strong civil society becomes an alternative to strong political institutions, the result is 
the atomisation of society and dispersion of political power, which complicates the process of 
democratic consolidation. Encarnacion, therefore, concludes that civil society is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for democratic consolidation. Diamond (1999) has also 
admitted that although a dynamic and active civil society is critical for the development of 
effective and legitimate democracy, it is not a substitute for strong legal and political 
institutions, which form the foundation for a democratic system.  
Similarly, Ndegwa (1996) has contributed to this debate in his study of NGOs in Africa. 
One of his case studies, Undugu Society, which works to help the urban poor in Nairobi, worked 
closely with the authoritarian Kenyan state for an extended period. The author argues that the 
cooperation with the state benefitted the organisation to the detriment of democratisation efforts 
intended to benefit the whole of the Kenyan society. Undugu society only moved to oppose the 
authoritarian state when the government enacted legislation that threatened its operations. 
Ndegwa thus critiques the “civil society liberalisation theory,” the view that organisations in 
civil society are central to both democratic transition and consolidation. He concludes that there 
is no necessary connection between NGO activity and democratic struggles.  
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Further, Armony (2004) also rejects the claim that the presence of a vibrant civil society 
will necessarily lead to or guarantee democracy. The author uses the case of the rise of Nazi 
Germany, the anti-desegregation movements in the US, and the spread of human rights 
movements in Argentina after the end of the military regime to demonstrate that intense levels 
of political engagement by strong and vibrant civil society lead to exclusionary policies. The 
thrust of his argument is that whether civic engagement contributes to democratisation or not, 
depends on specific socio-economic and institutional context. For Armony, civil society is only 
beneficial to democratic consolidation, if there is economic stability, less socio-economic 
disparities, social trust in transparent institutions and a healthy synergy between the state and 
civic actors. Sceptics conclude that the importance of civil society to democratisation has been 
exaggerated by those who believe in the positive link between civil society and democracy. In 
their view, there is no necessary association between civil society and democratic consolidation. 
In other words, a rich associational life does not necessarily guarantee a stable polity, for 
increased mobilisation by civil society could lead to the collapse of political institutions 
(DeVotta, 2004; Berman, 1997; Huntington, 1968) 
Despite the diversity of opinion about the relationship between civil society and 
democracy, there is a growing consensus among political analysts that a robust, active and 
vibrant civil society is beneficial to the consolidation of democracy (Graeme, 2000) and that 
civil society is a necessary though not sufficient condition for democracy.  Hagan (2013) goes 
as far as to claim that the current literature settles earlier doubts of a positive relationship 
between civil society and democratic consolidation. For scholars, who subscribe to this 
consensus, an active and robust civil society is consequential in all the stages of democratisation 
process (Diamond 1997; Fukuyama, 1995; Bratton 1994; Chazan, 1994a; Woods, 1992). What 
is at the core of this debate is whether the existence of a robust and dynamic civil society is a 
sufficient or a necessary condition for democracy. This study takes the position that civil society 
groups, and specifically advocacy groups, are beneficial to the process of democratic 
consolidation, although not, a sufficient condition for the same.  The study argues that in the 
context of Kenya and Zambia, the existence of a robust and autonomous civil society becomes 
even more critical since the two countries already face numerous institutional deficits, political, 
social and economic bottlenecks in the process of democratic consolidation. 
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2.3. Conceptualizing and Studying Civil Society 
As explained in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, civil society is a contested concept with 
various definitions, depending on the purpose for which the concept is used. It is, therefore, 
incumbent upon any researcher to explicitly articulate which approach is being employed 
(Heinrich, 2010; Fioramonti, 2005) for both conceptual and methodological clarity. However, 
studies of civil society and democratisation have faced two major problems. Firstly, most 
studies in this area of research hardly define the approaches that are employed in studying civil 
society. Secondly, contemporary popular discourses of civil society assume an implicit 
normative perspective, thus treating civil society as a virtuous society that is progressive and 
democratizing (Linz and Stepan, 1996a; Putnam, 1993). These problems have compounded the 
already existing conceptual confusions regarding the empirical research of civil society and 
generated a critical debate over the last three decades among social scientists on how best to 
study civil society. However, as noted by Heinrich (2010), most scholars of civil society who 
specify their approaches in studying civil society view it either as a virtuous society or a distinct 
sphere within society. Studies that view civil society as a virtuous society have dominated the 
literature on civil society for a long time, while most recent studies have tended to view civil 
society as a distinct sphere within society, which stands apart from the state, the market and the 
family and where uncoerced collective action for shared goals takes place (Powell, 2010; Linz 
and Stepan, 1996a). Additionally, other scholars have conceptualised civil society as a specific 
societal sector populated by a multitude of voluntary, non-profit organizations (Salamon et al., 
1999). All these approaches have specific merits and contribution to knowledge within the civil 
society literature.  
The dimension of conceptualising civil society as either normative-theoretical or 
empirical-analytical have attracted much interest and attention in the last decade, although 
normative-theoretical studies of civil society have dominated contemporary literature on civil 
society (Kopecky and Muddle, 2002). This dominant approach employs the concept of civil 
society as “a theological notion, not as a political or sociological one” (Rieff 1999). In other 
words, studies which use this notion, view civil society as a virtuous society and aim to study 
“what civil society ought to be,” while empirical-analytical perspectives view civil society as a 
distinct sphere within society and focus on studying the features of “existing or real civil 
societies” (Alexander, 1998) as experienced in the real world, where civil society operates and 
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performs its functions. This study, conceptualised civil society as a distinct societal sphere in 
which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests (Anheier, 2004; Schwartz and 
Pharr, 2003; Kymlicka, 2002; Bratton 1994) as explained in Chapter 1 and employed an 
empirical-analytical perspective based on the functions of advocacy groups, which support the 
process of democratic consolidation. 
The choice of the empirical-analytical approach was based on several reasons. Firstly, 
the tendency of employing normative-theoretical approaches to study civil society is more 
pronounced in studies of civil society and democratisation in Africa, (Heinrich 2010; Whitfield 
and Mustapha, 2009; Igoe and Kelsall 2005; Herbst 2001) especially after the political 
transitions in the continent from the early 1980s to mid-1990s, where civil society groups 
played a significant role as part of the pro-democracy movements. The dominance of this 
approach has placed unrealistic expectations on civil society (Howell and Pearce, 2002; 
Chandhoke 2003:36) and contributed to current the perceptions that civil society has 
underperformed in the post-transitional dispensations in Africa.  Fioramonti (2005), therefore, 
suggests that in studying civil society and democratisation, one needs to distinguish between 
civil society as “an ideal-type” and civil society as an “actual reality.” The “ideal-type 
corresponds to the normative-theoretical approaches, while the “actual or existing civil 
societies” corresponds to the empirical-analytical approach (See also Heinrich, 2010). Real 
civil societies manifest the qualities of separation, autonomy and civil association to varying 
degrees (Fioramonti 2005) due to their historical development, cultural and socio-political 
contexts. Therefore, civil society is not merely a theoretical and normative concept, but a tool 
to describe and explain concrete social reality and collective action. Keane (1998, p. 37) 
describes the objectives of employing an empirical-analytical approach as; 
“The immediate or avowed aim of such empirical-analytical interpretation of civil 
society is not to recommend courses of political action or to form normative judgments. 
Rather, the language of civil society is used to develop an explanatory understanding of 
a complex socio-political reality using theoretical distinctions, empirical research and 
informed judgment about its origins, patterns of development and (unintended) 
consequences.” 
 
Dicklitch (1998, p. 3) has also advised that “The recent surge of interest in NGO activity 
in Africa calls for an examination of what role they actually play, as opposed to what role they 
are expected to play, in the democratisation process.” This study, therefore, took these 
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suggestions and focussed on the real or existing advocacy groups in both Kenya and Zambia to 
explain the principal constraints that confront these groups in the process of democratic 
consolidation. Secondly, the normative-theoretical perspective conceptualises civil society 
narrowly and rigidly by setting strict standards, expectations, and boundaries for associations 
that would qualify as part of civil society. This prescriptive nature of the definition of civil 
society precludes most of the organisations that have been crucial in the process of 
democratisation in the continent (Kasfir, 1998). Additionally, it leaves out of civil society 
critical social interests, voices and diverse manifestations of associational life in Africa, which 
include informal, formal, traditional and ethnic associations as viable elements of civil society. 
Further, the normative-theoretical definition precludes uncivil societal groups, which in many 
cases have been more relevant to the process of democratisation than the civil types in Africa 
(Kasfir, 1998).  
All these precluded groups in the definition of civil society by theoretical-normative 
approaches are critical elements in social, political and economic development in the continent. 
The approach, therefore, distorts state-society relations and does not adequately capture the 
nature and essence of the reality of civil society in Africa (Kasfir, 1998). Empirical-analytical 
perspective, on the other hand, conceives civil society in a broader, more inclusive way as a 
distinct public sphere of collective action, separate from the state, the market and the family 
(Deakin 2001; Linz and Stepan 1996a) and therefore, allows for the inclusion of Africa’s 
diverse and complex elements of associational life in the study of civil society, broadening the 
social basis for democratic consolidation. Moreover, recent studies of civil society in both 
Kenya and Zambia (Ngunyi 2008; Maitra, 2006; Chweya, 2004, Kanyinga, 2004,) have adopted 
the Hegelian perspective by defining defined civil society broadly and inclusively. 
Thirdly, the normative-theoretical approach does not consider the historical, cultural 
and economic development processes that have shaped the nature and content of civil society 
in non-western societies. African civil society has developed through its own historical and 
socio-cultural conditions and, therefore, should not be viewed as a replica of western models 
(Obadare and Willems, 2014). The approach is, therefore, ethnocentric in its understanding of 
civil society and assumes that civil society is the same all over the World. It muddles the overall 
understanding, analysis and study of civil society in Africa (Gibbon, 2001; Kasfir, 1998; Orvis, 
2001). The empirical-analytical approach, on the other hand, views civil society as a societal 
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sphere and focuses on the specific modes of action or the purpose of activity of advocacy groups 
rather than their form of organisation, which primarily depends on historical, cultural and social 
processes. The approach, therefore, transcends the cultural relativism rooted in the western 
origin of the concept of civil society and its perceived incompatibility with non-western 
contexts. Consequently, the empirical-analytical approach facilitates the adoption of the 
concept of civil society to non-western contexts. Varshney (2001, p.369-70) has emphasised 
this point by noting that, “At least in the social and cultural settings that are different from those 
of Europe and North America, if not more generally, the purpose of activity rather than the form 
of the organisation should be the critical test of civic life.” 
Furthermore, the empirical-analytical approach is a much more realistic approach in 
studying civil society and in this case advocacy groups and democratic consolidation, because 
advocacy groups contribute to democratic consolidation not so much because of their quantity 
and form, but rather because of their functions, which support the process of democratic 
consolidation. The approach, therefore, views collective citizen action for interest articulation 
in the public sphere as the basis for civil society (Howard, 2003; Stepan, 1988) contribution to 
the process of democratic consolidation. Finally, empirical-analytical approach recognises the 
fluidity of the boundaries between civil society and the other spheres of social life (Alexander, 
1997; Young, 1999), an aspect of civil society that is more pronounced in the African setting, 
due to the practice of neopatrimonialism and undeveloped formal institutions of governance.  
 However, there are several challenges in employing an empirical-analytical perspective 
to study civil society and democratisation. Its broad definition of civil society includes all 
manner of collective action and types of associations into the concept of civil society, therefore, 
downplaying the complexities within society. However, several studies have successfully 
employed the perspective in analysing various processes and phenomena within society 
(Biekart, 1999). Secondly, Heinrich (2010) points out that some critics of the empirical-
analytical approach argue that it is difficult for scholars to use the concept of civil society as a 
“value-free” tool to describe social phenomena. However, most scholars agree that to use the 
concept of civil society in empirical studies successfully and productively; it must cast aside its 
cultural and historical baggage from its origins in Western Europe. It must be viewed as a 
universal concept of collective action and, be used as a heuristic tool free from any ideological 
or socio-historical trappings (Malena 2008, Edwards, 2004; Lewis 2002; Whitehead, 2002) 
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2.4. Theoretical Framework 
 
The study employed a rigorous deductive approach to the case study design and, 
therefore, identified the theoretical framework at the beginning of the investigation (Yin, 2014). 
As emphasized by Creswell (2009, p. 64) “apriori conceptual framework structure composed 
of theory and method, provide the starting point” in qualitative research.  The theoretical 
framework, therefore, is the “structure, the scaffolding or the frame of the study” (Meriam 2009, 
p. 66). It guided and shaped the formulation of research questions, which were translated into 
research propositions.31 It also structured data collection, analysis and interpretation of findings 
(Yin, 2014; Meriam, 2014; Creswell, 2009; Miles and Huberman, 1994). The framework 
further focused and situated the study within the scholarly conversation, guiding the 
researcher’s thinking about the constraints confronting advocacy groups and their effects on the 
ability of these groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation 
besides managing critical issues of the study such as confidence, validity, and reliability. 
Additionally, it helped in providing concepts that were used in the coding and analysis of data. 
Overall the theoretical framework of this study consisted of the study’s theoretical approach, 
the research questions and propositions, and the theories that informed such propositions. The 
use of multiple theories in this study enhanced insights into understanding the issues under 
study and allowed the researcher to use multiple facets in analysing the central issues of the 
study. 
2.4.1. The domestic politico-institutional approach 
The study employed a domestic politico-institutional approach,32to comparatively 
investigate the constraints confronting advocacy groups in the post-transitional countries of 
Kenya and Zambia and to assess the effects of such constraints on advocacy groups ability to 
effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. This approach posits that 
                                                             
 
31 In quantitative approaches, research propositions can be equated to hypotheses in that they both make an 
educated guess to the possible outcomes of the research study. 
32 Other theoretical approaches in comparative democratization include structural theories (Lipset, 1959; Diamond 
1992), social approaches (Moore, 1966; Rueschmeyer et al, 1992), economic models (Haggard and Kaufman, 
1996) and strategic approaches (Diamond 2010; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986) 
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institutions,33 whether formal or informal, interests and strategic behaviour of political actors 
shape political outcomes within specific contexts (Bratton, 2010; Teorell, 2010; Bratton and 
Van de Walle, 1997). The objective here is to provide a systematic account of the constraints 
experienced by advocacy groups in Kenya and Zambia as generated by political and 
institutional variables, interests and patterns of behaviour of advocacy groups in the process of 
democratic consolidation. Several scholars have employed this approach using variables such 
as elections, political parties, neopatrimonialism among others, to explain the democratisation 
process in Africa. The approach emphasises the interaction of actors, structures and processes, 
based on domestic political factors with specific attention paid to structural and contingency 
dimensions. 
 The foundation of this approach is an “emphasis on intermediate institutions that shape 
political strategies, the ways institutions structure relations of power among contending groups 
in society, and especially the focus on the process of politics and policy-making within given 
institutional parameters” (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p. 7). Political actors within this approach 
are viewed as agents, which Giddens (1979) defines as one person or an entire group of people 
acting with some common purpose. It involves a stream of human interventions intended or 
unintended in the flow of events making up history, while structure, is constituted in human 
relations. It is composed of the social practices and capabilities that these practices presuppose. 
Additionally, the author views structures as “rules and resources,” upon which actors draw in 
their daily actions and interactions; these rules and resources are constantly reconstituted 
through their use (Giddens, 1979 p. 65). The interaction between structure and agency is 
reciprocal and critical in understanding the relationship between advocacy groups and the 
process of democratic consolidation. Katznelson (1997, p. 97) simplifies the essence of this 
interaction when he states that, “structures and actors make democracy and democracy remakes 
structures and actors.” The author, therefore, emphasizes the structured-contingency interaction 
as being central to understanding the process of change and in this case understanding the 
interaction of advocacy groups and the process of democratic consolidation.  
                                                             
 
33 North (1990, p. 3) defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society, or more formally…the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interactions”. Political institutions on the other hand are the formal rules, 
regulations and policies that structure social and political interactions (Posner, 2005, p. 2) 
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Additionally, Karl (1990, p.7) has argued that “Historically created structures, while not 
determining which one of a limited set of alternatives political actors may choose are “confining 
conditions” that restrict, or in some cases enhance the choices available to them.” Similarly, 
Marx (1971/1859, p.15) has noted that “Men make their own history, but they do not make it 
just as they please; they do not make it under the circumstances chosen by themselves, but 
under the circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.” Advocacy 
groups operate within institutional and political contexts that are not directly created by them. 
There is thus a continuous struggle over the content and process of democratic consolidation 
with other political actors in an institutional and political environment, which influences the 
opportunities, choices, constraints, demands, and strategies for all actors involved in the 
process. 
 Institutional and political context also contributes to the distribution of resources that 
matter for organising public citizen engagement (Alagappa, 2004). Such resources include 
information and freedoms that support citizen engagement and participation. This context or 
environment is dynamic and may shift due to regime change and other political factors. This 
point is emphasised by Thelen and Steinmo (1992, p. 3) who noted that “political struggles are 
mediated by the institutional settings in which they take place.” Moreover, “institutions shape 
the goals that political actors pursue and structure power relations among them, privileging 
some and putting others at a disadvantage. Institutions structure battles and by so doing 
influence their outcome.” This relationship means that in the process of democratic 
consolidation, advocacy groups are constrained by the institutional variables in which they 
operate within and they must, therefore, make choices within these circumstances and as they 
do, those very choices may provide opportunities and create further constraints or opportunities 
for future action. However, it must be noted that within given constraints, there are still more 
choices of actions or inactions left open to them, for instance, the choices that advocacy groups 
made during the political transition process may support or hinder their contribution to the 
process of democratic consolidation. On the other hand, advocacy groups may use the changed 
political and institutional conditions to their advantage. Thelen and Steinmo (1992, p. 12) 
emphasise this point when they note that, “institutional change results from deliberate political 
strategies to transform structural parameters to win long-term political advantage.” 
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Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) have outlined several advantages for employing the 
domestic politico-institutional approach in studying political actors and democratisation 
process, which directly applies to this study.  Firstly, there is a growing shift among scholars 
from concerns with preconditions and agents only driven explanations in studying the dynamics 
of democratisation to the incorporation of the structure into the analysis of agency. As Gill 
(2000, p. 89) has stated, “actors do not play out their role in a vacuum, but in a context consisting 
of the structures from the past and continuing into the present.” The constraints that advocacy 
groups confront in the post-transitional countries of Kenya and Zambia would thus vary 
depending on the past, and the present structure, the strategic choices of advocacy groups and 
the political and institutional context in which they currently operate. Secondly, the domestic 
politico-institutional approach emphasizes the role of domestic political actors as critical in the 
transformation process. The approach, therefore, facilitates the understanding of the domestic 
considerations and the context shaping the rules of the game (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). 
  Democratic consolidation involves the realignment of these rules affecting the 
composition, relationships and power dynamics of players involved in the process of public 
decision-making. This realignment directly affects domestic political actors and organisations, 
which have a great deal to gain or lose in the transformation process. Moreover, there is a 
growing consensus among political analysts that domestic factors ultimately and fundamentally 
shape the pace and direction of democratic progress (Burnell, 2000; Ottaway, 1997; Remmer, 
1995, Ake 1991). Commenting on the democratic transition processes, Whitehead (2002) notes 
that “internal forces were of primary importance in determining the course and the outcome of 
the transition attempt and international factors played a secondary role.” Similarly, Schmitter 
and O’Donnell (1986, p. 5) have concluded that the “prospects for political democracy were 
largely explained in terms of national forces and calculations.” Several scholars have also 
contended that international factors appear to play a more significant role in the initiation of 
democracy, but only a secondary and supportive role in the process of democratic consolidation 
(Pinkney, 2003). In the end, Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) have noted that a country’s 
prospects for democratic consolidation directly depend on its inherited practices. In other 
words, domestic factors provide a solid foundation and focus on the analysis of the constraints 
confronting advocacy groups in the process of democratic consolidation. Ultimately, 
democratic consolidation is essentially a domestic drama.  
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Thirdly, Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) have stressed the importance of the rules that 
govern political interactions and the struggles over these rules such as constitutional reforms 
that determine the distribution of power among formal political institutions. The authors argue 
that rules and institutions impose limits on the range of choices available to actors and 
predispose them to opt for certain courses of action over others. The domestic politico-
institutional approach concern with rules and struggles, therefore, enables political analysts to 
address a full range of issues that relate to advocacy groups and democratic consolidation. For 
instance, examining the internal characteristics of advocacy groups and their relationships with 
other actors within the political environment. Thelen and Steinmo (1992, p. 13), have 
emphasised this point when they write, “The emphasis on institutions as patterned relations that 
lie at the core of an institutional approach does not replace attention to other variables, the 
players, their interests and strategies, and the distribution of power among them.” The politico-
institutional approach put all these factors in context and help us understand how they relate to 
one another in a politically structured environment.  
Finally, Thelen and Steinmo (1992, p. 10) have pointed out that the domestic politico-
institutional approach builds numerous analytical bridges between actors, agents and objects of 
history, between formal state and informal societal processes and between grand generalisations 
and narrower national cases. It focusses on explanatory factors that are proximate to advocacy 
groups to illuminate both regularities and variations across the two selected countries of Kenya 
and Zambia and systematically account for both continuities and change across time. This study 
thus claims that by employing the domestic politico-institutional approach to study the 
constraints confronting advocacy groups in the process of democratic consolidation, we stand 
the best chance of understanding in a very comprehensive and detailed manner not only the 
constraints confronting advocacy groups but also the context in which those constraints 
emanate. However, applying domestic politico-institutional approach, where states lack strong 
formal institutions such as Africa may pose challenges to researchers.  Bratton and Van de 
Walle (1997) have advised that analysts must consider this prospect when addressing the issues 
under their studies. Additionally, it must be taken into consideration that formal institutions 
have started to play crucial roles in the political processes in many African countries. 
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2.4.2. Primary research questions 
 
Two primary research questions motivated this study: 
Research Question 1: Why are advocacy groups constrained in the post-transitional states of 
Kenya and Zambia? 
Research Question 2: How have these constraints impacted on advocacy groups’ ability to 
effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in Kenya and Zambia? 
The objective of the first question was to comparatively investigate the primary 
constraints confronting advocacy groups in the new political and institutional dispensation in 
both countries. The study explored both generic constraints associated with the democratisation 
process and context-specific constraints associated with each country’s historical, political, 
social and economic circumstances. The objective of the second research question was to assess 
the effect or impact that the identified primary constraints to advocacy groups in question 1 
have had on advocacy groups’ ability to effectively contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation. The two primary research questions guided the research process and were the 
basis for data collection and analysis. They focused on the unit of analysis, i.e., advocacy 
groups, whose characteristics, organisation, relationship with other political actors, strategic 
behavior, interests, choices, and activities were of critical importance for this investigation. The 
primary research questions, therefore, framed the study by providing the structure and the focus 
for the investigation.  
Additionally, all the supplementary questions that were developed revolved around the 
two primary research questions and were all geared towards achieving the overall objectives of 
the study. Some additional questions were tailored to specific sub-groups of respondents, such 
as international donors, depending on their overall role in the process of democratic 
consolidation. The questions were meant to elicit maximum and comprehensive information 
and evidence from the respondents to explore the goals of the study. The same set of research 
questions were posed to respondents in both countries, which helped in the standardization of 
data collection and were valuable for systematic and comparative analysis of the findings of the 
study. 
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2.4.3. Research Propositions 
 
A rigorous qualitative case study such as this that seek explanations for concrete social 
situations requires the identification of specific research propositions at the outset of the inquiry 
(Yin 2013). The study’s research questions were, therefore, translated into research 
propositions. These are generalisations or hypotheses in case of quantitative research that help 
in explaining the constraints confronting advocacy groups in the new political environment in 
both Kenya and Zambia. For this study, the propositions were derived from well-established 
civil-society literature and over ten years of accumulated knowledge and work experience by 
the researcher within the civil society sector in Africa. Although advocacy groups in both Kenya 
and Zambia face numerous challenges in their quest to contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation, this study proposed three primary constraints confronting these groups in the 
new political dispensation; the uncertain political environment, state actions and strategies to 
control and restrict the activities of advocacy groups and popular disengagement from advocacy 
groups.  
The study claims that these propositions have the most significant effects on advocacy 
groups’ ability to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. The 
combination of these constraints has created an environment, in which advocacy groups are 
unable to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in both countries. 
These propositions formed the foundation for the theoretical framework for this study (Stake 
1995; Miles and Huberman, 1994) by providing themes for data collection and analysis and 
helping in placing limits on the scope of the study (Baxter and Jack, 2008). The propositions 
also provided the structure of the empirical chapters of the dissertation. 
2.4.3.1. Proposition 1: The Uncertain Political Environment 
 
Several studies have established that the democratisation process creates an uncertain 
political and institutional environment for all political actors, including advocacy groups and 
this significantly affect their role in the process. Political actors, therefore, continuously grapple 
with this challenge of transformation, which they attempt to shape, but at the same shape their 
choices, strategies, interests, and behaviour.  Political analysts have, therefore, developed two 
contrasting models that attempt to explain the trajectory of civil society organisations through 
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the democratisation process. These models explain the dynamics and changes that occur within 
civil society and the roles that they play in various phases of the democratisation process. 
i) The Civil Society Model 
 
The civil society model posits that civil society groups are consequential in all stages of 
the democratisation process if the process proceeds to completion. Scholars who ascribe to this 
model predict the continuous rise of civil society organizations throughout the democratisation 
process due to the mutually reinforcing relationship between democracy and civil society 
(Glaser, 1997; Cohen and Arato, 1992; Putnam, 1991). Linz and Stepan (1996a, p. 299)  have 
summarised this model by noting that, “a vibrant and lively civil society can help start 
transitions, help resist reversals, help push transitions to their completion, and help consolidate 
and deepen democracy.” Additionally, they argue that for civil society to effectively carry out 
these functions to support the completion of the democratization process, they need a strong 
political society. Proponents of this model also note that a weak civil society does exist within 
the authoritarian system (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986) 
since civil society is never “wholly obliterated by authoritarian rule” Bermeo (1992, p. 287). 
   Although civil society is weak in such systems, it continues to carry out limited 
functions sanctioned by the authoritarian state.  Once political liberalisation begins, the state 
extends rights and freedoms to citizens, and civil society takes advantage of these new rights to 
re-organize, expand its activities, and multiply and thus play a significant role in the 
democratization process by constructing individual rights and a public space free from state 
control. The role of civil society then dramatically peaks up in the democratic transition phase.  
Zuern (2000) argues that civil society groups as part of the pro-democracy movement are 
expected to play several roles in this phase, including the delegitimization of the state, ousting 
of authoritarian regimes, drafting of new constitutions, constructing a framework of the 
legitimate public sphere, supporting the development of political parties and a democratic 
electoral system, carrying out voter education and monitoring elections among others. Although 
some proponents of this model admit that partial demobilisation of civil society does occur 
during the transition phase as political parties take centre stage in the negotiation process with 
the elites from the incumbent regime, they, however, argue that such limited demobilisation 
does not mean the obliteration of a politically significant civil society (Arato, 2000, p. 71).  
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Regarding the consolidation phase, Diamond (1994) has argued that “a vibrant civil 
society is probably more essential for consolidating democracy than initiating it.” Along the 
same line of thought, Arato (2000, p. 68) notes that “While a democratic transition can be 
formally completed with a marginalised civil society, the same is not true for democratic 
consolidation.” He argues that civil society at this stage of democratisation supports the 
adherence to the constitutional framework, the rule of law and provides legitimacy to the 
government and adds that “only sociological legitimacy in the long term can congeal into a 
political culture supportive of democracy and a given set of institutions.” (p. 70). This kind of 
sociological legitimacy can only be provided for by civil society. These groups are also 
expected to channel mass discontent at this phase because of the adverse effects of the 
simultaneous implementation of both economic and political reforms and help reduce populist 
demands that may overburden the redistributive capacities of the new democratic state. Civil 
society is, therefore, expected to play a critical role in institutionalisation and sustainability of 
democracy at this stage (Diamond, 1997; 1994; Bratton, 1994; Chazan, 1994a).  Proponents of 
the civil society model, therefore, view civil society as a catalyst for democratisation from 
initiation to consolidation. In other words, as democratisation progresses, civil society becomes 
more diverse, robust and active (Zuern, 2000) in the process as depicted in Figure 2.1. below 
Figure 2 1 The Civil Society Model 
 
Source: Adapted from Zuern (2000) Democracy from the Grassroots? Civic Participation and the 
decline of participatory democracy in South Africa’s transformation process, 1979-1999, Columbia 
University. 
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ii) The Social Movement Model  
 
The second model that attempts to explain the trajectory of civil society through the 
democratisation process is the social movement model. Although there are connections between 
social movements and democratization, several scholars have lamented the narrow focus of 
social movement studies on contention to the exclusion of studying the nexus between social 
movements34 and democratisation (Della Porta, 2014, 2009a; Foweraker, 1995). Charles Tilly 
(2004), for example, argues that social movements promote democratisation. Bratton (1994) 
explains this relationship between civil society and social movements by noting that civil 
society acts as a social movement, when it mobilises pressure for political change, creating a 
source of counter-hegemonic social movement. Similarly, Chandhoke (1998) has observed that, 
if the literature on social movement, describes a phenomenon of popular struggle, civil society 
provides the conceptual apparatus to comprehend the implications of those struggles on state-
society relations. Ndegwa (1996) has thus gone further to suggest that democratisation studies 
require the reconceptualization of civil society by combining it with insights from social 
movement theory. Indeed, Cohen and Arato (1992) view civil society as both a movement, that 
is, a set of societal movements, initiatives and forms of mobilisation and an institution, that is, 
a framework of settled institutions such as rights and associations. Similarly, Dalton (1990) 
views social movements as forms of civil society. 
  Advocacy groups fit in this nexus between civil society and social movements more 
than any other type of civil society groups, since they frequently participate in social movement 
activities and most of them usually begin as social movements. The social movement model, 
therefore, can be useful and productive in explaining the trajectory of advocacy groups through 
the democratisation process. The model posits that social movements rise and fall with the 
democratisation process (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986), a 
trajectory that O’ Donnell and Schmitter (1986) have described as an inverted ‘U’ model of 
activism. The authors argue that popular activism is quite low during the authoritarian period 
due to the tight control and repression of social movements by the authoritarian regime.  
                                                             
 
34 Tilly (1985.p.735-6) defines social movement as a series of interactions rather than a set group of actors. It 
consists of a series of demands to power holders. 
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According to this model, political liberalisation is initiated either by pressure from 
progressive factions within the authoritarian regime elites or from outside the regime as a 
response to escalating economic protests (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; Cohen and Arato, 
1992). At this stage, repression reduces as the state grants both citizens and civil society some 
civil liberties and political rights. Civil society and social movements take advantage of these 
newly acquired civil liberties and political rights to rise and begin to mobilise the masses, 
therefore, putting pressure on the regime for further democratisation. This upsurge of civil 
society is what O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, p. 48-50) refer to as the “resurrection of civil 
society” to support the transition process. This is the phase where civil society activity is most 
intense, and the groups play the most significant role in the process of democratisation.  
The heightened civil society activities lead to either the outright collapse of the regime 
or a negotiated settlement between the regime and the opposition political parties. Once political 
leaders from both sides agree to the negotiations, the intense antagonism between civil society 
and the regime begin to diminish, and provisional demobilisation35 of civil society actors occurs 
in anticipation of a positive outcome towards democratisation from the negotiations between 
opposition elites and the elites from the authoritarian regime (Bernhard, 1996). Proponents of 
the social movement model argue that this demobilisation is necessary for successful 
negotiations. However, some scholars within social movement studies disagree with this 
proposition and instead argue that continued civil society mobilisation plays a significant role 
in pressurising politicians to negotiate and to commit and respect the outcomes from those 
negotiations. Bermeo (1997) for example, demonstrates this point in a study of Portugal and 
Spain, where she found that moderation in protests by popular groups is not necessary for a 
democratic transition to occur. On the contrary, persistent protests by civil society groups keep 
the transitions moving forward and broadens the arena for the democratisation process. These 
findings are consistent with the democratisation experiences of most African countries from the 
late 1980s to early 1990s, where the continued mobilization of the masses by civil society gave 
momentum to the transition negotiations. 
                                                             
 
35 Demobilisation of insurgent civil society is the process by which civil society groups withdraw from active 
engagement in the democratisation process. 
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  In the social movement model, the role of civil society is, therefore, mainly restricted 
to the liberalisation phase, while democratisation becomes the project of the political society 
(Przeworski, 1991; Stepan, 1988). O’Donnell and Schmitter, (1986, p. 55) have emphasised 
this point by stating that “regardless of its intensity and background from which it emerges, this 
popular upsurge is always ephemeral.” Other scholars such as Ulfelder (2005) have also 
supported this transient role of civil society in the democratisation process. The demobilisation 
of civil society following democratic transitions has been noted in many countries, including 
Russia, Poland, Uruguay, Brazil and Spain (Oxhorn 1995; Pickvance 1992). Similarly, Bratton 
and Van de Walle (1997) have cited the demobilisation of civil society following democratic 
transitions in several African countries. Most proponents of the social movement model 
perceive transitions as elite centred processes, whether initiated from above or below by the 
masses (Welsh, 1994).  If negotiations are successful and both the regime and opposition elites 
agree to reforms and founding elections, civil society gets re-mobilised in support of the 
opposition, and if the elections are successful and the opposition wins and replaces the 
authoritarian regime, civil society gets demobilised once again, as democratic institutions are 
established. In the new political and institutional environment, civil society groups turn to 
pursue institutional forms of collective action.  
Further, these groups become more institutionalised and frequently employ more 
moderate forms of collective action (Muller and Seligson, 1987) as they fail to replace the 
mobilised forms of action (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p. 68). Additionally, the decline of civil 
society at this stage of democratisation is aided by the establishment of more democratic 
channels and institutions for legal and peaceful participation, which include the legislature, 
elections, and political parties, following the restoration of democracy. Other factors that 
contribute to the decline of civil society, include regime repression, selective co-optation, 
protest fatigue or exhaustion, the emergence of internal conflicts within protest groups willing 
to compromise for new policies, the disillusionment of the masses and initiation of reforms by 
the new democratic regime (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 56-57). Political parties return 
to the forefront of political activity, taking up most of the roles initially played by civil society 
groups. The trajectory of civil society in the process of democratisation within the social 
movements’ model is depicted in Figure 2.2 below. 
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Figure 2 2 The Social Movement Model 
 
 Source: Adapted from Zuern (2000) Democracy from the Grassroots? Civic Participation and the 
decline of participatory democracy in South Africa’s transformation process, 1979-1999, Columbia 
University 
 
 Kenya and Zambia can both be considered to have undergone through the democratisation 
processes of political liberalisation, democratic transition and currently in the process of 
democratic consolidation. Civil societies in these countries have played significant roles, in all 
these phases of democratisation and continue to play a crucial role in the process of democratic 
consolidation. The two countries, therefore, provide a suitable pair of cases to test whether the 
constraints confronting advocacy groups influence or shape the trajectory of civil society 
through the process of democratisation. The study, therefore, proposed that the uncertainty for 
advocacy groups in the post-transitional political and institutional environment is as a result of 
a three-fold dilemma for these groups; 
a) Unclear roles in the post-transitional political and institutional environment. 
b) Unclear strategies for articulating demands for the process of democratic consolidation 
c) Unclear relationship with the newly democratic states 
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2.4.3.2. Proposition 2: State strategies and Advocacy groups: A Modified Fowler’s 
Model 
This study argues that although both Kenya and Zambia embraced multi-party 
democracy in the early 1990s improved civil liberties and political rights, the governments have 
continued to perceive advocacy groups suspiciously and, therefore, employ similar strategies 
and tactics, which were used by their authoritarian predecessors to control and restrict the 
activities of advocacy groups. Ngunyi and Gathiaka (cited in Ndegwa 1996, p. 26) have 
identified several strategies that the Kenyan authoritarian state employed to restrict the activities 
of advocacy groups during the pre-transition period. These strategies include; deregistration 
and proscription, emasculation by forcing the removal of leaders, withdrawal of resources and 
privileges, the reconstitution of organisations by the state and the reduction of contacts with the 
state. Similarly, Fowler, (1991) developed a framework for understanding the African 
authoritarian state’s primary strategies for controlling or restricting the activities of civil society 
organisations. He identified a mix of three primary strategies, which included the use of NGO 
legislation, administrative co-optation, and political appropriation. He argues that the overall 
objective of these strategies was to help authoritarian governments to capitalise on NGO growth 
while maintaining the political status quo. 
This study slightly modified Fowler’s framework by including selective harassment and 
political propaganda as strategies that are becoming popular with the new democratic 
governments in both countries for controlling and restricting the activities of advocacy groups 
in the new political and institutional environment (Figure 2.3). The modified framework was 
then used to analyse the state strategies and their impact on the ability of advocacy groups to 
effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in both countries. Fowler’s 
framework was considered appropriate for this study for several reasons. Firstly, the framework 
is an agency-oriented model focusing on deliberate state actions towards civil society 
organisations and thus fitted within the study’s broader framework of domestic politico-
institutional approach and helped in analysing the incentives for such actions. Secondly, these 
state strategies meant to limit the activities of civil society organisations disproportionately 
target advocacy groups in both countries, which are the focus of this study. Finally, the 
framework was appropriate for this study since it is informed by experiences of civil society 
groups drawn from both Eastern and Southern Africa, regions of Africa, where both Kenya and 
Zambia are located respectively. 
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The rationale for state attempts to control advocacy groups’ activities is based on the 
deep-seated suspicions of advocacy groups by the state due to advocacy groups’ challenge to 
the state’s territorial hegemony, national security, autonomy, continued legitimation and 
revenue (Young, 1988). Governments have also accused civil society groups of representing 
foreign interests, meddling in domestic affairs to promote regime change and unaccountable to 
the citizens. In addition, over the last decade, the “war on terror” after 9/11 terrorists attack in 
the United States has increased governments’ concerns with terrorism and the need to control 
or restrict foreign funding to non-state actors. Further, the endorsement of the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 by ninety-nine countries and major international donors has 
resulted in unintended consequences for civil society groups, with most developing countries 
misinterpreting the harmonization and alignment of aid with partner countries priorities to mean 
“host government ownership” (Rutzen, 2015) and, therefore, endeavour to control civil society 
funding and impose transparency and accountability measures through government regulation. 
In Africa, the state’s behaviour towards social formations has also been shaped by the effects 
of colonialism, where the state, “embodies the full strength of and instrumentality of 
colonialism” (Osaghae, 2003.p. 3) and displays a totalising tendency towards society (Bayart, 
1986) with the main goal of “seeking to achieve unrestricted domination over civil society” 
(Young, 1999), 
In the case of Kenya, Wanyande (1999) argues that civil society groups were widely 
viewed by the state as competitors for legitimacy, until 1986, when the government officially 
recognised them as partners in the development process. Despite the official recognition, the 
state continued to display controlling tendencies, especially towards advocacy groups. Okuku 
(2002) has also noted that the control of civil society groups in Africa by the state are mainly 
driven by the need to control revenues, which sustain the entrenched patronage system in the 
continent. Bratton (1989, p. 572-6) thus concludes that “the amount of space allowed to NGOs 
in any given country is determined first and foremost by political considerations, rather than by 
any calculation of the contribution of non-governmental organisations to economic and social 
development.” This calculation is mainly targeted at advocacy groups, which are traditionally 
perceived to be critical of government policies, behaviour, and actions.  
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In Fowler’s model, authoritarian regimes in Africa mostly viewed NGO as “both an 
asset and a liability” and, therefore, reacted to the growth and expansion of Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) with strategies that helped them retain the economic advantages offered 
by NGOs, while countering the political disadvantages, which NGOs represented (Fowler, 
1991, p. 64). The counter strategy, therefore, disproportionately targeted advocacy groups, as 
explained above. Fowler offers three significant strategies that authoritarian states in Africa 
employed to control and restrict the activities of civil society organisations; 
i) Introduction of NGO Legislations 
The state’s enactment of laws that regulate the operations of Non-State Actors impose both 
obligations and benefits to these groups. With the rapid growth and expansion of civil society 
groups in Africa from the late 1980s to early 1990s due to increased support and funding from 
international donors, most African states introduced NGO legislation under the guise of 
regulating the sector. Fowler notes that the most common reasons used to justify such regulation 
included; 
• To protect against abuse of status by NGOs 
• To support the coordination of NGO activities 
• To create alignment with the official system of development administration 
• To protect donor funds from misuse and abuse 
• To ensure national security  
• To control or restrict NGOs from questioning those in power 
Although NGO legislations impose obligations on and offer benefits for the organisations 
that they regulate, Fowler argues that in the real sense, authoritarian African governments were 
using NGO legislation to achieve political objectives by restricting the activities of these 
organizations through such laws. The NGO legislations enacted imposed strict conditions for 
foreign funding, severe penalties for violations of NGO laws, mandatory annual re-registration, 
and formation of government bodies with excessive discretionary powers to monitor and 
regulate civil society organisations. These kinds of provisions restrict the activities and 
operations of NGOs, undermine their autonomy and independence and, therefore, significantly 
impact on their ability to contribute to governance and the process of democratic consolidation 
effectively. 
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ii) Administrative Co-optation 
 Fowler (1991, p. 67), defines administrative co-optation as the process, whereby NGOs 
are required to fit into non-participatory systems of development administration to “ensure that 
their priorities and endeavours conform with national development priorities. The groups are 
increasingly obliged to have their activities approved through the bureaucratic procedures used 
by the government itself.” International donors have also encouraged this practice by requiring 
government approval of NGOs as a condition for receiving funding. In other words, it means 
the incorporation of civil society groups’ activities into state systems. Fowler notes that it is not 
unusual for governments to require some realignment of development policies.  
However, he argues that forcing NGOs to fit into such rigid and bureaucratic 
governmental procedures have led to three significant consequences for NGOs and other types 
of civil society organisations.  Firstly, it has subordinated the development choices of NGOs 
and POs (Peoples Organisations) to approval by state organs, which are not accountable to the 
people and only further their own interests. Secondly, it affects NGO effectiveness by reducing 
their local sensitivity and interferes with their comparative advantages, such as the flexibility 
of operations, agenda setting, innovation and reaching the most vulnerable and marginalised 
citizens in society. Finally, it has been used by governments and politicians to satisfy their own 
legitimacy imperatives by claiming that NGOs are working on their behalf and bringing 
additional benefits to the people. This study employed a broadened scope of co-optation, which 
included, both direct and quasi-co-optation of advocacy groups’ leadership into state 
bureaucracy. 
iii) Political Appropriation 
Political appropriation is the process by which NGOs are incorporated into state apparatus 
and bureaucracy while continuing to operate registered formal groups.  Fowler (1991) notes 
that there are two significant ways in which political appropriation operates in Africa. Firstly, 
in single-party regimes in Africa, political parties deliberately appropriate NGOs by absorption 
or affiliation. Elites, politicians, and bureaucrats establish NGOs to access donor resources for 
patronage purposes and ultimately dominate institutional spaces.  Secondly, there is also the 
formation of nominally independent, but in real fact, government-controlled NGOs (GONGOs), 
which provide civil servants with access to international donor resources. Such organisations 
formally remain outside the government but operate as “instruments of the state” by supporting 
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official government positions and policies. In some cases, such organisations also receive 
funding from the state. Political appropriation significantly contributes to the blurring of 
boundaries between the state and civil society and more importantly undermine the autonomy, 
independence, credibility, and legitimacy of NGOs and other types of civil society 
organisations. Additionally, it extends political patronage and legitimacy of authoritarian 
regimes through NGOs that are involved in the process. Finally, political appropriation 
significantly reduces the ability of civil society groups to play the critical role of a watchdog, 
challenge unpopular policies of the state and contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation.  
iv) Selective harassment and Political propaganda 
 Although Fowler’s (1991) framework of state strategies for controlling the activities of 
advocacy groups only includes the use of NGO legislation, co-optation, and political 
appropriation, this study included selective harassment and political propaganda, which have 
become popular with the newly democratic governments of both Kenya and Zambia. Selective 
harassment includes, brutal police attacks of advocacy groups leaders and supporters during 
demonstrations and protests, arbitrary arrests, threats of deregistration of advocacy groups and 
in some cases imprisonment, while political propaganda includes, public smear campaigns by 
the state branding advocacy groups as “foreign agents” serving imperial agenda, “evil society” 
and “sell-outs” mainly to undermine advocacy groups’ legitimacy, and credibility with the 
public and therefore, reduce their ability to effectively contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation. 
Figure 2 3 Summary of the Modified Fowler's Framework 
State Strategies towards Advocacy groups 
Co-optation 
Political appropriation 
Use of Legislation 
Selective harassment and political propaganda 
 
Source: Author created from Fowler (1991) “The Role of NGOs in Changing State-Society Relations: 
Perspectives from Eastern and Southern Africa,” Development Policy Review, 9 (1 ): 53-84 
 
 
 
Reasons for state action 
Territorial hegemony 
Legitimacy 
Revenue 
National Security 
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Regarding state strategies to control the activities of advocacy groups in the new political 
dispensation in both Kenya and Zambia, the study proposed the following: 
a) The new democratic states in both Kenya and Zambia have adopted new forms of co-
optation to control the activities of advocacy groups. 
b) The new democratic states in both Kenya and Zambia have expanded the use of 
legislation and political appropriation to constrain the activities of advocacy groups.  
c) Selective harassment and political propaganda against advocacy groups have become 
primary strategies used by the new administrations to control the activities of advocacy 
groups in both countries 
d) The various forms of co-optation, the use of legislation, selective harassment and 
political propaganda all undermine the autonomy and independence of advocacy groups 
and therefore circumscribe their ability to effectively contribute to the process of 
democratic consolidation in both countries. 
2.4.3.3. Proposition 3: Popular disengagement and Advocacy groups 
 
The concept of disengagement is central in the political analysis of state-society 
relations in contemporary Africa. It was introduced by Albert Hirschman (1970) in social 
organisations, who used the terms “exit and voice.” He argued that those who are dissatisfied 
with an organisation’s declining performance have two options. They can protest by the public 
voice, which means opposition to the organisation to modify its performance or protest by the 
private exit, which means withdrawal from the organisation. Drawing from Hirschman, Victor 
Azarya, Naomi Chazan and others in the 1980s developed the concept of incorporation and 
disengagement from the state as an alternative theory to the state-centred approaches that had 
dominated explanations of state failure in Africa (Azarya 1988; Chazan, 1988a; Azarya and 
Chazan, 1987). In articulating this theory further in his work, Re-Ordering State-Society 
Relations in Africa, Azarya puts greater emphasis on the continuous and often simultaneous 
responses by various groups and sectors within society to state actions, particularly in response 
to the states’ ability or inability to meet particular needs.  
According to Azarya (1988. p. 6-7), incorporation and disengagement are “societal 
responses to state actions (or anticipated state actions), which lead to a perceived change in the 
field of opportunities for given groups or individuals.” He defines incorporation as the “process 
whereby large segments of the population associate with the state and take part in its activities 
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in order to share its resources” while, disengagement as the “tendency to withdraw from the 
state and keep at a distance from its channels as a hedge against its instability and dwindling 
resource base.” Withdrawal from the state can thus be social, cultural, religious, political or 
economic. The withdrawal is based on society’s awareness of the state’s incompetence, 
declining capacities or illegitimacy and effectively undermines and delegitimises state actions 
and authority. It is important to note that in Azarya’s formulation, disengagement does not 
include active opposition to the regime with the objective of replacing its rulers or changing 
government policies. The groups or individuals disengaging thus seek to ignore, evade, mitigate 
or ward off the state (Baker, 2001). The state can respond to these processes with a wide range 
of choices ranging from “encouragement to policy adjustments, repression, and even 
reconciliation” (Azarya 1988, p.15).  
However, several scholars have lamented that most studies utilising the concept of 
disengagement have “singularly neglected the horizontal dimension within society, i.e., the 
relations among the various constituent actors in society” (Barkan 1992, p. 6). The theory of 
disengagement has almost exclusively been applied in analysing state-society relations.  
Chazan, one of the proponents of the theory has advised that the theory need not be restricted 
to the state alone because the state is not “the sole magnet of social, economic and political 
exchange. It constitutes merely one of the many foci of social actions...politics, power, and 
control are not necessarily coterminous with the state” (Chazan 1988a, p. 123). Similarly, 
Osaghae (1995, p. 195), who has written extensively on the concept notes that the state only 
occupies one of the several public spaces, whereas other authorities such as civil society 
organisations frequently occupy others. Baker (2001) in his analysis of various types of 
disengagements in Africa, therefore, broadened the definition of disengagement to include 
disengagement of citizens from non-state actors. This study, therefore, systematically apply the 
concept of popular disengagement in a horizontal dimension in explaining the dynamics of the 
relationship between advocacy groups and their membership in both Kenya and Zambia and 
argues that, if the weakening of state capacity and competencies can lead to individuals and 
groups to devise alternative methods of sustaining themselves socially and economically, then 
the same can apply in the pursuit of interests within civil society. If individuals perceive 
advocacy groups to be incapable of meeting their needs and expectations, then they are likely 
to disengage from such arenas.  
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The study argues that disengagement is likely to be the chosen option for individuals 
and groups disappointed with advocacy groups performance in the process of democratic 
consolidation since it is private, within reach, low in resource demand and with minimal risk of 
sanctions (Baker 2001). As Walzer (1992, p. 89) has noted, “Civil society is the space for the 
un-coerced human association.” In other words, the institutions of civil society have no 
jurisdiction over individuals that those individuals cannot avoid, and any person can easily 
initiate and withdraw from such institutions without any sanctions. Civil society institutions 
lack the power to coerce individuals to follow their rules. Moreover, withdrawal from civil 
society groups is a readily available alleviation or invisible means of protest, which Hirschman 
(1970) also believes would be a most likely response to voluntary associations’ poor 
performance. It is important to note that such invisible means of protest are always overlooked 
in political analysis, although they are extremely vital in understanding the primary constraints 
confronting advocacy groups in the process of democratic consolidation in Africa. Additionally, 
the theory of disengagement is an actor-oriented theory which fits well with the broader 
politico-institutional approach for this study. The study argues that popular disengagement from 
advocacy groups in the new political dispensation in both Kenya and Zambia is a significant 
constraint that has reduced advocacy groups’ capacity to effectively contribute to the process 
of democratic consolidation. The study proposes the following; 
1. The nature of disengagement 
Popular disengagement from advocacy groups depends on macro, meso and micro-scale 
factors. Macro-scale factors include the availability of strategy, political and economic 
conditions and spatial distribution of advocacy groups. Meso-scale factors include levels of 
membership and citizen participation in advocacy groups, legitimacy, agenda, and 
representation. Micro-scale factors include the availability of resources, personal efficacy, and 
cynicism. The relationship between the macro, meso and micro-scale factors is illustrated in 
Figure 2.4 below. 
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Source: Author created from the literature on macro, meso and micro scale factors  
 
2. The pattern of disengagement from advocacy groups 
▪ Popular disengagement from advocacy groups crosses social categories (gender, class) 
and spatial divides (Urban/Rural)  
▪ Popular disengagement from advocacy groups is a responsive and adaptive strategy 
employed by citizens when their own organizations are unable to meet their needs and 
expectations. 
▪ Popular disengagement from advocacy groups is both an individual and a collective 
response to advocacy groups’ failure to meet its member’s needs and expectations. 
3. The significance of popular disengagement 
▪ The nature and extent of popular disengagement from advocacy groups affect the 
legitimacy, credibility, and capacity of these groups to effectively contribute to the 
process of democratic consolidation. 
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Figure 2 4 The relationship between Macro, Meso and Micro Factors 
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2.5. Some difficulties with the concept of disengagement 
 
Baker (2001, p.12-15) has outlined three significant limitations of the concept of 
disengagement, which apply to this study. Firstly, he argues that the same phenomenon of 
disengagement is capable of being classified in one instance by some scholars as disengagement 
and in another instance as engagement. These types of classifications can be confusing when 
the concept is used in the political analysis. Azarya (1988, p.10-11) who is a major proponent 
of the theory of disengagement admits that this is a “vexing” problem that creates a 
“methodological quandary.” However, it must be noted that these difficulties do not render the 
concept incapable of being used to understand and explain political processes as long as the 
analysts explicitly define the perspective in which the concept is being used.  
Secondly, Baker argues that there are times when it appears that there is an ambiguity 
that some individuals or groups can be disengaging and engaging simultaneously, for instance, 
actors may be disengaging from advocacy groups and joining other civil society organizations 
such as self-help groups and kinship associations. He explains that this straddling is not because 
they are inconsistent in their views, but because they are consistent in their desire to maximise 
their own benefits. This kind of process is, therefore, not unusual within the dynamics of civil 
society groups and their membership. Finally, the author argues that there are difficulties 
associated with conceptually differentiating between disengagement and other closely related 
concepts such as non-engagement and apparent disengagement. It is possible that the 
phenomena usually associated with disengagement may be the evasion of engagement in the 
first place. He concludes that all these are difficult conceptual issues and advise that analysts 
should ensure transparency and clarity when applying the concept in their analyses since these 
difficulties do not invalidate the usefulness and applicability of the overall theory of popular 
disengagement in understanding both state-society relations and the relations between various 
components of society. 
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2.6. Summary 
This chapter reviewed the essential literature on the relationship between civil society 
and democracy, including the perspectives of the sceptics, and laid out the study’s theoretical 
framework, which guided the investigation. It discussed the conceptualization of civil society 
and suggested the best way to study “real” civil societies in Africa. In reviewing the relationship 
between civil society and democracy, the chapter employed Forbig’s (2002) framework, which 
categorised the role of civil society in the process of democratisation into five functions; the 
Lockean, Hegelian, Pluralists’, and Tocquevillian functions, historical institutionalists and the 
sceptics. The Lockean function, views civil society groups as vehicles through which citizens 
can challenge the excesses of the state. Civil society groups are considered a counterweight to 
state power. Liberals consider this function as the most critical function of civil society in a 
democracy as it relates to control of the state by society. The Hegelian function emphasises the 
contribution of civil society to democracy through restructuring various channels of interest 
aggregation, articulation, representation and mediation, while the pluralist function, holds that 
civil society as organised groups can influence the political agenda in the policy bargaining 
process and integrate individuals into social groups, where they have shared beliefs and values, 
which shape social identity and have mitigating effects on entrenched societal cleavages, which 
may cause conflicts and instability, which are detrimental to the process of democratic 
consolidation. However, the chapter noted that the pluralists’ assumption overstates the extent 
to which interests and views are represented in the political bargaining process, equality of 
power of interest groups and the neutrality of the state as an arbiter in the policy-making 
process. 
The section also discussed the Tocquevillian function, which uses the concept of social 
capital to explain how active participation of individuals in civil society help to inculcate skills 
of cooperation and shared responsibility for collective action, besides the development of 
positive civic virtues, attitudes, norms, and values such as trust and tolerance, all of which 
support democratic citizenship. However, the chapter noted that the concept of social capital 
has been criticised on both empirical and normative grounds as regards democratization. 
Scholars have questioned the empirical link between trust and democracy, although most 
scholars agree that trust and democracy are closely linked. Others have argued that the concept 
is overly stretched to explain almost everything and in the process lost its meaning and that the 
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concept has significant methodological and normative baggage. Despite all these criticisms, the 
chapter concluded that the concept of social capital remains a useful concept in explaining the 
relationship between civil society and democracy.  
Finally, the section also discussed historical institutionalists perspective, which 
emphasizes the direct political leverage or influence on political and economic processes that 
civil society groups have through lobbying, provision of information, aggregating, articulating 
views of citizens and mobilization for political, social and economic causes. However, sceptics 
remain unconvinced by the validity of the presumed causative relationship between civil society 
and democracy. They point out that there is no concrete evidence about how the causal 
mechanism works empirically,  that civil society alone is not a guarantee for democracy, and 
that what is more significant for democracy is the development of strong political institutions. 
Despite the diversity of opinions about the relationship between civil society and 
democratisation, there is a consensus among political analysts that a robust, active and vibrant 
civil society is beneficial to the consolidation of democracy. This study takes the position that 
advocacy groups’ functions as part of civil society are beneficial to the process of democratic 
consolidation, although not a sufficient condition for the same.  
The second section adopts the conceptualisation of civil society as a distinct societal 
sphere in which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests and employed an 
empirical-analytical approach with a functional perspective in studying civil society in Kenya 
and Zambia.  The empirical-analytical approach focuses on the purpose of the activity of 
advocacy groups rather than their form of organisation.  It is thus much more realistic and 
practical as it studies “what existing civil societies are doing” as opposed to “what civil society 
ought to do.” The approach was adopted because it transcends the cultural relativism rooted in 
the western origin of the concept of civil society and its perceived incompatibility with other 
parts of the world. Consequently, the empirical-analytical approach facilitates the adoption of 
the concept of civil society to non-western contexts. The approach also conceives civil society 
in a broader, more inclusive way thus allowing for the inclusion of Africa’s diverse and complex 
elements of associational life in the study of civil society and broadening the social basis for 
democratic consolidation. It also recognises the fluidity of the boundaries between civil society 
and other spheres of social life, an aspect that is more pronounced in the African setting, partly 
due to neopatrimonialism and thus needs capturing when studying civil society in Africa.  
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However, challenges in using the empirical-analytical approach include its broad 
definition of civil society, which assume the complexities within civil society and the use of the 
concept of civil society as a value-free tool to describe social phenomena. However, scholars 
agree that to use the concept of civil society in empirical studies successfully; it must cast aside 
its cultural and historical baggage and be viewed as a universal concept of collective action and 
used as a heuristic tool free from any ideological or socio-historical trappings. 
The third section lays out the theoretical framework that guided and shaped the 
formulation of research questions, the research propositions, and structured data collection, 
analysis, and interpretation of findings. The framework focused and situated the study within 
the scholarly conversation, guiding the researchers thinking about the phenomenon under study 
and managing critical issues of the study such as confidence, validity, and reliability. The 
theoretical framework, therefore, provided the structure or the frame of the study. The chapter 
outlined the domestic politico-institutional approach as the primary approach to the study.  This 
approach holds that institutions, whether formal or informal and interests and strategic 
behaviour of political actors such as advocacy groups shape political outcomes within specific 
contexts. The constraints experienced by advocacy groups in Kenya and Zambia are, therefore, 
assumed to emerge from the political and institutional variables and patterns of behaviour of 
advocacy groups in the process of democratic consolidation. The approach emphasises the 
interaction of actors, structures and processes based on domestic political and institutional 
factors with specific attention to structural and contingency dimensions. The approach 
represents a shift from preconditions and agents only driven explanations to the incorporation 
of the structure into the analysis of agency. It emphasises the role of domestic actors as the most 
critical in the process of democratic consolidation and its concern with rules and struggles 
enables political analysts to address a full range of other issues that relate to advocacy groups 
and democratic consolidation. However, it must be noted that applying domestic politico-
institutional approach where states lack strong formal institutions may pose challenges which 
analysts must consider when addressing the issues under study.   
The chapter outlined the two primary research questions which focused on why 
advocacy groups are constrained in the post-transitional states of Kenya and Zambia and how 
such constraints have impacted advocacy groups’ ability to effectively contribute to the process 
of democratic consolidation. The two primary research questions guided the research process, 
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provided structure and focus for the study and were the basis for data collection and analysis. 
Supplemental questions revolved around the primary research questions and were all geared 
towards achieving the overall objectives of the study. These research questions were translated 
into three major research propositions, which were informed by different well-established 
theories within civil society and democratisation literature. The first proposition was based on 
the uncertain political environment in which advocacy groups must operate in their quest to 
contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. The chapter lays out two contrasting 
models that attempt to explain the trajectory of civil society organisations during the 
democratisation process. The civil society model posits that civil society groups are 
consequential in all stages of democratisation if the process proceeds to completion. Scholars 
who employ this model predict the continuous rise of civil society organizations as 
democratisation progresses due to the mutually reinforcing relationship between civil society 
and democracy, while the social movement’s model posits that social movements rise and fall 
with the democratisation process. 
 The chapter thus proposed that because of the uncertainty created by the advent of 
democratisation process and the effects of political change, advocacy groups confront a three-
fold dilemma: unclear roles in the new political dispensation, unclear strategies for contributing 
to the process of democratic consolidation and unclear relationship with the newly democratic 
states. The second proposition was informed by a modified Fowler’s (1991) model which 
explains the strategies that authoritarian states in Africa employ to control the activities of 
advocacy groups.  The strategies included the use of NGO legislation, co-optation, political 
appropriation, selective harassment, and political propaganda.  The overall objective of these 
strategies is to help governments capitalise on NGO growth while maintaining the political 
status quo. The chapter considered Fowler’s framework appropriate for this study because it is 
an agency-oriented model, which fits into the broader theoretical framework adopted for this 
study. Secondly, state control of civil society organisations disproportionately targets advocacy 
groups-the focus of this study and finally, the model is informed by experiences of civil society 
groups from Eastern and Southern Africa, where the study’s case studies are located. The study 
thus proposed that new democratic states of Kenya and Zambia have developed new forms of 
co-optation and expanded the use of the old strategies, which have all undermined advocacy 
groups ability to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation.  
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The third proposition was derived from the concept of disengagement in its horizontal 
dimension, which attempts to explain the relations among various constituent actors within 
society as opposed to state-society relations and in this case the relationship between advocacy 
groups and their members and supporters. The study proposed that the nature of disengagement 
from advocacy groups depends on macro, meso and micro scale factors, while the pattern of 
disengagement from advocacy groups crosses social categories and spatial divides, is a 
responsive and adaptive strategy employed by citizens when their own organizations are unable 
to meet their needs and expectations and is both an individual and a collective response to 
advocacy groups’ failure to meet its member’s needs and expectations. Thirdly, the study 
proposed the nature and extent of popular disengagement from advocacy groups affect the 
legitimacy, credibility, and capacity of these groups to effectively contribute to the process of 
democratic consolidation. However, the chapter noted that there are three major difficulties 
when using the concept of disengagement. The same phenomenon of disengagement can be 
classified as engagement by other scholars, individuals can also engage and disengage 
simultaneously, and there are difficulties associated with conceptually differentiating between 
disengagement and closely related concepts such as non-engagement and apparent 
disengagement. The chapter, therefore, emphasized the need by analysts to ensure transparency 
and clarity when applying the concept of disengagement. The next chapter presents the overall 
research design of the comparative study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY: COMPARATIVE AND CASE-ORIENTED QUALITATIVE 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1. Introduction 
The study employed a combination of a comparative and case-oriented, qualitative 
research design to meet its two-fold objectives, of investigating and critically examining the 
primary constraints confronting advocacy groups in the post-transitional states of Kenya and 
Zambia and assessing the impact of such constraints on the ability of advocacy groups to 
effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. Conventionally, comparative 
and case study methods are considered as separate methods of research, where the former 
involves comparison of a small number of cases (Sartori, 1991), while the latter is usually 
regarded as a single case investigation.  However, recent studies have demonstrated that the 
most reliable means of drawing inferences from case studies is by using a combination of case 
analysis and cross-case comparison in a single study (Goodrick, 2014; Smith-Hohn, 2010). 
This study, therefore, combined case analysis with cross-case comparison with the overall goal 
of obtaining a more detailed and holistic understanding of the two cases with regard to the 
research questions. This chapter presents the overall research design of the comparative study 
and explains the methods and processes that were used in this investigation. Following this 
introduction, Section II elaborates on the rationale and the suitability of the comparative and 
case-oriented qualitative research design for this study, while Section III explains the case 
selection criteria based on the Most Different Systems Design (MDSD). Section IV focuses on 
instrumentation, sampling and sample size, data collection procedures, data analysis, and 
interpretation, while section V is a discussion of the ethical issues related to this study.  A 
summary of the chapter then follows. 
3.2. Case study design 
 
 Yin (2014, p. 2) defines a case study research design as “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) within its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident; and in 
which multiple sources of evidence are used.” This type of design can be a single or multiple 
case study. The use of case studies is established in political science and frequently used to 
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present a detailed and comprehensive analysis of contemporary phenomenon at the macro, 
meso and micro levels of research. The choice of case study research design for this study was, 
therefore, was based on five factors that are discussed in detail by Yin (2009). Firstly, this study 
sought to answer the “why” and “how” type of research questions and focused on a set of 
contemporary events.  It investigated and critically examined why advocacy groups were 
constrained in the post-transitional political and institutional environment in both Kenya and 
Zambia and how such constraints had impacted on advocacy groups’ ability to effectively 
contribute to the process of democratic consolidation.  
Secondly, the researcher had little or no control over the behaviour of those involved in 
the study. The respondents, who included key experts on issues of civil society and 
democratisation and ordinary citizens in both countries were free to answer the questions as 
they chose with no undue influence. Thirdly, contextual conditions were considered relevant to 
the study as it was essential to understand the context under which respondents developed their 
experiences, attitudes, views, and opinions on the issues of the study. Fourthly, the boundaries 
between the constraints confronting advocacy groups and the context in which citizens 
developed their experiences with advocacy groups were not explicitly clear. Finally, the 
research design was aligned with the study’s research paradigm of interpretive approach36 and 
fitted into the study’s hybrid thematic analysis by easily allowing for both confirmity as well as 
explanatory findings to be analysed (Yin, 2014; Hyde, 2000) 
The qualitative approach as part of the overall research design provided a detailed, rich 
and in-depth understanding of context, meanings, experiences, and views of the respondents 
(Pope and Mays, 1995) concerning the issues of the study. Additionally, qualitative data was 
useful in exploring complex, contextual, social and political experiences and issues (De Liste, 
2011; Mason, 2006). Such issues included citizens’ lived experiences, actions, attitudes, and 
opinions, with the purpose of developing more in-depth levels of explanations and meanings as 
concerns the dilemmas confronting advocacy groups and their relationship with the process of 
democratic consolidation.  
                                                             
 
36 The constructivist/interpretive approach assumes that individuals have an active role in the construction of social 
reality and that research methods should capture this reality. Human beings attach meaning to their social reality 
and thus human action should be considered meaningful. 
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The study was based on the comparative method, which Lijphart (1971) defines as the 
“systematic analysis of a small number of cases, entailing at least two observations, yet too few 
to permit the application of conventional statistical analysis.” It thus stands in contrast to the 
statistical or quantitative method of comparison. Similarly, Nohlen (1994a) defines the 
comparative method as a systematic comparison of cases to generate empirical generalizations 
and test pre-determined propositions (Nohlen, 1994a). The study thus generated pre-determined 
propositions, which guided the research process. The comparative component of the research 
design for this study had multiple functions.  Firstly, it was necessary for control purposes, 
which means that it allowed for verifying whether generalisations held across the two cases 
(Sartori, 1991). Additionally, it allowed for the description, analysis and synthesis of 
similarities, differences and patterns across the two settings regarding the constraints 
confronting advocacy groups and the extent to which observed relationships were tied to 
specific settings and contexts (Kohn, 1989). This relationship was critical since the 
effectiveness of advocacy groups in the process of democratic consolidation is mediated by 
contextual features of their political, social and economic environments.   
Secondly, the comparative approach helped in the comprehensive understanding of the 
context in which theoretical problems being studied occurred and, therefore, account for or 
challenge the pre-determined theories vis-à-vis lived realities in each case.37 It enabled an in-
depth analysis, which is the virtue of a case study method. Since the two cases were significantly 
different in their civil society formations and other contemporary social, economic and political 
variables, comparison across cases (unit of analysis) enabled a better understanding, 
explanations, and interpretation of the individual cases (Lim, 2006). It thus provided knowledge 
that transcended country boundaries in keeping with Sartori’s (1994, p. 16) assertion that “He 
who knows one country, only knows none.” Thirdly, comparative analysis helped in building 
stronger theoretical explanations for the research questions by refining, modifying and 
confirming theories from empirical data. The comparison of the unit of analysis allowed for 
broad-based inferences about the constraints confronting advocacy groups in both countries and 
how such constraints had impacted on the groups’ ability to effectively contribute to the process 
of democratic consolidation.  
                                                             
 
37 See Burnham et al (2008) Research Methods in Politics, Palgrave, Macmillan, New York 
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Finally, the comparative component of the study made it much more structured and 
manageable and conclusions drawn from the findings more reliable, robust and precise (Yin, 
2014; Burnham et al., 2008). The two-case study design provided a better basis for comparative 
analysis and allowed for more in-depth and holistic insight into the research problem, helping 
to describe, understand and explain the problem (Baxter and Jack, 2008; Tellis, 1997b) in a way 
that thoroughly answered the research questions. 
3.3. Case selection  
 
The two cases in this study were systematically selected using a theory-driven Small-N 
research process, to specifically maximize contrast. The study thus applied Przeworski and 
Teune’s (1970) approach of the “Most Different Systems Design (MDSD)” based on the logic 
of Mill’s “Method of agreement or similarity”38 (Mill, 1868) as a case selection process. MDSD 
is a purposeful general comparative research strategy in the field of political science. It means 
that the selected cases of Kenya and Zambia that were investigated and compared in this study 
were maximally different in all the characteristics of their civil societies or extraneous variables, 
except on the outcome of interest or the phenomenon under investigation, which was “a 
constrained advocacy sub-sector of civil society.” In other words, the “most different system, 
with the same outcome” (Murray-Faure, 1994, p. 316). The study fulfilled all the major features 
of the research task that satisfy the applicability of MDSD as outlined by Anckar (2008). These 
features include the requirement that variable interactions must be studied at the sub-systemic 
level, which in this case were advocacy groups as the unit of analysis; that deductive research 
strategy be employed as done in this study with apriori propositions and lastly, that the study 
operates with a constant dependent variable, which in this case was a “constrained advocacy 
sub-sector of civil society.” 
 
 
                                                             
 
38 John Stuart Mill (1868). A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the 
Principles of Evidence and Methods of Scientific Investigation, 7th Edition. London: Longman, Green, Reader and 
Dyer 
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The method was also appropriate because the goal of this study was to establish 
correlation and not causation, which is difficult to establish using MDSD (Lim, 2006; Ragin, 
1989) since we cannot rule out alternative explanations. Finally, establishing contrast enabled 
the identification of critical explanatory variables for the study and the development of more 
generalisable conclusions (Della Porta, 2008; Skocpol and Somers, 1980).  Kenya and Zambia 
are two Sub-Saharan African countries that share common historical, political and social 
experiences, yet have significant differences in their civil society formations. Firstly, regarding 
historical similarities, both countries achieved their independence in the early 1960s from 
Britain and briefly experimented with multi-party politics before adopting one-party systems. 
Chazan (1999) referred to these regimes as “administrative hegemonic regimes” with strong 
executives, coercive state apparatus, and one-party systems. Opposition political parties were 
banned, and civil societies in both countries automatically assumed the role of opposition to the 
authoritarian systems that had been established. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) have 
described the political systems established in both countries as “competitive one-party 
systems,” which means that despite being one-party systems, some political competition was 
allowed within the party at the parliamentary elections level.  
Secondly, both Kenya and Zambia experimented with different strains of socialism as 
an economic and political ideology and as an alternative to capitalism, which was then 
perceived by most African countries as a colonial ideology. Kenya adopted what was referred 
to as the “African Socialism39,” in 1965 based on African traditions, values of political 
democracy, and mutual responsibility, while Zambia, opted for “Zambian Humanism” in 1967, 
based on a combination of traditional African values and western socialist and Christian values. 
The ideology placed the human person at the centre of all social, economic and political 
development.40However, both ideologies did not fare well in their implementation, and the 
countries eventually became predominantly capitalistic systems. Thirdly, following the “third 
wave” democratisation process (Huntington, 1991) that swept across Africa from the late 1980s 
to the early 1990s, both countries went through political transitions, in which civil society 
played a significant role as part of the pro-democracy movement.  
                                                             
 
39 Sessional Paper, No.10 of 1965, Government Printer, Nairobi, Kenya. 
40 Kaunda, K.D (1967) ‘A Letter to my Children,’ Lusaka, Zambia Government Press and Kaunda, K (1971) 
Humanism and a guide to its implementation, Volume 2, Zambia Information Services, Lusaka, Zambia. 
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After more than two decades of multi-party democracy, both countries have become 
electoral democracies with electoral competition and minimum levels of civic freedom 
(Diamond, 1996). They have moved beyond the initial phase of transition to a more complex 
and challenging phase of democratic consolidation. However, Kenya and Zambia are also 
fundamentally different in crucial contemporary political, social and economic features, which 
make them an interesting and suitable template for a comparative study such as this. Although 
both countries have robust and active civil societies that occupy a significant space in their 
dynamic political landscapes, the two civil society formations differ strikingly in their nature 
and character, which has significant implications for their potential contribution to positive 
social and political change (Ibrahim, 2015; Hadenius and Uggla, 1996). Progress towards 
democratic consolidation can thus be explained at least in part by the variations in their civil 
society formations.   
Studying civil societies in both countries, immediately after the political transitions in 
the early 1990s, Bratton (1994) noted that the configuration of civil societies in both countries 
was organizationally, materially and ideologically different. These differences have remained 
to date, although the lead organisations identified by Bratton in both countries have 
considerably weakened, impacting on the overall capacity and effectiveness of these civil 
societies in the process of democratic consolidation. This study employed Bratton’s (1994) 
framework to examine the differences between Kenya and Zambia’s civil society formations. 
Firstly, Bratton (1994, p. 66) defines an organisational dimension of civil society as the 
“intermediate association and institutional linkages among them” and identified the “lead 
organisation” in civil society in Kenya and Zambia based on their prominence, size, density, 
and scope. In Zambia, he identified the labour movement, the Zambia Congress of Trade 
Unions (ZCTU) as the lead organisation, whose membership at the time represented more than 
80 percent41 of the total working force in formal employment.  
 
                                                             
 
41 Though this membership percentage has gone down since the political transition due to liberalization of the 
labour sector that has led to the creation of other independent national Labour Unions and government 
retrenchment of civil servants 
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ZCTU had an effective organisational structure, autonomy and a history of confronting 
the Zambian regime, besides having close links with alienated groups and other civil society 
organisations and the masses (Van Doepp, 1996).  In Kenya, Bratton (1994) identified the “lead 
organisation” as the Christian church, under the umbrella organisation, the National Council of 
Churches of Kenya (NCCK).42 The author noted that the characteristics of a lead organisation 
have implications for the overall strength and strategies of civil society in a country. For 
instance, churches engage in limited political roles and favour mediation and coalition building 
due to their social orientation, while labour unions are intrinsically class-based, well-organised 
and outrightly engage in partisan politics. He concludes that due to these differences, the 
organisational structure of civil society in Zambia was more favourable for political change 
than that of Kenya. While individual clergy of the church were at the forefront in the struggle 
for democracy in Kenya, the ZCTU became the main opposition to President Kaunda’s 
administration and was instrumental in the formation of the Movement for Multi-Party 
Democracy (MMD) under Frederick Chiluba which went on to defeat President Kenneth 
Kaunda of UNIP in the first multi-party elections in 1991.  
Although not discussed by Bratton (1994), this study considered the presence of an 
umbrella statutory body as an important aspect of the organisational structure of civil society 
as it has implications for the coordination and effectiveness of civil society activities which 
impact the process of democratic consolidation. Kenya has had such a statutory body, the NGO 
Council since 1993, which was established under the NGO Coordination Act of 1992. The body 
serves the function of representation and coordination of the activities of the sector, while 
Zambia has not had such a statutory body since independence, although the country is in the 
process of establishing a statutory body following the passing of the controversial NGO Act of 
2009. These structural differences impact on civil society strategies, capacity, operations and 
more importantly the degree of effectiveness in the process of democratic consolidation. 
    
                                                             
 
42 By 1990, NCCK was the largest national religious organization in Africa with thirty-two-member churches and 
associations and a staff of over 370 persons at headquarters and regional offices (Weekly Review, January 12, 1990). 
These numbers have since increased. 
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Since Bratton’s study in 1994, both the NCCK and ZCTU-the lead organisations within 
civil society in Kenya and Zambia, respectively, have relatively weakened. NCCK continued 
to be active in the reform process after the re-introduction of multi-party politics in 1991, 
conducting civic education and leading the agitation for the constitutional review process. 
However, after the 2002 general elections, which saw the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) 
ascend to power, the political landscape dramatically changed and NCCK decided to cooperate 
with the new administration as it believed that NARC was committed to the institutionalization 
of democracy. It became more lenient with the new government and retreated from the political 
sphere, hardly commenting on national issues and continuously supporting government 
positions. This change of approach was prompted by the fact that NCCK had closely worked 
with leaders in NARC for many years in opposition to remove the Moi regime from power. It 
was, therefore, challenging for the organisation to be critical of the NARC administration. 
Additionally, the new government had co-opted NCCK Secretary-General into state 
bureaucracy. Finally, ethnicity played a critical role in NCCK decision to cooperate with the 
state since its top leadership was dominated by the Kikuyu ethnic community-the same ethnic 
group as that of President Mwai Kibaki. The leadership thus easily capitulated to the 
government and the organization was politically appropriated by the state, which weakened its 
effectiveness in the process of democratic consolidation. 
Similarly, the new political dispensation presented ZCTU with an “acute strategic 
dilemma” (Alexander, 1993) on how to relate with the new MMD administration, which it had 
played a significant role in its formation and supported during the elections. Moreover, several 
leaders of MMD were former ZCTU officials, including, President Chiluba. However, the 
MMD administration had embraced SAPs, which included a reduction in social spending, trade 
liberalisation, removal of subsidies, and public sector retrenchment among other policies, which 
ZCTU had fiercely opposed during the Kaunda years. ZCTU was thus at crossroads with 
possible dangers of cooperating with the MMD administration yet the organisation’s leadership 
decided to support the administration and its policies mostly because they believed that “they 
were the government” (Larmer, 2005). The Chiluba administration embraced ZCTU support 
and cooperation but deliberately and diligently worked to weaken the organisation.  
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MMD employed multiple strategies to weaken the ZCTU in order to consolidate power 
and implement the Structural Adjustment policies, which ZCTU had fiercely opposed. First ly, 
the administration employed market strategies, which involved restrictive legislation to 
decentralise bargaining to weaken unions (Akwetey and Kraus, 2007). For instance, in 1993, it 
passed the Industrial and Labour Relations Act, which abolished mandatory unionisation of 
workers and compulsory dues check-off system. It also restricted workers right to strike and 
banned inter-sectoral solidarity strikes. The Act led to the emergence of several unions, while 
others disaffiliated from the ZCTU, leading to divisions within the labour movement. As a 
result, ZCTU lost vast numbers of its membership and revenue.  Additionally, privatisation 
under SAPs led to state retrenchment of employees, which further reduced union membership 
and revenue and ultimately weakened ZCTU bargaining power (Kraus, 2007) and its role in the 
process of democratic consolidation. The inability of ZCTU to defend its members undermined 
its authority and mobilisation capacity.  
Secondly, the MMD administration used corporatist strategies by incorporating ZCTU 
within the regime interests and granting some benefits to the union in exchange for state limits 
on trade union behaviour (Akwetey and Kraus, 2007). ZCTU appeared disorganised with no 
clear ideology or agenda on what it wanted from its relationship with MMD. It, therefore, 
supported policies that were detrimental to its own survival as a movement and against its own 
membership interests. Thirdly, MMD directly interfered with internal affairs of ZCTU through 
co-optation and influencing the selection of union leadership, which diminished the 
organization’s internal democracy (Kraus, 2007), caused internal divisions, and conflicts and 
further weakened the union. The disaffiliation of Mine Workers Union (MUZ) and the Zambia 
National Union of Teachers (ZNUT) was a tremendous numerical, and financial blow to ZCTU 
since the two organisations alone accounted for about 80 percent of ZCTU revenue (Akwetey 
and Kraus, 2007). The divisions also damaged the unity of ZCTU and further weakened its role 
in the process of democratic consolidation. Although the new ZCTU leadership that emerged 
from 2002 were not beholden to MMD as their predecessors, comparatively confrontational 
and assertive on the autonomy and independence of the organisation (Akwetey and Kraus, 
2007), it will likely take time for ZCTU to regain its autonomy, build a strong organisational 
structure, and accumulate resources to become a significant political force in the process of 
democratic consolidation in Zambia.  
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Bratton (1994) also noted that civil societies in Kenya and Zambia were also different 
regarding their independent capacity to acquire and control resources, which enables them to 
conduct their operations and implement their programmes effectively and efficiently. The 
author argues that this dimension of civil society has worked better for Kenya than Zambia for 
two significant reasons. Firstly, Kenya has had a long history with organized voluntary activity, 
encouraged by the government through the Harambee43 spirit, which broadened the base of 
cooperatives and the indigenous bourgeoisie, while in Zambia, the government discouraged the 
formation of voluntary groups and muzzled the ones that were in existence, except the church. 
Secondly, Kenya had a relatively better economic performance compared to Zambia. For 
instance, between 1965 and 1988, the Kenyan economy expanded at an average per capita Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of 1.9 percent annually, while the Zambian economy shrank by 2.1 
percent annually in the same period (World Bank, 1990). In 2010, Zambia’s GDP was estimated 
to be $20.03 billion, while Kenya’s GDP was double that of Zambia standing at $40.12 billion 
(UNDP, 2011). Moreover, Zambia ranking in the Human Development Index (HDI) dropped 
from 110 out of 136 countries in 1990 (0.465) to 166 out of 177 countries in 2005 (0.394) 
(UNDP, 2006).  
In 2008, UNDP ranked Zambia under low human development, with a human 
development index of 0.453, while Kenya was ranked under medium human development with 
a human development index of 0.532.  In 2014, Kenya was re-classified as a middle-income 
country becoming the 9th largest economy in Africa with a GDP of $53.3 million.44 It must be 
noted that economic performance in a country has a positive relationship with civil society 
growth and performance. Firstly, the economic decline affects the middle class, who are likely 
to form and contribute to the development of civil society organisations (Bratton, 1994; Lipset, 
1959). Secondly, the economic decline reduces the resources available to civil society 
organisations to operate and perform crucial functions for the process of democratic 
consolidation. With the relatively better economic performance, Kenya has more indigenous 
                                                             
 
43 Harambee is a Swahili word which means pulling together. The harambee spirit is part and parcel of the 
country’s social fabric and has been used to encourage the growth of indigenous self-help groups and other 
collective endeavours in the country. 
44 Copley, A (2014) Kenya Becomes a Middle Income Country, In Africa in Focus, Brookings Institutions, Oct, 
3, 2014 found at www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/10/03-kenya-middle-income 
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foundations that directly fund civil society organisations than Zambia, and its civil society 
organisations have had more resources at their disposal to perform various functions compared 
to Zambia’s civil society organisations. 
Civil societies in both countries are also different in their ideological orientation. 
Bratton (1994), argues that the ideological orientation of civil society is linked to the level of 
economic development in a country. He notes that civil society groups in Zambia are mostly 
driven by economic issues due to the relative weakness of the country’s economy, while 
Kenya’s civil society groups are mainly driven by demands for civil liberties and political rights 
due to its relatively prosperous economic conditions. The differences in the economic 
performance of the two countries have significantly impacted on the ideological orientation of 
their respective civil societies. The trade union umbrella organisation, which is the lead civil 
society organisation in Zambia, has also influenced civil society ideological orientation with its 
primary focus on economic issues affecting its membership and the country-at-large.  
Additionally, civil societies in both countries are numerically different. Although both 
countries have experienced rapid growth of civil society organisations since the 1990s, Kenya 
has a large number of civil society organisations compared to Zambia.45 This difference is partly 
rooted in the country’s popular tradition of self-help ideology known as Harambee and the 
deliberate encouragement by the state for the formation of such organisations to supplement 
state efforts for social and economic development. With the relative economic development in 
the country, there is a growing middle class, which is conscious enough to form civil society 
organisations in the interest of their members and the public good. Further, President Moi’s 24 
year-ethnically exclusive government, drove a significant number of intellectual middle-class 
individuals into civil society both as a space for expressing their views, but also for economic 
livelihood thus further strengthening the sector and making it more vibrant and robust.  
Conversely, in Zambia, President Kaunda’s one-party administration was relatively more 
inclusive of the middle class, ethnically-diverse and discouraged the formation of civil society 
organisations.  
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Although reliable and accurate data on the number of civil society organisations in both 
countries is hard to obtain due to multiple levels and points of registration, the NGO 
Coordination Board in Kenya had registered 9, 728 NGOs by 2015 spread across several 
sectors, besides thousands of Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) and self-help groups 
registered under the Ministry of Culture and Social Services. According to Kanyinga (2007), 
there were 140,000 civil society organisations in Kenya in 1999, a number which increased to 
186,000 by 2002 and stood at 350,000 in 2005.46A USAID report in 2012 noted that the country 
might have the largest number of civil society organisations in Africa (USAID, 2012). In 
Zambia, the Registrar of Societies’ records showed that 5,860 NGOs, trade unions, and 
associations had been registered by 2010, besides thousands of informal civil society 
organisations spread throughout the country. Table 3.1 below shows a summary of the 
differences between Kenya and Zambia’s civil society formations. 
Table 3. 1: Summary of differences between Civil Societies in Kenya and Zambia 
 
Extraneous Variables              Kenya                             Zambia 
Organisational dimension          Religious-led 
         Umbrella body 
                      Trade Union-led 
                      No umbrella body 
Ideological orientation     Political- Civil   Rights                   Economic Rights Issues 
Numerical dimension     Estimated no. 7,833 (2012)                   Estimated no. 5,860 (2010) 
Material dimension     Relatively developed                   Relatively less developed 
Outcome       A constrained advocacy sub-sector of civil society 
Source: Author created from Bratton (1994), Kenya NGO Coordination Board and Zambia Registrar of 
Societies records. 
3.4. Instrumentation 
 
Data for this study were gathered from multiple primary and secondary sources (Yin, 
2014; Gillham, 2000) with the primary goal of investigating and critically examining the 
constraints confronting advocacy groups in the post-transitional countries of Kenya and Zambia 
and how such constraints have impacted on the ability of these groups to effectively contribute 
to the process of democratic consolidation. Data triangulation from both primary and secondary 
sources had several advantages to the study.  Firstly, it provided a broader view of the research 
                                                             
 
46 The figures are exclusive of thousands of informal associations that people form to promote common interests 
such as culture and welfare and not captured in governmental administrative records. 
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questions and acted as a means of cross-checking, validating and corroborating the evidence, 
besides checking the integrity of inferences drawn from the data, thus leading to “convergence” 
of both data and the conclusions derived from them (Denzin and Lincohn, 1994). Secondly, 
triangulation extended the understanding of data and added breadth and depth to the analysis 
(Fielding and Fielding, 1986) thus ensuring a systematic account that was rich, robust, more 
convincing, accurate and comprehensive (Yin, 2009). Finally, triangulation helped in checking 
the consistency of the findings generated by different data sources. Overall, triangulation 
improved the study’s internal validity, credibility, and dependability (Yin, 2014).  
The study used in-depth semi-structured interviews as the primary source of data 
collection since the researcher was interested in more in-depth understanding and insights from 
both objective and subjective perspectives of respondents’ views and opinions on the 
constraints confronting advocacy groups and their impact on the ability of advocacy groups to 
effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in both countries. In-depth 
semi-structured interviews were used to gather face-to-face, focused, qualitative and textual 
data for the study from both the key expert respondents and ordinary citizens, representing top-
down and bottom-up perspectives respectively on the issues under study. In-depth semi-
structured interviews as a method of data collection had several advantages. Firstly, it helped 
focus the discussion on the research questions and provided a more in-depth exploration of the 
context in which respondents experience the activities of advocacy groups and the process of 
democratisation.  
Secondly, in-depth semi-structured interviews helped in standardising data collection 
across the two cases thus providing reliable, comparable qualitative data and facilitating 
comparative analysis.  Thirdly, in-depth semi-structured interviews provided a balance between 
the flexibility of an open-ended interview and the focus of a structured interview (Kvale, 1996). 
This balance was critical in collecting comprehensive data for the study. Fourthly, in-depth 
semi-structured interview questions helped the study to unearth in sufficient detail what lies 
beyond the statistics and buried in the minds, actions and lived experiences of key experts and 
ordinary respondents in their assessment of the constraints confronting advocacy groups and 
the process of democratic consolidation. It allowed respondents to freely express their views 
and experiences on their own terms and voices while giving the researcher the ability to probe 
interesting respondents’ answers for further clarification. 
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The in-depth semi-structured interviews consisted of a set of general closed-ended 
questions and specific open-ended questions that defined the areas that were explored (Britten, 
1999). The questions were designed in a relatively simple and open framework, allowing for a 
focused two-way communication. The researcher avoided leading questions to reduce interview 
bias. Closed-ended questions covered more general information, and a Likert-scale type of 
questions were used to gauge respondents’ level of agreements or disagreement with a series of 
statements. These answers from different respondents were more straightforward to compare, 
code and analyze. Open-ended questions delved deeper into the constraints confronting 
advocacy groups and their effect on the ability of advocacy groups to effectively contribute to 
the process of democratic consolidation. Such questions required more than a yes or no response 
(Britten, 1999) and gave respondents the opportunity to freely explore and provide their 
perspectives on the central themes of the study. This process helped to adequately address the 
research questions by providing depth, value, insights and more elaborate and detailed 
responses.  
Open-ended questions also allowed for greater spontaneity, flexibility, and 
opportunities by the researcher to ask probing questions on a variety of issues, leading to new 
and unexpected information that was very useful to the study (Dane, 2010; Daymon and 
Holloway 2002).  Interview questions were slightly modified to fit various groups of 
respondents in the selected countries. These groups included international donors, expert 
respondents, and ordinary citizens. The study also used field notes to provide additional 
descriptive data. These were handwritten and taken during and immediately after each 
interview. Field notes mainly captured thoughts and ideas about the interview process and 
content and informed possible changes in later interview processes and content. Field notes 
included the date and location of the interview, respondents’ organisation and information on 
why the respondent was included in the research process. Ideas and thoughts from field notes 
were also useful in the data analysis process (Kvale, 1996; May 1991) and complemented 
audio-recordings and interview notes of the in-depth semi-structured interviews with both key 
expert and ordinary citizens’ respondents.  
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Data was also obtained from a range of multiple primary sources, including advocacy 
groups’ annual reports, minutes of meetings, statements on advocacy groups’ websites and 
articles in newspapers and magazines. The advantage of these sources is that they are stable and 
allowed the researcher to review them repeatedly, besides containing exact names and details 
of events (Yin, 2014) that were useful to the study. Documentation provided specific details 
that were used to corroborate and augment evidence obtained from interviews. Secondary data 
were obtained from a wide range of sources to complement the primary data. These sources 
included publicly available World Bank data, Censuses, annual household surveys, economic 
reports, government registry of NGOs in both countries, organisational records, relevant 
academic literature from the libraries in political science, sociology, political economy, history 
and international relations among others.  
The study developed and used a case study interview protocol (CSP), which is “a set of 
comprehensive guidelines that is an integral part of the case research design and contains the 
procedures for conducting the research, the research instrument itself and the guidelines for 
data analysis” (Maimbo and Pervan. 2005, p. 1282). The case study protocol ensured 
consistency across the two cases and across different respondents, which aided in the 
comparative analysis of the two cases. Additionally, the case study protocol ensured accurate 
documentation of data collection and analysis procedures, which improved reliability and the 
possibility of replication of the study.  The CSP was designed around analytical themes derived 
from the study’s theoretical framework that guided the interview process. It also contained the 
pre-determined set of questions that every respondent was asked, which were developed from 
the primary research questions. The list of written standardized closed-ended and open-ended 
questions covered all the topics of the study for both key expert and ordinary citizen 
respondents. The researcher made sure that the questions were simple, relevant, focused, clear, 
intelligible and neutral (Bryman, 2001). Additionally, the CSP included interview guides for 
various groups of respondents, information and consent form and explanation of the interview 
process (See APPENDIX A) 
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3.5. Sampling and Sample size 
 
The study employed four different forms of purposive sampling methods47; expert 
sampling, snowballing sampling, convenience sampling, and proportional quota sampling. This 
process resulted in two sets of samples in each of the selected countries, specifically, key-expert 
and ordinary-citizen respondents. Purposive sampling “implies seeking information-rich 
cases.” In other words, it means deliberately seeking knowledgeable respondents, who can 
provide significant insights and deeper understanding of the issues under study (Patton, 2002). 
The sampling method helped to increase the scope of data and covered multiple perspectives 
from the sample of participants (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). This process also added credibility 
and reliability to the study. Expert sampling and snowballing sampling methods were used to 
select key expert respondents, who provided “knowledge from above,” while proportional quota 
sampling was used to select ordinary citizen respondents, who provided “knowledge from 
below” on the central themes of the study. This process led to innovative and comprehensive 
coverage of the issues under study.  
The first set of respondents for in-depth semi-structured interviews were selected using 
expert and snowballing sampling methods. In expert sampling, “you decide the purpose you 
want an informant to serve, and you go out to find one” (Bernard, 2006, p. 95). Selection of 
experts was based on their expertise, knowledge, experience and active involvement on issues 
of democratisation and civil society in their respective countries. This focus was necessary as 
the researcher needed to interview individuals, who could provide credible, objective and 
reliable information on the constraints confronting advocacy groups and how such constraints 
had impacted the ability of these groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation in Kenya and Zambia. The sampling process took into consideration the size and 
location of organisations from which the experts were drawn. The first step in the sampling 
process of key expert respondents involved the selection of advocacy organisations in both 
countries from a list of registered groups obtained from the NGO Coordination Board in Kenya 
and the Ministry of Community Development in Zambia48both used as sampling frames.  
                                                             
 
47 Purposive sampling depends on value judgement of the researcher in identifying key respondents and institutions 
that are perceived to be more knowledgeable on matters that concern the study. 
48 In 2013, the Zambia Congress of NGO was established under section 26 and sub-section 1 and 2 of the NGO 
Act passed in 2009, which is responsible for registration of NGOs. 
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The selection was based on the purpose or the nature of the activities of the 
organisations, i.e., advocacy, rather than their form, as explained in Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation. Additional criteria used in the selection of the organisations included location 
{urban vs. rural} due to the differential impact and presence of advocacy groups in these places, 
size, type {intermediary vs. membership organisations} and the traditional vs. non-traditional 
social movements such as Bunge La Mwananchi (the Peoples’ Parliament) and Bunge La 
Wazalendo (Patriots Parliament) in Kenya and the Land Alliance in Zambia to have a balanced 
and representative sample. Other expert respondents were selected from policy-think tanks and 
relevant University departments in both countries to provide more objective and balanced 
perspectives on the central themes of the study. International donor organisations supporting 
issues of governance, democracy, the rule of law and human rights in both countries were 
selected from the directory of international donor and development agencies.49 Table 3.2. below 
is a summary of the number of key expert individuals selected from different organisations. 
Table 3. 2 Number of key experts selected from the sampling frame 
Organisation Kenya Zambia Total 
National advocacy 
organisations 
5 5 10 
Women and Youth 
organisations 
4 4 8 
Community-Based 
Organisations 
3 3 6 
International donor 
organisations 
3 3 6 
Policy-Think Tanks 3 3 6 
Relevant University 
departments 
3 3 6 
The Media 3 3  6 
Source: Author created from the sampling frame 
                                                             
 
49Directory of International Donor and Development Organizations available from 
http://www.comsats.org/publications/other_docs/directory_of_international_donor_and_development_organizati
ons_june_2007.pdf 
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The study thus involved a total of 48 organisations, 24 in each of the two countries of 
Kenya and Zambia, reflecting differences in location, size, and type. This broad approach was 
adopted to help collect sufficient data representing the breadth and depth of the views and 
opinions concerning the constraints confronting advocacy groups in both countries and their 
effects on the ability of these groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation. It is important to note that the sampling was slightly skewed towards national 
advocacy groups, women and youth organisations and Community-Based Organisations 
engaged in advocacy since they were the primary focus of the study. Although most of the 
groups sampled were based in the capital cities of Nairobi and Lusaka, due to practical 
considerations such as accessibility, the researcher included individuals from several groups 
based in rural areas in both countries to ensure representativeness and balance of the sample.  
The second step in the sampling process involved selecting key expert respondents 
working in the selected organisations. Key expert interviewees were deliberately selected from 
the management levels of the organisations, with most of the selected respondents being 
executive directors of their organisations. It was assumed that such individuals would have the 
most significant amount of knowledge on the operations and activities of their organisations. 
Selected University scholars and Media personalities were individuals, who had vast experience 
and expertise and had written extensively on issues of civil society and democratisation in their 
respective countries (See APPENDIX B). The second set of respondents in the study were 
drawn from adult male and female of over 18 years old, living in rural and urban areas in Kenya 
and Zambia. This group was sampled using a non-probability proportional quota sampling 
(PQS) method, where the assembled sample had the same proportions of individuals as the 
entire population of the pre-selected characteristics. This method is similar to stratified 
sampling in quantitative research and was deliberately chosen due to the limited time and 
funding available for the fieldwork, which could not allow for the use of a probability sampling 
method, which would have required a strict use of random sampling techniques. It ensured that 
all key groups relevant to the study were included in the sample to achieve a representative 
sample, according to the pre-specified characteristics of the populations in both countries 
(Hung, 2005; Lee et al. 2004).  
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The heterogeneous sample (Robson, 2002) helped explore the central themes of the 
study as perceived by various groups of people, and the diversity of respondents improved the 
chances of identifying a full range of factors that explain the constraints facing advocacy groups 
in both Kenya and Zambia in the new political dispensation. Proportional quota sampling also 
saved time and resources since it was easier and quicker to conduct, satisfied population 
proportions and had 100 percent response rate, better than most probabilistic sampling methods, 
thus reducing potential bias and producing results that are equivalent to the ones generated by 
probability sampling (Yang and Banamah, 2014; Buck, 2011; Cumming 1990). The first step 
in the proportional quota sampling process involved the selection of a sample frame, which in 
this case was based on the population census data of 2009 and 2010 in Kenya and Zambia 
respectively. The use of censuses may affect the accuracy of the quota frame or the proportion 
of each category of the sample since the population figures have changed from the last time 
they were collected. However, one must note that reliable and up-to-date information on 
populations of the selected countries was difficult to obtain as both countries only conduct 
population census once every ten years.  
The second step involved the selection of mutually exclusive known population 
characteristics or quota controls that were relevant to the study. In this case, educational levels 
(none, primary level, secondary and above secondary level) and location (urban and rural) were 
chosen as the key characteristics of the population that needed to be reflected in the sample due 
to their considerable influence on the socio-economic status of the populations of both Kenya 
and Zambia. Education and location are key determinants of human development through 
access to more opportunities and enhanced earnings. The level of education is, therefore, a key 
determinant of social and economic outcomes (Kovacevic, 2010; Bourguignon et al. 2007). 
Consequently, it is highly reasonable to expect that the activities of advocacy groups and 
democratisation process will impact various socio-economic groups differently and that their 
level of participation, attitudes, views, and opinions towards advocacy groups would be varied. 
The third step involved calculating the proportions of each subgroup or stratum in the 
population of both countries. The total number of units in each stratum in the sample is the 
product of the corresponding proportion in the population and the pre-determined sample size 
of 40 for each of the selected two countries.  
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The number of cases that were included in each stratum thus varied depending on the 
makeup of each stratum in the population of the chosen countries as recorded in 2009 (Zambia) 
and 2010 (Kenya) censuses. In Kenya, the urban and rural populations represented 24 and 76 
percent of the total population respectively, while in Zambia, the urban and rural populations 
represented 40 and 60 percent of the total population respectively. The sample matrix and the 
sample distribution for Kenya and Zambia are shown below in table 3.3 and figure 3.1 
respectively. 
Table 3. 3 Sample Matrix for Kenya and Zambia 
Country Kenya Zambia 
Location Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Characteristics Popn Sample Popn Sample Popn Sample Popn Sample 
No education 16% 2 30% 9 24% 4 35% 7 
Primary Education 46% 5 55% 17 48% 8 60% 13 
Secondary Education and above 38% 3 15% 4 28% 4 15% 4 
TOTAL  10  30  16  24 
 
Sources: Author created from the sampling process and sources of data; Exploring Kenya’s Inequality: 
Pulling Apart or Pooling Together (2012), KNBS and SID and Zambia Demographic and Health Survey 
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author created from the sample matrix 
Figure 3. 1 Sample distribution in Kenya and Zambia 
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The last step involved the invitation of cases through convenience sampling from the 
population using the calculated number of units in each stratum until the quota for each stratum 
was filled. The researcher chose anyone, who met the characteristics of each stratum without 
discrimination. Since the data on levels of educational attainment by gender were unavailable 
in both cases of Kenya and Zambia, the researcher made sure that both sexes were fairly 
represented in the sample during this stage. To reduce the selection bias, the researcher ensured 
that the selection of respondents was not just based on ease of access but persuaded most 
uncooperative potential respondents to participate in the study. This approach increased the 
validity and reliability of the explanatory power of the responses derived from the interviews. 
3.6. Data collection procedures 
 
The data collection process for this study involved two main phases; the preparation or 
the planning phase and the fieldwork. The planning phase involved obtaining ethical 
authorisation from City, University of London, training in Research Methods, application for 
permission to conduct fieldwork in Zambia, recruitment of key expert interviewees, and review 
of the interview protocol. The second phase involved the actual data collection in the field in 
both Kenya and Zambia. Before commencing fieldwork, ethical clearance was sought and 
obtained from both the Department of International Politics and City, University of London 
since the study dealt with human subjects. An application form was filled and approved by both 
ethical committees at the Department of International Politics and the University levels. To 
conduct productive interviews and analysis of data, the researcher took a master’s level course 
in Research Methods and Analysis at City, University of London, besides attending several 
seminars on Qualitative Research. The course and the seminars covered critical skills, values, 
and techniques that are used in conducting qualitative research and analysis. The values and 
techniques included listening and note-taking skills, techniques for conducting interviews such 
as creating rapport, asking right questions, adopting open and emotional neutral body language, 
strategic use of silence and maintaining ethical standards, data collection methods, and analysis 
among others. The researcher was thus well-prepared and well equipped with the knowledge 
and skills needed for effective data collection and analysis in qualitative research.  
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Besides the training, the researcher had accumulated over ten years of practical 
fieldwork experience within Africa and had previously taken courses in qualitative research 
both at the undergraduate and master’s levels. As part of the above preparations, the researcher 
became thoroughly familiar with the structure and detailed contents of the case study interview 
protocol, including possible follow-up questions and probes. This process led to the refinement 
of the interview protocol before the fieldwork. Once the key expert interviewees were sampled, 
their contacts were retrieved from their organisations’ websites, and an email was sent to each 
of them explaining the objectives of the study and the reason why they were selected as potential 
respondents in this study. This step was followed by telephone calls to discuss the study and 
the interview process further. The researcher also conducted brief research on their background, 
their organisations, and their work on civil society and democratisation in their respective 
countries. A laptop and notebooks were also purchased for the fieldwork. The researcher 
secured an audio-recorder from City, University of London and bought enough batteries for the 
entire interview process. Before leaving for Kenya and Zambia, the researcher scheduled most 
of the appointments with the main expert interviewees through email and telephone calls and 
noted all the dates and times of the interviews. Interviews were scheduled in such a way that 
allowed time between the interviews for review of the already done interviews and preparation 
for the next interviews, including time to travel to the next appointment location. 
 Field research was conducted in Kenya and Zambia for three months in each country 
from May to October 2012. In Kenya, the research was undertaken in Nairobi (the capital), 
Kisumu City and its environs (Rural) in the western part of the country and Mombasa City and 
its environs (Rural) in the coastal part of the country.50 In Zambia, the research was conducted 
in Lusaka (the capital), Chipata and its environs (Rural) on the Eastern part of the country and 
Mongu and its surroundings (Rural) on the western part of the country51.  The researcher was 
attached at the University of Zambia, Department of Public Administration and Political 
Science. The University of Zambia Ethics Committee conducted a second ethical approval, and 
the researcher also obtained a research permit from the government of Zambia before 
                                                             
 
50 See the map on  https://www.mapsofworld.com/kenya/kenya-political-map.html 
51 See the map on https://www.mapsofworld.com/zambia/zambia-political-map.html 
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commencing fieldwork in the country. In-depth semi-structured interview method was used as 
the main primary method of data collection, and key expert interviews ran concurrently with 
interviews with ordinary citizens. 
 For the key expert respondents, most of the in-person, in-depth interviews took place 
in their offices and homes, while for ordinary citizens, most of the interviews were conducted 
in their homes or a place chosen by them, where the interviewee felt comfortable. The 
interviews were approximately one hour long in duration, exploring more in-depth and 
comprehensively the reasons why advocacy groups were constrained in the post-transitional 
countries of Kenya and Zambia and how such constraints had impacted on their ability to 
effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. Once the researcher arrived 
in each of the countries of research, follow-up phone calls to respondents were made to confirm 
the appointments for the interviews. The interview process was systematic, thorough and guided 
by a case study interview protocol as explained earlier in this chapter. In cases where 
respondents failed to turn up or could not find time for the interview within the period of the 
fieldwork in both Kenya and Zambia, “snowballing” sampling technique was used to find more 
potential respondents for the in-depth personal interviews. Snowballing sampling means asking 
key experts who have already been interviewed to recommend or identify other potential 
individuals, who due to their expertise and experience on issues of civil society and 
democratisation would fit the selection criteria for possible inclusion in the sample.  
Each interviewee was asked at least two contact persons to minimise the burden on the 
respondent and to reduce the potential bias of interviewing respondents in the same social 
network. Suggested potential respondents were included depending on the number of times they 
were identified by other key expert respondents already interviewed. Preliminary data analysis 
was undertaken in real-time after every four interviews were done. It was a simple process that 
involved checking and tracking the information collected to understand what was coming out 
of the interviews, identifying areas that required follow-up and questioning the meaning of the 
information already received. This process ensured continuous engagement with the data and 
highlighted emerging issues, allowing all relevant data to be collected while providing direction 
for adjusting data collection activities (Yin, 2012; Dooley, 2002). Approximately 120 
interviews were conducted with both the principal expert interviewees (Table 3.4) and ordinary 
citizens’ respondents by the end of the fieldwork research in both countries. 
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Table 3. 4: Number of Key Experts interviewed by organisation type and country 
 Organisation type National 
advocac
y groups 
Women 
and youth  
CBOs International donor 
organisations 
Policy-
think    
tanks 
     Academia   Media 
Kenya 5 2  3 2     3       3      2 
Zambia 5 3  2 2     2                      3                   3 
Total 10 5  5 4     5       6      5 
Source: Author created from the sampling process 
3.7. Data Analysis and Interpretation 
 
Data analysis “consist of examining, categorising, tabulating, testing, or otherwise 
recombining evidence to produce empirically based findings” (Yin, 2014, p. 132). For this 
study, the objective of data analysis was to seek explanations, similarities, differences, patterns, 
and relationships of themes that help us understand the constraints confronting advocacy groups 
in both Kenya and Zambia and the impact of such constraints on advocacy groups’ ability to 
effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation.  The analysis thus represented 
accumulated voices of key experts and ordinary citizens expressing their opinions, lived 
experiences, actions, and attitudes about advocacy groups and democratic consolidation in the 
post-transitional states of Kenya and Zambia. The process thus involved description, analysis, 
and interpretation (Wolcott, 1994). 
 The study adopted qualitative thematic analysis, whose primary purpose is to “identify, 
analyse, and report patterned meanings across a data set that provide an answer to the research 
questions being addressed” (Braun and Clarke 2006, p. 79). The process also included the 
interpretation of various aspects of the data set (Boyatzis, 1998).  It involved searching for 
themes from the data that were relevant to the description of the phenomenon under study (Daly 
et al., 1997). Thematic analysis (TA) was chosen as the most appropriate method of analysis 
for this study primarily because of its suitability for analysing questions related to people’s 
experiences, attitudes, views, and perceptions (Guest and McQueen, 2012; Braun and Clarke, 
2006). The method is also easy to administer and allows for flexibility and application of 
multiple theoretical frameworks as the case in this study (Vaismoradi et al., 2013; Braun and 
Clarke, 2006).  
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Additionally, thematic analysis was suitable in identifying implicit and explicit ideas 
within the data (Guest and McQueen, 2012) and the emergence of themes from the data 
(Saldana, 2009), all of which were critical for the interpretation phase of this analysis. This 
process ensured the application of a hybrid approach to thematic analysis, which combined 
both deductive and inductive methods (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006) to interpret raw data.  
In the deductive process, the study relied on the pre-determined theoretical framework as 
outlined in Chapter 2 of this dissertation to analyze and interpret data (theory-driven), while at 
the same time considered the possibility for the refinement of some aspects of the theoretical 
framework through the data (data-driven).  Gadamer (1979, p. 273) refers to this process as “the 
fusion of horizons.” The theoretical framework, therefore, formed the basis (Crabtree and 
Miller, 1999) for the interpretation of data, and once this was done, consideration was made on 
how to improve the same through data-driven analysis. Additionally, deviations from identified 
patterns and their explanations, interesting stories emerging from the data about the broader 
research questions and the findings of the existing similar studies formed part of the analysis. 
Regarding the process of analysis, the study adopted a synthesis of Braun and Clarke’s (2006), 
Pope and Mays (2006) and Crabtree and Miller (1999) step-by-step thematic analysis and 
interpretation process. The modification was done to ensure that the analysis was theoretically 
coherent, consistent, clear and transparent. 
Step 1: Development of deductive codes 
Data analysis relied on the theoretical framework, which necessitated the development 
of a template apriori based on research questions, propositions and the theoretical framework 
developed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. Several broad categories were developed and 
formed the basis for the theory-driven data analysis process.  
Step 2: Familiarisation with the entire data set 
This step involved “careful reading and re-reading of the data” (Rice and Ezzy, 1999, 
p. 258) or the interview transcripts, and field notes and listening to interview audio-recordings 
several times to become sufficiently familiar with it. This process helped the researcher to 
clearly understand the content and context of the data while trying to identify specific patterns 
of meaning or repeated issues and ideas in the data. The audio-recordings were then transcribed 
verbatim into text documents to avoid any biases and inconsistencies that could emanate from 
the transcription process.  
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The researcher listened to the recordings while reading the transcripts to ensure the accuracy of 
the transcription. Memos52 and reflective notes were taken on the first impressions of initial 
ideas about the research questions, which later helped in formulating codes, categories, and 
themes. Field notes were also thoroughly reviewed at this stage and contributed to the 
understanding of the interview content and context. 
Step 3: Generating Initial inductive codes 
For the inductive codes, the researcher used clear, concise and concrete descriptive 
codes based on interview dialogues to ensure dependability and credibility of the codes. These 
included relevant keywords, sentences, phrases, and sections. The codes were manually 
attached to key features of the data that were relevant to the research questions.  Distinct colours 
of highlighters were used to differentiate codes and to document where and how patterns 
occurred. This process was implicit and iterative as the researcher continually altered and 
modified codes as reflected by the data and as new ideas emerged. The study generated as many 
codes as was possible from the data set. Coding for this study thus involved both data reduction 
and data simplification through collating relevant identified codes into broader analytical 
categories in readiness for the next step in the data analysis process. 
Step 4: Applying the template of codes and searching for themes 
This step involved three processes. The first process used the analytical template 
technique (Crabtree and Miller, 1999) to apply the codes from the codebook to the text to 
identify significant broader patterns of meanings or potential useful themes and categories that 
accurately described the data set. In the second process, the codes generated from the data in 
step 3 were carefully examined and clustered into themes and sub-themes using flashcards.  The 
study’s themes were thus made up of a subset of codes that were related to the research 
questions and the theoretical framework but also sets directly generated from the data. Codes 
which could not fit into any of the identified themes were kept as outliers and considered as 
valuable in the interpretation process. The third process involved the selection and highlighting 
of the most representative, unedited, direct key quotations from the interviews that depicted 
broader trends of respondents’ attitudes and opinions.  
                                                             
 
52 Memos are “research notes that may contain interpretations of patterns found in the data or general comments 
on issues revealed during the analysis” (Baskarada 2014:17) 
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Key quotations from minority attitudes and opinions were also highlighted as they were 
considered equally important for the analysis. The quotations were attributed using the 
interview number in the interview schedule, year and country of the interview and a brief 
description of the respondent’s socio-economic background. 
Step 5: Reviewing themes 
This step involved a careful and thorough review of themes about each of the theoretical 
propositions on the constraints confronting advocacy groups in the post-transitional states of 
Kenya and Zambia and to determine whether the themes told a convincing and compelling story 
of the data that answered the research questions. Themes were thus refined, resulting in some 
themes being combined, others broken-down, while others were discarded. Specifically, each 
theme was considered in relation to the entire data set and some themes combined, others 
condensed, while others were split. 
Step 6: Defining and naming of themes 
In this step of the analysis, the researcher developed a detailed analysis of the scope, 
focus, and significance of each theme to the research study. Potential themes were assigned 
informative names to reflect a full sense of the themes and their significance. The step resulted 
in a comprehensive analysis of what themes contributed to understanding the entire data. These 
themes or categories and their relationships were the main results of this study and were thus 
considered as the new knowledge about the World from the perspective of the respondents in 
the study (See APPENDIX C). Although the step-by-step process is presented as a linear 
process, the actual research analysis was an iterative and reflexive process as shown in Figure 
3.2. below. 
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Figure 3. 2 Diagrammatic representation of the stages of data coding 
 
Source: Adapted from Braun and Clarke (2006) Pope and Mays (2006) and Crabtree and Miller 
(1999) 
 
The final phase of data analysis involved interpretation and writing-up of the results, 
which meant weaving together a convincing narrative from the findings and a careful drawing 
of inferences and conclusions regarding explanations, patterns, relationships, and variations or 
cross-case comparison between themes in the two cases about the research questions. 
Researcher's thoughts, views, and ideas were also included at this stage, besides triangulation 
of secondary data obtained through library research. The interpretation went beyond the data to 
the implications of the study’s findings to the broader research agenda in the field of 
comparative politics and democratisation. Data interpretation was achieved through three main 
strategies, including reliance on theoretical propositions, relating research results to existing 
theories and literature, and examining plausible primary rival explanations.  Specific techniques 
included explanation building (Yin, 2014) which meant building general explanations about the 
cases from the data, cross-case synthesis, pattern matching the findings and the theoretical 
propositions or what is referred to as the “congruence method” (George and Bennett, 2004).  
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Data interpretation relied on the initial theoretical propositions of the case study by 
examining whether the findings were consistent with or different from them. This process 
focused data interpretation on research questions and was the basis of theory testing, providing 
an opportunity for corroborating, modifying, rejecting or advancing the initial theoretical 
framework. The researcher carefully examined the findings that failed to support all or parts of 
the initial propositions leading to a refinement of theories, where the researcher proceeded to 
“conjecture intelligently about a more satisfactory general theory” (Rogowski, 2010, p. 95). 
The process also involved clarifying the relationship between propositions and the broader 
context of theory and previous research. Here, the researcher employed a strategy of relating 
research findings to existing theory and literature. This process involved moving beyond the 
data to relate or integrate the results of the study creatively into existing theory and research to 
situate the current information into existing literature. The researcher, therefore, considered the 
findings in relation to the existing research studies and examined how the findings replicate or 
fail to replicate, extends or clarifies existing research, thus conceptualising and demonstrating 
the novel contribution of the study to research and the field of comparative politics and 
democratisation.  
Additionally, the researcher identified, explained and reviewed plausible rival 
explanations for the constraints confronting advocacy groups in both Kenya and Zambia to 
contextualize the analysis of these alternative explanations. To achieve a high-quality 
interpretation process, data interpretation just like data analysis was recursive and moved back 
and forth between the two phases, helping to improve the confidence in the results. The study 
addressed the most significant findings, attended to all evidence and comprehensively covered 
all research questions. Effective selection and display of data were used to improve the quality 
of the dissertation in several ways. Firstly, the visual elements helped the researcher present 
detailed results and complex relationships, patterns and trends more clearly and concisely in 
less space (Clark, 2011; CSE, 2006; Durbin, 2004).  
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Secondly, effective display of data offered a quick overview of the study's findings thus 
enhancing the reader's interest and understanding of complex study results in a simplified 
format,53 and finally, efficient display helped reduce the length of the dissertation54besides 
organising and clarifying complex information.  Data for this dissertation were organised in the 
form of quotations, tables, and figures, followed by more detailed explanations. With 
respondents’ explicit permission, the researcher selected some of the most representative 
verbatim quotations and some outlier quotations from interviewee responses from the in-depth 
semi-structured interviews in the analysis to add detail, support and effectively illustrate the 
researcher’s themes, arguments, and findings (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The use of such 
verbatim spoken words of research participants has become an effective standard practice in 
much of social science research (Corden and Sainsbury, 2006) because of the value, the depth, 
and the richness that they add to the research findings. The quotations, which accurately 
reflected informants’ perceptions also helped in building trust, authenticity, and credibility of 
the research results. They provided significant evidentiary impact, illustrating the respondents’ 
arguments and enhancing the readability of the dissertation.   
Additionally, quotations from participants’ views and opinions gave them ‘voice,' 
brought their experiences and perceptions to life, illuminated the linkages that respondents 
made between experiences, actions, and attitudes and thus improved the researcher’s 
understanding of their lived experiences, insights, attitudes, and opinions. Finally, using a 
variety of selected direct quotations from respondents indicated the balance of views on 
particular issues and helped clarify the link between data, interpretation, and conclusions. The 
dissertation also used tables and figures. Tables were used as an efficient and effective way to 
present complex information for easy visualization, understanding, and description of data. 
Tables focused on specific data, where detailed information was condensed, showing both exact 
numbers and clear contrasts and comparisons of data values or characteristics of related items 
(Clark, 2011; McMillan, 1988). Tables also helped to provide clarity, a summary of concepts, 
and classification of data and quick evaluation of critical information in the study.  
                                                             
 
53 SAGE Publications: How to get your Journal Article published {Accessed June 15, 2016}, Available form 
http://www.uk.sagepub.com/journalgatenway/files/how_to_get_your_article_published.pdf 
54 Purdue Online Writing Lab, APA Tables and Figures {Accessed on June 15, 2016} Available from 
http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/560/19/ 
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For high-quality tables, the researcher ensured that all tables were simple, self-
explanatory, well-labeled, easy to understand, described by their legends, which were clear and 
complete, conveying as much information as possible about the table. The figures were used in 
this dissertation to show trends and patterns of relationships across and between data sets 
(Clark, 2011; Paradise, 2011; McMillan, 1988). Additionally, the figures presented a visual 
explanation of the sequence of events and procedures, illustrated and analysed concepts, 
delineated selected features of aspects of the study and summarised research results. For high-
quality figures, the researcher ensured that all figures were interpretable, self-explanatory, 
clearly labeled with informative titles and sources with complete legends that explained critical 
information about the figures. 
3.8. Ethical issues 
 
Ethical issues for this study emanated from the nature of qualitative research, which 
involves more personal and subjective methods of data collection, a more significant role for 
the researcher-participant relationship, and the data analysis process. The researcher ensured a 
very high level of professionalism in conducting this research by maintaining high standards of 
honesty, integrity, and accountability throughout the data collection and analysis process. The 
primary data collection process involved in-depth semi-structured personal interviews, and 
therefore, was informed by academic and ethical standards that govern social science research.  
Firstly, individual respondents were given full and open disclosure of all information 
concerning the study, which included the purpose of the research, how collected data was to be 
used, what participation required of them, subjects to be covered and the approximate time that 
the interview would take. Respondents were informed that participation in the interview was 
free and voluntary and that they had a right to withdraw at any point in the interview process if 
they felt uncomfortable. Additionally, participants were informed and guaranteed that all 
information provided to the researcher would be treated confidentially. Informed consent and 
confidentiality were ensured through a written agreement signed by both the researcher and the 
respondent before the interview (APPENDIX A). Secondly, the researcher made respondents 
aware of their rights to privacy, and respected and guaranteed those rights. No identifying 
information about the respondents was revealed in written or other communication methods 
unless permission was sought from the said individual respondent.  
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The researcher, therefore, requested permission from the respondents to audio-record 
the interviews and to publicise the findings before the interview. All the recordings done were 
therefore explicitly permitted by the respondents. Some respondents declined to be recorded, 
and the researcher instead took interview notes during the interview process. Specific consent 
was also sought from respondents for attribution of comments to respondents in the dissertation. 
Thirdly, the researcher made every effort to develop a rapport with the respondents and to create 
a trustworthy environment where the respondents felt comfortable disclosing information 
without fear. However, the researcher avoided creating a situation in which respondents would 
think that they were friends with the researcher. This approach ensured a professional 
relationship with the respondents.  
Finally, the researcher avoided any situation that could be perceived as excess 
intrusiveness on the respondents’ time, space and personal lives. Interview questions were 
neutral, and most of the interviews were conducted in the respondent's’ offices or neutral 
locations chosen by the respondents. The interviews were also limited to a maximum of one 
hour and focused on the research questions and topics relevant to the study. Despite the 
unavoidable subjective influence and biases of the researcher which is in-built in qualitative 
research such as this, the researcher made every effort to mitigate against this bias by analysing 
data for this study transparently and professionally, avoiding misstatements, misinterpretations 
and interpreted and presented a picture that is supported by data and evidence. Overall, 
informed consent, confidentiality, respect for privacy and anonymity were strictly adhered to 
throughout this study. The data collection process, therefore, respected the dignity, rights, 
safety, and well-being of all participants. Broadly, the research project complied with City, 
University of London ethics code and followed all the formal procedures established by the 
University.  
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3.9. Summary 
 
This chapter presented the overall research design of this comparative study and 
comprehensively described and explained the methods and the processes used to investigate the 
principal constraints confronting advocacy groups in the post-transitional countries of Kenya 
and Zambia and how these constraints have impacted on the ability of advocacy groups to 
effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. It also elaborated on the 
rationale and the suitability of the comparative and case-oriented qualitative research design for 
this study and explained the case selection criteria, the instrumentation, the sampling and 
sample size, data collection procedures, data analysis, and interpretation, and a discussion of 
the ethical issues related to this study. The chapter explained that the rationale for the 
combination of case analysis with cross-case comparison was to obtain a more detailed and 
holistic understanding of the two cases with regard to the research questions. Additionally, the 
chapter argued that such combination is one of the most reliable means of drawing inferences 
from case studies in a single study. The use of case study approach was based on four factors, 
which included the fact that the study sought to answer the “why” and “how” type of research 
questions and focused on a set of contemporary processes within real-life contexts. The 
researcher also had little control over the behaviour of those involved in the study and 
contextual conditions were relevant to the study. Additionally, there were unclear boundaries 
between the constraints confronting advocacy groups and the context in which citizens 
developed their experiences and views about these groups and the process of democratic 
consolidation.   
 The qualitative approach as part of the overall research design provided a detailed, rich 
and in-depth understanding of the context, meanings, experiences, and views of respondents on 
issues under study. The approach was useful in exploring complex, contextual social and 
political experiences and issues and helped in developing more in-depth levels of explanations 
about the constraints confronting advocacy groups in the post-transitional countries of Kenya 
and Zambia and their effects on the ability of these groups to effectively contribute to the 
process of democratic consolidation. The comparative component of the research design was 
necessary for control purposes and allowed for the description and analysis of variations and 
patterns across the two cases. It also helped in understanding the context in which the study 
took place, the interpretation of individual cases and in building stronger theoretical 
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explanations for the research questions by refining, modifying and confirming theories from 
empirical data. Finally, the comparative component made the study more structured and 
manageable and conclusions drawn from the findings more reliable, robust and precise. 
The chapter also laid out the case selection process, which was based on a systematic 
selection of the two cases using a theory-driven Small-N research process, to maximize 
contrast. The study thus applied the “Most Different Systems Design (MDSD)” as a selection 
process since Kenya and Zambia are maximally different in all of the major characteristics of 
their civil society formations, except on the outcome of interest, that is “a constrained advocacy 
sub-sector of civil society.” The study fulfilled all the requirements for the applicability of 
MDSD as it critically examined the constraints confronting advocacy groups in Kenya and 
Zambia at the sub-systemic level, used deductive research strategy with apriori propositions, 
operated with a constant dependent variable and had the goal of establishing correlation and not 
causation. The chapter argued that civil societies in both countries are fundamentally different 
organizationally, materially, numerically and ideologically, which have significant implications 
for their potential contribution to the process of democratic consolidation. Organisationally, the 
Kenyan civil society is led by the National Council of Churches of Kenya, while the Zambian 
civil society is led by the labour movement, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions. The 
characteristics of these lead organisations have implications for the strength and strategies 
employed by these civil societies and thus the potential contribution to the democratisation 
process. While churches engage in limited political roles and favour mediation and coalition 
building due to their social orientation, labour unions are intrinsically class-based, well-
organized and outrightly engage in partisan politics.  
Additionally, Kenya has an umbrella statutory body that coordinates the activities of 
civil society organisations in the country while Zambia has had no umbrella statutory body. 
Coordination of civil society organisations and other functions of such umbrella bodies have 
critical implications for the overall operations and effective contribution to the process of 
democratic consolidation. The civil society formations in both countries are also different in 
their material dimension, which helps civil society groups develop independent capacity and 
autonomy to conduct their operations and implement their programmes effectively. Kenya 
performs much better in this dimension than Zambia due to government recognition and support 
for civil society organisations and the Harambee spirit which has encouraged the formation of 
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thousands of self-help groups around the country. Kenya has had a relatively better economic 
performance and conditions than Zambia, which has given the middle-class access to resources 
and incentives to form and contribute to the development of civil society in the country. There 
are also ideological differences between Kenya and Zambia civil societies which are influenced 
by the economic conditions in each of the countries. While Kenyan civil society is primarily 
driven by demands for civil liberties and political rights, the Zambian civil society, on the other 
hand, is primarily driven by economic issues due to the relative weakness of the country’s 
economy. Finally, the civil society formations in both countries are also numerically different. 
Although both countries have experienced rapid growth of civil society organisations since the 
1990s, Kenya has a large number of civil society organisations than Zambia due to the culture 
of Harambee spirit, relatively better economic development and state support for such groups.  
The chapter laid out both the instruments and the process of data collection and 
interpretation. The study gathered data from multiple primary and secondary sources, leading 
to data triangulation, which provided a broader view of the research questions and acted as a 
means of cross-checking, validating and corroborating evidence. Data triangulation also 
extended the understanding of data and added breadth and depth to the analysis and ensured the 
integrity and consistency of inferences, which led to an account that was rich, robust, more 
convincing and comprehensive. Overall, triangulation improved the study’s internal validity, 
credibility, and dependability. The study used in-depth semi-structured interviews as the 
primary source of data collection because the researcher was interested in a more in-depth 
understanding of the constraints confronting advocacy groups in the selected countries. In-
depth semi-structured interviews infused reasonable flexibility and focused the interviews, 
provided a more in-depth exploration of the context and standardized data collection across the 
two cases thus providing reliable, comparable qualitative data and facilitating comparative 
analysis. Field notes were used to provide additional descriptive data, which improved 
subsequent interviews and later complemented audio recording of the interviews. Secondary 
data were obtained from a wide range of sources to complement the primary data. The study 
also developed and used a case study interview protocol which ensured consistency across the 
two cases and respondents.  
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Regarding sampling, the study employed four different forms of purposive sampling 
methods, which included expert sampling, snowballing sampling, and proportional quota 
sampling to select key expert and ordinary citizens’ respondents. The sampling methods 
achieved several objectives; they increased the scope or range of data, covered multiple 
perspectives from the sample of participants and ensured the selection of individuals who 
provided credible, objective and reliable information on the issues under study. Expert sampling 
and snowballing sampling methods were used to select key expert respondents, who provided 
“knowledge from above,” while proportional quota sampling was used to select ordinary citizen 
respondents, who provided “knowledge from below” on the central themes of the study. This 
process led to innovative and comprehensive coverage of the issues under study. Selection of 
experts was based on their expertise, knowledge, experience and active involvement on issues 
of democratisation and civil society in their respective countries. This focus was necessary as 
the researcher needed to interview individuals, who could provide credible, objective and 
reliable information on the issues under study. The sampling process took into consideration 
the size and location of organisations from which the experts were drawn. 
 The second set of respondents in the study were drawn from adult male and female of 
over 18 years old, living in rural and urban areas in Kenya and Zambia. This group was sampled 
using a non-probability proportional quota sampling (PQS) method, where the assembled 
sample had the same proportions of individuals as the entire population of the pre-selected 
characteristics. It ensured that all key groups relevant to the study were included in the sample 
to achieve a representative sample, according to the pre-specified characteristics of the 
populations in both countries. It also saved time and resources since it was easier and quicker 
to conduct, satisfied population proportions and had 100 percent response rate, better than most 
probabilistic sampling methods, thus reducing potential bias and producing results that are 
equivalent to the ones generated by probability sampling. The data collection process for this 
study involved the preparatory phase and the actual fieldwork in Kenya and Zambia. The 
preparatory phase included obtaining ethical authorisation from City, University of London, 
training in research methods, recruitment of key expert respondents and review of the interview 
protocol.  
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The second phase involved the actual data collection in the field in both Kenya and 
Zambia. Field research was conducted in Kenya and Zambia for three months in each country 
from May to October 2012. The researcher interviewed a combined total of 40 expert 
respondents and 80 ordinary citizens in the two countries. The interview process was 
systematic, thorough and was guided by a case study interview protocol. The interviews were 
approximately one hour long in duration, exploring more deeply the issues under study. 
Preliminary data analysis was undertaken in real-time after every four interviews were done. It 
involved checking and tracking the information collected to identify and highlight emerging 
issues, and areas that required follow-up. Additionally, it ensured continuous engagement with 
the data and highlighted emerging issues, allowing all relevant data to be collected, while 
providing direction for adjusting data collection activities. Data analysis was then conducted 
with the primary objective of seeking explanations, similarities, differences, and relationships 
of themes to understand the constraints confronting advocacy groups in both Kenya and Zambia 
and the impact of such constraints on advocacy groups’ ability to effectively contribute to the 
process of democratic consolidation.  
The study adopted thematic analysis (TA) as the most appropriate method of data 
analysis primarily because of is its suitability for analysing questions related to people’s 
experiences, attitudes, views, and perceptions. Specifically, a hybrid approach to thematic 
analysis was used, which combined deductive and inductive methods to analyse and interpret 
raw data. In the deductive process, the study relied on a pre-determined theoretical framework 
(theory-driven), while in the inductive process (data-driven) the study was open to the 
possibility of themes emerging from the data.  Data interpretation was achieved through reliance 
on theoretical propositions, relating research results to existing theories and literature and 
examining plausible primary rival explanations. Data presentation included direct quotations 
from respondents, tables, and figures, followed by more detailed explanations. Direct 
quotations from respondents added detail, depth, authenticity, and credibility to the research 
findings besides providing significant evidentiary impact and bringing respondents’ 
experiences and perceptions to life. Efficient use of tables and figures provided easy 
visualisation, understanding, and description of data.  
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The chapter concluded with a brief discussion of ethical issues such as full and open 
disclosure of all information concerning the study to respondents, voluntary nature of 
participation in the research, informed consent and confidentiality of information provided and 
respect for respondents’ dignity, safety, privacy and anonymity among others. The next 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present and analyse data on the constraints confronting advocacy groups in 
the new political and institutional environment in Kenya and Zambia and their impact on the 
ability of advocacy groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ADVOCACY GROUPS AND THE POST-TRANSITIONAL POLITICAL 
ENVIRONMENT IN KENYA AND ZAMBIA: UNCERTAINTY AND 
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 
 “Civil society actors are expected to toe an ever-moving line. They are expected to work to tear down 
the authoritarian, non-democratic state, but then dramatically change tactics once a democratic state 
has been created. This is a difficult transition for both civil society leaders and the communities, which 
they claim to represent; there is no clear answer as to when civil society groups will work to support 
their political system and when they will work in a counter-hegemonic fashion against the political 
establishment”. (Zuern 2000, p. 131) 
 
“There is nothing more difficult to execute, nor more dubious of success, nor more dangerous to 
administer than to introduce a new system of things; for he who introduces it has all those who profit 
from the old system as his enemies, and he has only lukewarm allies in all those who might profit from 
the new system” (Niccolo Machiavelli. The Prince, VI.) 
4.1. Introduction    
 
In the early 1990s, advocacy groups in both Kenya and Zambia played a significant role 
in the struggle for the restoration of democracy and the return to multi-party politics. As part of 
the broader pro-democracy movement, the groups organized mass demonstrations and protests 
for political change. Once the negotiations for elections were completed between the opposition 
political parties and the incumbent regimes, the groups conducted civic education and 
monitored the elections to foster democratic transitions in most African countries (Young, 
1999; Ihonvbere, 1997; Bratton, 1994). The pro-democracy movements were responding to 
years of authoritarianism and economic mismanagement, which had led to poor standards of 
living for the majority of the population, repression, and violation of civil liberties and political 
rights and systemic corruption that had paralyzed service delivery in most of these countries. 
In Kenya, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) led a constellation of 
professional groups, churches, student unions, NGOs and women’s movements among others 
to demand for political pluralism, while in Zambia, the  Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU) led other civil society actors in the quest for the restoration of democracy in the country 
(Bratton, 1994). These domestic forces were augmented by international pressure from both 
multilateral and bilateral donors, which helped push for democratic transitions in the continent.  
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In 1991, after widespread protests and demonstrations, followed by numerous 
negotiations between the opposition political party, the Movement for Multi-party Democracy 
(MMD) and President Kenneth Kaunda’s United National Independence Party (UNIP), the 
administration finally repealed article 4 of the 1973 constitution to allow for multi-partyism. 
The country held its first multi-party general elections on October 31st, 1991. MMD won both 
the presidential and parliamentary elections in a landslide against UNIP, leading to the first 
time in post-independence Sub-Saharan Africa in which power was peacefully transferred 
through the electoral process (Van Doepp, 2000). Zambia thus became a trailblazer in Africa 
for the democratisation process and was at the time, described as a “model of democracy” 
(Bratton, 1994; Joseph, 1992). Since then, the country has held five multi-party general 
elections with MMD winning the first four of those elections, but subsequently lost power in 
2011 to the opposition political party-the Patriotic Front (PF).   
In Kenya, President Moi accepted to re-introduce multi-partyism in 1991 after massive 
protests and demonstrations organised by the prodemocracy movement composed of civil 
society groups and opposition political parties and supported by the international community. 
The first multi-party general election was held on 29 December 1992 and, the ruling party, the 
Kenya African National Union (KANU) managed to retain power against a hopelessly divided 
opposition and amid claims of rigging, manipulation of results, use of state resources, 
intimidation and violence by the incumbent regime.55  KANU went on to win the second multi-
party general elections held on the 29 December 1997 with the political opposition still divided 
and the ruling party massively employing state resources in the elections. In 2002, major 
opposition political parties united under-the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) supported by 
most civil society groups and defeated the Kenya African National Union (KANU). NARC’s 
win was a watershed in the struggle for democratization in Kenya. It was the first regime change 
through free, fair and peaceful democratic elections in the country since independence in 1963. 
In the post-transitional period, the political landscape dramatically changed in both countries, 
creating new opportunities and significant constraints to advocacy groups in their quest to 
contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. 
                                                             
 
55 Human Rights Watch (1993) Divide and Rule: State Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya, available from 
www.humanrights.org  
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 The potentially “enabling” political and institutional environment for the growth, 
expansion, and vibrancy of advocacy groups has posed serious constraints for the operations of 
advocacy groups and, therefore, created enormous doubts on their ability to effectively support 
the deepening of democratic governance, sustaining change and effectively contributing to the 
process of democratic consolidation. Moreover, such challenges have come at a time when 
advocacy groups are considered crucial players in the daunting task of democratic 
consolidation, due to the convergence of numerous obstacles to the process in the continent. 
Such obstacles include extensive institutional and bureaucratic deficits, the persistence of neo-
patrimonialism, poor economic performance and lingering authoritarian tendencies among 
others (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; Ihonvbere, 1997; Van Doepp, 1996; Nyongo, 1992).  
This study employs the domestic politico-institutional approach as explained in chapter 
2 of this dissertation, to explore the principal constraints confronting advocacy groups in their 
quest to contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in the new and rapidly evolving 
political and institutional environment in the post-transitional countries of Kenya and Zambia. 
The first section of the chapter examines the opportunities for advocacy groups brought about 
by the democratic transition, which includes improved civil liberties and political rights, the 
establishment of legitimate opposition political parties and institutionalization of free, fair and 
regular democratic elections among others. The second section delves into the principal 
constraints confronting advocacy groups in the new political environment. These include the 
three-fold dilemma of re-defining their roles, crafting new strategies for articulating demands 
for democratic consolidation and building a new and productive relationship with the newly 
democratic states. Other constraints discussed in this chapter include the “paradox of pluralism” 
within advocacy groups, the legacy of authoritarianism, the gradual movement of advocacy 
groups from the civic space to the primordial arena and advocacy groups’ relationship with 
major political actors such as international donors and political parties. The chapter concludes 
by analysing the implications of all these constraints on the ability of advocacy groups to 
effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in both Kenya and Zambia. A 
summary of the chapter then follows. 
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4.2. Opportunities for Advocacy groups in the new political environment in 
Kenya and Zambia 
  
The establishment of democratic systems in both Kenya and Zambia from the early 
1990s, presented advocacy groups with new sets of opportunities and constraints that are critical 
for the process of democratic consolidation due to the changes in the power structure, the 
establishment of new democratic institutions and improvement in civil liberties and political 
rights.56 Advocacy groups mid-wived the political transition, and were, therefore, expected to 
contribute to the creation and strengthening of democratic institutions and policies that would 
support the process of democratic consolidation. In Kenya, the political environment 
considerably remained the same from 1992 to 2002 with the incumbent regime holding on to 
power and continuing to espouse authoritarian tendencies in a democratic setting. However, in 
2002, the country experienced its first peaceful transfer of power from the incumbent regime to 
the opposition through free and fair multiparty elections, when the National Rainbow Coalition 
(NARC) defeated the Kenya African National Union (KANU). The political landscape 
markedly changed and the political space for the work of advocacy groups, exponentially 
expanded. Additionally, the promulgation of a progressive new Constitution in 2010 increased 
the avenues and channels for citizen participation, besides enshrining a robust Bill of Rights 
and establishment of other democratic institutions.  
In Zambia, the democratic transition was achieved in the first multi-party general 
elections in 1991 through a peaceful, free and fair general elections, which saw the Movement 
for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) under Chiluba defeat the incumbent President Kaunda’s 
United National Independence Party (UNIP) in a landslide victory. However, the new 
dispensation proved to be more contentious and defined by continuity rather than a break from 
the past authoritarianism. The amendments to the constitution in 1996 left the powers of the 
presidency largely intact, postponing any meaningful democratic deepening in the country 
(Erdmann and Simutanyi, 2003). Nevertheless, the political space for the work and operations 
of advocacy groups relatively improved through piecemeal administrative and judicial reforms.  
                                                             
 
56 Freedom House Report have consistently ranked Kenya and Zambia as “partly free” since 2003-Reports 
available from www.freedomhouse.org 
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The relative improvement in civil liberties and political rights in both Kenya and Zambia 
have increased the spaces, platforms, and activities of advocacy groups in several ways. Firstly, 
the improved legal framework in both countries has made it much easier for the registration and 
operation of advocacy groups. Kenya promulgated a new progressive Constitution in 2010, 
while Zambia has instituted several positive legal and administrative reforms, which have 
supported the work of advocacy groups. Secondly, advocacy groups have found it much easier 
to organize and pursue various goals and interests due to the relative respect for freedom of 
expression, assembly and association and the right to challenge state decisions. In Zambia, most 
respondents cited the 2001 protest against President Chiluba’s quest for a third term in office. 
The Oasis Forum successfully mobilized citizens countrywide through social media and 
organized a massive Anti-Third Term campaign, which stopped the President from amending 
the constitution to contest the presidency for a third term.  In Kenya, some advocacy groups 
have successfully used the court system to challenge state decisions and to redress gaps in 
governance and public accountability. Moreover, there is a growing acceptance of divergent 
views and opinions within both political systems. As explained by one respondent,  
“There is now freedom and space to organise and not agonise. It is totally different from the 
one-party authoritarian period. There are relative restraint and tolerance from the government” 
(Kenya: Author interview, 10:2012). 
 
Thirdly, the relatively expanded civil liberties and political rights have broadened and deepened 
the levels of citizen participation in governance and other democratic processes such as 
participating in parliamentary committee hearings, signing of petitions, and through various 
types of media, including TV stations, social media, FM radio stations, and independent 
newspapers. Finally, the improved civil liberties and political rights have helped advocacy 
groups create “invented” spaces, where they establish their own spaces and agenda for public 
deliberation and the articulation of demands for democratic consolidation. In Kenya, there has 
been a proliferation of civic spaces such as Bunge La Mwananchi (the Peoples’ Parliament), 
Bunge La Wazalendo (Patriots’ Parliament), Wamama Mashinani (Women at the Grassroots) 
and Korti ya Wananchi (The Peoples’ Court). These are social movement type organizations, 
which hold free public deliberations on national issues in open spaces, where all Kenyans are 
free to attend and contribute to the discussions. 
152 
 
The media has immensely contributed to this process by airing some of these discussions on 
National Television and inviting leaders from these groups to contribute their views and 
opinions on the national debates. Bunge La Mwananchi has become very popular with the city 
population and meet twice a week at Jevanjee Gardens within the city of Nairobi. An advocacy 
group leader in Nairobi asserted that; 
“The improved civil liberties and political rights have helped us create our own spaces such as 
the establishment of “Bunge la mwanachi” (Peoples’ parliament) and the people’s court, besides 
several social accountability fora throughout the country. These groups have improved public 
deliberation and made significant efforts in ensuring public accountability” (Kenya: Author 
interview, 2:2012).  
 
The Zambia Land Alliance is an equivalent group to Bunge la Mwananchi in Kenya. It 
is an indigenous network of local advocacy groups that was established in 1997 and works for 
fair and just land policies and laws which take into account the interests of the marginalized 
and the poor communities in the country.57 It rejects the neoliberal agenda and international 
donor support and has adopted a demand-driven agenda by advocating and lobbying for fair 
land policies. The alliance solely relies on its membership support to conduct its operations 
(ZLA, 2007) and has resolved hundreds of land issues in rural Zambia. The group holds 
frequent meetings in the villages, where they take up land issues that need resolutions either 
formally through the court system and the Lands Ministry or informally through community 
and family negotiations. The group has also engaged the government on reforming the land 
administration system. The Executive Director of the Foundation for Democratic Process in 
Lusaka noted that; 
“The new political environment has given us more spaces and freedom to establish new groups 
such as the Zambia Land Alliance and to operate freely without fear. Almost all advocacy 
groups in Zambia today were established after the transition in 1991” (Zambia: Author 
interview, 28: 2012) 
 
The new political and institutional environment has significantly also improved advocacy 
groups latitude for participation and engagement with the state in both countries, giving these 
groups opportunities to influence state policies towards democratic consolidation.  
                                                             
 
57 Detailed information about the alliance is available from the website www.zla.org.zm 
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In Kenya, the relationship between advocacy groups and the state dramatically 
transformed in 2002 from confrontational to a more collaborative engagement. This change 
signalled that advocacy groups and the state at least shared similar policy goals and preferred 
similar strategies for achieving those goals (Najam, 2000). The National Rainbow Coalition 
(NARC) administration (2002-2007) was more willing to work with advocacy groups on policy 
issues than its predecessor, the Kenya African National Union. Moreover, most advocacy 
groups, had closely worked with and supported NARC in the opposition and thus believed that 
the new government was committed to the institutionalization of democracy. An adversarial 
relationship with the state was thus regarded as unnecessary. An advocacy group leader 
interviewed for this study captured this new mood when he stated; 
“Advocacy groups must move away from the old mentality of confrontation with the state and 
constructively engage the state in institutional building and democratic governance in the 
country.” (Kenya: Author interview, 17: 2012). 
 
This development of mutual trust, which was later formally supported by the imperatives of a 
new Constitution passed in 2010 led to the incorporation of advocacy groups into the formal 
governance processes of the state. It meant institutional cooperation between advocacy groups 
and the state on policy and development issues. An advocacy group leader interviewed for this 
study explained this new-found engagement with the government thus;  
“The new political environment has created opportunities to constructively engage with the 
government and other stakeholders in the Sector Working Groups and Sector Advisory Groups. 
These are platforms, where we share our policy positions and attempt to influence the 
government to adopt such policies for the benefit of ordinary Kenyans” (Kenya: Author 
interview, 8: 2012). 
 
The government thus established “invited spaces” for policy engagement with advocacy 
groups, which have integrated into the governance processes in policy-making committees 
(Brass, 2012b). Some of the formal channels of engagement between the state and advocacy 
groups include advocacy group participation in parliamentary hearings, Sector Advisory 
Groups (SAGs), Sector Working Groups (SWG) among others. Most advocacy groups have 
welcomed participation in these fora as a mechanism for influencing national policy decisions. 
This gesture signalled the official recognition of advocacy groups by the state as essential 
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players in the democratisation process. International donors have encouraged such partnership 
and collaboration in policy-making.  
Although the conflictual relationship between advocacy groups and the state continued in 
Zambia, there are some policy areas, where the government and advocacy organizations have 
found common grounds for cooperation and engagement. Advocacy groups thus had some 
ability to influence policy decisions in the country. Most respondents interviewed for this study 
reported that the formal engagement between the state and advocacy groups on policy issues 
have taken place at the district-level through the District Development Coordinating 
Committees (DDCCs) and the provincial level through the Provincial Development 
Coordinating Committees (PDCCs). Advocacy group leaders in Lusaka interviewed for this 
study, revealed that the most advanced consultative process has been in the budget formulation 
process under the Ministry of Finance, where advocacy organizations are invited annually by 
the Ministry to submit views and proposals and present testimonials to the parliamentary budget 
committee. Advocacy groups also participate in the Sector Working Groups (SWGs) and the 
Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) on thematic areas such as trade, health, and education. An 
advocacy group leader interviewed for this study explained this working relationship with the 
government as follows; 
“We have worked with government representatives on civic education at the local level in 
sensitizing citizens at this level on decentralisation policy and citizens’ role in the process. We 
have also submitted our budget proposals to the Ministry of Finance annually and do give 
testimonials to the parliamentary committee on the budget” (Zambia: Author interview, 2012-
32) 
 
Although some advocacy group leaders have lauded the state-advocacy group’s 
collaboration in policy making as critical in policy formulation and implementation processes, 
such engagements have faced enormous problems. First, most advocacy groups in both 
countries lack the technical capacity to engage in high-level policy discussions effectively. 
Advocacy group leaders interviewed in both countries explained this problem thus; 
“Our engagement with government on policy issues exposed the capacity weaknesses that we 
were not aware of before. We had to initiate our own capacity-building processes to fully 
understand government policy-making processes and policy content and how to engage with 
both” (Zambia: Author interviews, 29:2012) 
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“We had to quickly adjust to the policy language and engage in a lot of research and capacity 
building for our programme officers so that they could adequately contribute to the 
policymaking process with government officials. We still have to do a lot in this area” (Kenya: 
Author interview, 14:2012) 
 
Secondly, there is a problem of uncertainty of continued formal engagement with the state, in 
Zambia, where advocacy group participation in formal policy is not anchored in the law 
(Waldenhof, 2005) and, therefore, solely depends on the goodwill and willingness of various 
government agencies, while in Kenya, the formal engagement is anchored into law, but there is 
no framework to guide the engagement between civil society and the state.  
Thirdly, most advocacy group leaders interviewed for this study reported that there was 
a lack of timely and reliable information from the government for meaningful participation of 
advocacy groups in the policy-making processes as governments are unwilling to share policy 
documents beforehand. Advocacy groups are thus ambushed with large documents and forced 
to read and engage with such documents during the formal meetings. Moreover, several 
respondents pointed out that invitations to these meetings were always sent late and advocacy 
groups forced to respond to already prepared documents. Other problems identified by 
respondents included government unilaterally inviting advocacy groups, which they consider 
friendlier to such meetings to represent civil society and the fact that advocacy groups are forced 
to react to an already prepared policy document by the government. Fourthly, a particularly 
critical problem with participation in government-sanctioned bodies was that advocacy groups 
were always locked out of macroeconomic policy discussions, which were solely reserved for 
the government and international donors. This exclusion of advocacy groups from 
macroeconomic discussions undermined advocacy groups’ role in the policymaking process for 
policies only have an impact when funded and implemented.  
Regarding the overall assessment of the impact of advocacy group-state engagement in 
policy-making processes and democratic consolidation, opinion was sharply divided among 
respondents. The first group of respondents felt that advocacy groups were having a valuable 
impact on public policy-making processes through their participation in government-sanctioned 
forums and institutions, for instance, the Executive director of the Non-Governmental 
Coordination Council (NGOCC) in Zambia, interviewed for this study reported that the 6th 
National Development Plan (NDP) was heavily influenced by advocacy groups representing 
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gender issues as reflected by the inclusion of some of their contributions in the plan (Zambia: 
Author interview, 23: 2012). The second group of respondents interviewed for this study, 
however, were very sceptical about the impact of advocacy groups’ participation in official 
government forums. They argued that such participation had no real or tangible impact on 
public policy-making and ultimately democratic consolidation. A policy analyst interviewed 
for this study in Nairobi noted that; 
“These are fake forums that the state uses for three main reasons; to please international donors, 
as a mechanism of containment of advocacy groups and as a public relations exercise. For 
international donors, these forums help in endorsing their neoliberal policies to appear locally 
owned. Its just tokenism and advocacy groups have no impact on major decisions by the state 
(Kenya: Author interview, 16: 2012) 
 
A political scientist interviewed for this study concurred with the above assessment and added 
that official government forums for policy engagement are; 
 
“Illusions of participation meant to hoodwink international donors and the general public. At 
the end of the policy engagement, significant economic and budgetary decisions are made by 
the government in consultation with international donors (Kenya: Author interview, 9: 2012) 
 
According to this view, the forums are merely meant to show that civil society groups 
have endorsed government decisions to fulfill international donor conditionalities. Major 
macro-economic decisions are still reserved for the government in consultation with 
international donors. Advocacy groups participation in such forums are, therefore, more 
ritualistic and symbolic than substantive and do not serve any meaningful purpose for 
transformative action. An advocacy activist, interviewed for this study who subscribes to this 
line of thinking described the forums as; “Government talking to advocacy groups, but not listening 
to them” (Kenya: Author interview, 23:2012). This statement alludes to the fact that governments 
are forced by international donors to include advocacy groups in such official forums and, 
therefore, do not take them seriously since they still reserve the right to make the final decisions 
on major policy issues. However, it is important to note that this practice of tokenism when it 
comes to policy making is not unique to Kenya and Zambia. Chabal and Daloz (1999) have 
referred to this practice as “politics of the mirror,” in which many African governments reflect 
back to international donors what they want to see and hear while following their preferences 
behind the “looking glass.” 
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Several respondents also felt that attention to national level issues through the 
involvement of advocacy groups in government advisory bodies crowd out the strengthening 
of grassroots structures. Dwyer and Zeilig, (2012) have emphasized this point and argued that 
the participation of advocacy groups in government fora raises the question of the extent to 
which grassroots organisation participate in such official forums and, therefore, question the 
extent to which such participation increases bottom-up influence on state policies. This view 
means that advocacy groups’ participation in official fora, as intermediaries between the people 
and the government and not representatives of the grassroots. However, it must be noted that 
the partnership between advocacy groups and the state in the policy-making process is a 
worldwide trend that is not unique to Kenya and Zambia (Brautigam, 1994; Rhodes, 2000). It 
is considered best practice for the successful implementation of democratic reforms with the 
assumption that it confers ownership of the reforms to the people. 
The study also found that the new political and institutional dispensation in both Kenya 
and Zambia has led to an expanded scope and depth of old issues and the evolvement of new 
issues in the policy-making domain of democratic politics. Several issues have become 
necessary for advocacy groups in the policy-making process. These include taxation, national 
debt, budget transparency, monitoring and accountability, climate change, gender 
representation, devolution, and corporate social responsibility, among others. Most respondents 
interviewed for this study in Kenya, attributed this expansion of issues to the promulgation of 
the new Constitution in 2010, which established devolution by creating 47 counties, enshrined 
a progressive Bill of Rights in the constitution and established various state commissions and 
offices with the mandate of handling various issues that are of interest to advocacy groups. 
These commissions include the Kenya National Human Rights Commission, The Gender 
Commission and, the Commission on Administration of Justice (the Ombudsman Office), 
among others. The commissions have extensively engaged advocacy groups on issues pertinent 
to their mandates. According to the Executive Director of the Centre for Governance and 
Development (CGD); 
“The new constitution widened the opportunities and scope for advocacy organisations’ 
engagement and work with the public on various issues at different administrative levels. It also 
expanded the spaces and the platforms for dialogue and engagement with the county and the 
national governments” (Kenya: Author interview, 4: 2012).  
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The promulgation of the new Constitution promoted new forms of popular participation 
with most advocacy groups expanding their scope of activities to the county level through the 
creation of local chapters or affiliates besides new groups emerging to take advantage of these 
new opportunities. For instance, the Social Development Network (SODNET)-an advocacy 
group in Nairobi expanded its budget literacy and tracking programme to several counties to 
democratize county decision-making and monitoring of resources (Kenya: Author interview, 
7:2012). A further reflection on the new opportunities was provided by an advocacy group 
leader interviewed for this study in Mombasa, who stated that;  
“The new constitution has opened up more spaces for advocacy groups. Even previously 
marginalised groups such as the pro-abortionists and atheists have emerged to openly and 
publicly demand their right to be recognized and respected. These issues were unheard of in the 
public domain just a decade ago (Kenya: Author interview, 15:2012).  
 
Other issues like social justice and economic emancipation have also come to the forefront of 
policy advocacy. A prominent civil society activist interviewed for this study noted that; 
“We cannot consolidate our democracy without economic emancipation. The liberation 
narrative must now be replaced with a re-focusing of our energies on the economic emancipation 
of our people from poverty, disease and ignorance” (Kenya: Author interview, 10: 2012).  
  
Most advocacy groups are also focused on the implementation of the new constitution through 
civic education to raise awareness of the contents of the new Constitution with the public. These 
groups argue that it is fundamental to educate the citizens to fully understand, internalise and 
put in practice the new constitution. An advocacy group leader interviewed for this study 
summarised this role as; “breathing life into the new constitution” (Kenya: Author interview, 
18: 2012). In other words, making the new Constitution, a living document, which is accepted, 
understood and practiced by most Kenyans.  
 Most respondents interviewed for this study also argued that the new media and 
technology has created more opportunities for the work of advocacy groups in both countries. 
Most groups now consider the internet, social media, the email, and cell phones as critical tools 
for their operational efficiency with a tremendous positive impact on their programmes. For 
instance, advocacy groups in both countries have used the internet, the email, and cell phones 
to monitor general elections. The domestic Election Observer Group (ELOG) in Kenya and the 
Foundation for the Democratic Process (FODEP) in Zambia have both used information 
technology tools to monitor various elections and to provide information to citizens about 
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elections in real time. These groups have joined the global trend of development of information 
and communication technology (ICT) for civil society organisations, which has “helped the 
proliferation and the strengthening of NGOs and other private associations” (Franda, 2002, p. 
18-19).  
In Zambia, advocacy groups have also taken advantage of the proliferation of the 
community media, FM radio and TV stations to communicate their programs to the citizens 
(Zambia: Author interview, 32: 2012), while in Kenya, the Social Development Network has 
started an innovative program, the info-net platform for public participation, accountability, and 
transparency. These information technology programmes have helped improve citizen voice in 
policy and governance issues through call-in sessions in radio and TV stations and citizen 
participation in budget monitoring and implementation and, therefore, ensuring alternative 
sources of information, transparency, and public accountability. The media has become critical 
for the democratic consolidation process as one community leader in Lusaka interviewed for 
this study state; 
“The media has become the voice of the people and the space for free deliberation of democratic 
issues in Zambia” (Zambia: Author interview, 34:2012) 
 
The study also found that the new political and institutional dispensation in both 
countries has led to the rapid growth of local civil society organisations due to both domestic 
and international factors. Democratic reforms adopted as part of the transformation process by 
Kenya and Zambia have improved civil liberties and political rights and thus created a political 
environment conducive for civil society growth. The New Policy Agenda (NPA) adopted by 
international donors in the early 1990s linked development aid and the promotion of human 
rights, democracy and good governance, and re-directed donor resources to civil society groups, 
concerned with issues of democracy and governance, particularly, in the initial period after the 
transitions (Robinson, 1994). These groups were viewed as cost-effective because they were 
less bureaucratic and reached the marginalized and the poor than the state. Additionally, 
international donors pressurized African countries to implement democratic reforms. All these 
factors stimulated the rapid and unprecedented growth of local advocacy groups promoting 
liberal models of good governance and human rights. The growth was accompanied by 
increased diversity of organisations within the broader civil society sector and reflected similar 
trends in NGO growth in other developing countries (Hershey, 2013) 
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 It is difficult to obtain accurate and reliable data on the number of civil society 
organisations in both Kenya and Zambia due to several factors. Firstly, there is a lack of an 
updated record of civil society groups in both countries from the bodies mandated with the 
registrations. Secondly, civil society organizations in both countries register under several laws 
in multiple administrative levels with no overall register for the groups. In Kenya, the NGO 
Coordination Act of 1990 that govern the registration and operations of NGOs in the country 
allows civil society groups to register under the NGO Coordination Act, the Companies Act, 
and the Societies Act, while some types of civil society groups are exempted from registration. 
This fragmented registration means that the NGO Coordination Bureau records do not capture 
all registered civil society groups in the country. However, due to these challenges brought 
about by different legal, operational frameworks and regulations, the government has sought to 
bring all registrations of civil society organisations under the new PBO Act No, 18 of 2013, 
which is yet to be operationalised. 
 In Zambia, the registration of civil society groups is also administratively fragmented 
in various government departments, relevant statutory bodies and at different administrative 
levels in the country. In principle, all civil society organisations should register with the 
Registrar of Societies, but the current law allows other forms of registrations, for example, 
youth organisations register with the National Youth Development Council, organisations 
dealing with issues of disability register with the Zambia Agency for persons with disabilities 
while other groups can still register with the Zambia Council for Social Development (NORAD, 
2008). Furthermore, a growing number of advocacy groups are registering as limited private 
companies to avoid governmental control under the controversial NGO Act of 2009.58 
Additionally, civil society organisations operate in multiple sectors and engage in a variety of 
activities defying easy categorisation, for instance, both the Kitua Cha Sheria (Centre for Law) 
and the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) in Kenya and Zambia respectively, simultaneously 
conduct advocacy on legal issues and provide legal services to their clients.  
 
 
                                                             
 
58 Author interviews in Zambia, 29:2012, 33:2012 and 36:2012 
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Despite all these challenges of registration of civil society groups in both countries, all 
available data and observations show that civil society groups have experienced unprecedented 
growth in numbers since the democratic transitions. In Kenya, Figure 4.1, shows a clear trend 
of rapid growth of NGOs from 2001 to 2012 from data obtained from the NGO Coordination 
Bureau59 with the highest recorded annual growth between 2004-2005 periods when 710 new 
groups were registered. Brass (2010) has noted that from 2001 to 2012, NGOs grew by 390 
percent, the fastest growth ever recorded in the country.  Since most advocacy organisations in 
the country are NGOs,60 this trend of the overall growth of the sector accurately reflects the 
growth of advocacy groups during the same period. 
Figure 4. 1 Growth of NGOs in Kenya 2001-2014 
 
Source: NGO Coordination Bureau data 2001-2014 
  This period of rapid proliferation of civil society organisations saw the establishment 
of some of the most significant and well-established advocacy groups in the country. These 
include the Centre for Law and Research International (CLARION), the Citizen Coalition for 
Constitution Culture (4Cs) formerly the Citizen Coalition for Constitutional Change, the Centre 
                                                             
 
59 The NGO Co-ordination Bureau is the official organization charged with the registration, co-ordination and 
facilitation of the work of national and international NGOs operating in the country 
60The NGO Co-ordination Act defines an NGO as “a private voluntary grouping of individuals or associations not 
operated for profit or for other commercial purposes, but which have organized themselves nationally or 
internationally for the benefit of the public at large and for the promotion of industry and supply of amenities and 
services” (NGO Co-ordination Board, 2010, p.3) 
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for Governance and Development (CGD), and the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) 
among others. Most of these organisations are urban-based, elite-led advocacy groups with 
considerable reach to the countryside. These groups replaced the mainstream church 
organisations, which had led the demands for multi-party politics in the early 1990s, but 
retreated to traditional interest representation and articulation after the transition. The most 
recent advocacy groups to be established in Kenya include the Katiba Institute and the Africa 
Centre for Open Governance (Africog). According to Brass (2010), by 2006, governance 
organisations constituted about 4 percent of all civil society groups registered in the country as 
shown in Figure 4.2. By 2009 advocacy groups constituted 9 percent, capacity building groups 
39 percent, and service provision groups 53 percent of all registered NGOs (NGO Coordination 
Board, 2009:2) demonstrating the rapid growth in sectoral diversity. 
Figure 4. 2 Sectoral distribution of NGOs in Kenya (2006) 
 
Source: Brass, J. (2016) Allies or Adversaries: NGOs and the State in Africa, Cambridge University 
Press. 
In Zambia, Erdmann and Simutanyi (2003) indicated that by 1995 more than 1,000 new 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) had been registered by the Registrar of Societies, 
besides many informal civil society groups in rural areas. Eight years later, the number of 
registered civil society organisations had reached almost 10,000, addressing various issues in 
the country (Maitra, 2006). Other groups have estimated the number of registered civil society 
organisations in Zambia to be more than 20,000 though not all are active (NORAD, 2008). The 
Registrar of Societies’ records showed that 5,860 NGOs, trade unions, and associations had 
been registered by 2010, besides thousands of informal civil society organisations spread out in 
rural areas.  The increase in the number of CSOs in the country is also demonstrated by sectoral 
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growth, for example, the Non-Governmental Organisation Coordinating Council (NGOCC) 
membership has seen unprecedented growth since its inception. From only nine organisations 
in 1985 to 69 in 2005, 83 in 2007 and 109 in 201261 as shown in Figure 4.3 below. 
Figure 4. 3 Growth of NGOCC Membership 1985-2012 
 
Source: NGOCC Annual Report (2012) 
Most of the major advocacy organisations in Zambia were also established after the 
political transition in 1991, primarily supported by international donor funding (Elemu, 2010). 
These new organisations took over advocacy campaigns from the churches and the Zambia 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), which had been the only opposition voices spearheading 
political change in the country. These new groups included the Foundation for Democratic 
Process (FODEP), the NGO Coordination Committee (NGOCC), and the Southern Africa 
Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD) among others. These new groups 
are mainly urban-based, and elite-led groups, focusing on human rights, governance and 
democracy, the rule of law, civic education, the conduct of elections and addressing the 
increasing poverty levels in the country. By 2010, advocacy groups focussing on democracy 
and governance accounted for about 13 percent of all registered civil society organisations in 
the country. The rapid growth of civil society organisations in Zambia has also been 
accompanied by sectoral diversity as shown in figure 4.4 below.  
                                                             
 
61 Gender Equality in Zambia: A presentation of NGOCC during the Civil Society-Patriotic Front Dialogue held 
on 12-13th April 2012 at Cresta Golf Hotel, Lusaka, Zambia. NGOCC is a network of NGOs involved in women 
and girls’ empowerment, advocacy and development (Author Interview, 30: 2012) 
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Figure 4. 4 Sectoral distribution of CSOs in Zambia 
 
Source: Zambia Council for Social Development Report, 2010 
4.3. The primary constraints confronting advocacy groups in the new political 
and institutional environment in Kenya and Zambia  
 
Although the new political and institutional environment in both Kenya and Zambia 
accorded advocacy groups several opportunities as discussed in this chapter, the same 
environment has also brought in significant constraints, which have left advocacy groups in 
both countries in a quandary and near paralysis. These constraints emanate from the broader 
institutional and political environment and include the legacy of authoritarianism, advocacy 
groups’ strategic choices within conditions of uncertainty, and the relationship between 
advocacy groups and other political actors among others. Moreover, the new political 
environment is in flux and constantly shaped and re-shaped by a complex interplay of the 
interactions between the state, society and other political actors within the evolving process of 
the democratisation process. Advocacy groups, thus face a three-fold dilemma that involves; 
re-defining their role in the new political dispensation, crafting new strategies for articulating 
demands for the support of democratic consolidation and re-defining their relationship with the 
newly democratic states in a way that is constructive and productive to the transformation 
process. These constraints have put in doubt advocacy groups’ ability to effectively contribute 
to the process of democratic consolidation.  
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Additionally, challenges have emerged from advocacy groups’ internal contradictions 
and their relationships with other major political actors such as political parties and international 
donors. The near paralysis of advocacy groups in the supposedly democratic post-transitional 
environment is an intriguing paradox that invokes fundamental questions about groups that once 
played a significant role in the process of democratic transitions in both countries and are now 
facing an existential threat and finding it extremely difficult to adapt to the new political and 
institutional environment and play a productive role in the process of democratic consolidation. 
4.3.1. Advocacy groups’ Role, Strategies, and Relationship with the State 
 
The literature on democratisation has shown that democratic transitions alter the 
political dynamics, the power structure and the institutional environments in which advocacy 
groups operate and thus affects advocacy groups’ orientation, roles, relations with other 
political actors and the strategies for articulating demands for democratic consolidation. The 
changing environment requires flexibility and improved capacity for these groups to adapt and 
effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. Regarding civil society 
relations with the state, Najam (2000) has developed a model, which posits that the relationship 
between the two groups is a product of congruencies or divergences’ of means and ends in the 
political process and identifies four tendencies; cooperation, complementarity, co-optation, and 
conflict. Cooperation occurs when civil society groups and the state seek similar ends and 
employ similar means to achieve those ends, while conflict occurs when the state and civil 
society have divergent goals and means to achieve those goals. Finally, complementarity occurs 
when the state and civil society seek similar ends but prefer dissimilar means, while co-optation 
occurs when both civil society and the state prefer similar means but dissimilar ends (Pearce 
1997; Bratton 1990).  
The relationship between advocacy groups and the state is critical to democratic 
consolidation since the nature and effectiveness of advocacy groups are contingent on the 
structure of the state and its relationship with advocacy groups (Encarnacion, 2001). An 
effective process of democratic consolidation, therefore, requires a strong and productive state- 
advocacy group relationship. In Kenya, advocacy groups played a critical role in the process of 
democratic transition by organising rallies, demonstrations, and protests, convening opposition 
party meetings and pushing for opposition unity besides conducting political mobilisation and 
civic education among other functions.  
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The groups were highly politicised and deeply consumed in opposition politics and 
agenda in their efforts to dislodge the authoritarian regimes. Their relationship with the state 
was confrontational as the incumbent regime resisted political change through various means, 
including violence and intimidation. With the incumbent regime retaining power for the next 
years after the transition, the political and institutional environment considerably remained the 
same and so were the role, strategies and relationship of advocacy groups with the state. The 
dramatic change of regime in 2002, following the election of the National Rainbow Coalition 
(NARC) left advocacy groups with the “shock of victory, “which contributed to the paralysis in 
the traditional reform sectors (Holmquist 2005, p. 4) and presented advocacy groups with a 
grave dilemma on how to relate with the new administration, having closely worked with and 
supported the opposition party-NARC. Most advocacy groups’ leaders, therefore, felt obliged 
to support the regime as they considered the NARC victory to be their own victory (Oloo, 2005). 
They appeared unprepared for the new political dispensation with no agenda of their own to 
pursue. The civil society sector was disorganised, disoriented and became extremely 
reactionary to national issues with discordant voices and opportunistic maneuvers by various 
organisations within the sector. 
 In 2003, the leadership of civil society in Kenya was involved in a deep reflection 
regarding the new role that it needed to play in the new political dispensation, the new 
relationship that it needed to build with the new administration,  the agenda that it needed to 
pursue, and the strategies that it needed to employ to achieve that agenda. The leadership of 
civil society believed that all these changes were critical if civil society was to play a significant 
role in the process of democratic consolidation. The sector-wide reflection generated a critical 
debate on these issues from 2003-2005 with numerous attempts to bring the sector together to 
adopt a joint strategic position on how to approach the new political and institutional 
dispensation. Although the ideological spectrum of advocacy groups in Kenya is expansive, the 
debate on the new role of civil society groups in the new political dispensation led to the 
emergence of two distinct and opposed groups within civil society. The first group, which was 
probably the most vocal and visible group within civil society believed that the National 
Rainbow Coalition (NARC) administration was “civil society friendly” or “civil society 
compliant” (Kanyinga, 2004) and the best guarantor of civil society objectives.  
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According to this first group of advocacy groups, the NARC administration needed 
advocacy groups’ support through pragmatic engagement to achieve its goals and ultimately 
democratic consolidation. This position was shared by international donors, who were ready to 
support these groups’ initiatives with the government. The perspective was represented by large 
and well-established, urban-based, formal, more liberal and elitists powerful and well-funded 
organisations with virtually no social base at the grassroots. In contrast, the second group 
believed that the kind of cooperation and accommodation proposed by the first group would 
lead to advocacy groups being “too close for comfort” (Hulme and Edwards 1997) with the 
state and, therefore, undermine their autonomy and independence. They preferred a range of 
strategic relationships with the state, involving the continuation of the autonomous 
associational life, in which advocacy groups play a strong watchdog role and employ all 
available strategies and tactics,62 depending on the issue and the situation to achieve their goals. 
This group was represented by small, formal and informal grassroots organisations based in 
both urban and rural centres and led by the Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change (4Cs).63  
 The first group held its first meeting from January 23-24 in Nanyuki, three weeks after 
the new government had been installed. The meeting was organised by the NGO Council and 
attended by about 25 leaders drawn from key advocacy groups in the country to broadly “reflect 
on the future of civil society in light of the election held on December 2002.” The primary 
objective of the meeting was to “analyse the new political dispensation and its implications for 
civil society and identify strategic positions for civil society.” The group identified threats and 
challenges that advocacy organisations were likely to face in the new political dispensation. 
These challenges included possible confusion and complacency within the sector, possible 
capture of civil society initiatives by the government, potential for co-optation of advocacy 
group leaders, shifting of funding to the government by donors, weakening of the opposition 
and polarisation of civil society along pro and anti-government elements.  
                                                             
 
62 The Limuru Civic Organizations Reflective Meeting Report 2003 and the Narumoru Civic Organizations 
Reflective Meeting Report 2004 
63 4Cs was formed mainly to push for popular constitutional change and after the passage of the new constitution 
in 2010, it changed its name to Citizen Coalition for Constitutional Culture. Other groups in this camp included 
the Ujamaa Centre, Bunge La Mwananchi, Nubian Human Rights Forum, Kenya Debt Relief Network, Social 
Development Network and Kenyans for Peace with Justice and Truth. 
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The meeting resolved that to further the democratisation process in the country, the 
agenda for advocacy organisations needed to be developed in cooperation with the new 
administration.64 The group envisaged a more collaborative, less oppositional and 
professionalised approach to the process of democratic consolidation in the new political 
dispensation. It eschewed any form of confrontation with the new government as it believed 
that the main aim of popular mobilisation had been achieved during the transition and, therefore, 
settled for what Madlingozi (2007) refers to as “in-system tactics.” In other words, to make 
demands for democratic consolidation through the official channels of participation and 
engagement with the state. It held its follow-up meeting on December 15-16, 2003 at Panafric 
Hotel with the theme of “Civil Society Contribution to Democratisation and Development in 
the New Dispensation.” The primary aim of this meeting was to review the civil society 
contribution to the democratic processes in the country and to determine the way forward for 
such organisations in the new political dispensation.  
The meeting reviewed the threats and challenges identified in the first meeting and 
concluded that advocacy organisations needed to productively engage the government, while 
at the same time maintain their watchdog role. Moreover, the groups needed to be more 
proactive, increase their capacity and expertise, maintain collective action through issue-based 
coalitions and develop and apply more accurate indicators for monitoring and evaluating 
government performance. It identified new strategies that advocacy groups needed to employ 
in the new political dispensation, including research, civic awareness campaigns, political 
advocacy, coalition building, and collaboration. There appeared to be movement towards a 
middle ground position on the role of advocacy groups in the new political environment, 
however, overall, the group believed that cooperation with the new administration was the best 
strategy for advocacy organisations to influence public policy and achieve democratic reforms 
that would significantly contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in the country.  
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The second group of advocacy groups also held a series of meetings in Limuru and 
Naromoru to develop a framework for their role, strategies, and relationship with the new 
democratic government in the new political and institutional dispensation. The first group 
perceived the second group as the “radical” wing of the country’s advocacy sector. An active 
member of this group interviewed for this study stated that;   
“We were perceived as the radical group and shunned by both the liberal wing of civil society 
and the international donor community, but we considered ourselves as the radical progressives, 
who wanted to engage in the transformation of the country” (Kenya: Author interviews, 10: 
2012).  
 
The group resolved to continue playing the role of a strong watchdog for the government and 
embraced both the “in-system tactics” and the “extra-institutional tactics” (Madlingozi, 2007) 
as had been used by the prodemocracy movement during the transition period. It prioritised 
exerting maximum pressure on the state through both “invited” and “invented” spaces, 
including direct popular mobilisation such as demonstrations and protests, where necessary 
(Kenya: Author interviews, 10:2012, 12:2012). The group also endorsed the use of the court 
system to redress the excesses of the state, lobbying, and other strategies that would contribute 
to the process of democratic consolidation. The group articulated a more transformational 
ideology based on social and economic justice. The group perceived themselves as the “real” 
civil society, embodying the spirit of the social movement, opposed neoliberalism, and was 
active at the World Social Forum meetings both in Africa and abroad. (Kenya: Author 
interviews 10:2012, 18: 2012).  
Table 4. 1 Summary of orientation and characteristics of advocacy groups in Kenya 
Group characteristic Group 1 Group 2 
Goal/ democratization Reform-oriented Transformation-oriented 
Location Mostly urban Both urban and rural 
Structure Large and well-established Small, formal and informal 
Ideological orientation Liberal Radical progressives 
Strategies In-system strategies Both in-system and extra-institutional 
strategies 
Relationship with the 
state 
Cooperative/Collaborative A plurality of relationships 
Program design Supply side approach Demand side approach 
Community 
participation 
Non-political Political 
 
Source: Author created from qualitative interviews with respondents. 
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These differences between the two groups within civil society outlined in Table 4.1. 
continued and were exacerbated by the paralysis and near collapse of the NGO Council over 
leadership differences.  In April 2003, a new organization-the National Civil Society Congress 
was established to coordinate and galvanise advocacy groups’ efforts towards democratisation. 
NCSC drew its membership from a broad spectrum of organisations within the sector. Its 
membership was composed of urban-based, formal and informal, small and well-established 
organisations. The President of the organisation interviewed for this study revealed that the 
formation of the umbrella organisation was necessitated by the realisation that advocacy 
organisations were losing voice and influence in the democratic reform process due to their 
fragmentation and lack of consensus on a national agenda (Kenya: Author Interview, 8:2012).   
In 2004, another attempt was made to create an organization that would coordinate the 
activities of civil society  groups through the formation of the Civil Society Forum (CSF) but 
failed to gain traction as most organisations were already involved with the NCSC, while others 
were making efforts at reviving the NGO Council (Kenya: Author interviews, 2:2012, 6: 2012, 
12: 2012). Despite the intense debate and various efforts at creating umbrella groups to 
coordinate the activities of civil society groups between 2003 and 2005, the unity of purpose 
within the sector remained elusive in the new political dispensation due to ideological and other 
differences within the sector. However, the relationship between advocacy groups and the state 
remained more collaborative between 2002-2004 as the groups which supported collaboration 
with the state were larger, well-established, more visible, better financed by international 
donors, and, therefore, more powerful and dominant within the sector. One respondent 
interviewed for this study described the transformation thus; 
“Advocacy organisations have moved from the streets to the boardrooms and have to contend 
with the complexities of policy-making and implementation. We want to contribute to the 
process of democratic consolidation” (Author interview 1:2012).   
 
The second group was much smaller, more informal and their strength and support base remain 
unclear, although there are cases, where they have organised successful demonstrations within 
the capital city of Nairobi.65 This group continued to believe that the proper role of advocacy 
                                                             
 
65 On 31st May 2011, Unga Revolution organized a successful demonstration within the city of Nairobi protesting 
the high cost of living in the country. Unga is a Kiswahili word for maize flour. 
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groups in a democratic society must necessarily be that of keeping a check on the state at all 
times and that this role can only be achieved if the groups are willing to employ all available 
strategies and tactics strategically. A leader from this group interviewed for this study noted 
that; 
“No matter what type of government we have, advocacy groups can never act as rubber stamps 
for the state. We must continue playing our traditional role of a watchdog to the government 
and ensure that checks and balances are respected, and public accountability practiced by state 
officials” (Author interview, 1:2012) 
 
In Zambia, the swift and smooth democratic transition in the very first multi-party 
general elections in 1991 did not give advocacy groups time to be socialised in the complexities 
of multi-party politics. The groups appeared to have had no higher goal than the removal of 
President Kaunda and UNIP from power. They had no clear platform for democratic reforms 
in the post-transitional period and were thus disorganised and dis-oriented amid attempts to 
figure out what roles, strategies, and agenda they needed to adapt to be effective in the process 
of democratic consolidation. The political and institutional environment was further 
complicated by the fact that the MMD administration had politically appropriated the lead 
organisation within civil society-the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). ZCTU became 
an appendage of the administration and retreated from the struggle for democratic 
consolidation. MMD had started to marginalise civil society groups as early as the transition 
negotiations between itself and UNIP in July 1991 (Van Doepp, 2000). It viewed advocacy 
groups suspiciously and continued to marginalise them in the policy-making processes (Rakner, 
2003), once it was in power, besides employing high handed strategies such as threats and 
intimidation towards the groups.  
The new MMD administration inherited a failed economy and chose to embrace the 
neo-liberal economic policies under the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) supported 
by the IMF and the World Bank to jumpstart the economy. The state, thus deliberately side-
lined advocacy groups, progressives, and intellectuals to allow for the implementation of SAPs 
(Bartlett, 2000). Although the most advocacy groups supported MMD in the 1991 general 
elections, they continued to oppose SAPs in the post-transitional dispensation due to their 
deleterious effects on the economy, the poor and the marginalised. Most respondents 
interviewed for this study noted that the continued implementation of SAPs in Zambia caused 
friction between MMD administration and advocacy organisations and created tensions 
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between advocacy groups and the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) which changed 
its stance and was now  supporting (Zambia: Author interviews, 29: 2012; 32: 2012; 35: 2012).  
The opportunities and avenues of advocacy groups to influence state policies and 
contribute to the process of democratic consolidation were thus severely limited.  In such an 
uncertain and continuously evolving political and institutional environment, advocacy groups 
found it extremely difficult to redefine their new roles, develop an agenda and adopt strategies 
that would allow them to be effective in the process of democratic consolidation. Most 
advocacy group leaders interviewed for this study noted that as a result of the obtaining political 
environment, the sector became mostly reactionary to events and issues of national importance 
preferring to employ ad-hoc mobilisation strategies in response to emerging national issues. 
 An advocacy group leader interviewed for this study reflected on this situation and stated that;  
“We were in a total quandary once ZCTU joined the government. We had no agenda of our own 
and lacked the leadership to help us develop a new agenda of transformation. We did not have 
a way forward, and the government had quickly become more authoritarian and repressive. The 
whole civil society was paralyzed” (Zambia: Author interview, 29:2012) 
 
The reactionary nature and ad-hoc posture of advocacy groups in the new political 
environment was successful at times, for instance, the Oasis Forum established in 2000 by the 
Non-Government Coordination Council (NGOCC), the Law Association of Zambia and three 
church organisations, coordinated, mobilised and successfully campaigned against the third 
term quest by President Fredrick Chiluba. The group essentially replicated the spirit of the 
prodemocracy movements of the early 1990s (Dwyer and Zeilig, 2012). The study also found 
that the problem of internal capacity of advocacy groups hindered effective advocacy groups’ 
engagement with the state in the policy-making process. The imperatives of the new 
dispensation demanded formal engagement with the state in policy discussions, lobbying and 
understanding of the policy process. All these processes require skills, knowledge, and 
understanding of the legislative process, which most advocacy groups lack. In the absence of a 
national statutory body, advocacy group networks became important actors in agenda setting 
of national policy processes such as the PRSP, SAGs and the formulation of the national 
development plans.  
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Advocacy groups continued their participation in the Constitutional Review process. In 
2005, the Mungomba Commission had presented a draft constitution that recommended the 
reduction of presidential powers, the institution of a 50 percent plus one requirement for a 
winning presidential candidate, strengthening of parliamentary oversight and enshrined 
freedom of speech, expression, and assembly in the Bill of Rights among other 
recommendations. Advocacy groups initiated a major campaign to ensure that the new 
constitution would be adopted by a constituent assembly. The groups launched demonstrations 
and held conferences across the country on the constitutional review process. Eventually, 
President Mwanawasa conceded and directed that the new constitution would be adopted by a 
constituent assembly but postponed the process until after the 2006 general elections. In 2007, 
the president initiated the National Constitutional Conference (NCC)-a constituent assembly of 
550 political and civil society representatives to finalise the constitutional review process, but 
the process was again delayed. 
 The Banda administration, which replaced the Mwanawasa government took over the 
process, but lacked the political will to midwife a new constitution for Zambians.  In 2011, the 
Patriotic Front government replaced the Banda administration and promised to complete the 
constitutional review process with full citizen participation. However, the process was ongoing 
at the time of this study. The adoption of mass demonstration and protests by advocacy groups 
in the quest for a constitutional review process represented the continued strategies of the 
prodemocracy movements of the 1990s. An advocacy group leader interviewed in Lusaka puts 
it this way; 
“It was becoming clear to us that to confront the MMD administration, we had to use the same 
strategies that we used during the Kaunda years. What was different was that some powerful 
groups like the ZCTU were now on the side of the government and the divisions within our 
side” (Zambia: Author Interview, 32: 2012) 
 
The pattern of semi-authoritarian governance style exhibited by successive MMD 
administrations since 1991 exacerbated the corrosive relationship with advocacy groups. Two 
major factors could explain the continuity of this style of governance. Firstly, in 1991, the 
Chiluba administration inherited a one-party system constitution in a democratic setting and 
was unwilling to make any major changes to that constitution that would support the 
institutionalisation of democracy. The administration’s attempt at constitutional reform in 1996 
mostly left the executive powers of the Presidency intact, giving Chiluba the authority to govern 
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in a semi-authoritarian manner. The successive MMD administrations maintained that status 
quo and failed to institute any meaningful constitutional reforms. Most respondents interviewed 
for this study unanimously agreed that the fight for a comprehensive constitution review has 
been at the centre of the confrontational relationship between the state and advocacy 
organisations with the administrations making every effort to tightly control the process, while 
advocacy groups are campaigning for a more participatory and transparent constitutional review 
process.  The state strategies led to the shrinking of the civic space and put enormous strain on 
advocacy groups’ efforts towards democratic consolidation (Zambia: Author interviews, 31: 
2012; 33: 2012; 38: 2012; 40: 2012). President Fredrick Chiluba continuously vilified and 
demonised advocacy groups as agents of imperialism pursuing foreign agenda and used 
strategies of co-optation, threats, and intimidation to control the activities of these groups.  
Further, any consultation between government and interest groups were limited to 
formal representation on various government committees in the first year of MMD as the 
government interpreted its sizeable electoral majority as a mandate for change and, therefore, 
lost incentive for a wide-ranging consultation with interest groups. By the end of Chiluba’s first 
term, Mphaisha (2000) concludes that civil society was facing a hostile environment with 
heightened intimidation, harassment, and restricted freedom of assembly. The National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) pulled out of the country in 1996 citing a hostile political 
environment which had hindered its operations. Consultation with interest groups further 
declined during the MMD second administration (Rakner, 2003). 
President Levy Mwanawasa, who took over from President Chiluba criticised advocacy 
groups for their refusal to be co-opted into his administration to help reform the country’s 
constitution (Burnell, 2001a). In 2004, he banned the activities of Oasis Forum.66 Although the 
PRSP process during President Mwanawasa’s tenure gave both advocacy groups and the state 
a golden opportunity to rebuild their relationship and engage in constructive cooperation as, 
mutual suspicion continued after the process (Seshamani, 2002, p. 17). Mwanawasa continued 
to play lip-service to consultation with civil society groups in the constitutional review process 
by creating a government-dominated constitutional reform commission, which was boycotted 
by most civil society groups.  
                                                             
 
66 The Post ‘Zambia: Mwanawasa Needs to Change attitude towards Civil Society’ 12th July 2004 
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On December 2007, most advocacy groups boycotted the National Constitutional conference, 
citing bias in the selection of delegates, who were primarily aligned to the MMD (AfDB/OECD 
2008, p. 628).  
President Rupiah Banda took over after the death of President Mwanawasa in 2008, and 
state-advocacy group relationship worsened. An advocacy group leader with CARITAS-a 
human rights organization in Zambia interviewed for this study noted that; 
“President Banda’s relationship with advocacy groups was the worst of all MMD 
administrations. He exacerbated the confrontational relationship with advocacy groups through 
authoritarian tendencies, which culminated in his government crafting one of the most draconian 
and controversial NGO legislation ever done in Zambia, which was passed in parliament in 
2009” (Zambia: Author Interview, 32:2012). 
 
During the debate in parliament on the controversial NGO Bill in 2009, several 
advocacy groups led by CARITAS, organised a forum to discuss the Bill and submit their views 
to the government, but the meeting was violently disrupted by police and several advocacy 
group leaders arrested (Zambia: Author interview, 32:2012). The leaders were later released 
without charges. The administration also deregistered several advocacy groups, which included 
the Citizens Committee, the Forum for Leadership Search and the Southern Africa Centre for 
the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD) which was deregistered on the grounds 
that it was a “danger to state security”67 (Zambia: Author interview, 29:2012) without 
elaboration on the activities of the organisation that constituted that danger.68 The relationship 
between advocacy groups and the state in the post-transitional political and institutional 
environment in Zambia has thus been variously described as antagonistic (Habasonda, 2010), 
adversarial (Mutesa, 2010), confrontational, and conflictual owing to the pattern of 
authoritarian tendencies of the state in a democratic political setting. This type of relationship 
has given advocacy groups no incentive to redefine their roles, strategies, and relationship with 
the state in a way that would support their contribution to the process of democratic 
consolidation.  
 
                                                             
 
67 Times of Zambia “SACCORD Looses Appeal”, March 4th, 2010 from  
http://allafrica.com/stories/201003040558.html 
68 CAP 119 Societies Act of the laws of Zambia empowers the Minister to proscribe a registered society 
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Overall, the political transition in Zambia can best be described as a “transition without 
transformation” (Ngunyi, 2001) or “change without change” (Ihonvbere, 1996, p. 93) signifying 
a high degree of continuity with the practices and vices of the one-party system in the post-
transitional democratic setting. The state is reluctant to implement comprehensive 
constitutional reforms that would transform its nature and relationship with society to create the 
foundation for the institutionalisation of democracy. All the MMD administrations reproduced 
a pattern of authoritarian tendencies, which they had accused the Kaunda administration of 
perpetrating during the one-party system. With the regime change in 2011, advocacy 
organisations had hoped that the state-civil society relationship would improve to a more 
constructive engagement as signalled by a meeting held from April 12-13th 2012 in Lusaka 
between the new government and advocacy groups on governance and partnership between the 
state and advocacy groups. However, since that meeting, the Patriotic Front (PF) administration 
has exhibited reluctance to involve advocacy groups in policy discussions besides intimidation 
to these groups, which have threatened its cooperation with advocacy groups.69  
It is thus unlikely that the confrontational relationship between advocacy organisations 
and the state will change unless the PF government changes its strategies and move towards 
embracing constructive engagement with advocacy groups before the next general elections in 
2016. The above analysis of the role, the strategies and the relationship between state and 
advocacy groups in the new political and institutional environment in both Kenya and Zambia 
has demonstrated that advocacy groups were utterly unprepared for the new political 
dispensation. The groups are unable to develop a democratic reform agenda, craft new strategies 
to articulate demands for democratic consolidation and create a new relationship with the 
democratic states. Moreover, the transition has exposed their internal contradictions, lack of 
capacity to engage in policy-making processes and lack of flexibility to adapt to the new 
political environment. All these factors have undermined their ability to effectively contribute 
to the process of democratic consolidation. 
                                                             
 
69 Zambia: PF Moves to Intimidate Independent Radio Stations-30 August 2013-
http://allafrica.com/stories/201308200246.html and CDDR Requests Suspension of Zambia from the 
Commonwealth, February 12, 2013-http://zambiareports.com/2013/02/12/cddr-requests-suspension-of-zambia-
from-commonwealth/ 
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4.3.2. The Paradox of pluralism and Advocacy groups in Kenya and Zambia 
 
A pluralist civil society with (featuring a dense network of intermediate groups and 
voluntary associations independent of the state” (Diamond 1989, p. 142) ensures that no one 
group monopolizes the community interest. It also acts as a channel for aggregating, 
representing, and articulating the interests of its members and the public, creating various 
centres of power and ensuring political accountability.  In both Kenya and Zambia, civil society 
has undergone tremendous transformation since the political transitions and today represents 
diverse sections of society, the poor and the marginalised, various interests and values. There 
is a notable re-assertion of the plural nature of civil society manifested in a multiplicity of 
groups and voices within the civic sphere in both countries. The groups also vary in terms of 
size, type, level of engagement, reach, and professionalism among other features. However, this 
study found that the multiplicity of advocacy groups in terms of numbers, issues, values, roles, 
and strategies has led to several unintended consequences which have constrained these groups’ 
ability to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. An activist in 
Nairobi noted that; 
“Advocacy groups’ approach to the state has been varied, disjointed and fragmented, thus 
significantly reducing their ability to influence public policy-making. It is a total mess” (Author 
interview, 18:2012) 
 
Advocacy groups have thus experienced the “paradox of pluralism,” where pluralism within 
civil society has led to more disadvantages than advantages. Firstly, advocacy groups have 
created a multiplicity of relationships with the state, which has given the state the advantage to 
cherry-pick which organisations to cooperate with and which ones to marginalise, avoid or 
ignore in the process of democratic consolidation (Kenya: Author interview, 12:2012; Zambia: 
Author interview, 16:2012). The governments in both countries have chosen to cooperate with 
groups which they consider“friendlier” and sideline advocacy groups, which they perceive to 
be critical of their policies and actions. An advocacy group leader interviewed for this study in 
Lusaka puts it this way; 
“The government only invites those advocacy groups it considers friendlier and sympathetic to 
its neoliberal policies. The formal meetings, therefore, become an echo chamber, where invited 
advocacy groups endorse government policies” (Zambia: Author interview 28:2012) 
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The strategy of selective engagement has crowded out critical voices, issues, and 
interests that in many cases represent marginalised sections of society in the process of 
democratic consolidation. For instance, in Kenya, the state has chosen to cooperate with well-
established, well-funded and elite-led, urban-based advocacy organisations, which favour 
cooperation with the state, while ignoring small, formal and informal advocacy groups which 
are more critical of its policies, while in Zambia, the state has used the lack of formal law that 
guarantees state-civil society engagement to unilaterally choose which groups to engage and 
which ones to ignore. Additionally, a lack of formal law to ensure state-advocacy groups 
engagement has left cooperation solely dependent on the willingness of the various government 
departments and agencies to engage with advocacy groups (Zambia: Author interview, 33:2012, 
29:2012). The strategy of selective engagement has also led to the representation of parochial 
and narrow interests that serve the whims of the state and its elites at the expense of 
marginalized groups, interests, and voices. This behaviour of the state undermines the ability 
of advocacy groups to effectively represent the interests of the poor and the marginalised groups 
in the process of democratic consolidation.  
Secondly, the study found that the dwindling resources to advocacy groups over the past 
decade in both Kenya and Zambia due to international donors shifting most of their resources 
to support the state has created fierce competition among advocacy groups, leaving them open 
to the risk of state co-optation and political appropriation, which in the end undermine their 
autonomy and independence and circumscribe their ability to effectively contribute to the 
process of democratic consolidation. Competition for scarce resources has also created mistrust, 
suspicions, and schisms within the sector and made it much more challenging to build strategic 
alliances for the engagement in policy advocacy and activism geared towards the process of 
democratic consolidation. A large number of registered advocacy groups in both countries has 
also led to duplication of efforts with several groups pursuing the same agenda and in some 
cases in the same administrative unit, while hardly sharing any information. 
Thirdly, pluralism has made coordination of advocacy groups’ activities extremely 
challenging in an environment with a weak national statutory body in Kenya and no statutory 
body for civil society groups in the case of Zambia. As noted by Keane (1988, p. 43-44), “a 
fully democratic civil society will always be threatened by poor coordination, disagreements, 
stinginess and open conflict among its members.” For advocacy groups to have any meaningful 
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impact or influence in the process of democratic consolidation, their efforts and activities need 
to be effectively coordinated. In most countries, such coordination is carried out by a national 
statutory body, whose mandate includes coordination and facilitation of the work of all civil 
society organisations in the country. In Kenya, the coordination of advocacy organisations and 
other civil society groups has long been carried out by the NGO Council, which was established 
under the NGO Coordination Act of 1990. The Act mandates the Council to; empower NGOs 
to make the sector more democratic, efficient and socially aware of the provision of services to 
the public and make them provide leadership in the creation of an enabling environment for the 
development and relief activities that have long-lasting impact (National Council of NGOs, 
1994, p. 1).  
To achieve these objectives, the Council defined its functions to include the provision 
of information and coordination around specific legal requirements arising from the NGO Act; 
establishing effective dialogue between NGOs and the Government, providing support on 
fundraising issues and establishing a base for local funding; and generally acting as the 
spokesperson for the NGO community (National Council of NGOs, 1994, p. 9). The Council 
carried out its mandate very well in the pre-transition period, contributing immensely to the 
defense of NGOs from intimidation and threats from the authoritarian government and 
coordinating the activities of the sector with significant achievements culminating in the 
political transition in the early 1990s. However, with the regime change in 2002, the NGO 
Council gradually weakened and eventually collapsed, leading to fragmentation and poor 
coordination of civil society groups in the country. Several respondents interviewed for this 
study attributed the genesis of the collapse of the Council to the election of Dr. Gichira Kibara 
in 2003 as the Chairman of the Council. A section of civil society organisations in the country 
considered him a “front for the government” (Kenya: Author interviews 2: 2012; 7: 2012; 
5:2012; 12: 2012)70 and, therefore, had lukewarm support for the Council after his election. 
 
 
                                                             
 
70 This view was given some credence, when he was appointed to the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs 
in 2004 and abruptly resigned from the Council.  
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 The test of the unity of civil society organisations and his leadership came in 2004 
during the Bomas Constitutional Review Conference, where there was a lack of leadership 
leading to poor coordination of civil society groups’ participation in the conference under the 
NGO Council. This situation was interpreted by most advocacy groups as a deliberate action 
by the Council to give government control of the process and to many civil society groups, 
more proof that the Council was under full control of the government. Civil society groups, 
therefore, failed to meaningfully contribute to the constitutional review process on various 
critical issues (Kenya: Author interviews 3:2012; 5: 2012; 7:2012; 12:2012). With lack of 
leadership and coordination, civil society group’s contributions in the conference took a 
dangerous ethnic and religious divide, which tremendously weakened their influence on the 
discussions at the conference (Kenya: Author interviews, 6: 2012; 12: 2012; 14:2012).  
The President of the National Civil Society Congress (NCSC), who was interviewed for 
this study argues that the chaotic situation at the Bomas Constitutional conference caused a lot 
of tension among several advocacy groups and the Council at the time as many groups believed 
that the Council was acting on behalf of the National Alliance Party (NAK), which was part of 
the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) to move the review process in the direction that would 
entrench the status quo, primarily by centralising power on the executive (Kenya: Author 
interviews, 8:2012, 2:2012). On May 2004, Dr. Kibara abruptly resigned from the Council to 
take up a government appointment in the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. The 
Council imploded as fierce disagreements emerged within the NGO Board as to whether there 
was a need for fresh elections for the Chairmanship position or the Vice Chair was to assume 
the leadership of the Council for the remaining period before the next elections. These 
disagreements spilled over to the entire civil society with some groups, including the 
international NGOs supporting the first option,71 while others supported the second option. 
Eventually, elections were held and won by the then Vice Chair, Ms. Orie Rogo-Manduli who 
had mobilised small, formal and informal NGOs mainly from the countryside against the large 
well-established and well-funded urban-based NGOs. 
                                                             
 
71 This group was openly opposed to the Vice Chair Ms. Orie Rogo-Manduli taking over the leadership of the 
Council for the remaining term of Dr. Gichira Kibara 
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With the election of Ms. Orie-Manduli, the Council wrangles intensified within the 
NGO Board and factions and divisions based on tribal and political party affiliations emerged 
over her leadership style. Most international donors withdrew their funding for the Council and 
the Chief executive officer, and several Board members resigned in protest of what they 
considered poor leadership from the Chairperson.72 The relationship between the Council and 
the government deteriorated, and most civil society groups withdrew their membership and 
subscriptions to the Council. The loss of funding and membership weakened the Council’s 
legitimacy and operations. Some international NGOs led by Action-Aid International mooted 
the idea of the establishment of a parallel NGO Council, which was soon formed, registered 
and immediately recognised by the Government’s NGO Coordination Board. The parallel 
Council was primarily perceived as “government friendly” and its legitimacy contested within 
the civil society sector. It soon got entangled in allegations of corruption and collapsed. 
Although the chairperson finally resigned from the original NGO Council, the wrangles have 
persisted, as some advocacy organisations have revived the second NGO Council, causing more 
confusion in the coordination of the sector. With a weakened NGO Council, several advocacy 
groups formed the National Civil Society Congress (NCSC) in 2004 mainly to; 
“Serve as a platform for a collective voice to increase advocacy organisations influence and 
solidarity in responding to emerging national issues” (Kenya: Author interview 8:2012). 
 
  Although the NCSC President dismisses the view that the Congress was formed to fill 
in the void left by the collapsing NGO Council, the organisations’ own charter states explicitly 
that one of its objectives is to set an agenda for civil society groups in the country.73 NCSC is 
thus gradually attempting to reclaim civil society influence by aggregating and articulating civic 
organisations interests and efforts at ensuring democratic consolidation. It has a broad 
membership of organisations from urban and rural areas and has emerged as an alternative 
platform for advocacy groups in the country.74 However, the NCSC is not a statutory body 
recognised by the NGO Coordination Act and, therefore, its mandate and legitimacy cannot be 
compared with that of the NGO Council. 
                                                             
 
72 Kenya: Four Officials Quit Over NGO Council Wrangles-http://allafrica.com/stories/200411020369.html 
73 http://www.clarionkenya.org/index.php/component/content/article/37-main-content/66-national-civil-society-
congress 
74 Interview with the President of the National Congress of Civil Society in Kenya, 2012 
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Zambia has never had a national statutory body mandated to coordinate the activities 
and operations of civil society organisations. The controversial NGO Act of 2009 whose 
implementation started in 2012 during the fieldwork for this study, proposes to establish the 
Zambia Congress of NGOs, composed of 12 members elected by NGO membership annually 
and whose mandate will be the management and control of the affairs of all registered NGOs 
in the country.  It will also facilitate NGOs self-regulation on matters of NGO activities, 
funding, programme, foreign affiliation, training and development of the national human 
resource, institutional building, scientific and technological development. It will draw-up and 
administer a code of conduct approved by the NGO Board.75 It is, therefore, envisaged that the 
Congress might resolve the problem of civil society groups once the Act is fully implemented.  
Most NGOs have vehemently opposed the NGO Act of 2009 on the grounds of excess 
discretionary powers over NGOs given to the Minister-in-charge of Community Development, 
the requirement for NGOs re-registration every five years and the creation of a government-
dominated NGO Coordination Board with broadly defined powers over NGOs operations 
among others. Poor coordination of advocacy group activities in both countries has led to 
advocacy groups’ activities being competitive rather than coordinated. It has also led to 
fragmentation, inadequate sharing of information, lack of a national platform to articulate 
legitimate national interests and jointly respond to national policies and state actions. All these 
problems have limited advocacy groups’ ability, influence, and effectiveness in the process of 
democratic consolidation. 
Finally, the study found that pluralism within civil society has led to the proliferation of 
several disreputable advocacy groups, including “briefcase NGO” (BRINGOs), “Government-
Owned NGOs” (GONGOs), business NGOs (BONGOs), donor NGOs (DONGOs) political 
NGOs (PONGOs), family-owned NGOs (FANGOs) and business organized NGOs (BONGOs) 
among others-all of which undermine genuine advocacy groups’ efforts towards the process of 
democratic consolidation. The most common type is the briefcase NGOs, which are nominally 
registered organisations, but have no offices, no staff, no tangible programs, do not submit audit 
reports and, therefore, functionally ineffective. In other words, they operate on paper only.  
                                                             
 
75 http://www.parliament.gov.zm/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=454 
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These types of advocacy groups are formed primarily to attract and misuse international 
donor funds for personal aggrandizement. They generally take the form of rent-seeking 
activities at the expense of the public good and thus abuse the civic space. Moreover, through 
such fraudulent activities, the groups tarnish the credibility and the image of genuine advocacy 
groups in both countries. An advocacy group leader interviewed for this study noted that; 
“Briefcase NGOs have become so common in our country and every sub-sector of civil society. 
They have no agenda for the public, no conviction and no commitment to advocacy work. Their 
only agenda is accessing donor funds for self-aggrandizement” (Kenya: Author interview, 
14:2012).  
 
The formation of nominally independent, but government-induced NGOs (GONGOs), also 
undermined advocacy groups’ efforts towards the process of democratic consolidation. 
Although they remain outside of government, these groups operate as “instruments of the state” 
by continuously supporting and endorsing official government positions and policies. Their 
participation in the policy process is, therefore, unlikely to make any real impact on public 
accountability and democratic reforms. The groups also attempt to substitute for advocacy 
groups that are deemed too critical of state policies by the government and, therefore, muddy 
the waters by creating confusion in civil society policy standpoints. 
4.3.3. Advocacy Groups and the Legacy of Authoritarianism: Divisions within the 
Monolith 
 
As part of the prodemocracy movements in both Kenya and Zambia, advocacy groups 
played a significant role in the democratic transition process. Their strength and vibrancy was 
derived from the “unity of purpose,” which created the counter-hegemonic drive, and united 
the multifarious movements over the concerns of the national struggle for change. These groups 
were united by a common agenda of the restoration of democracy and multi-party politics. This 
understanding was shared by all the forces behind the political change agenda, and viewed the 
authoritarian incumbent regimes as the “common enemy.” The state was thus treated as the 
major object of popular struggles for social transformation of society (Mamdani 1990). 
Authoritarianism, therefore, helped galvanize several groups into powerful social movements 
that were capable of dislodging the incumbent regimes from power. The groups were 
responding to decades of poor governance, repressive policies and economic mismanagement 
by the incumbent regimes.  
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The pro-democracy movements expressed their quest for change in the language of 
rights through protests and demonstrations. Since Kenya was relatively developed than Zambia, 
the pro-democracy movement emphasised civil and political rights, while in Zambia the same 
groups emphasised economic rights. The movements in both countries consisted of a 
constellation of diverse groups, which included the opposition political parties, labour unions, 
student organisations, women’s movements, churches, and human rights groups among others. 
The civic sector, in both countries, therefore, collapsed into purely political expression.  
According to Foweraker (1990), this kind of orientation made these organisations “popular” 
rather than “social.” In other words, the groups represented the interests of all the dominated in 
society rather than focusing on achieving the social-economic interests of their members. They 
were fully drawn into the political frame of the national liberation struggle and subordinated 
their autonomy to the “national democratic agenda.” The pursuit of this common agenda 
cushioned their internal contradictions and differences throughout the transition process.  
In Kenya, the prodemocracy movement mainly consisted of groups of urban and rural 
youth, young activists, and the church (Kanyinga, 2015). It was led by the National Council of 
Churches of Kenya (NCCK), with a large membership, strong organisational base, extensive 
country-wide network and international support, while in Zambia the groups were led by the 
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), which had become the de-facto opposition party in 
President Kaunda’s one-party system. ZCTU had a large membership, countrywide networks 
and massive amount of resources that supported the activities of the pro-democracy movement. 
The Movement for Multi-party democracy, which was part of the prodemocracy movement was 
later transformed into a political party that dislodged the United National Independence Party 
(UNIP) from power in the first multi-party general elections in the country in 1991.  
The study found that in the post-authoritarian political and institutional environment in 
both Kenya and Zambia, the “unity of purpose” that galvanized advocacy groups collapsed and 
had several consequences for advocacy groups and the process of democratic consolidation.  
Firstly, with the state being largely perceived as “democratic and legitimate,” by the majority 
of the citizens of both countries, it no longer generates the anti-authoritarian impulse that could 
galvanize advocacy groups around a common national agenda. This situation shattered the 
political consensus that had united civil society groups on a national agenda and driven the 
process of democratic transition. The discordant voices from the advocacy sector have 
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complicated consensus on national issues that are related to the process of democratic 
consolidation. Additionally, advocacy groups’ fundraising strategies based on the excesses of 
the state significantly no longer attract much funding as they did during the authoritarian period. 
In the post-transitional dispensation, the state implemented various constitutional and 
administrative reforms, which have relatively transformed the state and its relationship with 
other major political actors within society.  
Secondly, the state is no longer the primary target of advocacy groups’ campaigns and 
activities. There are now many other established democratic institutions like political parties, 
which advocacy groups target with their campaigns. An advocacy group leader who 
participated in the struggle for the restoration of democracy in Zambia and interviewed for this 
study asserts that; 
“The motivation and drive, which held us together against a “common enemy” in the name of 
the authoritarian state have crumbled, and putting together a new inclusive agenda has become 
quite elusive. Things have fallen apart, and the center can no longer hold” (Zambia: Author 
interview, 19:2012). 
 
A particularly interesting take on the issue by a leader of a women’s organisation in Kenya 
interviewed for this study noted that; 
“During the authoritarian period, it was crystal clear to all of us within the civil society who the 
enemy was-Moi and his administration, and what the agenda was-the restoration of democracy. 
Today, it is unclear who the enemy is and what the agenda should be” (Kenya: Author interview, 
18:2012).  
 
Thirdly, advocacy groups now must simultaneously handle both the interests of their members 
and participate in the national agenda, such as the building of democratic institutions, the rule 
of law, transparency, accountability, and citizen participation among others. The groups have, 
therefore, become both social and popular organizations. A University Professor in Zambia 
interviewed for this study noted that; 
“Internal differences within the advocacy sector have resurfaced as these organisations attempt 
to assert their identity in the public sphere and cut a niche for themselves. This change was 
expected once the transition occurred” (Zambia: Author interview, 27:2012) 
 
Fourthly, as part of the national liberation struggle, advocacy groups were highly politicized 
and deeply stooped in the agenda of the restoration of democracy. With the transition, they 
found themselves with no concrete agenda of their own to pursue and crafting such an agenda 
in the changed political environment became quite elusive.  
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 In Kenya, the study found that there is a significant problem of discordant voices within 
the advocacy sector responding to national issues and speaking at cross purposes. This 
uncoordinated and fragmented response to critical national issues has limited advocacy groups’ 
efforts and influence in the process of democratic consolidation. Although the groups were 
united in 2004 in conducting civic education before the constitutional referendum in 2005, the 
referendum campaigns on the Draft Constitution divided them to the extent that they ended up 
rallying around political parties in either rejecting or supporting the proposed constitution. The 
same pattern repeated itself in 2007 when advocacy groups were sharply divided on the need 
for minimum constitutional reforms before the elections. While the Council for Imams and 
Preachers of Kenya, the Kenya National Human Rights Commission (KNHRC) and the 
Federation of Women Lawyers in Kenya (FIDA-K) supported the calls for minimum 
constitutional reforms, several major advocacy groups, including the Kenya Human Rights 
Commission (KHRC), the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the Central 
Organization of Trade Unions (COTU), and the Catholic Church among others opposed the call 
on the grounds that there was not enough time for such reforms. A prominent advocacy group 
leader interviewed for this study noted that; 
 “We have been unable to front a united position on critical national issues of the day such as 
the constitutional review, corruption, extra-judicial killings and more importantly on 
governance. We thus have a limited influence on these issues” (Kenya: Author interview, 
8:2012) 
 
Divisions within advocacy groups based on ethnic, ideological and religious cleavages 
intensified during the 2007 general elections, for instance, the Catholic Church leadership 
publicly and openly supported President Mwai Kibaki. The divisions and lack of direction from 
civil society, therefore, contributed to the Post-Election violence in 2007 over disputed 
elections. The crisis caused by the PEV further divided civil society groups. The sector was 
polarised into two major groups; the pacifist and the justice faction. The pacifists preferred a 
return to calm and peace as a way forward for the country and thus viewed peace as a priority 
in resolving the electoral differences. For this group of civil society organization, it did not 
matter who won the elections, all they wanted was the end of violence and a return to peace.76  
                                                             
 
76 The Standard, 20, January 2008 
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The justice faction, on the other hand, wanted electoral justice. They called for setting 
up a transitional government to plan for fresh elections within 90 days. On January 2008, a third 
group emerged-Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice, which succeeded in reconciling the 
two factions through a consensus based on the understanding that electoral fraud had to be 
resolved through the justice system, while there was a need for civil society efforts towards 
peaceful reconciliation of all Kenyans. Although the plural nature of civil society does not 
necessarily require the organisations to have a national consensus on an agenda as they 
represent various and sometimes conflicting interests within society, strategic alliances on 
broader national issues such as democratic consolidation in emerging democracies are 
necessary within civil society if they are to influence such processes. Moreover, with weak 
bureaucratic and political institutions and vast social and economic inequalities in both Kenya 
and Zambia, broader national strategic alliances become critical. Additionally, advocacy 
groups’ consensus on national issues significantly increases their weight, strength, and impact 
on the national agenda and help with political mobilization around issues of democratic 
consolidation. 
Finally, the study found that advocacy groups have sharply differed on and contested 
the language and meaning of democratic reform with conflicting visions of democracy in the 
post-transitional dispensation, which significantly circumscribe their ability to form strategic 
alliances for the process of democratic consolidation. Although the pro-democracy movement 
focus was the restoration of democracy, the post-transitional contestation of democracy is 
defined by competing visions of democratic reform and transformation. This polarisation has 
further fragmented advocacy groups between the dominant civil society rooted in the middle-
class values, the moderates, the left, and the radical elements. This open contestation of the 
meaning of reform has complicated their mutual engagement with the state in the reform 
process. While the liberals emphasise civil liberties, political rights and procedural elements of 
democracy, the radical groups have stressed the total transformation of the nature of the state 
and reforms geared towards the realization of economic, social and cultural rights. The 
Executive Director of Kenyans for Peace and Justice, who is in the latter camp noted; 
“For us to consolidate democracy in this country, we must structurally re-organize the state in 
a way that fundamentally restructures state-society relations for the benefit of society” (Kenya: 
Author interview 18:2012). 
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The dominant neoliberal advocacy groups, on the other hand, believe that consolidation 
of democracy requires meaningful reforms within the existing system that benefit the citizens. 
Reflecting on this issue, an advocacy leader with a governance organization in Nairobi 
interviewed for this study noted that, 
 “Democratic consolidation includes reforming governance institutions, ensuring the respect of 
civil and political rights, economic growth and reconciliation of the people so that development 
can benefit all Kenyans” (Kenya: Author interview, 19:2012). 
  
The two quotations above epitomise the stark differences that have defined advocacy groups’ 
political discourse in Kenya and their visions of democracy in the country.  
In Zambia, the divisions within civil society are widespread and compounded by the 
continuation of the conflictual relationship between the state and advocacy groups in the new 
political and institutional dispensation.  An advocacy group leader interviewed for this study in 
Lusaka noted that; 
 “After the Movement for Multi-party Democracy disappointed advocacy groups on the 
economic front with SAPs and the constitutional review process, everyone retreated to doing 
their own thing, only coming out once in a while to give press releases and then disappear” 
(Zambia: Author interview, 30:2012). 
  
The continuous delay and manipulation of the Constitutional review process by the state has 
created fatigue and exhaustion within civil society about the prospects for a comprehensive 
constitutional review in the country, and significantly reduced advocacy groups’ participation 
in the formal constitutional fora. The Executive Director of the Centre for Policy Dialogue in 
Zambia interviewed for this study underscored the above situation thus, 
 “Advocacy organisations in Zambia today operate in a very ad-hoc fashion defined by short-
term unity, instigated by crises and unexplained external factors” (Zambia: Author interview 
27:2012). 
 
For example, in 1996, advocacy groups joined the opposition political parties in calling for 
fresh elections after widespread claims of rigging, and other malpractices. The main opposition 
political party had also boycotted the elections. However, there was not much unity towards 
this goal, and the groups failed to have fresh elections, and MMD assumed a second term in 
office. However, in 2001, the groups succeeded through the Oasis Forum in stopping President 
Chiluba quest to change the constitution and seek a third term in office. It must be noted that 
the Anti-Third Term campaign consisted of a broad coalition of forces opposed to the third term 
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quest, including opposition political parties, some members of the MMD, several think tanks in 
the country and international donors. Although advocacy groups succeeded in this quest, such 
ad-hoc unity cannot sustainably ensure consolidation of democracy, which requires continuous 
engagement in the transformation process. 
In democratising countries such as Kenya and Zambia, there is a need for a minimum 
consensus within advocacy groups on the desired nature of social, economic and political order 
in the country. Without such a consensus, advocacy groups’ contribution to the process of 
democratic consolidation become fragmented, uncoordinated and limited. The inability to 
“speak with one voice” undermine the very source of advocacy group effectiveness in the 
process of democratic consolidation. As Tarrow (1994) has correctly noted, to solve the 
problem of collective action, social movements need a common purpose. Additionally, while 
serving socio-economic needs of their membership, advocacy groups need to simultaneously 
and actively engage in the national democratic agenda, if they are to effectively contribute to 
the process of democratic consolidation. Advocacy groups appeared to have been more 
dynamic and effective under the authoritarian regime than the democratic regimes in both 
Kenya and Zambia. The dynamism and effectiveness in the pre-transition period were defined 
by clear national goals, strategies, framing, and expression of democratic demands in the form 
of rights of citizens and the unity of purpose that united a broad coalition of all forces pushing 
for a democratic transition. 
  4.3.4. Advocacy groups: From civic space to the primordial arena 
 
Peter Ekeh (1975, p. 91) in an influential article published in the 1970s, explained the 
unique nature of African politics that has significantly influenced its governance process. He 
argues that “the experiences of colonialism in Africa have led to the emergence of a unique 
historical configuration in modern post-colonial Africa: the existence of the two publics instead 
of one public, as in the West.” Colonialism, according to him alienated the individual and led 
to the segmentation of the social and political space into two publics. The first realm is a 
formally constructed “public” or the civic realm, in which the formal state operates, while the 
second realm is the “primordial” public that endures, despite social and political developments. 
The second realm is the domain of modern social formations associated with kinship and the 
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informal moral sphere of society that governs private relations within the family, the clan and 
the ethnic groups.  
In post-colonial Africa, the two publics function alongside, within and across the 
boundaries of each other. However, Ekeh (1975) has noted that the civic public hardly functions 
as expected in Africa since the reality of most Africans is the primordial public. In the same 
vein, Bratton and Van de Walle (1997, p. 42) have noted that “Africa’s formal political 
institutions are thoroughly steeped in, and penetrated by informal, personal networks,” which 
limits the functioning of the civic realm. Africans are morally attached to the primordial public, 
which is a crucial element of social pluralism on the continent (Ake, 1993). Consequently, 
“society has priority over the state in Africa, private over public and patronage over policy” 
(Hyden, 2006, p. 229-31). Chabal and Daloz (1999, p. 2) even go further to argue that the state 
in Sub-Saharan Africa has not been institutionalized. It is not structurally differentiated from 
society, meaning that the political realm in Africa is more of an informal, personalised nature, 
structured in a patrimonial model, where personal relations dominate. This type of political and 
social environment is, therefore, problematic for the development of associational life, such as 
advocacy groups, which defend the common good in the public sphere, since the groups are 
expected to operate within the civic sphere to influence public policy and, therefore, contribute 
to the process of democratic consolidation.  
Since independence, both Kenya and Zambia have been described as neo-patrimonial 
states, which means that the state operates mainly within the primordial arena and hardly 
functions through the legally defined structures for publicly acknowledged aims (Gifford, 2009, 
p. 200). African political and social systems have, therefore, been held together by loyalty and 
kinship ties rather than by a hierarchy of administrative and bureaucratic functions. In both 
Kenya and Zambia, ethnicity with its origin in colonialism has not only provided the primordial 
basis for governance but also used instrumentally as a means towards both political and 
economic ends. Regarding voting, for instance, Posner (2005) has argued that Africans, mainly 
vote their ethnic group, “because of the widespread expectations that politicians will channel 
patronage resources to members of their own ethnic group.” He further notes that this 
expectation generates predictable patterns of ethnic appeal-making by politicians and electoral 
support from voters. Ethnicity, is thus, perceived as an influential factor in the redistribution of 
national resources, and, therefore, highly politicized during electoral campaigns. 
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In Kenya, ethnicity has always been a salient feature of politics and has long been used 
as a medium of political mobilisation in both local and national politics (Posner, 2005; Ajulu, 
2001). Politics is generally organised around the principles of primordial and ascriptive 
identities (Nyangoro, 1999; Matanga, 2000) and politicians view citizens as demographics 
defined by their ethnicities rather than a set of ideas. Ethnic politics has thus led to entrenched 
patronage and clientelist systems reinforced by inequality and widespread poverty in the 
country. In a detailed account of Kenya’s post-colonial history, Branch (2011) has demonstrated 
how the Kenyan political elite has encouraged political debate to centre on ethnicity rather than 
issues of economic redistribution. This focus on ethnicity is beneficial to the political elite at 
the expense of the majority poor. Additionally, Barkan (1979) has shown how the majority of 
Kenyans perceive their political representation as sources of patronage resources. These 
perceptions are reflected in the voting patterns in general elections, which become zero-sum 
games for the leaders and their ethnic groups, who lose elections, as demonstrated by Moi’s 24-
year rule, which excluded the majority of Kenyans from any meaningful economic or political 
benefits to the advantage of his Kalenjin community (Lynch, 2013). Since independence, the 
electoral politics, the governance style and the pattern of economic redistribution by the state 
have all reinforced the salience of ethnicity in politics and society. 
Advocacy groups in the country have always reflected the political and ethnic politics 
of the Kenyan society but have managed to operate mainly within the civic sphere. However, 
Ngunyi (2001), has observed that during the multiple cycles of democratic transitions from the 
early 1990s, civil society has gradually retreated from the “civic” sphere to the traditional 
ethnocultural sphere, where democracy is expressed in ethno-regional terms. This ethnicization 
of advocacy groups has eroded the democratic gains in the “civic sphere.” This study found that 
the regime change of 2002, accelerated this process of the movement of advocacy groups from 
the civic to the primordial arena, where politicized ethnicity has become a significant factor in 
advocacy groups’ operations and relationship with the state. Divisions within NARC along 
ethnic lines spilled over into internal affairs of advocacy groups and influenced the groups’ 
agenda, responses to national issues and political mobilisation strategies. Additionally, the 
“divisions seeped into church networks, which had long been impervious to ethnic divisions of 
any of the major institutions in Kenyan society” (Holmquist 2005, p. 213).  
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The high level of significance of politicised ethnicity within the advocacy sector has 
eroded the democratic gains and circumscribed the groups’ ability to effectively contribute to 
the process of democratic consolidation. A former Executive Officer of the National Council 
of NGOs interviewed for this study captured this situation very eloquently when he noted that, 
“Kenya’s civil society is today riddled with schisms of ethnicity, class, and religion, and risks 
civic death” (Kenya: Author interview, 6: 2012).  
 
The accelerated retreat of advocacy groups from the “civic” to the “primordial” arena after 2002 
can be attributed to three major factors. Firstly, most advocacy groups in Kenya supported the 
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in 2002 as an opposition political party, which went on 
to win the elections and formed a new democratic government. Once in power, the coalition 
split along the two main coalition parties-ODM and NAK over issues of unfulfilled 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). This split directly reflected ethno-regional divisions, 
which were replicated and manifested within the advocacy sector. The conflicts within the 
political society easily filtered into civil society. The President of the National Civil Society 
Congress interviewed for this study noted that; 
“The tones of advocacy organisations’ responses and approaches to national issues are today 
being influenced by ethnic and political party affiliations, setting a very dangerous precedent 
for civil society and the country as well” (Kenya: Author interview, 8: 2012)  
 
Another prominent advocacy group leader interviewed for this study in Nairobi noted that; 
 
“Advocacy groups have lost their collective voice as they have gotten mired into political 
patronage, ethno-regional politics and manipulation by political elites in the country” (Kenya: 
Author Interview, 7:2012) 
 
The political appropriation of the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK)-an 
umbrella organisation that led the prodemocracy movement in the 1990s directly fitted into this 
broader trend and was described by a prominent journalist interviewed for this study as “the 
tragedy of ethnicity” (Kenya: Author interview, 9: 2012). In other words, the cooperation 
between the NCCK and the state after 2002 was partly informed by ethnic ties and interests 
between its leadership and the state. NCCK top leadership thus found it difficult to be critical 
of the actions and policies of the government in which one of “their own” was the President. It 
readily became an appendage of the state with significant consequences, both on its ability and 
civil society to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation.  
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Secondly, as explained earlier in this chapter, during the clamour for change, advocacy 
groups were united under the prodemocracy movement with the agenda of the restoration of 
democracy. This unity of purpose was maintained within the civil society sector from 1992 to 
2002 since the incumbent retained power after the transition. Advocacy groups’ agenda of 
comprehensive constitutional review also became the agenda of the main opposition coalition, 
NARC. With NARC taking over power in 2002, advocacy groups’ unity of purpose collapsed, 
and they entered the new political dispensation with virtually no agenda of their own, thus easily 
got sucked into the national partisan political conflicts, interests and divisions within the 
political society, which were mostly narrow, parochial and ethno-regional. 
Thirdly, most respondents interviewed for this study pointed out that international 
donors have unconsciously reinforced ethnicity within advocacy groups by basing their funding 
decisions on personal relationships, networks, and connections with powerful individuals 
within the advocacy sector, which happen to be dominated by certain ethnic groups. (Kenya: 
Author interviews, 2:2012; 8:2012; 12:2012; 18:2012). This network of individuals has deep 
connections with government officials, international donor agencies, and belong to several 
advocacy groups as directors, advisors or board members. This group of individuals almost act 
as gatekeepers for the civil society sector in the country. Most respondents interviewed for this 
study, therefore, claimed that international donor funding is skewed towards organizations 
supported by this network. They thus inject ethnicity into advocacy sector funding processes. 
Additionally, most respondents noted that international donor domestic employment mirrors 
the same ethnic influence by the said powerful network of individuals within civil society 
(Kenya: Author interviews, 12: 2012; 14: 2012; 18: 2012). This framework and structure of 
international donor funding and employment, limits cooperation, create ethnic mistrust and 
suspicions and fuel resource inequalities within the advocacy sector amid feelings of 
discrimination and bias. An advocacy executive interviewed for this study noted that: 
“In Kenya, we long stopped fundraising through international donors. What we do now is friend-
raising. An advocacy group is much most likely to be funded by international donors, if its 
director or one of its board members has connections with the international donors. This scheme 
of funding has worked against those groups, which have no such connections” (Kenya: Author 
interview, 2:2012). 
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In Zambia, ethnicity is influential in the political behaviour of both the elites and the 
general citizenry. After independence, the country briefly practiced multi-party politics, with 
political parties largely perceived to represent the interests of ethnic groups or regions. The 
African National Congress (ANC) was widely viewed as a Tonga party, the United Party (UP), 
a Lozi party and both the United Progressive Party (UPP) and the United National Independence 
Party (UNIP) considered Bemba parties (Gertzel et al., 1984).77 In February 1972, Zambia 
became a one-party system under the United National Independence Party (UNIP). President 
Kaunda acknowledged the potential dangers of ethnic fragmentation and attempted to contain 
it through two primary strategies. Firstly, he adopted the philosophy of humanism to enhance 
the image of ethnic homogeneity under the one-party system (Musonda, 2015). Secondly, 
Kaunda promoted the creed of “One Zambia; One Nation” as a deliberate attempt to forge a 
rallying call to enhance national unity and harmony. He implemented this strategy through 
“tribal balancing” which meant ethnic inclusion in government bureaucracy in his 27-year rule, 
while politically encouraging competition at the local and parliamentary level seats within the 
one-party system. 
The Zambian intellectual middle class from all ethnicities were thus fairly represented 
within the Kaunda administration, besides genuine attempt at equal redistribution of national 
resources to all regions of the country. President Kaunda, therefore, not only coined slogans 
and philosophies to enhance national unity, but also made practical steps to “Zambianize the 
country.” The negative effects of ethnicity were thus somehow contained by the UNIP 
administration. A political science University Professor interviewed for this study in Zambia 
noted that; 
“UNIP was fairly inclusive of the various ethnic communities of the Zambian society, both in 
its bureaucracy and in the redistribution of national resources. Kaunda appeared to be genuinely 
committed to building one country that all Zambians felt they belonged to” (Zambia: Author 
interview, 29: 2012).  
However, since the re-introduction of multi-party politics in the country in 1991, there has been 
a growing pattern of ethnic politics, which has continued to define the Zambian democracy. 
Political parties have been formed along ethno-regional bases, and political coalitions for 
national elections have followed the same pattern.  
                                                             
 
77 Times of Zambia, 15th August 1968 
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Most respondents interviewed for this study expressed concerns about the growing 
effects of ethnicity and the regionalization of political parties on the Zambian multi-party 
politics (Zambia: Author interviews, 38: 2012; 32: 2012; 34: 2012). Larmer and Fraser (2007, 
p. 612) have emphasized this point by noting that the Zambian politics is characterised by 
“ethno-regional coalition building rather than a contest of alternative policies.” The 
politicisation of ethnicity has influenced political mobilisation for electoral support. 
Additionally, political opponents have continued to brand other political parties as ethnic. For 
instance, in 2001, Levy Mwanawasa, the then-presidential candidate for the MMD continuously 
branded the United Party for National Development (UPND) as a tribal party, since it drew its 
primary support from the southern part of the country, while at the same time defining MMD 
as a national political party. There is also a growing intensity of ethnic feelings within the 
Zambian society, which have been reinforced by successive MMD administrations bureaucratic 
and political appointments. The Bemba ethnic community has dominated MMD 
administrations, despite the party receiving support from across the country (Weekly Post, 15-
21, November 1991; The Sun, 25-31, October 1993) 
Posner (2005) has explained the change of ethnic dynamics and politics in Zambia from 
one party to multi-party politics using an institutional framework. He argues that institutional 
structures trigger the activation of different dimensions of ethnicity. For instance, electoral rules 
may privilege or disable one of the several ethnic cleavages. In his study of Zambia, he found 
that tribal identities were more effective in campaign discourse and voter choice in single-party 
elections, while language identities succeeded more in multi-party elections. Additionally, the 
author found that political coalitions were mobilised along linguistic lines under multi-party 
politics, but along tribal lines under one-party rule. This difference is explained by the fact that 
in multi-party politics, political parties must seek votes throughout the country to win national 
elections; national level cleavages, therefore, become important, while in the single-party 
system, the level of competition is local and, therefore, tribal affiliations become critical. 
Moreover, in single party systems, people were less concerned about the national level as it was 
apparent who was going to be president.   
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Since Zambia is split along four large linguistic lines nationally,78 the linguistic 
dimension has become important in multi-party politics but did not matter in a one-party system 
as local constituencies were mostly linguistically homogeneous. Posner (2005) notes that 
Zambians, just like Kenyans assume that having a member of their own ethnic group in a 
position of power will increase their access to patronage resources and are, therefore, inclined 
to join coalitions led by members of their own ethnic groups. Despite the dominance of ethnicity 
in Zambian politics and society, this study found that ethnicity is relatively less reflected within 
the Zambian advocacy sector compared to Kenya’s advocacy sector for two primary reasons.   
Firstly, unlike President Moi, who practiced the politics of exclusion for 24 years, 
leaving most Kenyans feeling politically alienated and excluded to the benefit of his Kalenjin 
community (Lynch, 2013), President Kaunda practiced “tribal balancing act” which contained 
ethnicity as a major factor in politics and society. The balancing act meant practicing inclusion 
in government appointments and equitable distribution of national resources to all parts of the 
country, therefore, tampering down ethnic and tribal feelings and sentiments. Additionally, 
Kaunda’s philosophy of humanism enhanced the image of ethnic homogeneity and his slogan 
of “One Zambia; One Nation” encouraged national unity. Although, the Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (MMD) that took over from the United National Independence Party 
(UNIP) abandoned the “tribal balancing” strategy and adopted a merit-based recruitment of 
government leadership, most respondents interviewed for this study felt that the strong 
foundation of ethnic inclusivity created by President Kaunda has played a critical role in 
maintaining advocacy groups’ civic orientation. This orientation may change as feelings of 
ethnicity and exclusion continue to permeate the Zambian politics and society. Secondly, 
Zambia is the third most urbanised country in Sub-Saharan Africa with an estimated 40 percent 
of its population concentrated in a few urban areas.79 The urbanisation process has led to 
intermarriages and interactions among different ethnic communities, leading to the significant 
moderation of adverse effects of ethnicity both within the Zambian society and within advocacy 
groups.  
                                                             
 
78 The four large linguistic lines in Zambia are Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga and Lozi. These languages were made 
official during colonialism for the purposes of instruction under a 1927 colonial edict, which then led to linguistic 
consolidation and political relevance of these languages (Posner, 2003) 
79 World Bank (2002) Zambia: Country Assessment Report: Upgrading Low Income Settlements, Washington 
DC. 
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 Although ethnicity has always been linked to advocacy groups in Kenya, political 
transition and regime change have exacerbated and raised the significance of ethnicity as social 
cleavage within advocacy groups. The groups thus have gradually moved from the civic to the 
primordial public, which has undermined their contribution to the process of democratic 
consolidation. Zambian advocacy groups, on the other hand, have continued to maintain their 
civic orientation. Political culture in the primordial sphere permeates most advocacy groups in 
Kenya making them “unable to foster democratic reforms because they are not oriented towards 
common notions of liberty” (Ekeh, 1992). Moreover, the pursuit of ethno-national interests that 
have defined these groups erode democratic gains within the civic sphere. Furthermore, 
patrimonial networks cripple democratic politics through the alignment with ethnicity and, 
therefore, undermines civil society integration and mediation functions. The groups have 
become “disintegrative forces” (Schmitter, 1997). The groups’ disintegration along ethnic 
cleavages have exacerbated fragmentation, therefore, complicating strategic coalition, alliance 
formation, coordination and consensus building on the national agenda. The pursuit of narrow 
interests based on ethnicity has made advocacy groups “deploy their powers in ways that infirm 
the conditions of a well-ordered democracy” Cohen and Roger (1992 p. 393). In other words, 
associational ties based on exclusive and clientelist exchanges promote narrow and parochial 
interests that are inimical to the process of democratic consolidation. 
4.3.5. Advocacy groups relationship with International donors in Kenya and 
Zambia 
The relationship between advocacy groups and international donor organisations is 
perhaps the most consequential relationship due to the chronic dependence of advocacy groups 
in both Kenya and Zambia on international donor funding for their very existence. Additionally, 
international donors contribute to advocacy groups’ technical assistance and capacity building. 
Advocacy group leaders interviewed for this study in both countries were unanimous that 
without international donor funding, their groups would likely cease to exist. Several factors 
catalysed the significant shift by international donors towards funding civil society 
organizations in developing countries in the 1980s, the "decade for NGOs" (Hearn, 2007, p. 
1095; Bebbington et al., 2008). Firstly, civil society organisations were expected to shore up 
social development sectors, which had been devastated by the deleterious effects of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes measures (Brouwers, 2011).  
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Secondly, the collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically changed the international 
political, social and economic architecture. There were no longer any strategic interests in 
supporting repressive and dictatorial regimes (Meredith, 2005, p. 387) in developing countries. 
International donors thus freely pursued democratisation and human rights agenda through civil 
society organisations, which were viewed as the prime catalysts for the process. Finally, with 
the new world order, neoliberalism dominated the development discourse and favoured a 
limited role for the state, giving civil society groups and other non-state actors space to freely 
operate and influence social, economic and political development (Kanyinga, 2009). Through 
funding advocacy groups and other types of civil society groups, international donors wield 
enormous power over these groups’ agenda and capacity to effectively contribute to the process 
of democratic consolidation. The overdependence of civil society groups on international 
donors is, therefore, the most significant single limitation to their freedom (Shivji 2003). The 
groups thus exhibit dual-accountability to international donors and the beneficiaries of their 
programmes.  
 In Kenya, the relationship between advocacy groups and international donors was 
cordial, cooperative and collaborative in the early 1990s, when most advocacy groups were 
established with international donor funding, which targeted democracy and governance 
advocacy groups to promote democracy, human rights, and good governance as part of the 
dominant neoliberal agenda. NGOs were thus overfunded during this time (Andreason et al. 
1996). As a result of donor funding several groups were established around this time, including 
the Centre for Law and Research International (CLARION), the Citizen Coalition for 
Constitution Change (4Cs), the Centre for Governance and Development (CGD), the Institute 
for Education in Democracy (IED) and the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) among 
others. Most of these organisations are urban-based, well-established, well-funded and elite-led 
advocacy organisations based in the capital city of Nairobi with some outreach to the 
countryside. During this time, the donor agenda was to work with these groups and opposition 
political parties to force the state to open up political space and institute democratic reforms. 
While supporting advocacy groups, international donors imposed conditionalities on the state, 
including, withdrawal of aid linked to the democratization process, the rule of law and respect 
for human rights. International donor conditionalities contributed to the reintroduction of multi-
partysm through the repeal of section 2 (A) which had banned opposition political parties.  
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After the political transition in 1992 in which the incumbent President Moi and the 
Kenya African National Union (KANU) retained power in a multi-party general election, the 
opposition was weakened through fragmentation and co-optation into government. 
International donors and advocacy groups turned their attention to political reforms, which 
included, the strengthening governance institutions, civil society, and political parties, capacity 
building, voter education, rights awareness, social justice, monitoring the conduct of elections, 
human rights, and political governance. According to Kanyinga (2009), international donor 
funding increased to support these programs and made civil society groups an indispensable 
feature of Kenya’s political life, besides transforming the groups into alternative “opposition 
forces.” Advocacy groups assumed the role of the opposition and focused on the constitutional 
review process with the support of international donors. KANU again won the 1997 general 
elections, and advocacy groups continued to pursue constitutional reforms as the best way to 
reconstruct the state for democratic change, besides conducting civic education with the belief 
that civic education would equip citizens with skills to meaningfully and effectively participate 
in the political process (Kanyinga, 2009) 
 In the mid-1990s, international donors were concerned by the way foreign aid was 
delivered and utilized regarding its effectiveness, especially in poverty reduction programs. 
Together with developing countries, they developed the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) process as an integrated framework to deliver coordinated programmes for poverty 
reduction. The poverty reduction strategies were expected to be country-driven, results-
oriented, comprehensive and long-term in perspective and developed with extensive 
participation of all major stakeholders (World Bank, 1999). This process marked the return of 
the state’s role in development, but with a focus on “good governance,” what Banks et al. (2015) 
refer to as “governmentalisation of aid.” It was a defining moment for advocacy groups-
international donor as the groups became proxies for citizen engagement in the process (Murray 
and Overton, 2011). In Kenya, the government launched its PRSP process in November 2000 
led by the Ministry of Finance and Panning. An elaborate consultative process was developed, 
which consisted of divisional, district, provincial and national consultation forums, thematic 
groups, and sector working groups. This was the first time that advocacy groups were involved 
in an extensive partnership with the government. 
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 The contribution of NGOs as the most formal civil society representation was 
commensurate with their policy intervention capacities developed over the years through policy 
advocacy interactions with both multilateral and national development agencies. Several 
advocacy group leaders interviewed for this study, felt that advocacy groups played a critical 
and significant role in the process and influenced the shape and content of the final PRSP 
document adopted by the government. However, civil society participation, in the PRSP process 
both at the national and the district levels, was dominated by well-organized organisations 
(Owinga, 2006). Moreover, there were two parallel processes; one dealing with social issues 
within the context of the PRSP, which allowed the full participation of civil society groups, 
while the other process addressing the macro-economic issues in the context of the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), excluded civil society groups from participation. The 
deliberations on macro-economic issues were reserved for government and international donor 
representatives. Most of these multilateral and bilateral donor agencies came on board the PRSP 
process and aligned their financial assistance portfolios against corresponding policy 
conditionalities. These included the World Bank, IMF, DFID, GTZ, and UNDP among others. 
They had a wide variety of agenda as their strategic interests in the Kenyan geo-political 
economics dictated. Their participation and influence in the process ranged from funding, 
advising and observing to capacity building. Some had their officials located at the PRSP focal 
points in the respective 20 ministries through which they could maximize their strategic 
influence, while others came on board the PRSP process through their country NGO partners.  
Consequently, international donor influence on the PRSP process was profound and extensive. 
An advocacy leader interviewed for this study and who participated in the PRSP process noted 
that;  
“The participatory nature of the process was cosmetic, because advocacy groups involvement 
appeared designed to satisfy the World Bank and the IMF conditionalities rather than providing 
a new way of doing development business” (Kenya: Author interview, 3:2012) 
 
The process exposed the weaknesses of advocacy groups to organise effectively, engage and 
influence the government in complex and rapidly evolving policy-making processes. Despite 
their large numbers and diversity, advocacy groups could not effectively articulate and 
consolidate their efforts to provide the much-needed alternative input into the Sector Working 
Groups (SWGs) consultative process. The CSO community was overwhelmed by the task of 
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marshaling the required professional capacity for effective participation in a complex and 
highly technical process, which required continuous monitoring over several months. The 
situation was different at the district levels of consultation, where the engagement of civil 
society was stronger and to a substantial extent influenced the outcomes of district-level 
consultation processes and outcomes. The PRSP process was completed in June 2001. 
The regime change in 2002 in Kenya with the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) 
defeating the independence party-the Kenya African National Union (KANU) led international 
donors to shift the bulk of their of funding from advocacy groups to budgetary and institutional 
support for the new government. The international donor confidence in the new government 
was based on the government’s resolution for proper management of the economy and the 
establishment of adequate measures to fight corruption (UNDP, 2006). The shifting of funding 
to the NARC administration was not unusual as a study by Freytag and Pehnelt (2009) found 
that countries that are perceived by international donors to be well-governed have a positive 
prediction of foreign aid through the state, while countries that are perceived to be poorly 
governed have a positive prediction of foreign aid through NGOs.  
Additionally, it must also be noted that international donors primary goal is to ensure 
the diplomatic relationship with the host nation to secure their country of origin’s political, 
economic, and strategic interests. This goal far much supersedes their relationship with 
advocacy groups. From interviews with various international donor agencies in both countries, 
the study found that international donors appear to regard the state as the most crucial player in 
the democratisation process and, therefore, readily support it once it shows some willingness 
and commitment to the institutionalisation of democracy. International donor priorities are, 
therefore, mainly by political calculations rather than the appreciation of the role of advocacy 
groups in the process of democratic consolidation. With the bulk of international donor funding 
going through the government, funding for advocacy groups dramatically declined by 83 
percent from Kshs.3 billion (US$30 million) in 2002 to only Kshs.500 million (US$5 
million)80in 2003, and, after that, gradually began to improve as shown in Figure 4.5 below.  
                                                             
 
80Otsieno, N (2006) How the Government is Killing Civil Society in Kenya, available from 
http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/649.html 
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Figure 4. 5 The percentage share of NGO Aid to Kenya (1997-2005) 
 
Source: UNDP (2006) Kenya Development Cooperation Report, 2006, United Nations Development 
Programme 
 
This study found that the shifting of funding by international donors from advocacy 
groups to the state had an enormous effect on advocacy groups’ operations, activities and 
impact on governance, and democratic consolidation reforms. It starved these groups of the 
much-needed funds for meaningful participation and engagement in the constitutional review 
process and discussions of other institutional and administrative reforms within the political 
system. Most advocacy group leaders interviewed for this study expressed surprise by the 
sudden shift of funding to the government by international donors in 2003 and it appeared that 
international donors perceive advocacy groups as “convenient partners,” who are dispensable, 
whenever necessary. It also led to questions about the commitment of international donors to 
the process of democratisation in the country. An advocacy group leader interviewed for this 
study put it thus; 
“International donors have their own strategic interests and advocacy groups just happen to be 
the groups that can help them achieve those interests. We are convenient partners that they can 
drop at any time provided that they perceive the government to be committed to democratic 
reforms and economic growth” (Kenya: Author interview, 15:2012) 
 
The shifting of funding to the government showed the unpredictability of international funding 
to advocacy groups and the limitations of advocacy groups’ independence and autonomy. James 
and Caliguire (1996) in a study of South African civics after the transition to democracy in 1994 
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found the same pattern of international donors shifting of funding from the civics to the newly 
elected democratic government of the African National Congress (ANC). 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness81 reached in February 2005 by more than 
100 developing countries and international donor agencies impacted on the relationship 
between advocacy groups and international donors. The declaration led to a consensus on how 
to make aid effective based on five core principles; ownership, alignment, harmonization, 
results-oriented, and mutual accountability. Regarding ownership, developing countries 
committed to “take the lead in coordinating aid at all levels in conjunction with other 
development resources in dialogue with donors and encouraging the participation of civil 
society and the private sector” (PD on Aid Effectiveness, paragraph 14). International donors, 
therefore, pushed for partnerships between advocacy groups and governments in policy-making 
and development. International donor countries and developing countries also agreed to shift 
focus to measured development results and be accountable for such results. Finally, regarding 
harmonization, international donor countries committed to coordinating, simplifying 
procedures and sharing information to avoid duplication and adopted basket funding as a new 
framework for achieving this objective.  
Basket fund arrangements are instruments for improving coordination among 
international donors and partners involved in the implementation of complex projects. 
International donors consider it an effective way of delivering funds to civil society groups. 
Most international donor representatives interviewed for this study argued that basket funding 
assists in providing maximum efficiency in resource use and service delivery and thus 
eliminates duplication of efforts (Kenya: Author interview, 14: 2012). In basket funding 
process, several international donors and partners sign a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) and jointly channel funds through the government. Advocacy groups are expected to 
participate in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of the programs. In Kenya, one 
of the best examples of basket funds was a multi-billion sector-wide program initiated by the 
government, jointly funded by 15 international donors, and implemented between 2003 and 
2005 to strengthen Governance, Justice, Law, and Order Sectors (GJLOS). The program had 
                                                             
 
81 The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness principles were reaffirmed by the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008, 
which emphasized ownership, inclusive partnerships, delivering results and capacity development. 
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broad participation of advocacy groups from the planning, implementation, and evaluation 
stages.  
Most advocacy group leaders interviewed for this study noted that the programme had 
a moderate impact on the sectors that it targeted. However, the program faced numerous 
challenges, including lack of meaningful participation by advocacy groups, unclear roles for 
various partners involved, unclear reporting procedures, lack of mutual accountability and 
questions about the commitment of the government to the reform programme. By 2005, the 
NARC administration had reneged on several political and economic promises that it had 
campaigned on in 2002 including the failed referendum in 2005, the disintegration of the NARC 
coalition, and the resurgence of corruption within the administration. International donors 
finally realised that the administration was not committed to real political and economic reforms 
and gradually began shifting funding back to advocacy groups in the country (See Figure 4.5). 
As funding improved, advocacy groups, shifted their focus on the revival and engagement on 
the constitutional review process and civic education in readiness for the 2007 general elections. 
After the 2008 Post-Election violence which killed more than 1,300 people and displaced over 
600,000 people, international donors supported the political negotiation process between the 
Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), which led to 
the formation of the Grand Coalition government. International donors also supported advocacy 
groups in the process of reconciliation and the constitutional review process, which led to the 
promulgation of a new progressive constitution in 2010. 
Since the re-introduction of multi-party politics in Zambia in the early 1990s, the 
country has witnessed the rapid growth of democracy and governance organisations focussing 
on the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and good governance 
(Habasonda, 2010). These groups conduct civic and voter education, election monitoring, and 
campaigns on human rights, anti-corruption, fair trade, social justice, gender mainstreaming, 
and provide legal aid to thousands of Zambians among other responsibilities. Most of these 
groups were established in the early 1990s due to the availability of international donor funding, 
which focussed on democratisation. These groups include the Women for Change (WFC), 
Foundation for the Democratic Process (FODEP), Afro-net, the NGO Coordination Committee 
(NGOCC), the Anti-Voter Apathy Project (AVAP), Southern African Centre for the 
Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD), and the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction 
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(CSPR) among others. Most of these advocacy groups are urban-based, well-established, well-
funded and elite-led organisations.   
This study found that with the encouragement and support by international donors, these 
groups have participated in various policy-making processes such as budget formulation, 
execution, and monitoring. Although their impact on policy-making is varied, especially at the 
national level, Mumba and Mumba (2010) have argued that advocacy groups have improved 
policy interventions. Additionally, several advocacy group leaders interviewed for this study 
noted the impact that these groups have had on budget planning, implementation, monitoring, 
and evaluation. However, Mudenda et al. (2005) have argued that advocacy groups have played 
a minimal role in influencing the budget formulation process in Zambia due to the lack of any 
law that guarantees their participation in the policy-making process. Their participation in 
policy-making is haphazard since it solely depends on government goodwill. Majority of 
advocacy group leaders interviewed for this study were sceptical about the impact of advocacy 
groups’ participation in the policy-making process in the country. 
The study found that the relationship between advocacy groups and international donors 
dramatically changed from the mid-1990s as the wave of donor enthusiasm with advocacy 
groups started to dwindle due to the changing international donor priorities. According to 
Akapelwa (2006), most bilateral donors shifted their funding away from advocacy groups to 
the state to support the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), while 
others moved away from direct funding of advocacy groups to basket funding. Additionally, 
some international donor agencies like the National Democratic Institute (NDI) closed their 
operations in Zambia, citing a hostile political environment. All these factors led to the 
diminishing resources for advocacy groups and thus reduced their participation in critical 
processes such as the Constitutional Review process and campaigns for anti-corruption and 
public accountability, which are crucial for the process of democratic consolidation. Some 
advocacy groups simply folded up, while others dramatically cut back on their activities and 
operations.  As one advocacy group leader interviewed for this study puts it; 
“We could not engage effectively in the constitutional review process without funding, and this 
crippled our participation and mobilisation strategies. The reduction of funding was devastating 
to advocacy groups at a time when the state was doing everything to consolidate power and 
control the constitutional review process for its own advantages” (Zambia: Author interview, 
32:2012) 
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Similar to Kenya, Zambia also developed its PRSP process to align with the agreement 
between international donors and developing countries on aid delivery and its effectiveness in 
poverty reduction. According to Dwyer and Zeilig (2012), this change was a liberal response to 
decades of criticisms that top-down economic liberalisation in the form of SAPs had failed to 
achieve poverty reduction due to lack of popular ownership and participation of stakeholders 
in the policy process. Participation of civil society organisations in the national policy process 
was, therefore, viewed as critical to sustainable development outcomes as these groups were 
considered to be closer to the beneficiaries of development policies and would thus bring on 
board the needs, views, and aspirations of the poor and the marginalised (Matenga 2010). The 
PRSP process also became a condition for accessing international loans and debt relief through 
the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC).  
The Zambian government launched its PRSP process with a broad strategy of engaging 
an array of stakeholders, including civil society organisations, citizens, international donors, 
and the private sector. International donors established the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction 
(CSPR) as a coalition of civil society groups to purposely coordinate participation in the PRSP 
process. The organisation was mandated to bring on board the people's views, and needs into 
the PRSP process (Dwyer and Zeilig, 2012; Brouwers, 2011) and was fully funded by 
International donors. There was extensive country-wide participation of civil society groups 
and ordinary citizens in the process that culminated in the final PRSP which was adopted by 
the government. Seshamani (2002) has praised advocacy groups’ participation in the PRSP 
process in Zambia as the most exemplary in comparison with other countries in the region. 
Moreover, it opened up advocacy group-government collaboration in other policy areas such as 
budget formulation, and implementation and improved advocacy groups-international donor 
relations. However, advocacy groups faced numerous challenges in participation in the PRSP 
process. An advocacy group leader who participated in the process and interviewed for this 
study noted that; 
“The PRSP process was not locally owned. Government officials and international donors 
hijacked the process. They already knew what they wanted and were intent on selling these ideas 
to us. Our participation was just tokenism to fulfill international donor requirements. It was 
more of consultation than participation. Moreover, we were excluded from the deliberations of 
the macro-economic issues that were critical for funding our proposals to achieve poverty 
reduction” (Zambia: Author interview, 34:2012) 
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The exclusion of advocacy groups from the deliberations of the macro-economic 
parameters was thus similar to the process in Kenya, which put to question advocacy groups 
value addition to the whole process (Matenga, 2010) and the country ownership of the final 
PRSP. Other challenges included lack of access to vital information and documents from the 
government, limited time frames, lack of participation at the highest level of the process, no 
representation at the drafting committee and the technical committee that received the final 
PRSP. Several respondents interviewed for this study also cited several discontinuities in the 
consultative process with the government, which impacted on civil society groups’ focus and 
confidence in the process. Despite all these challenges, the process improved both advocacy 
groups-international donor relations and advocacy group-government working relations for 
some time. 
After 2005, basket funding became an important donor disbursement tool to improve 
international donor coordination and harmonisation of their funding. In Zambia, the best 
example of such a programme focused on good governance. According to Mzyece (2010), the 
good governance basket funding (2009-2012) supported the efforts of the Zambian advocacy 
groups to address good governance reforms, checks, and balances in the private sector, and 
poverty reduction processes with anti-corruption as a cross-cutting theme. Several organisations 
participated in this program, including the Anti-Voter Apathy Project (AVAP), CSPR, Caritas-
Zambia, FODEP and the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection. Another important basket 
funding program was the Civil Society Election Coalition in 2011, which was meant to ensure 
effective electoral oversight by advocacy groups monitoring the September 2011 elections as a 
means of achieving electoral integrity and in so doing contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation. The program encouraged the proactive participation of citizens against electoral 
malpractices such as bribery and vote buying (CS Election Coalition report, 2011). The 
organisations that participated in this programme included the Anti-Voter Apathy Project, 
Caritas-Zambia, FODEP, Operation Young Vote, the Southern African Centre for the 
Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD) TI-Zambia, Young Women in Action and 
Zambia National Women’s Lobby (ZNWL).  
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However, most advocacy group leaders interviewed for this study did not favour the use 
of basket funding as a strategy for delivering funds to advocacy groups. They argued that basket 
funding leads to lack of meaningful participation in the process, including unclear roles and 
means of participation, poor reporting hierarchies and lack of mutual accountability. 
Additionally, advocacy group leaders noted that international donors have openly shown bias 
in selecting groups to participate in basket funding by favouring large, well-established, highly 
professionalised, elite-led, urban-based advocacy groups, which are capable of meeting donor 
reporting and accountability standards, while neglecting small, formal and informal grassroots 
advocacy groups, which in many respects are more closer to the majority poor and the 
marginalised groups, whose voices and interests are critical to the process of democratic 
consolidation. 
4.3.6. Advocacy groups relationship with political parties in Kenya and Zambia 
 
Political parties are the backbone of modern representative democracy, and therefore, 
their strategic alliance with advocacy groups is critical, if democratic consolidation is to be 
achieved in both Kenya and Zambia. The two groups do have a symbiotic relationship in the 
governance process. As Linz and Stepan (1996a) have argued, for civil society groups to 
accomplish the goals of supporting the process of democratic consolidation, they need a strong 
political society since political parties are indispensable to the functioning of democracy. They 
claim direct representation of citizens through regular universal suffrage and democratic 
elections and perform functions that are integral to the functioning of democracy such as interest 
aggregation, integration, and mediation, socialization roles, holding government accountable, 
influencing policy, leadership recruitment, and governing among others. Advocacy groups 
supplement some of these roles. Political parties’ explicit objective is to capture and exercise 
political power. Advocacy groups, therefore, can lobby political parties for policy positions, 
provide them with information on various issues in exchange for support. They can also support 
political parties financially and technically through training of political party agents and 
organizing forums, where political parties can discuss public policies and respond to citizen 
questions (Sharma and Gupta 2006). 
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The alliance between advocacy groups and political parties become even more crucial 
in emerging democracies such as those of Kenya and Zambia, struggling with the daunting task 
of democratic consolidation.  However, political parties in both countries are organizationally 
weak, elitist, lack ideologies basis, ethnicised, poorly institutionalized, lack roots in society, 
internally undemocratic, fragmented with high volatility and persistence of personalistic and 
clientelist relationships and systematically manipulated by incumbent regimes (Oloo 2007; 
Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005; Van de Walle 2003; Ottaway 1999). Political parties in both 
countries are also poorly governed and “ remain very much the preserve of individual 
politicians, who hold sway in their parties and who stand above their parties institutional 
structures”(Oloo, 2007, p. 95). They are thus unable on their own to effectively play their 
representative roles and ensure democratic consolidation. These weaknesses have also reduced 
their ability to partner with advocacy groups in the democratic consolidation process. 
During the liberalisation process in Africa, advocacy groups and opposition political 
parties became natural allies, with numerous reasons to work together to end the reign of 
authoritarian regimes and restore multi-partism and democracy. The two groups strategized 
together, shared information, organized rallies and demonstrations and joined forces to confront 
authoritarian regimes to bring about political change. As negotiations for transitional processes 
between the incumbent regimes and opposition political parties proceeded, advocacy groups 
maintained the momentum of political change on the streets through mass action to help push 
the negotiations forward and to ensure that both sides respected the outcome of such 
negotiations. Persistent protests and demonstrations, therefore, kept the transitions moving 
forward. However, in the new political and institutional dispensation, the relationship between 
advocacy groups and political parties has become problematic, especially in the process of 
democratic consolidation. 
 In Kenya, the long, protracted and gradual transition process ensured that advocacy 
organisations developed a very close working relationship with opposition political parties. The 
very first mass opposition political party, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) 
was formed in May 1991 by six opposition leaders as a pressure group, calling for the 
restoration of multi-party politics and democracy. It was officially launched in July 1991 
(Throup and Hornsby 1998) and drew its membership from civil society and the political 
community (Kanyinga, 2009).  
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Most advocacy groups, including, the church represented by the National Council of 
Churches of Kenya (NCCK) joined the prodemocracy movement led by FORD, which finally 
forced the ruling party-the Kenya African National Union (KANU) to repeal section 2(A) of 
the Constitution via Constitutional Amendment Act No. 12 of 1991, to allow for the formation 
of opposition political parties for multi-party politics to work. Although the incumbent regime 
retained power in the first two general elections after the re-introduction of multi-party politics 
through various political maneuvers, including violence and manipulation of the electoral 
system, advocacy groups and opposition political parties continued to work together focussing 
on comprehensive constitutional review and other critical issues of governance and democracy. 
However, the two groups had fundamental differences which impacted on their relationship in 
the democratisation. For instance, in 1991 just after the repeal of the constitution to allow for 
multi-partyism, advocacy groups felt that it was crucial that comprehensive constitutional 
review is carried out before the first multi-party general elections to level the playing field for 
political parties. However, opposition political parties just needed enough reforms to defeat 
KANU (Mutua 2008) and, therefore, demanded multi-party elections as soon as possible. The 
opposition lost that election to the incumbent President Moi and KANU due to divisions within 
itself and manipulation of the election by the incumbent. Moreover, FORD had failed to evolve 
an organizing ideology to inform its agenda (Mutua 2009; Nasongo 2007).   
In 1997 the Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change (4Cs), a coalition of activist 
advocacy groups called for the comprehensive constitutional reform as the country was 
preparing for the second multi-party elections that year. The group mobilised other advocacy 
groups and the public and campaigned for a boycott of the elections, unless comprehensive 
constitutional reforms were undertaken.  Political parties including the ruling party-the Kenya 
African National Union (KANU) again differed with this position and instead spearheaded 
minimum electoral reforms, through the Inter-Party Parliamentary Group (IPPG) created within 
parliament to negotiate the minimum constitutional reform package, which was adopted by 
parliament before the elections. Advocacy groups became a challenge to political parties in the 
democratization process, and their relationship was thus defined by suspicion, distrust and 
divergent political agenda. With advocacy groups taking on the lead in the constitutional review 
process, political parties feared that they were losing control of the reform agenda to civil 
society (Kanyinga, 2009).  
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 Reflecting on the constitutional review process, Murungi (2000) who was a member of 
parliament then, argues that political parties distrusted secular civil society groups and felt that 
political parties were being overshadowed by these activists, whose campaign on the 
constitutional review process by this time had gained significant traction with the public. 
Political parties, therefore, decided to join the proposed inter-party parliamentary group with 
the government to negotiate for the minimum electoral reforms. Mutua (2008) has thus argued 
that the interest of opposition political parties was not centred on the democratization of the 
state but rather on minimum constitutional changes that would make its ascendancy to power 
possible. They were thus largely opportunistic advocates of the reform agenda and adopted self-
serving strategies in the democratization process. Opposition political parties and the 
government left out civil society groups from the minimum constitutional reform negotiations. 
After the 1997 second defeat of the opposition by the incumbent regime, advocacy 
groups focused on oppositional unity since they believed that ethnic divisions within the 
opposition had cost them victory twice. They played a guiding role in opposition unity and 
identified the constitutional review process as the basis for that unity (Kanyinga, 2009). With 
continuous negotiation with opposition political parties, they finally helped in the formation of 
the National Alliance for Change (NAC), which joined the National Party of Kenya (NPK). 
Several meetings and negotiations between advocacy groups and opposition political parties 
then culminated in the birth of the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK), which was later 
joined by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to form the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), 
which went on to win the 2002 general elections. Advocacy groups campaigned for NARC, 
besides mobilisation of resources and development of its political strategy and manifesto. 
  With NARC coming to power, the relationship between advocacy groups and political 
parties dramatically changed. Having played a significant role in both the formation and victory 
of the opposition coalition-the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), it was evident during the 
interviews with advocacy group leaders that most of them felt beholden to the government in 
power, which they considered as “their government” that needed their full support, while a few 
others maintained that advocacy groups had to remain autonomous and continue playing their 
traditional role of a watchdog on the government.  
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Working with KANU, which was now the main opposition political party and which 
advocacy groups had fought for so many years as the ruling party of the authoritarian 
government became problematic. Moreover, other opposition political parties were small, 
fragmented and lacked a reform agenda. This scenario of a dominant ruling coalition supported 
by most advocacy groups with a fragmented opposition party system weakened advocacy 
groups’ voice and actions in the process of democratic consolidation. Advocacy groups were 
reluctant to criticize the NARC government, which was composed of their former colleagues, 
allies and friends from the opposition. Additionally, Kanyinga (2009) has noted that the 
government itself began to speak civil society language of rights and democracy and designed 
programs similar to those of human rights and governance NGOs, which created a crisis of 
legitimacy among NGOs. He adds that civil society groups became irrelevant once the 
government started to address human rights, corruption, and transitional justice. Additionally, 
civil society was disorganized and faced a dilemma of redefining a new role and crafting new 
strategies for democratic consolidation in the new political and institutional dispensation. 
In 2008, after the Post-Election violence, a Grand Coalition government was formed 
between the leading political parties-the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and the Party 
of National Unity (PNU). This further transformed and complicated the relationship between 
advocacy organisations and political parties. The coalition government polarised advocacy 
groups along party and ethnic lines at a time when there was hardly an opposition political party 
they could work with. Most respondents interviewed for this study noted that the appointments 
of civil society leaders into state bureaucracy, commissions, and several task forces, strictly 
followed their affiliations to either the Orange Democratic Movement or the Party of National 
Unity-the two coalition partners in the Grand coalition government. An advocacy group leader 
interviewed for this study noted that; 
“Almost everyone within civil society was in government, either directly from appointments, 
through parliament or indirectly as a supporter of the government. It became a civil society 
overload in the government” (Kenya: Author Interview: 12: 2012)  
 
Additionally, some advocacy group leaders doubled as officials of existing political parties, 
which blurred the boundaries between civil society and political parties and led to a potential 
conflict of interest, and complicated consensus and alliances building on democratic reforms 
since the interests of political parties sometimes differ with those of advocacy groups. 
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In Zambia, the relationship between advocacy groups and political parties is tenuous 
and extremely weak. The Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) began in 1990 as a 
pressure group supported by the Zambia Congress for Trade Unions (ZCTU) to fight for the 
restoration of multi-partism and democracy. It was later joined by hundreds of advocacy groups, 
leading to the creation of the prodemocracy movement, which forced the incumbent, President 
Kenneth Kaunda of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) to accept multi-party 
politics and democracy through a series of negotiations between the two groups. MMD would 
later be transformed into a political party under the leadership of Fredrick Chiluba after the 
repeal of Article 4 of the Zambian Constitution on November 17, 1990, to allow for the 
formation of opposition political parties. The party was composed of former UNIP member of 
parliament, trade unionists, business people, academicians, students, and ordinary citizens. 
MMD went on to win the first multi-party elections in Zambia in 1991. Upon assuming office, 
MMD adopted a policy of deliberately co-opting opposition politicians into government and, 
therefore, further weakened and marginalized the opposition.  
Apart from the deliberate actions of the MMD to weaken the opposition, the opposition 
political parties themselves are institutionally and ideologically weak, with most lacking 
functional offices around the country and thus making productive collaboration between 
advocacy groups and the opposition political parties quite challenging and short-lived. 
Advocacy groups’ relationship with the ruling party, on the hand, is confrontational and 
adversarial since the government has continued to view advocacy groups suspiciously and 
marginalised them in the policy-making process (Rakner, 2003). The mistrust stems from 
advocacy groups’ fierce opposition to the MMD Structural Adjustment programme (SAP) 
policies and their deleterious effects on employment and citizens’ standards of living.  
Additionally, the appropriation of ZCTU by the MMD significantly weakened the advocacy 
sector of civil society, further fermented the mutual mistrust between advocacy groups and 
political parties and has impeded the formation of strategic alliances between the two groups to 
formulate policies which can support the process of democratic consolidation. Most 
respondents interviewed for this study also pointed out that the failure of political parties to 
honour their electoral promises creates mistrust with advocacy groups, who in many cases have 
supported such political parties and thus hinder a constructive collaboration in the process of 
democratic consolidation. 
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Most respondents also noted that the short-term interest of political parties of capturing 
political power hindered the long-term collaboration with advocacy groups in the 
democratisation process. (Zambia: Author interviews, 33: 2012; 35:2012). For instance, one 
advocacy leader interviewed for this study in Lusaka noted that; 
“Political parties have always abandoned us in the constitutional review process, whenever the 
election period nears to focus on the elections, even when we have suggested postponement of 
such elections for the completion of the constitutional review process” (Zambia: Author 
interview, 37:2012). 
 
The study also found that political parties have a unique relationship with advocacy 
groups in Zambia, where both the ruling party and opposition political parties establish political 
NGOs (PONGOs) and government-owned NGOs (GONGOs) during the campaigns to 
champion their interests. These groups align themselves with those political parties and support 
their policy positions through press conferences besides campaigning for those political parties 
but fold up immediately after the elections. Such groups have no functional offices and 
membership and have been referred to as “popcorn” political advocacy groups in Zambia. Most 
respondents interviewed for this study noted that this practice creates confusion both within the 
advocacy sector and for voters on advocacy groups’ positions on major campaign issues.  
Despite the above constraints, which impede advocacy groups’ relationship with 
political parties, most of the groups have supported various political parties during elections. In 
1991, for instance, most advocacy groups supported the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, 
while in 2011, several advocacy groups, including the independent newspaper-the Post openly 
supported the Patriotic Front (PF), which eventually won the general elections. The strategic 
alliances between advocacy groups and political parties remain critical in the process of 
democratic consolidation in both Kenya and Zambia. As the backbone of representative 
democracy, political parties are critical for the process of democratic consolidation. Advocacy 
groups cannot replace political parties, which directly derive their legitimacy of representation 
from the public through universal suffrage. Advocacy groups’ efforts towards democratic 
consolidation will only make a difference if political parties played their proper role in the 
process. It is thus imperative that concerted efforts are made towards building the capacity of 
political parties if democratic consolidation is to be achieved in both countries. 
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4.4. Implications for democratic consolidation in Kenya and Zambia 
 
The post-transitional political and institutional environment in Kenya and Zambia have 
created both opportunities and constraints to advocacy groups in their quest to effectively 
contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. The establishment of democracy is thus 
a double-edged sword for these groups, which they must negotiate through to remain relevant 
players in the democratisation process. While the relatively improved civil liberties and political 
rights have opened up spaces and platforms for the activities of advocacy groups geared towards 
the process of democratic consolidation, advocacy groups’ history, strategic choices and the 
complex relationship with the newly democratic states and other major political actors have 
created significant constraints that have impacted on their ability to effectively contribute to the 
process of democratic consolidation.  
The political transitions from authoritarian systems to more democratic systems in both 
countries have led to relatively improved civil liberties and political rights, the establishment 
of legitimate opposition parties, electoral competition and other democratic institutions, which 
have opened up more political space and created more platforms for the work and operations 
of advocacy groups geared towards democratic consolidation. The institutional and political 
environment has also improved advocacy groups latitude to engage with the citizens, easily 
register and operate as legitimate groups and, therefore, freely organise, assemble and deliberate 
on issues which contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. It has also improved 
advocacy groups’ participation in the formal channels of engagement with the state in policy-
making. However, there was mixed feeling about the extent to which advocacy groups have 
influenced policy-making and the process of democratic consolidation through such formal 
engagement. While some advocacy groups felt that they had had some influence in policy- 
making, most of the groups are skeptical about the extent to which their participation has shaped 
the form and content of policy in their respective countries. The relatively improved civil 
liberties and political rights have increased the levels of citizen participation in the democratic 
processes such as participation in parliamentary committee hearings, signing of petitions, 
participation in government public service open days and political discussions in various types 
of media. These forms of participation have positively impacted on policy discussions in both 
countries.   
216 
 
Further, the new political environment has created opportunities where advocacy groups 
have expanded the scope and depth of old issues while incorporating new social, economic and 
political issues such as fair trade, taxation budget transparency and accountability and 
devolution among others in the policy domain of democratic politics. The groups have made 
credible efforts to incorporate previously marginalised groups into public politics, which has 
improved the quality of deliberation and participation of citizens on issues that are critical to 
the process of democratic consolidation. The development of the internet, social media, the 
email, and cell phones have become tools for enhancing the operational efficiency and impact 
of advocacy groups in the process of democratic consolidation. The groups have taken 
advantage of the newly-found freedoms and rights to create their own spaces for articulating 
demands for the institutionalisation of democracy through their voices, political mobilisation 
and constructive criticism of the government while advocating for policies that would improve 
responsive governance. The groups have also made significant efforts at the institutionalization 
the civil society sphere, by pushing for laws and legislation towards the same. These new 
opportunities together have led to the rapid and unprecedented growth of the sector in both 
Kenya and Zambia regarding their numbers, diversity and issues thus broadening the discourse 
and the social basis for the process of democratic consolidation. 
However, the new political and institutional environment has also presented advocacy 
groups with significant constraints which have stymied their effectiveness in the process of 
democratic consolidation in both countries. The groups face a three-fold dilemma that involves; 
re-defining their role in the new political dispensation, crafting new strategies for articulating 
democratic demands and re-defining their relationship with the newly democratic states and 
other political actors. Additionally, advocacy groups are constrained by lack of internal 
capacity, the legacy of authoritarianism, the movement from the civic the primordial arena and 
their relationship with other political actors. In the pre-transition period in both countries, 
advocacy groups were united under the prodemocracy movement and played the role of a 
countervailing force towards the authoritarian state, which they viewed as illegitimate. They 
were thus highly politicised and deeply consumed in opposition politics and agenda.  
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With the democratic transitions, advocacy groups had no agenda of their own and no 
concrete strategy to support the process of democratic consolidation in both countries. They 
were disorganised, disoriented, and fragmented. In Kenya, the debate about the role, the 
strategies and the relationship of advocacy groups with major actors in the new political and 
institutional dispensation led to the emergence of two groups within the advocacy sector. While 
one group composed of well-established and well-funded advocacy groups, supported 
cooperation with the state, the other group, composed of small, formal, and informal advocacy 
groups argued for an autonomous advocacy sector willing and ready to employ all tactics and 
strategies whenever necessary. With this kind of chasm and divisions within the advocacy 
sector, coupled with the collapse of the national statutory body, advocacy groups have remained 
weak with little influence and impact on the process of democratic consolidation.  
In Zambia, the swift and smooth democratic transition in the first multi-party elections 
left advocacy groups unprepared and disoriented with little time to re-organize and re-strategize 
for the new political and institutional dispensation. Moreover, the groups have no national 
statutory body to coordinate their activities, nor organize a reflection and planning session on 
their new roles and strategies in the new political dispensation. This situation has led to 
fragmentation and the inability of advocacy groups to effectively contribute to the process of 
democratic consolidation. Additionally, the MMD administration deliberately marginalised 
advocacy groups from the policy-making process to implement the Structural Adjustment 
Program, which the groups had opposed. Political transitions, therefore, exposed various 
internal contradictions and dynamics within the advocacy sector of civil society in both 
countries defined by fragmentation, competition, rigidity, and ideological differences that have 
negatively impacted on the ability of these groups to effectively contribute to the process of 
democratic consolidation. The study also revealed that regime change in both Kenya and 
Zambia, has led to fragmentation of advocacy groups, while regime stability leads to unity of 
purpose and coherence within the sector. The effectiveness of advocacy groups’ in the process 
of democratic consolidation is contingent upon the structure of the state and its relationship 
with the groups. A constructive state-advocacy groups relationship ensures progress towards 
the process of democratic consolidation, 
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 However, the relationship between advocacy groups and the state in both countries has 
been inconsistent depending on the nature of the regime in power. In Kenya, advocacy groups’ 
relationship with the state continued to be confrontational from 1992 to 2002 with groups 
unable to make any significant influence in the process of democratic consolidation despite 
their continued efforts at constitutional review process. The change of regime in 2002 through 
democratic elections, dramatically changed the relationship between advocacy groups and the 
state from confrontation to a more collaborative one until 2005 after the failed constitutional 
referendum. Despite this, the efforts of advocacy groups and other political players led to the 
promulgation of a new progressive constitution in 2010, which was a milestone in the process 
of democratic consolidation. In Zambia, the relationship between advocacy groups and the state 
remained confrontational due to the state’s reluctance to implement comprehensive political 
and economic reforms and appreciate the role of advocacy groups in the national development 
process. The successive MMD administrations continued with a pattern of authoritarian 
tendencies, suspicion towards advocacy groups and marginalization of the groups in policy-
making processes, thus significantly limiting their ability to influence policies towards the 
process of democratic consolidation. 
The political and institutional reforms in the new political dispensation also demanded 
the engagement of advocacy groups with the state in the policy-making processes in both 
countries. However, advocacy groups faced several constraints in formal engagement with the 
government, which included lack of technical capacity, skills and knowledge about the complex 
policy-making processes, lack of feedback from the state, late invitations to meetings, lack of 
timely and reliable information, governments unilateral decisions on which organisations to 
invite and more critically the exclusion of advocacy groups from the macroeconomic 
discussions, and lack of guarantee that advocacy groups’ proposals would be considered let 
alone included in the final policy decisions. The state and international donors also dominated 
the formal engagements. This pattern of engagement limited the broader representation of 
interests, curtailed meaningful engagement, created mistrust, and significantly circumscribed 
the ability of advocacy groups to influence public policies critical to the process of democratic 
consolidation.  Moreover, the formal framework of engagement was replete with dangers of co-
optation, manipulation, political appropriation and incorporation into cycles of state patronage 
and control.  
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Although a pluralistic, vibrant and robust civil society is critical to democracy 
(Diamond, 1989), as a channel for representing, aggregating and articulating the interests of 
their members and the public, the multiplicity of advocacy groups regarding their numbers, 
issues, roles and strategies in both Kenya and Zambia have led to a “paradox of pluralism” in 
several ways, which has implications on their ability to effectively contribute to the process of 
democratic consolidation. The state has taken advantage of civil society pluralism to cherry-
pick “friendlier” organisations to cooperate with and marginalize groups perceived to be critical 
of government policies and actions. This process has crowded out critical interests, issues, and 
voices that represent marginalised sections of society in the process of democratic 
consolidation, besides leading to the representation of parochial and narrow interests in the 
policy-making process.  
Pluralism within civil society has also made it much more challenging to create strategic 
alliances and coalitions in the process of democratic consolidation. With no national statutory 
body in Zambia and a dysfunctional national statutory body in Kenya for civil society groups, 
most advocacy groups have turned to thematic networks,82 which are a significant medium for 
organizing collective agency to pursue democratic governance and consolidation through the 
exchange of resources, addressing common goals, and amplify their voices to achieve more 
significant influence on policy-making among others. However, networking needs skills such 
as consensus building, communication, and dialogue facilitation, which some advocacy groups 
lack. Additionally, thematic networks lack official recognition and are fraught with challenges 
of effective communication, “founder syndrome,” loss of autonomy, conflict, competition, 
identity, politics, and structure. Pluralism also complicated coordination of advocacy groups 
activities in both countries. With so many groups, spread across the country, handling various 
issues at different administrative with different levels of capacity, skills, and knowledge, and 
different ideological leanings, coordination became extremely difficult and led to duplication 
of efforts, discordant voices on national issues and fierce competition for international donor 
funding. All these challenges undermined advocacy groups ability to effectively contribute to 
the process of democratic consolidation in both countries.  
                                                             
 
82 Networks tend to be loose and flexible associations of people and groups brought together by a common 
concern or interest to share information and ideas. 
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 With the expanded political space for the work of advocacy groups in the post-
transitional dispensation, the study revealed that there was an unprecedented increase in the 
number of disreputable advocacy groups such as “briefcase NGOs” (BRINGOs),” Government-
owned NGOs” (GONGOs) and political NGOs (PONGOs) among others. Most of these groups 
have no offices, no programs, and no staff and, are, therefore, functionally ineffective with the 
sole goal of attracting donor funding for personal aggrandizement. These groups have 
undermined the activities of genuine advocacy groups in at least three ways. Firstly, they have 
dented and tarnished the image and credibility of advocacy groups as representatives of the 
people, and therefore, reduced their legitimacy with the public and the state. Secondly, most of 
these groups have operated as “instruments of the state” by endorsing official positions of the 
state and, therefore, creating an appearance and confusion that advocacy groups have endorsed 
such positions. Finally, these groups and pluralism in general, have led to fierce competition  
for the scarce international donor resources, which deny genuine advocacy groups funding for 
activities, which support the process of democratic consolidation and create a risky political 
environment for advocacy groups co-optation by the state-a strategy which undermine 
advocacy groups’ autonomy and independence and reduce their effectiveness in the process of 
democratic consolidation. 
The legacy of authoritarianism has also impacted on advocacy groups’ effectiveness in 
the process of democratic consolidation. With the state being perceived as “democratic and 
legitimate,” the unity of purpose for the restoration of democracy that galvanized these groups 
against the authoritarian state during the pre-transition period dissipated in both Kenya and 
Zambia, leading to fragmentation and lack of consensus on a national agenda in the process of 
democratic consolidation. Additionally, the agenda of advocacy groups have changed from a 
singular focus on the restoration of democracy to a multiplicity of issues that define the new 
political and institutional dispensation. Moreover, advocacy groups have regained their 
autonomy and independence in the post-transitional dispensation as social organisations and 
must primarily focus on achieving the socio-economic interests of their members. This situation 
needs adjustment, flexibility, capacity, and focus, which most of these groups lack. The groups 
have also contested the language and meaning of democratic reform in the post-transitional 
dispensation, which has led to competing visions of transformation and, therefore, complicating 
the building strategic alliances to support the process of democratic consolidation.  
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The gradual movement of advocacy groups in Kenya from the “civic” to the 
“primordial” arena due to the influence of politics throughout the cycles of transitions, and more 
significantly after the regime change in 2002 which has influenced these groups’ agenda, their 
relationship with the state and their responses to critical national issues. It must be noted that 
advocacy groups with a political culture in the primordial sphere are “unable to foster 
democratic reforms because they are not oriented towards the common notions of liberty” 
(Ekeh, 1992). Patrimonial networks have crippled democratic politics by aligning with ethnicity 
and thus undermined civil society integration and mediation functions. Advocacy groups’ 
disintegration along ethnic cleavages has contributed to social fragmentation and the rise of 
ethno-regional interests within the sector, which has eroded the democratic gains and stifled the 
ability of advocacy groups to contribute to the process of democratic consolidation.  
Furthermore, the movement of advocacy groups towards the primordial arena has 
complicated strategic coalition building, coordination, and consensus building on a national 
agenda, which are all critical for the process of democratic consolidation. Associational ties 
based on exclusive and clientelist exchanges have promoted narrow and parochial interests that 
are inimical to the process of democratic consolidation. The funding structure of international 
donors based on interpersonal relationships and networks has also limited cooperation within 
the sector, created mistrust and suspicions, increased competition and exacerbated resource 
inequalities, processes which have constrained advocacy groups’ capacity and ability to 
effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. 
The study also found that advocacy groups’ relationship with international donors in 
both Kenya and Zambia is the most critical relationship with the greatest impact on these 
groups’ ability to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation since 
international donor support is key to the existence, operations, and survival of these groups. In 
Kenya, for example, 85 percent of civil society groups funding in 2013/2014, came from 
international donors, while only 15 percent of the funds were resourced from within the 
country.83 The chronic dependence on international donor funding has led to an imbalanced 
relationship of control based on the asymmetry of power between advocacy groups and 
international donors.  
                                                             
 
83 NGO Sector Report 2013/2014-NGO Coordination Board, Nairobi, Kenya. 
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The establishment of most advocacy groups in both countries in the early 1990s was 
stimulated by the availability of international donor funding, which defined their priorities at 
the expense of domestic needs and expectations of their citizens. With the continuation of 
dependency on international donors, most advocacy groups’ priorities have continued to reflect 
donor priorities, which have shaped their orientation, values, agenda, and focus. These groups, 
therefore, define themselves more towards the donor environment than towards those they 
claim to represent (Dwyer and Zeilig, 2012). The impact of advocacy groups in the process of 
democratic consolidation has thus been ambiguous and mixed since international donors have 
undermined their independence and autonomy. Most of these groups have implemented the 
neoliberal agenda of reform, which is limited to constraining and not transforming the state. 
Moreover, most advocacy group leaders interviewed for this study were less ideologically 
oriented and just followed the neoliberal ideology pushed by international donors, while others 
criticized and contested the neoliberal agenda-the very agenda that opened-up political space 
for them to grow and perform new roles in the development process (Bebbington. et al., 2008).   
The Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) 84in Zambia is a classic example of a 
donor created and driven coalition of civil society organizations with donor defined and funded 
mandate (Brouwers, 2011, Dwyer and Zeilig, 2012). The network has little grassroots 
ownership and the GTZ, its principal donor attends all its weekly meetings, all meetings of the 
management team and all staff retreats (Banda 2007, p. 6), In many respects, this kind of direct 
control demonstrates that participation engineered by international donors is but a means to 
legitimize neoliberal policies by civil society organisations. Cooke and Kothari (2001) refer to 
this type of participation as the “new tyranny” and reject the assumption about the authenticity 
of motivation and behaviour in such participatory processes, where power relations prevent the 
meaningful participation of the marginalised, while the very process legitimises the voices of 
the most powerful. These types of participation, therefore, do not contribute to the process of 
democratic consolidation.  
                                                             
 
84 However, by 2006, the organization had established offices in 5 out of the nine provinces in Zambia 
to connect with grassroots citizens in consultation and dissemination of information directly and 
through its many partner organizations. 
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Similarly, in a study of civil society, development, and democracy, Gabay (2011, p. 
498) describes the Malawian civil society organisations as “disciplined and docile” in the face 
of a deeply politicised development agenda. The author explains that by docile, he means that 
the activism of these groups merely serves to legitimise donor discourses of participation. 
Gaynor (2011) has also shown how the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN) pushed its 
way to join government deliberations on Malawi’s PRSP process only to be “disciplined” by 
the parameters of donor expert knowledge relating to development.  
The delivery of international donor funds through the call for proposal framework with 
predefined agenda and thematic focus, timeline, expected outcomes, geographic coverage, 
specific strategies, and funding amounts has serious implications for advocacy groups’ 
independence and autonomy, and therefore, their ability to effectively contribute to the process 
of democratic consolidation. It distracts the groups from focusing on the domestic agenda and 
priorities of their membership and the public and essentially makes them implementers of donor 
priorities through the incorporation of donor ideas of economic orthodoxy and good governance 
into their practices (Dwyer and Zeilig, 2012). Advocacy groups have thus continuously 
reproduced the priorities, assumptions, and the practices of international donors. The 
framework has also prevented them from developing indigenous roots in society and the 
relationship with the constituencies and the people they claim to represent. Advocacy groups 
have therefore failed to represent their citizens because they are oriented towards upward 
accountability to donors rather than downward accountability to the beneficiaries of their 
programs. Edwards (2013) concludes that this type of orientation hinders advocacy group 
democratizing potential by delinking them from their domestic constituencies and making them 
more accountable to external donors. 
The study found that the frequent changing priorities of international donors have an 
enormous impact on advocacy groups’ activities, strategic plans, sustainability and their impact 
on the process of democratic consolidation. After the transition in both countries, international 
donors immediately shifted most of their funding away from advocacy groups to support the 
new democratic governments in direct budgetary support and institutional building. Advocacy 
groups were left in a quandary and forced to either scale back or stop some of their activities, 
which were meant to support the process of democratic consolidation. A financially weakened 
advocacy sector in both countries lost a critical window of opportunity to actively engage in the 
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constitutional review processes to support the consolidation of democracy. International 
donors, therefore, appear to view advocacy groups as “convenient partners,” who are valuable 
in helping them their strategic agenda, but who can easily be abandoned provided the host 
government shows some signs and commitment to the institutionalisation of democracy. This 
perception of advocacy groups by international donors leads to serious questions about the 
donor’s commitment to democratization in developing countries. The frequent shifting of 
funding from advocacy groups to government and from one agenda to another without 
consultations with advocacy groups does not guarantee timely, predictable and sustainable 
support (Siegel, 2007) which is critical if advocacy groups are to effectively contribute to the 
process of democratic consolidation in both countries. 
The frequency of change in international donor priorities have forced advocacy groups 
to stretch their agenda, mandates and functional boundaries to undertake any project that is 
listed in the call for proposals, thus making these groups pick multiple agenda which they have 
no expertise on and preventing them from developing a niche in governance and development. 
This random nature of program development has led to a lack of commitment and poor 
understanding of the programs, leading to reduced impact and success of the programs, some 
of which focus on the process of democratic consolidation. Additionally, the short-term funding 
strategy to advocacy groups by international donors hardly supports the sustainability of 
projects undertaken by these groups, which usually focus on political, social or attitudinal 
change. Specifically, the process of democratic consolidation requires building democratic 
institutions, citizenship, and democratic political culture, which is a long-term and challenging 
process, which takes time and requires long-term support and commitment. Project support 
without institutional support also leaves these groups institutionally weakened to implement 
programs which support the process of democratic consolidation effectively. 
The study found that the adoption of basket funding by most international as a new 
strategy of delivering aid to advocacy groups to improve ownership, alignment, harmonization, 
and mutual accountability has constrained advocacy groups’ ability to contribute to the process 
of democratic consolidation. The strategy has led to various challenges for advocacy groups, 
including the lack of meaningful participation, unclear levels of participation, unclear roles of 
various actors and unclear reporting procedures and mutual accountability. Additionally, there 
is an institutional bias, where international donors favour large, well-established, highly 
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professionalised, urban-based advocacy groups, which are capable of meeting donor standards 
of accountability, transparency and professionalism in the basket funding arrangements at the 
neglect of small, formal and informal grassroots advocacy groups, which in many cases 
represent marginalised voices and interests that are crucial to the process of democratic 
consolidation. Most international donors, therefore, appear to fund advocacy groups that are 
mirror images of themselves. For democratic consolidation to be achieved, a broad-based group 
of advocacy groups and most citizens need to be actively involved in the process. The overly 
bureaucratic approach to political and social issues within basket funding and other funding 
strategies by international donors kill activism and the spirit of social movements that drive 
advocacy groups’ quest for democratic consolidation. 
The study found that most international donors are reluctant to fund advocacy groups 
perceived to directly challenge governmental authority, thus creating tension between them and 
the host governments and interfering with their national and strategic interests. International 
donors prioritize stability above all other advocacy groups’ activities towards democratic 
consolidation. They shun groups which are likely to engage in activities such as protests, and 
demonstrations, which are legally sanctioned methods of seeking redress in democratic 
societies and are some of the most potent strategies of ensuring public accountability and 
democratic reform. Most international donors, therefore, project their own caution and timidity 
on advocacy groups. As Jalali (2013) has noted, they transform advocacy groups from 
confrontational to consensus movements. For instance, Mutua (2008, p. 107) has argued that 
most international donors supported the IPPG initiative in 1997 in Kenya because they 
considered it “rational and less threatening alternative.” NGOs had threatened protests and 
demonstration if the constitutional review was not done before the elections that year. However, 
in the face of government intransigence regarding the process of democratic consolidation, 
advocacy groups, sometimes have no option but to use protests and demonstrations, if they are 
to ensure the institutionalization of democracy. 
International donors have also pushed for partnerships between advocacy groups and 
governments in both Kenya and Zambia in the policy-making processes to enhance ownership 
and implementation of development policies. However, this study found that the involvement 
of advocacy groups in these partnerships has slowed down the process of reflection and 
redefinition of advocacy groups’ roles, agenda, and strategies for democratic consolidation. 
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State-advocacy group partnership has in many respects blurred advocacy groups’ 
oversight, and public accountability roles and crowded out critical forms of associational life 
that are crucial in the process of democratic consolidation. Dwyer and Zeilig (2012) have 
argued that the tendency of international donors to encourage cooperation between government 
and liberal advocacy groups is a form of control that donors wield over civil society groups.  
Heller (2000, p.55) also notes that “If the idea of partnership tends to underestimate the 
complexities of engaging the state, it also presumes an alignment of interests and perspectives 
that leave little room for the contestation of the state power.” Additionally, the insistence of 
international donors on political neutrality or non-partisanship for advocacy groups in the 
political sphere has undermined the very activist orientation that advocacy groups require to 
empower citizens and contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. It must be noted 
that advocacy work is deeply political as these groups must decide what policy options to 
support and what policies to oppose.  
Finally, the study found that the relationship between advocacy groups and political 
parties in both Kenya and Zambia is weak, fluid, unpredictable and primarily defined by mutual 
mistrust, tension, and suspicions. Although advocacy groups closely and strategically worked 
with opposition political parties in both countries to end authoritarianism through the 
prodemocracy movements in the early 1990s, this study found that the relationship between the 
two groups in the post-transitional dispensation has become contentious and defined by mutual 
mistrust, suspicion and divergent political agenda. The mistrust emanates from political parties’ 
suspicions that advocacy groups activities overshadow them in various political processes such 
as the constitutional review process in both countries. The mistrust has undermined strategic 
cooperation on the process of democratic consolidation. Additionally, political parties’ 
immediate interest in capturing political power has compromised their long-term engagement 
with advocacy groups in the process of democratic consolidation. Political parties in both 
countries are also fundamentally weak, ethnicised, un-institutionalized, lack ideological basis, 
and functional offices. They are also characterised by elitism, factionalism and easily 
manipulated by incumbent regimes. The nature of these parties has thus hindered constructive 
and productive collaboration with advocacy groups in the process of democratic consolidation. 
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Finally, the failure of political parties to honour their electoral promises once in power in both 
countries has exacerbated mistrust between advocacy groups and political parties as advocacy 
groups have shared the blame from citizens for such failures for having supported, campaigned 
and encouraged citizens to vote for such political parties. Despite all the above constraints and 
challenges between advocacy groups relationship with political parties, the strategic alliances 
and productive cooperation between the two political actors in the post-transitional countries of 
Kenya and Zambia remain critical to the process of democratic consolidation. 
4.5. Summary 
This chapter examined the experiences of advocacy groups in the post-transitional 
political and institutional environment in both Kenya and Zambia and focused on opportunities 
and constraints confronting these groups due to the democratic transition and the character of 
the broader institutional and political environment, advocacy groups’ strategic choices, the 
authoritarian legacy, and the interaction of advocacy groups with various political actors. In the 
first section, the chapter discussed the opportunities for advocacy groups in the new political 
dispensation in both countries, which included the relatively improved civil liberties and 
political rights, the establishment of legitimate opposition parties, relatively free, fair and 
regular electoral competition and other democratic institutions and processes, which have 
helped open up the political space and have created more platforms for the work and operations 
of advocacy groups geared towards the process of democratic consolidation.  
The new political environment has improved advocacy groups latitude and ability to 
engage with the citizens and operates as legitimate political actors recognized by the state, while 
at the same time the level of citizen participation in the democratic and governance processes 
has significantly improved. The groups have thus created their own spaces for articulating 
demands for the deepening of democracy and expanded the depth and scope of old issues while 
incorporating new issues. Additionally, advocacy groups have been recognized by the state as 
development partners and formally incorporated into governance processes on various public 
policy issues. The incorporation of advocacy groups into the formal governance processes has 
had mixed results. While some groups feel that they have been able to influence public policy 
through such forums, most groups feel that their participation is more of tokenism meant to 
legitimize public policies and a containment strategy by the state.  The development of the 
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internet, social media, the email, and cell phones have become essential tools, which have 
enhanced the operational efficiency and impact of advocacy groups in the governance 
processes.   
The second section examined the principal constraints confronting advocacy groups in 
the process of democratic consolidation in the post-transitional political and institutional 
environment in both Kenya and Zambia. The chapter argued that democratic transitions 
fundamentally altered the political dynamics and institutional environments in which advocacy 
groups operate. The process created a “shock therapy” for advocacy groups which affected their 
orientation, roles, strategies, relations with other political actors. The constraints confronting 
these groups have emanated from this broader institutional and political environment, advocacy 
groups strategic choices and interests and internal contradictions and weaknesses, the legacy of 
authoritarianism and their interaction with other principal political actors. The post-transitional 
political environment thus created a three-fold dilemma for advocacy groups which involved; 
re-defining their role in the new political dispensation, crafting new strategies for articulating 
democratic demands and re-defining their relationship with the newly democratic states.  
In Kenya, the political and institutional environment remained relatively the same after 
the political transition from 1992 to 2002 with the incumbent regime retaining power under the 
one-party constitution in a democratic and multi-party setting. Consequently, advocacy groups’ 
relationship with the state remained more or else confrontational due to the regime’s 
authoritarian tendencies and opposition to the comprehensive constitutional review which 
advocacy groups demanded. However, the dramatic regime change in 2002 fundamentally 
altered the political landscape for advocacy groups. It created a grave dilemma for these groups 
as they had closely worked with and supported the new administration, the National Rainbow 
Coalition (NARC) for many years in the opposition. Most of the groups, therefore, felt obligated 
to support the new regime. Additionally, the groups were highly politicized and sucked into the 
national liberation agenda and, therefore, were unprepared and had no agenda of their own to 
pursue in the post-transitional dispensation. The sector was disorganized, disoriented and faced 
an existential threat. Moreover, it had lost most of its experienced leaders to the government 
through co-optation and political appropriation and became a reactionary force with limited 
influence in the process of democratic consolidation. 
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In Zambia, the swift and smooth democratic transition in the first multi-party general 
elections in 1991 after the re-introduction of multi-party politics forced advocacy groups to play 
catch up adjustments with the fast-evolving character of the new political and institutional 
environment. The groups, therefore, entered the new political dispensation unprepared, 
disorganised and disoriented, having spent much of the pre-transition time organizing and 
campaigning for the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD), which had won the first 
multi-party general elections. The new political environment was further complicated by the 
immediate political appropriation of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) which had 
led the prodemocracy movement and was the convener of advocacy groups in the process of 
democratization. Further, the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) by MMD as 
the blueprint for economic recovery created tensions between the state and most advocacy 
groups, which fiercely opposed the policies as detrimental to the poor and the majority of 
Zambian. The new administration was also reluctant to support the comprehensive 
constitutional review, which advocacy groups had demanded as the foundation for democratic 
consolidation. The relationship between advocacy groups and the state was strained by 
successive MMD administrations, which have continued view advocacy groups suspiciously, 
marginalize them in the policy-making processes, and employ high-handed strategies to curtail 
their activities. With this kind of political environment, advocacy groups have found it 
extremely challenging to redefine their new roles, craft new strategies for articulating demands 
for democratic consolidation and redefine their relationship with the new democratic state.   
The chapter also examined the effects of the rapid and unprecedented growth of 
advocacy groups in both Kenya and Zambia in the new political dispensation on their ability to 
effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. It argued that the multiplicity 
of advocacy groups in terms of numbers, issues, roles and strategies has created a “paradox of 
pluralism,” whereby instead of pluralizing civil society and making it more vibrant, pluralism 
has led to widespread fragmentation and competition of advocacy groups for international 
donor funding, which has undermined advocacy groups effectiveness in the process of 
democratic consolidation. It has led to the proliferation of hundreds of disreputable advocacy 
groups which have undermined genuine advocacy groups’ efforts at the institutionalization of 
democracy by tarnishing their credibility, trust, legitimacy, and public image, thus complicating 
citizen mobilisation for the process of democratic consolidation. 
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The fragmentation of advocacy groups has given the state the opportunity to cherry-
pick, which organisations to cooperate with and which ones to exclude from the policy-making 
process. Critical interests, issues, and voices representing the marginalised sections of society 
have thus been left out as policy-making is dominated by the representation of parochial and 
narrow interests, which have undermined the process of democratic consolidation. 
Additionally, fragmentation and competition for international donor funds by advocacy groups 
have complicated the formation of strategic alliances to support activities geared towards the 
process of democratic consolidation and made coordination of advocacy groups quite 
challenging. Pluralism has also led to multiple and sometimes discordant voices on national 
policy issues, which has weakened advocacy voice and efforts at the institutionalisation of 
democracy. Fierce competition for donor funding within the advocacy sector has created a 
schism within the sector, making advocacy groups vulnerable to state co-optation and political 
appropriation, processes that undermine their autonomy and independence and consequently 
reduce their effectiveness in the process of democratic consolidation.  
In examining the legacy of authoritarianism and its effects on advocacy groups’ ability 
to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in the post-transitional 
political environment, the chapter argued that the collapse of the unity of purpose that 
galvanized advocacy groups under the common agenda of the restoration of democracy has 
contributed to fragmentation of advocacy groups, complicated the task of building consensus 
on a national agenda of democratic consolidation and led to contestations over the interpretation 
of the meaning of democratic reform and transformation within the sector. Further, the state no 
longer generates the anti-authoritarian impulse, which helped unite these groups under the pro-
democracy movement. Additionally, with the transition, advocacy groups now must be social 
organizations representing the interests of their membership and at the same time attempting to 
contribute to the national agenda of democratisation, a process that requires adjustment, time 
and flexibility, which most of these groups have not exhibited.  All these factors emanating 
from the legacy of authoritarianism have constrained advocacy groups’ ability to effectively 
contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in both countries. 
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 The chapter also noted that the gradual movement of advocacy groups from the civic 
to the primordial arena in the post-transitional political environment in Kenya has constrained 
these groups’ ability to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. 
Although advocacy groups in Kenya have always reflected the political and ethnic divisions 
within the country, the effect of these cleavages have been exacerbated significantly in the post-
transitional dispensation which has influenced their relationship with the state, their agenda, 
their responses to national issues and their mobilisation strategies. The advocacy groups’ 
movement towards the primordial arena has been attributed to the collapse of the unity of 
purpose, the spillover of ethnic divisions within the ruling coalition into advocacy groups, and 
the structure of international donor funding framework, which has mostly relied on a network 
of powerful and influential individuals within the advocacy sector of civil society. The 
movement towards the primordial arena has led to the rise of ethno-regional interests within 
advocacy groups, which has eroded the democratic gains and impeded advocacy groups from 
actively contributing to the process of democratic consolidation. It has also limited cooperation 
by creating mistrust and suspicions within the sector and thus complicated the formation of the 
strategic alliances for democratic consolidation. 
The chapter also examined the relationship between advocacy groups and international 
donors and argued that it is perhaps the most consequential relationship to advocacy groups for 
their ability to contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in both Kenya and Zambia 
due to their chronic dependence on international donor funds for their very existence. This type 
of dependent, unequal, patronizing and asymmetrical relationship has created almost total 
control of advocacy groups by international donors, leading to advocacy groups pursuing the 
neoliberal agenda and priorities defined by international donors over domestic needs and 
priorities. This dependency has led to a lack of sustainability of programs, poor roots within 
society and an upward accountability process to external funders rather than downward 
accountability to beneficiaries of advocacy groups’ programs. Most advocacy groups are, 
therefore, shaped by and reflect the agenda and priorities of international donors. The funding 
framework is also biased towards large and well-established, formal, more liberal, urban and 
middle class-led influential organisations, at the expense of indigenous, small, formal and 
informal advocacy groups, which in most cases have deeper roots within society and represent 
the poor and the marginalized constituencies of the population. 
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 The chapter also argued that the dominant call for proposal framework as a strategy for 
funding advocacy groups with a predefined agenda, thematic focus, timelines, expected 
outcomes, geographic coverage, specific strategies and funding amounts has tightened 
international donor control over advocacy groups and further distracted them from domestic 
agenda and local priorities, curtailed their flexibility and innovation and prevented them from 
developing roots in society. Advocacy groups have become implementers of international 
donor agenda and a mirror reflection of their funders. The tight control of advocacy groups by 
international donors has undermined their independence and autonomy and the participation 
that they have promoted served to legitimize neoliberal policies of international donors rather 
than policies of transformation that would contribute to the consolidation of democracy in 
Kenya and Zambia. Further, the frequent changing donor priorities and funding modalities have 
destabilized advocacy groups’ strategic plans and activities to the extent that they have lost 
several windows of opportunities to contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. 
Additionally, the frequent shifting of funding and priorities by international donors, especially 
after the transition in both countries to support the new democratic governments, significantly 
reduced funding to advocacy groups, leading these groups to scale back and stop most of their 
activities meant to support the institutionalisation of democracy. Moreover, without funding, 
several advocacy groups just folded up. 
The chapter, therefore, concluded that international donors appear to view advocacy 
groups as “convenient partners,” which are dispensable as long the state shows signs of 
commitment to the institutionalization of democracy. The frequent shifting of funding from 
advocacy groups to government and from one policy area to another without consultations with 
advocacy groups creates unpredictable, erratic and unsustainable short-term funding that can 
hardly support the long-term process of democratic consolidation. Additionally, such frequent 
changes in international donor priorities have forced advocacy groups in both countries to 
stretch their agenda, mandates and functional boundaries to undertake projects which they have 
no expertise or interest in to survive, leading to lack of commitment and consequently poor 
impact and success. The adoption of basket funding by international donors as a strategy to 
improve ownership, alignment, harmonisation, and mutual accountability has been detrimental 
to most advocacy groups’ efforts towards democratic consolidation.  
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Basket funding has led to a lack of meaningful participation of advocacy groups in such 
projects with unclear roles, reporting procedures and mutual accountability. Moreover, the 
selection of advocacy groups to participate in basket finding projects has been biased towards 
large, well-established, highly professionalized, urban-based advocacy groups, which are 
capable of meeting international donor standards of accountability, transparency, and 
professionalism at the expense of small, formal and informal grassroots advocacy groups, which 
in many cases represent the majority poor and marginalised sections of society. It has meant 
that critical voices and interests have been left out in the process of democratic consolidation 
through such frameworks. Equally important is the fact that the overly bureaucratic approach 
of basket funding to social and political issues has led to the decline of the spirit of social 
movements that drive advocacy groups quest for democratic consolidation. 
The chapter also discussed the reluctance of international donors to fund advocacy 
groups that are perceived to directly challenge governmental authority through protest and 
demonstrations as this creates tension between international donors and the host government 
and thus interfere with international donors’ strategic interests in the host country. This 
behaviour demonstrates that international donors are first and foremost committed to their own 
strategic interests in both Kenya and Zambia and only support particular initiatives when there 
is mutual convergence of goals with advocacy groups. However, it must be noted that advocacy 
groups which are not ready to deploy protests and demonstrations as a strategy to push for the 
institutionalization of democracy in the context of reluctant governments to institutionalize 
democracy such as those of Kenya and Zambia may not effectively contribute to the process of 
democratic consolidation. 
Although the push by international donors for state-advocacy group partnership in the 
policy-making process may improve ownership and effective implementation of public 
policies, in the post-transitional countries of Kenya and Zambia, the partnership between 
advocacy groups and the state has constrained advocacy groups ability to effectively contribute 
to the institutionalization of democracy. State-advocacy group partnership is fraught with many 
challenges. It has slowed down the advocacy sector own processes of re-adjustment to the new 
political environment such as redefining their own agenda, strategies, and relationship with the 
newly democratic states. The structure and process of state-advocacy group partnership have 
also crowded out critical forms of associational life in both countries, where the state 
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unilaterally cherry-pick which organizations to work with and which ones to ignore. The 
insistence of international donors on advocacy groups’ political neutrality or non-partisanship 
has also undermined the very activist orientation of these groups, which is crucial for the 
empowerment of citizens in the process of democratic consolidation. The chapter noted that 
advocacy work is necessarily political as these groups must make choices among policy 
alternatives. Finally, the chapter discussed the relationship between advocacy groups and 
political parties in both Kenya and Zambia. Such relationship has considerably weakened in the 
post-transitional political environment due to the nature of political parties, which is 
characterised by fragmentation, ethnicity, lack of ideological basis, dependence on personalities 
and lack of institutional capacity. Advocacy groups-political party relationship is also 
characterised by suspicion and mutual mistrust emanating from divergent goals and objectives 
of the two groups in the democratic consolidation process. While political parties appeared to 
have short-term goals of capturing state power, advocacy groups have long-term goals of 
democratic consolidation. This situation has discouraged alliance building and collaboration 
between advocacy groups and political parties in the process of democratic consolidation in 
both Kenya and Zambia. The next chapter examines the strategies employed by the democratic 
states in both Kenya and Zambia to control and restrict the activities of advocacy groups in the 
post-transitional political and institutional environment and how such strategies have 
constrained advocacy groups’ ability to effectively contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation. 
REFERENCES 
 
Adejumobi, S (2000) “Elections in Africa: A Fading Shadow of Democracy?” In International 
Political Science Review, 21 (1): 59-73 
 
AfDB/OECD (2008) Zambia, available from www.oecd.org/dev/emea/40578395.pdf, 
Accessed on 09/12/2016 
 
Ajulu, (2001) Democratisation and Conflict in Eastern Africa: Kenya’s Succession Crisis and 
Its Likely Impact on Eastern Africa and the Great Lakes Region, IGD Occasional Paper, no. 
28. 
 
Akapelwa, M (2006). KEPA Civil society paper 2006 Zambia. (Mimeo) 
 
235 
 
Ake, C (1993) “What is the Problem of Ethnicity in Africa?” Transformations, 22 (1993) 
 
Andreason b, Maina W and M, Ngunyi (1996) Promoting Democracy Through Civil Society 
in Kenya, Oslo, Norwegian Human Rights Institution 
Banda, S (2007) “Integrating a Rights-Based Approach (RBA) in Monitoring PRS: Lessons 
from CSPR in Zambia,” MA Thesis, The Hague, ISS 
Banks, N et al. (2015) “NGOs, States, and Donors Revisited: Still Too Close for Comfort,” 
World Development, 66: 707-718 
Barkan, J (1979) “Bringing home the pork: Legislator behavior, rural development and political 
change in East Africa,” In J, Smith and L. Musolf (eds.) Legislatures in Development: Dynamic 
of Change in New and Old States, p. 265-88, Durham, N.C, Duke University Press. 
 
Bartlett, D (2000) “Civil Society and Democracy: A Zambian Case Study” In Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 26 (3): 429-446 
 
Bebbington, A (1997) “The New States, New NGOs? Crisis and Transition among Rural 
Development NGOs in the Andean region,” World Development, 25 (11): 1755-1765 
Bebbington, A et al., (2008) Can NGOs Make a Difference: The Challenge of Development 
Alternatives, London, Zed Books 
 
Branch, D (2011) Kenya: Between Hope and Despair: 1963-2011, Yale University Press, 
New Haven 
 
Brass, J (2010) Surrogates for Government? NGOs and the State in Kenya: A dissertation 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of doctor of philosophy in 
Political Science-University of California, Berkeley 
 
Brass, J (2012b) “Blurring Boundaries: The Integration of NGOs into Governance in Kenya,” 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions, 25 (2): 209-
235 
Bratton, M (1990) “NGOs in Africa: Can they Influence Policy?” Development and Change, 
21 (1): 87-111 
 
Bratton, M (1994) “Civil Society and Political Transition in Africa” In Harbeson et al. (eds) 
Civil Society and the State in Africa, Lynne Rienner, London 
 
Bratton, M and van de Walle (1997) Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in 
Comparative perspectives, Cambridge University Press 
 
Brautigam, D (1996) “State Capacity and Effective Governance” In Ndulu B and van der 
Walle (eds) Agenda for Africa’s Economic Renewal, Washington DC, ODC, p.81-108 
 
236 
 
Brouwers, R (2011) The Power of Civil Society: When “Civics” go “governance” on the Role 
and Relevance of “civic” organizations in the Policy Arena in Sub-Saharan Africa, Hivos 
working Paper Number. 9. 
 
Burnell, P (2001a). ‘The First Two MMD Administrations in Zambia: Millennium Dawn or 
Millennium Sunset? Contemporary Politics, 7 (2): 95-111 
 
Chabal P and Jean-Pascal-Daloz (1999) Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument, 
Indiana University Press 
 
Civil Society Election Coalition (2011) Report on Zambia’s 2011 Tripartite Elections, 
September 2011, CSEC Secretariat, Lusaka, Zambia 
 
Clark (1992) “Democratising Development: NGOs and the State,” Development in Practice, 2 
(3) 
 
Cohen, L, and Roger, G, (eds) (1992) The technology of Pork Barrel, Washington DC, 
Brookings Institution. 
 
Cooke, B. and Kothari, U (2001) Participation: The New tyranny, London, Zed Books 
De Wet, J (2012) Friends, Enemies or Frenemies: Development and Civil Society Organisations 
Relations with the State in a Democratic South Africa, Working Paper No. 370 in Development 
Sociology and Social Anthropology 
 
De, Tocqueville. A (1863/2006) Democracy in America, University of Michigan, USA 
 
Diamond, L (1989) “Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Strategies for 
Democratisation,” Washington Quarterly 12:141-142 
 
Diamond, L (1994) “Towards Democratic Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy, 5 (3): 4-17 
 
Dwyer, P, and Zeilig, L (2012) African Struggles Today: Social Movements since 
Independence, Haymarket Books, Chicago, Illinois 
 
Edwards, M (2013) Civil Society, John Wiley and Sons 
Ekeh, P (1975) “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A theoretical Statement,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 17 (1): 91-112 
 
Ekeh, P (1992) “The Constitution of Civil Society in African History and Politics,” In B. 
Caron et al., eds. Democratic Transition in Africa, CREDU, University of Ibadan, p.83-104 
 
Elemu, D (2010) “Emergence and Development of Governance and Human Rights Civil 
Society in Zambia,” In F. Mutesa ed. State, Civil Society, and Donor Relations in Zambia, 
Lusaka, UNZA Press. 
 
237 
 
Erdmann G and Simutanyi R (2003) Transition in Zambia: The Hybridisation of the Third 
Republic, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 
 
Foweraker J (1990) “Popular Movements and Political Change in Mexico,” In J. Foweraker 
and A. Craig (eds) Popular Movements and Political Change in Mexico, Boulder, Lynn 
Reinner, Colorado. P.3-20 
 
Franda, M (2002) Launching into Cyberspace: Internet Development and Politics in Five 
World Regions, Lynne Rienner, and Boulder. Colorado 
 
Freedom House Reports-Various reports, Available from www.freedomhouse.org [Accessed 
on 13/10/2016] 
 
Freytag A and Pehnelt G (2009) “Debt Relief and Governance Quality in Developing 
Countries,” World Development, 7 (1): 6280 
Friedman, S and Maxine R (1996) “Democratisation or Bureaucratisation? Civil Society, the 
Public Sphere and the State in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” Transformations, 29: 55-73 
 
Gabay, C (2011) Exploring an African Civil Society: Development and Democracy in 
Malawi, 1994-2014, Lexington Books, Boulder 
Gaynor, N (2011) “The Global Development of Project Contested: The Local Politics of 
PRSP Process in Malawi,” Globalisations, 8 (1):17-30 
Gifford, P (2009) Christianity, Politics and Public Life in Kenya, Columbia University Press 
 
Habasonda, L (2010) “State-Civil Society Relations in Zambia: An Assessment of Conflict 
Dynamics, Contestations, and Cooperation in the Political Space,” In F. Mutesa ed. State, 
Civil Society, and Donor Relations in Zambia, Lusaka, UNZA Press. 
 
Hamalengwa, M (1992) Class Struggles in Zambia 1889-1989 and the Fall of Kenneth Kaunda 
1990-1991, University Press of America 
 
Hearn, J (2007) “African NGOs: The New Compradors?” Development and Change, 38 (6): 
1095-1110 
 
Heller, P (2000) “Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lessons from India,” World 
Politics, 52. 
Holmquist, F (2005) “Kenya’s Anti-Politics,” Current History: A Journal of Contemporary 
World Affairs: 212-213 
Hulme, D, and Edwards, E (1997) NGOs, States, and Donors: Too Close for Comfort? 
Basingstoke, Macmillan, London 
 
Human Rights Watch (1993) Divide and Rule: State Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya 
 
238 
 
Hyden, G (2006) African Politics in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 
 
Ihonvbere, J (1996) “The Crisis of Democratic Consolidation in Zambia,” Civilizations, 43, (2): 
83-109 
 
Ihonvbere, J (1997) “Democratisation in Africa,” Peace Review, 9 (3): 371-378 
 
Jalali, R (2013) “Financing Empowerment? How Foreign Aid to Southern NGOs and Social 
Movements Undermine Grassroots Mobilisation,” Sociology Compass, 7 (1): 55-73 
James, W, and D, Caliguire (1996) “Renewing Civil Society,” Journal of Democracy, 7 (1): 
56-66 
 
Joseph, R (1992) “Zambia: A Model for Democratic Change,” Current History, 91 (565): 199-
121 
 
Kanyinga K, et al. (2007) The Non-Profit Sector in Kenya: What we know and what we do not 
Know, IDS, Nairobi-Kenya. 
 
Kanyinga, K (2004) “Democratisation in Kenya” In Samuel Mushi, Rwekaza Mukandala and 
Saida Yahya-Othman (eds) Democracy and Social Transformation in East Africa, Research 
and Education for Democracy in Tanzania, Department of Political and Public Administration, 
University of Dar-es-salaam. 
 
Kanyinga, K (2009) “Contradictions in Neoliberalism: Donors, Human Rights NGOs, and 
Governance in Kenya,” In Makau Mutua. Ed. Human Rights NGOs in East Africa: Political 
and Normative Tensions, University of Pennsylvania Press. P.183-202 
Kanyinga, K (2015) “Evolution of Kenya’s Civil Society,” Opinion, Daily Nation, February 
28, 2015 
Kanyinga, K et al. (2007) “Political Change in Kenya 1991-2002” In Wanyande, P, Omosa, M 
and Chweya, L (eds) Governance and Transition Politics in Kenya, Nairobi, University of 
Nairobi Press 
 
Lanegran (1996) “Civic Associations in Transitional Local Government Structures in South 
Africa: Death of Social Movements,” Critical Sociology, 22 (3):113-134 
 
Lang, S (2013) NGOs, Civil Society, and the Public Sphere, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press 
Larmer, M and A, Fraser (2007) “Of Cabbages and King Cobra: Populist Politics and 
Zambia’s 2006 Elections,” African Affairs, 106 (425): 611-637 
 
Lynch, G (2013) I say to you: Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya, Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press 
 
239 
 
Madlingozi, T (2007) “Post-Apartheid Social Movements and the Quest for the Elusive ‘New’ 
South Africa,” Journal of Law and Society, 34 (1) March 
 
Maitra, S (2006)” The Role of Civil Society in Democratisation: A Case of Zambia” Global 
India Foundation, Available from www.globalindiafoundation.org/Africa.html, [accessed on 
15th October 2015] 
 
Mamdani, M (1990) “State and civil society in Contemporary Africa: Reconceptualizing the 
Birth of State nationalism and Defeat of Popular Movements in Africa,” Africa Development, 
15:3-4 
Matanga, F (2000) Civil Society and Politics in Africa: The Case of Kenya, A Paper presented 
at the Fourth International Conference on ISTR, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland, July 5-8, 2000 
 
Matenga, C (2010) “Civil Society participation in National Policy Processes”, In F. Mutesa 
ed. State, Civil Society and Donor Relations in Zambia, Lusaka, UNZA Press. 
 
Mati, J (2015) “Constraining Political Transformation: The Two Faces of Activist Religious 
Organisations in the Search for a new Constitution in Kenya,” Journal of Civil Society, 11 
(4):348-365 
 
Meredith, M (2005). The State of Africa: A History of the Continent since Independence, 
Simon, and Schuster 
 
Mphaisha, C (2000) “The State of Democratisation in Zambia,” Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics, 38 (3): 131-146 
 
Mudenda, D et al. (2005) “The Budgetary Process and Economic Governance in Zambia: A 
Literature Review,” NEPRU Paper No.104, Windhoek, Namibia 
 
Mudhai, F (2004) “Researching the Impact of ICTs as change catalysts in Africa,” Equid Novi: 
South African Journal for Journalism Research, 25 (2): 313-335 
 
Mumba, M, and Mumba, R (2010). The Status of Civil Society in Zambia: Challenges and 
Future Prospects, CIVICUS-Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Zambia 
 
Murray, W, and Overton, J (2011) “Neoliberalism is Dead, Long Live neoliberalism? Neo-
structuralism and the International Aid Regime of the 2000s,” Program in Development Studies, 
11 (4): 307-319 
Murungi, K (2000) In the Mud of Politics, Acacia, Nairobi 
 
Musonda, A (2015) “Perceptions of Tribalism in Zambia,” Available from 
www.zambiareports.com/2015/06/19/perceptions-of-trbalism-in-zambia/, Accessed on 
16/10/2016 
 
240 
 
Mutua M (2008) Kenya’s Quest for Democracy: Taming Leviathan, Kampala, Fountain 
Publishers 
Mutua, M (ed) (2009) Human Rights NGOs in East Africa: Political and Normative Tensions, 
Pennsylvania University Press 
 
Mutunga, W (1999) Constitutional Making from the Middle: Civil Society and Transition 
Politics in Kenya, 1992-1997, SAREAT and Mwengo, Nairobi 
 
Mzyece, M (2010) Democratisation, State and Civil Society Programme, Zambia Good 
Governance, GTZ, Lusaka 
 
Najam, A (2000) “The Four C’s of the Third Sector-Government Relations: Confrontation, 
Co-optation, Complimentary and Cooperation,” Available from 
www.joseybass.com/JBJournals/tocs/nm110-4art.html [Accessed on 14/10/2014]  
 
Nasongo, S.W (2007) “Political Transition Without Transformation in Africa: The dialectic of 
Liberalisation Without Democratization in Kenya and Zambia,” African Studies Review, 50 
(1):83-207 
NGO Coordination Bureau data 2001-2004, Government of Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya 
 
NGOCC (2012) Gender Equality in Zambia: A Presentation of NGOCC during the Civil 
Society-Patriotic Front Dialogue held on 12-13th April 2012 at the Cresta Golf Hotel, Lusaka, 
Zambia. 
 
Ngunyi, M (1999) “Civil Society and the Challenge of Multiple Transition Cycles in Kenya” 
In Nyangoro, E (ed) Civil Society and Democratic Development in Africa: Perspectives from 
Southern and Eastern Africa, Mwengo Publications, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
 
Ngunyi, M (2001) “Transition without Transformation: Civil Society and the Transitional See-
saw,” SAREAT-Available http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/civsoc/final/Kenya/kens.doc, [Accessed on 
10/20/2015] 
 
Nicolo, M (2006). The Prince, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Company 
 
NORAD Report (2008) Support Models for CSOs at Country Level: Zambia Country Report 
No. 6/2008, Oslo, Norway 
 
Nyangoro, J (1999) “Civil Society, Democratisation and State Building in Kenya and Tanzania” 
In Kidane, M and Daddieh, C (eds) State Building and Democratisation in Africa: Faith, Hope 
and Realities, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut 
 
Nyon’go, P (1992) “Democratisation Processes in Africa,” Review of African Political 
Economy, 54 (92): 92-102 
 
241 
 
Otsieno, N (2006) How the Government is Killing Civil Society in Kenya, Available from 
http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/649.html[Accessed on 24/12/2015] 
 
Owinga, B (2006) Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and Participation: the Kenyan 
Experiences, Available from 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242412035_Poverty_Reduction_Strategy_Paper_an
d_Participation_The_Kenyan_Experience (Accessed on 02/10/2016) 
 
Pierce, J (1997) “Between Co-optation and Irrelevance? Latin American NGOs in the 1990s”, 
In D. Hulme and M. Edwards, eds. NGOs, States, and Donors: Too Close for Comfort, New 
York, St. Martin’s Press, p. 257-274 
 
Posner, D (2003) “The Colonial Origins of Ethnic Cleavages: The Case of Linguistic 
Divisions in Zambia,” Comparative Politics, 35 (2): 127-146 
 
Posner, D (2005) Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press 
 
Rakner, L (2003) Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia. Uppsala: The Nordic Africa 
Institute 
 
Rhodes ed. (2000) Transforming British Government: Changing Roles and Relationships, Vol. 
2, London, Macmillan 
 
Salamon, L et al. (2004) Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Non-Profit Sector, 2, 
Kumarian Press, Bloomfield, Connecticut 
 
Schmitter, P (1997) “Clarifying Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy, 8 (2): 168-174 
 
Seshamani, V (2002). The PRSP Process in Zambia, Economic Commission for Africa, 18-21 
November. 
 
Sharma, A, and Gupta, A (2006) The Anthropology of the State: A Reader, Wiley-Blackwell 
Shivji, G (2003) “Reflections on NGOs in Tanzania: What we Are, what we are Not and 
What We Ought to Be,” Keynote address at the September 2003 Gender Festival, organized 
by Tanzania Gender Networking Group, Dar-es-salaam, Tanzania. 
Shivji, I (2007) Silences in NGOs Discourse: The Role and Future of NGOs in Africa, Oxford, 
Fahamu Books 
 
Simutanyi, N (1996) “The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Zambia,” Third World 
Quarterly, 17 (4): 825-839 
 
Tarrow, S (1994) Power in Movements, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
242 
 
The Post (2004) “Zambia: Mwanawasa Needs to Change attitude towards Civil Society,” 12th 
July 2004 
 
Throup, D and Hornsby, C (1998) Multi-Party Politics in Kenya: The Kenyatta and the Moi 
States and the Triumph of the System in the 1992 Elections, Ohio State University Press. 
Times of Zambia (2010) “SACCORD Loses Appeal,” March 4th, 2010 
 
UNDP (2006) Kenya Development Cooperation Report, 2006, Washington DC 
 
Van Doepp, P (1996) “Political Transition and Civil Society: The Case of Kenya and Zambia,” 
Studies in Comparative International Development, 31, (1): 24-47 
 
Wanyande, P (1999)” Civil Society and Transition Politics in Kenya: Historical and 
Contemporary Perspectives” In Wanyande, P and M. Okebe (eds) Discourses on Civil Society 
in Kenya, African Research and Resource Forum, Nairobi, Kenya 
 
World Bank (2002) Zambia: Country Assessment Report: Upgrading Low-Income Settlements, 
Washington DC 
 
World Bank/ IMF Board Paper (1999) “Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper: Orientation 
Issues,” December 10, 1999, Washington DC 
 
Young, C (1999) “The Third Wave Democratisation in Africa: Ambiguities and 
Contradictions,” In Richard Joseph (ed) State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa, Boulder, 
Lynne Rienner 
 
Young, D (2000) “Alternative Models of Government-Non-Profit Sector Relations: 
Theoretical and International Perspectives,” Non-Profit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 29 
(1):149-172 
 
Zuern, E (2000) “The Changing Roles of Civil Society in African Democratisation Processes,” 
In Solomon, H and Ian Liebenberg (eds) Consolidation of Democracy in Africa, Ashgate, 
Vermont, USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
243 
 
CHAPTER 5 
STATE STRATEGIES TO CONTROL AND RESTRICT ADVOCACY 
GROUPS’ ACTIVITIES IN THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIC 
CONSOLIDATION IN KENYA AND ZAMBIA 
 
“The amount of space allowed to NGOs in any given country is determined first and foremost 
by political considerations, rather than by any calculation of the contribution of NGOs to 
economic and social development” (Bratton 1989, p. 572-6) 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The African authoritarian state dominated much of public life in the first three decades 
of the post-colonial period. The state led the development process and heavily regulated the 
existence and activities of non-state actors, thereby, continually shrinking the political space 
(Kasfir, 1976). The post-colonial state was, therefore, a predator state bent on the destruction 
of civil society (Fatton 1992) through the reliance on several strategies, including NGO 
legislation, administrative co-optation, political appropriation, and extra-legal mechanisms 
such as intimidation, threats of deregistration, deregistration and political propaganda. It 
perceived civil society as a threat to its legitimacy, policies, security, and territorial hegemony. 
The state’s attitude towards advocacy groups was, thus, characterized by suspicion and mistrust 
and this influenced the types of laws and regulations, it crafted to restrict the activities and 
operations of these groups. Most of these laws and regulations were presented under the guise 
of facilitating the proper functioning of advocacy groups, while in actual sense they were meant 
to restrict advocacy groups’ entry into the civic arena, operations, and self-regulation and to 
extend political patronage and clientelism across the country. 
The political transitions in the early 1990s in both Kenya and Zambia dramatically 
changed the political landscape and redefined the relationship between the state and society. It 
was considered the “new dawn” in Africa. For the first time in most countries, citizens gained 
the right and freedom to elect their own governments through relatively free and fair regular 
elections. The newly democratic states also implemented several administrative and 
constitutional reforms, which improved governance and opened the political space for the 
activities of advocacy groups and other non-state actors. It was, therefore, expected that the new 
“democratic” states would continue with this trajectory of reforms to deepen democracy and 
development in the continent. 
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However, there has been a continuation of authoritarian tendencies and mindset within 
the democratic settings in the continent, whereby the newly democratic states have deliberately 
replicated the same strategies that were used by their authoritarian predecessors to curtail the 
activities of advocacy groups, leading to the closing of the civic space and the dismantling of 
the influence of independent civil society groups to consolidate state power and undermine the 
process of democratic consolidation. This chapter is devoted to the examination and analysis of 
the primary strategies employed by the newly democratic states in both Kenya and Zambia to 
control and restrict the activities of advocacy groups in the new political and institutional 
environment. It employs a modified version of Fowler’s (1991) framework of African 
authoritarian states to control and restrict the activities of civil society organizations as outlined 
and explained in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. The chapter examines the various strategies 
employed by the newly democratic states in both countries to control the activities of these 
groups including direct and quasi-co-optation, the use of NGO legislation, political 
appropriation, selective harassment, and political propaganda.  
Following this introduction, section two examines the use of direct and quasi co-
optation and NGO legislation as strategies to control the activities of advocacy groups, while 
section three uses the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and the Zambia 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) as case studies to analyse the process of political 
appropriation and advocacy groups in the post-transitional political and institutional 
dispensation. Section four examines the use of selective harassment and political propaganda, 
which has disproportionately targeted advocacy groups since the newly democratic regimes 
perceive them to be critical of state policies and challenge their legitimacy, autonomy, and 
territorial hegemony. Moreover, most of their actions are targeted towards the state to reform 
its nature and relationship with society through the democratization process. Finally, section 
five is a reflection on the implications of the various state strategies on the ability of advocacy 
groups’ to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in both countries. 
A summary of the chapter then follows.  
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5.2. Direct and Quasi-co-optation of Advocacy Groups’ Leaders in Kenya and 
Zambia 
 
The domination of the non-state actors by the African post-colonial state through 
administrative co-optation was justified because it, “ensures that NGOs priorities and 
endeavours conform to national development priorities” (Fowler 1991, p. 91). Although the 
alignment of civil society groups’ priorities with those of the state is not in itself a violation of 
the rights of these groups, the post-colonial state not only sought to align civil society 
organisations’ activities with the state’s development priorities, but  also to curtail their 
activities since they considered almost all activities of advocacy groups to be subversive. 
However, with the establishment of the new democratic regimes in the early 1990s through 
democratic transitions in both Kenya and Zambia, it was expected that these regimes would 
recognize and respect the activities of advocacy groups as part of the democratic governance 
and to support the process of democratic consolidation. Surprisingly, the regimes have not only 
continued with the use administrative co-optation to control and restrict the activities of 
advocacy groups but also expanded the scope and forms of co-optation in the new democratic 
setting in the post-authoritarian political environment. This new framework of co-optation is 
the focus of this section. 
In Kenya, administrative co-optation has always been part of development 
administration since independence as a strategy for regulating and aligning the activities of civil 
society organisations with national development priorities. However, in the second half of 
President Moi’s 24-year reign, after the attempted coup of 1982, the strategy was transformed 
into a tool for curtailing the activities of civil society groups as the administration continued to 
lose legitimacy and support and felt much more threatened by the activities of these groups. 
The administration demanded and established into law the requirement that advocacy groups’ 
development priorities be strictly aligned with those of the state. It became a crucial part of the 
regime’s “ideology of order” (Odhiambo, 1987, p. 91), i.e., the notion that political order was 
critical for the effective functioning of the state.  It was an ideology of domination of society 
by the authoritarian state. The political transition in 1991 did not alter this practice as the 
incumbent regime retained power and state-society relations relatively remained unaffected. 
The regime also resisted any attempts at fundamental constitutional and institutional reforms 
that would have significantly changed the nature of the state and the governance process.  
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However, in 2002, the country witnessed the first peaceful regime change through free 
and fair multi-party elections since independence. The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) 
defeated the Kenya African National Union (KANU). The political and institutional 
environment dramatically changed and with it came a new framework of co-optation of 
advocacy groups, which was much more expansive and directly targeted at advocacy groups’ 
leadership. This new focus involved direct and quasi-co-optation of advocacy groups’ 
leadership into state bureaucracy, including state commissions and task forces, which were 
established to investigate various issues such as corruption in the previous regime. The first 
wave of direct and quasi-co-optation of advocacy groups’ leadership occurred between 2003 
and 2007 and involved direct co-optations, that is the appointments of advocacy groups’ 
leadership into state bureaucracy and quasi-co-optation which means the appointment of 
advocacy group leaders into various state commissions and task forces, while still serving as 
legitimate leaders of these groups, therefore, holding both positions simultaneously. The 
practice has been described as advocacy group leaders “wearing two hats,” meaning serving 
both in government and civil society.  
The second wave of direct and quasi-co-optation of advocacy group leadership in Kenya 
occurred after the promulgation of the new constitution on the 28th August 2010 under the 
Grand Coalition government. This wave was much larger than the first wave and involved 
filling in hundreds of positions in the constitutional offices and independent constitutional 
commissions established under the new constitution. It marked the peak of these new forms of 
co-optation in the country with the new constitution establishing more than twenty independent 
commissions comprising of about 150 commissioners. These commissions were mandated with 
the task of policy oversight for various governance issues and included the Kenya National 
Human Rights Commission (KNHRC), the National Land Commission (NLC), Commission 
on the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC), Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission (IEBC), the National Police Service Commission (NPSC), Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission (TJRC), the National Gender Commission (NGC) and the National 
Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) among others. 
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Although the appointments of advocacy groups’ leaders into government bureaucracy 
are not unusual as civil society is considered a training ground for the development of a new 
cadre of state leadership and political society (Diamond, 1994), these waves were unusual in 
terms of the numbers of advocacy group leaders appointed in these positions. The study, 
therefore, investigated the motivations behind the involvement of both the state and civil society 
leadership into the process of direct and quasi-co-optation during this time. There were several 
competing explanations for these waves of direct and quasi co-optation from respondents 
interviewed for this study. The first group of respondents associated both processes to the close 
relationship that civil society had developed with the leaders of the National Rainbow Coalition 
(NARC) for a long time while in the opposition. Moreover, most of the rank and file leaders of 
NARC, including the President came from civil society (Kenya: Author interviews, 2: 2012; 
4:2012; 10: 2012; 12:2012; 17:2012, 18:2012). Additionally, advocacy groups played a 
significant role during the negotiations for the formation of the coalition, which brought 
together the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). 
The groups went ahead to campaign for the coalition in the 2002 general elections. Advocacy 
groups and NARC became natural allies, and it was apparent that NARC would look to civil 
society for experienced leadership and skills to bring into its bureaucracy and the governance 
system. The state, therefore, viewed civil society as a “talent pool” from which to source 
leadership, technical knowledge, skills, and experience.  
The second group of respondents interviewed for this study held the view that the ‘raid’ 
on advocacy groups’ leadership was a deliberate attempt by the NARC administration to 
weaken civil society in order to consolidate state power (Kenya: Author interviews, 9:2012, 
12:2012, 14:2012, 19:2012). To underscore this view, the Executive Director of the National 
Youth Agenda-one of the prominent advocacy groups in the country noted that; 
“The government strategized to ensure that civil society was crippled when NARC 
took over power and the donor community aided this move by shifting their support 
for democracy and governance funding from civil society to the government”85 
 
                                                             
 
85 Ngetich, J (2013) “The Return of a Vibrant Civil Society in Kenya”, East African Standard, Sunday, June 16, 
2013 
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The third group of respondents considered direct and quasi-co-optation of advocacy 
group leaders into state bureaucracy as a deliberate attempt by the NARC administration to cast 
itself as a reformist government, mainly to please and attract international donor funding and 
for public relations purposes (Kenya: Author interviews, 2012; 12: 2012; and 13: 2012). The 
strategy seemed to have worked as there were increased donor inflows into government to 
support development projects, social sectors and state commissions (UNDP, 2006). Other 
respondents interviewed for this study cited personal reasons, lack of conviction and 
commitment by advocacy leaders to democratic ideals and pure ambitions to access state power 
as motivations for both direct and quasi-co-optation. It must also be noted that some of the 
leaders were driven by considerations of economic livelihoods. The latter argument is premised 
on the fact that government positions in Kenya at the level of presidential appointments are 
more lucrative with generous packages and allowances compared to advocacy group leadership 
positions, which are temporary and dependent on unpredictable international donor funding 
environment. The following two quotations from the interviews underscore this point;  
“At the end of the day, activism does not put food on the table, and the movement of advocacy 
group leaders into government was a real ‘gold-rush’ mainly to access state power and 
resources” (Kenya: Author interview: 4:2012).  
 
“Co-optation easily occurred because there was a lack of commitment and conviction on the 
part of advocacy leaders to the ideals that they once purported to champion while in civil society. 
Joining the administration was an opportunity to access and enjoy state power and all the 
trappings that come with it.” (Kenya: Author interview, 18:2012). 
 
Further, some respondents interviewed for this study noted that some advocacy group 
leaders, joined the government with the genuine belief that they were capable of bringing 
political and administrative changes from within the government to support the process of 
democratic consolidation (Kenya: Author interviews, 5:2012; 11:2012; 12:2012; 18:2012). This 
view was tied to the fact that the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) had campaigned on a 
platform of political and economic reforms and, promised the promulgation of a new 
constitution within 100 days in office. Most citizens, therefore, believed that the administration 
was committed to social and political change. The very early years of the NARC administration 
gave this view, some credence as the government introduced free primary education, 
established the National Anti-Corruption Steering Committee, introduced the Constituency 
Development Fund (CDF) and undertook massive road construction all over the country. 
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 However, Kanyinga and Okello (2010) have presented a different but compelling 
perspective in explaining the massive direct and quasi co-optation of advocacy group leadership 
witnessed in the country after the regime change in 2002. They argue that the 24 years of the 
one-party system of President Moi was extraordinarily exclusive and alienated a large part of 
the intellectual middle class which eventually found themselves in civil society, both as a space 
to articulate their views on governance but also for economic livelihood. This group, they 
contend was the power behind the vibrant civil society that pushed for political pluralism in the 
early 1990s. With the regime change, most members of this group moved into mainstream 
politics, through being elected into parliament, while others joined the state bureaucracy 
through political appointments. According to this view, therefore, direct and quasi-co-optation 
of advocacy group leadership into government was a result of a broader process of elite re-
alignment than a deliberate government strategy.  
From 2004 the NARC dream started to fizzle out over internal disagreements between 
the coalition partners on the power-sharing Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and the 
constitutional review process. The failed referendum on the Draft Constitution in 2005 marked 
the end of the Grand coalition government when the President lost the referendum to LDP wing 
of the coalition. He immediately disbanded the cabinet, dismissed the coalition partners and 
formed the Government of National Unity (GNU), which included ministers from the Kenya 
African National Union (KANU) and some smaller political parties in parliament like the Ford-
People (Ford-P). The focus of the new administration dramatically changed from economic 
development and constitutional reforms to political survival. Politics of cronyism, patron-client 
relationships, the resurgence of grand corruption, widespread allegations of tribalism in 
government appointments and increased harassment of the media and civil society 
characterized this period. The state reverted to operating like an authoritarian one-party system 
within a democratic setting, and most of the democratic gains from 2002 were lost. Several 
ministers also resigned over allegations of corruptions. 
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The second question that was crucial for this study was the process of co-optation. Most 
respondents interviewed for this study revealed that advocacy group leaders actively lobbied 
for government positions through their networks, cronies, and contacts within the government. 
(Kenya: Author interviews, 2:2012; 4: 2012; 10: 2012; 12:2012, 17: 2012, 18: 2012).86 A 
particularly interesting take on this issue was noted by the executive director of the Centre for 
Governance and Development, who noted that; 
“Co-optation is not just a government strategy to control the activities of advocacy groups; it is 
a very attractive prospect for advocacy groups’ leadership, which in this case actively lobbied 
for government positions in the bureaucracy, judiciary, and state commissions” (Kenya: 
Author interview, 14:2012) 
 
The lobbying process for government positions by advocacy group leaders created anxiety and 
tension within the sector and almost paralyzed advocacy group activities meant to support the 
process of democratic consolidation. It distracted advocacy groups from their core mandate of 
holding government accountable and strengthening democratic institutions. One Advocacy 
group leader interviewed for this study captured this situation when she stated that;  
“Lobbying for state appointments by advocacy group leaders created a state of anxiety and 
paralysis within advocacy sub-sector of civil society. It distracted all of us from our work, and 
those who still expected to be appointed by the government retreated from criticizing the 
government. They were government officials in waiting” (Kenya: Author interview, 14: 2012). 
 
Further explaining this process of state co-optation of advocacy group leadership into state 
bureaucracy, one advocacy group leader interviewed for this study noted that,  
“These appointments were not random. They revolved around a very a small clique and 
exclusive network of well-connected urban-based elite advocacy group leaders, who have built 
strong relationships with both the state and the international donors, through a close-knit web 
of cronyism, consultancy, friendship, and ethnicity. This is the group which connected the state 
and advocacy group leadership appointments into the government” (Author interview, 2: 2012) 
 
This club of elite advocacy group leaders straddles civil society, government, and international 
donor community through power and influence. One advocacy group leader interviewed for 
this study described this exclusive group as being “above associational life in Kenya” (Kenya: 
Author interview, 1:2012).  
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The group significantly influence civil society discourses, activities, focus, and more 
importantly, the relations with both the international donors and the state. Additional factors 
cited by respondents as having influenced state appointments of advocacy group leaders into 
government bureaucracy included tribalism and political party affiliation (Kenya: Author 
interviews, 2: 2012; 9: 2012; 14:2012).  Both wings of the coalition government were keen on 
bringing on board into the government advocacy group leaders who were affiliated to their 
parties. The study found that the performance of co-opted advocacy group leadership had not 
improved the process of democratic consolidation. From the interviews with several 
respondents, this study categorised advocacy group leaders, who were co-opted into state 
bureaucracy from 2003 to 2012 into three broad groups which included the idealists, the 
moderates, and the conformists. These groups were categorised based on observed and reported 
behaviour, actions and performance of these leaders while in government, regarding the 
constitutional and institutional reforms, which support efficient service delivery and democratic 
consolidation.  
The idealists were fewer compared to the other two groups and were mainly appointed 
due to their record of integrity and performance, while in civil society.87 This group of leaders 
consistently maintained the spirit of political reform and democratic consolidation within the 
government. They performed quite well while in government and implemented critical reforms 
within their dockets. However, they resigned from office barely two years after their 
appointments, citing frustrations with the reform agenda from the administration. Several 
respondents interviewed for this study described this group as being “naïve”88into believing 
that the NARC administration, which was dominated by former KANU leaders, including the 
President himself was fully committed to the institutionalisation of democracy and that they 
could easily transform government from within and foster democratic consolidation in the 
country (Kenya: Author interviews, 1: 2012; 2: 2012; 13: 2012; 14: 2012). However, it is 
essential to understand that the transformation of the state is a broader systemic process that 
requires the full commitment of both the political and the bureaucratic government leadership. 
                                                             
 
87 This group included the former Permanent Secretary for Governance in the Office of President Mwai Kibaki 
(2003-2005) and the former director of Kenya Ant-Corruption Commission (2010-2011) 
88 Although John Githongo, the former Ethics and Governance Permanent Secretary in the Kibaki administration 
admonishes this term (Wrong, 2010) 
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 The second group of co-opted advocacy group leaders took a middle ground approach 
to reforms, while in government. They were less aggressive and less vocal in public but were 
determined in implementing critical reforms within their dockets. They seem to have learned 
the bureaucratic culture and procedures very quickly and found effective and innovative ways 
of implementing incremental changes and reforms for better service delivery to the citizens. 
This group of leaders performed fairly-well during their time in office. One respondent 
interviewed for this study described this group as “Walking a very tight rope within a government 
dominated by anti-reformists” (Kenya: Author interview, 6: 2012).89 This group managed to survive the 
entire five years of the NARC administration. 
The third and largest group of advocacy leaders co-opted into government was 
composed of the conformists.90 This was the most prominent group in terms of its visibility and 
voice within the public sphere. Members of this group were “spontaneously socialised or 
deliberately absorbed into the ethos and practices of the state”91 (Chweya, 2004). The group 
easily abandoned the ideals, values, and principles of democratic reform that they once 
championed, while in civil society and which conflicted with their immediate political interests. 
They became the staunchest defenders of the status quo and radically transformed themselves 
within a short period from defenders of human rights and democracy to defenders of the status 
quo and the excesses of the state. This group represented the total repudiation of everything 
they once stood for while in civil society. Their behaviour led to fundamental questions about 
the commitment and conviction of advocacy group leaders to the causes and values they claim 
to represent while in civil society. Most respondents interviewed for this study viewed this 
group of leaders as opportunistic political actors, who used the civil society platform to position 
themselves to access state power and resources. Respondents for this study were unanimous 
that the conformists, not only performed the worst regarding the push for democratic 
consolidation but also became the greatest stumbling block to political and economic reforms 
that were critical for the realization of democratic consolidation 
                                                             
 
89 This group included the Chief Justice, Dr. Willy Mutunga, the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs, Dr. Gichira Kibara and the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs and 
National Heritage Dr. Ludeki Chweya. 
90 This group included Prof. Kivutha Kibwana, the late Mirugi Kariuki, Paul Muite, Kiraitu Murungi, Cecil 
Mbarire, Gibson Kamau Kuria, Mukhiya Kituyi and Koigi Wa Wamwere among others 
91 It is interesting to note that Prof. Ludeki Chweya would later be appointed the Permanent Secretary in the 
Ministry of Culture and Social Services. 
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 The conformists appeared to consider the opportunity to be in government as one of 
self-aggrandizement by any means necessary and readily joined the state’s gravy-train. They 
gained huge political rewards in exchange for their loyalty and defense of the status quo. 
Additionally, their remuneration was extremely lucrative, for instance, a state commissioner 
earned $8,630 per month plus all other benefits that included a car, a house, and transport 
allowance among other perks92 in a country, with a minimum wage of $98 per month in 2013.93 
They were essentially “trapped into the logic of eating and seemed to view their time in 
government as their time to eat”94 (Kenya: Author interview, 1:2012). This logic of eating is 
documented in detail by Michela Wrong (2010) in her aptly titled book “It is Our Time to Eat.” 
Several respondents also pointed out that such anti-reformist behaviour and actions of this 
group tainted the image, credibility, legitimacy of civil society with the public, created a sense 
of disappointment and circumscribed advocacy groups’ capacity for popular mobilisation for 
crucial reforms that were supportive of the process of democratic consolidation (Kenya: Author 
interviews 1: 2012; 2: 2012; 8: 212; 9:2012; 13:2012; 14: 2012). A commentator with the 
national newspaper noted that: 
“Then, we knew we had a dictator as president and found ways to survive in a hostile, autocratic 
environment. Today our so-called liberators have proved to be no better than wolves in sheep’s 
clothing. Our sense of betrayal today is far greater than it was even three years ago, because 
everyone we thought was on our side was actually looking out for himself and herself” (Warah 
2004:14)95 
 
Overall, the performance and impact of co-opted advocacy group leaders on democratic 
deepening were dismal as the majority easily transformed into conformists and anti-reformers 
in exchange for access to government resources and political payoffs. The conformists 
supported the “Wako draft Constitution” during the 2005 referendum, a document that had 
centralised power in the presidency and the executive-a position that they strongly opposed, 
while in civil society leading to questions about their commitment to the process of democratic 
transformation in the country and painting civil society leaders as turncoats and untrustworthy. 
                                                             
 
92 Abdullahi, A (2013) ‘Make Commissioner’s job Part-time to Cut on the Wage Bill, Daily Nation, Opinion piece, 
April 20th, 2013 
93 http://www.braeburn.com/attachments/article/182/Wages%20%20Guide%202013.pdf 
94 See Michela Wrong (2010) “It’s Our Time to Eat”, Fourth Estate, London 
95 Warah, R (2004) “Ngugi in Exile: Home is Where the Art is,” The EastAfrican, 30 Aug-5th Sept. 2004 
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However, one could argue that the co-opted advocacy group leaders, including the 
conformists, joined the government as individuals and did not, therefore, form a critical mass 
within the administration to effectively ensure significant democratic reforms. Further, Bratton 
and Van de Walle (1997) have argued that co-opted advocacy group leaders were constrained 
by governmental norms of collective responsibility. Nevertheless, their strategic choices, 
actions, public pronouncements, and behaviour have been counter-productive to the process of 
democratic consolidation in the country. The study also found that state commissions which are 
dominated by former advocacy group leaders have taken over much of the work that was 
previously done by civil society groups and in the process crowded out and undermined the 
contribution of advocacy groups to the process of democratic consolidation. Additionally, the 
state commissions through their mandates and strategies, which are very similar to those used 
by advocacy groups have captured civic spaces traditionally inhabited by advocacy groups and, 
therefore, contributed to the closing civic space in the post-transitional political and institutional 
dispensation in both countries. 
In Zambia, direct and quasi-co-optation as state strategies to control and restrict the 
activities of advocacy groups were not as popular as they were in the case of Kenya. This is 
surprising since most advocacy groups supported the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy 
(MMD), which went on to win the first multi-party general elections in 1991. However, Bartlett 
(2000) argues that MMD was a class compromise between business and labour after it came to 
power and, therefore, excluded the progressives and the intellectuals, who were the forces 
behind civil society in the prodemocracy movement. Further, the Chiluba administration 
strategically embraced the business community in order to implement the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) and, therefore, deliberately marginalised advocacy groups, which were 
opposed to these economic policies (Rakner, 2003). Most respondents interviewed for this study 
were unanimous that the Chiluba administration sidelined advocacy groups due to its adoption 
and implementation of SAPs for economic recovery. Advocacy groups had long opposed SAPs 
arguing that the policies were detrimental to the country, especially the poor and the 
marginalized sections of the population (Zambia: Author interviews, 28:2012; 30:2012; 
35:2012).   
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Other respondents interviewed for this study cited lack of commitment to political 
reforms and the authoritarian tendencies of the Chiluba administration, as factors which pushed 
advocacy groups’ leadership away from the administration (Zambia: Author interviews 26: 
2012, 27: 2012, 32:2012). The goals, objectives and strategic interests of advocacy groups and 
the MMD administration, were, therefore, too far apart for the use of direct or quasi co-optation 
as happened in Kenya. To emphasise this point, Bartlett (2000) argues that in the case of 
Zambia, old political logics did not disappear with the replacement of the authoritarian regime 
in 1991. The Chiluba administration reproduced authoritarian tendencies under the new 
political dispensation, which ensured the continuation of the confrontational relationship 
between advocacy groups and the state. This type of relationship continued during both the 
Mwanawasa (2002-2008) and the Banda administrations (2008-2011). Despite President 
Mwanawasa’s bold move to fight corruption, his economic and political policies were 
significantly similar to those of President Chiluba. Additionally, President Mwanawasa’s 
attitude and approach towards advocacy groups were that of suspicion and mistrust. In the early 
days of his presidency, he criticized civil society organisations for their reluctance to be co-
opted by his administration to help drive the constitutional review process (Burnell 2001a).  
The Banda administration, which came to power in 2008 after the sudden death of 
President Mwanawasa the same year is considered the most confrontational administration with 
advocacy groups in the post-transitional period in Zambia. It was, therefore, unlikely that it 
would contemplate using direct or quasi co-optation as a strategy to control the activities of 
advocacy groups. Several respondents interviewed for this study, noted that having failed to 
develop a positive and constructive relationship with advocacy groups, the Banda 
administration turned to restrictive and oppressive legislation through the NGO Act of 2009 
and the Public Order Act to silence any group perceived to be critical of its policies and actions 
(Zambia: Author interviews, 26: 2012; 32: 2012; 34: 2012).  Overall, the relationship between 
advocacy groups and the state during the twenty-year reign of all the MMD administrations 
was characterised by suspicion, antagonism, mistrust, and conflict, making both the strategy of 
direct and quasi-co-optation extremely difficult to use. 
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 Several respondents noted that the continued antagonistic relationship between 
advocacy groups and the MMD administrations consequently drove most advocacy groups into 
supporting the opposition party, the Patriotic Front, which won the 2011 multi-party general 
elections with Michael Sata as its candidate (Zambia: Author interviews, 30: 2012, 38: 2012, 
39: 2012). At the beginning of the Patriotic Front administration, the relationship between 
advocacy groups and the state appeared positive, with the administration promising to review 
the NGO Act of 2009 and to jumpstart the Constitutional Review process. The Sata 
administration directly co-opted several advocacy group leaders into its central bureaucracy and 
other levels of government, while other advocacy group leaders joined the administration 
through parliament. The administration co-opted two members of the Independent Newspaper, 
The Post, an independent newspaper which was considered an anti-MMD (Zambia: Author 
interviews 26: 2012; 28: 2012; 32: 2012).  
 President Sata appointed several advocacy group leaders to the technical committee of 
the Constitutional Review Commission on the 16th of November 2011. Out of an 18-Member 
Technical Committee for the constitutional review process, at least seven members were from 
civil society (Zambia: Author interviews 26: 2012; 26: 2012; 29: 2012).96The administration 
also directly co-opted a significant number of key staff of the Radio Phoenix to the Lusaka City 
Council with serious implications of the station’s independence. Radio Phoenix, an independent 
radio station, which has played a significant role in Zambia’s democratisation process since the 
1990s and presented a critical platform for the Patriotic Front (PF) as an opposition political 
party in the run-up to the 2011 general elections.  Several respondents interviewed for this study 
noted that the potential effect of loyalty to the new administration was not as extreme as was 
expected due to the difficulty of a radio station committed to listener participation being 
partisan. The Lusaka City Council sponsored radio phoenix flagship show “Let’s Be 
Responsible” which was initially meant to encourage citizens to follow the rule of law, but 
became a popular political show with call-ins from all over the country and was eventually 
stopped by the administration (Zambia: Author interviews, 28: 2012; 29: 2012; 32: 2012) 
                                                             
 
96 These included Mr. Reuben Lifuka from Transparency International-Zambia, Mr. Simon Kabanda from Citizens 
Forum, Mr. Pualman Chungu from the Law Association of Zambia and Reverend Suzanne Mutale from the 
Council of Churches of Zambia among others  
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5.3. NGO Legislation and the “shrinking civic space” for Advocacy groups in 
Kenya and Zambia 
  In the mid-1990s, Salamon (1994) had observed that the world was experiencing an 
“associational revolution,” which meant an accelerated growth and expansion of civil society.  
This revolution was driven by several factors, including, the deleterious effects of the Structural 
Adjustment Program (SAPs) which had forced international donors to fund civil society groups 
to engage in service delivery, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the spread of neoliberal ideas 
around the world as explained in detail in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. The emergence of pro-
democracy movements in developing countries from the late 1980s to the early 1990s was also 
attributed to these changes. However, two decades later, Rutzen (2015) has observed a reverse 
trend of a shrinking civil society around the world, beginning with the war on terror after the 
9/11 attack in the United States. During this time, civil society groups were associated with 
terrorism97and governments around the world increasingly passed restrictive legislations, which 
curtailed civil society growth and expansion. Moreover, international donor funding, which had 
sustained civil society growth in the 1990s, considerably declined as international donors 
shifted funding to support the institutionalisation of democracy in the newly democratic regimes 
in the Developing World.  
Additionally, international donors were also developing frameworks to ensure foreign 
aid effectiveness, to include “alignment of foreign aid with partner countries’ priorities.” This 
process gave the state a leading role in the use and implementation of development aid, which 
it used as a basis to control the activities of advocacy groups. All these factors combined led to 
a new trend of “global associational counter-revolution” (Rutzen, 2015, p. 29) resulting in the 
contraction of the civic space and the assault on civil society around the world. According to 
the International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) data, between 2004 and 2010 more than 
fifty countries considered or enacted measures restricting civil society activities based on 
concerns with terrorism, foreign interference in internal political affairs, transparency, 
accountability, and aid effectiveness.  
                                                             
 
97 George W. Bush, “President Freezes Terrorists’ Assets,” Remarks on Executive Order, U.S Department of State 
Archive, 24 September 2001. 
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Although the constriction of the civic space is being experienced worldwide, it is more 
profound in the Sub-Saharan African countries, where ICNL data shows that 26 countries had 
considered or enacted such laws between 2004 and 2010. According to the CIVICUS monitor, 
in 2017, 43 African countries were categorised as closed, repressed and obstructed with only 
one country categorised as open as shown in Figure 5.1 below. There is thus a growing and 
dangerous trend in the continent of governments increasingly exerting more legislative 
restrictions, cracking down on civil society groups and independent media and broadening the 
powers and reach of security services and in the process shrinking the civic space. This process 
is impeding citizens and civil society groups from exercising their fundamental human rights 
such as freedom of expression, assembly, association, peaceful demonstrations and holding 
governments accountable and thus contributing to the process of democratic consolidation. 
Figure 5. 1 The State of Civic Space in Africa (2017) 
 
Source: CIVICUS: State of Civil Society Report, 2017 
The civic space research explains the categorizations as follows; 
Closed: There is complete closure in law and practice of civic space 
Repressed: The civic space is significantly constrained. Active individuals and civil society 
members, who criticize power holders risk surveillance, harassment, intimidation, 
imprisonment, injury, and death 
Obstructed: The civic space is heavily contested by power holders, who impose a combination 
of legal and practical constraints on the full enjoyment of fundamental rights 
Narrowed: The state allows individuals and civil society groups to exercise their right to 
freedom of association, peaceful assembly, and expression but a violation of these rights also 
take place 
Open: The state enables and safeguards the enjoyment of civic space for all people. 
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 In the 2017 CIVICUS data, both Kenya and Zambia were categorised as obstructed in 
the report with “framework legislations” which are meant to restrict the operations of civil 
society organisations. In both countries, the restriction of civil society groups was additionally 
motivated by a deep sense of suspicion of these groups’ rising influence, their challenge to the 
state’s legitimacy and the rapid growth and politicisation of the sector in the new political and 
institutional environment. In Kenya, the Moi administration had a very turbulent and 
confrontational relationship with civil society groups with the state employing various 
strategies to restrict the activities of civil society groups after the 1982 attempted coup. The 
government became a de jure and a de facto one-party state and outlawed several welfare 
associations, which were ethnically based through parliamentary legislation on the basis that 
this action would reduce the power of ethno-regional interests and improve national unity and 
cohesion (Matanga 2000, p. 25; Barkan, 1992). The outlawed groups included the Akamba 
Union, the Abaluhya Union, the Luo Union and the Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association (GEMA). 
Also, the administration deregistered the University of Nairobi Staff Union, the Student 
Organisation of Nairobi University (SONU), the Matatu Vehicle Owners Association (MVOA) 
and the Public Service Club (Ndegwa 1996, p. 27). All these groups were perceived to be anti-
government and some of the harshest critics of the Moi regime (Matanga 2000, p. 12). 
The confrontational relationship between the Moi administration and civil society 
groups reached its peak in the early 1990s, when a constellation of civil society groups, 
including, the women’s movement, professional associations, youth organizations, the media, 
and the clergy from the mainline churches began to call for the restoration of democracy and 
pluralism in the country.  The response from the Moi administration included the introduction 
of one of the most intrusive NGO legislation in the history of civil society in Kenya, the NGO 
Coordination Act of 1990 to regulate the activities of civil society groups. The NGO Act 
established the NGO Coordination Board-a government-controlled board, whose functions 
include; monitoring the registration and activities of NGOs in the country,98coordination and 
facilitation of the work of all national and international NGOs operating in the country; the 
maintenance of a register of national and international NGOs operating in Kenya, with their 
precise sectors, affiliations and locations of their activities and the evaluation of the annual 
                                                             
 
98 See the NGO Co-ordination Board Brochure (1990) 
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reports of NGOs. Additional functions of the board included the provision of policy guidelines 
for NGOs, for harmonizing their activities with the National Development Plans for the country 
and the approval of the code of conduct prepared by the NGO Council for self-regulation of 
NGOs and their activities among others (Matanga, 2000). The second body established by the 
NGO Coordination Act was the NGO Council, which was to empower NGOs to make the sector 
more democratic, efficient and socially aware of the provision of services to the public and to 
provide leadership in the creation of an enabling environment for the development and relief 
activities (National Council of NGOs, 1994, p. 1). To achieve these objectives, the Council 
defined its functions to include the provision of information and coordination around specific 
legal requirements arising from the NGO Act; establishing effective dialogue between NGOs 
and the Government, providing support on fundraising issues and establishing a base for local 
funding; and generally acting as the spokesperson for the NGO community (National Council 
of NGOs, 1994, p. 9).  
Civil society actors condemned the NGO Coordination Act of 1990 for being too 
intrusive on the activities of NGOs and primarily meant to tightly control rather than facilitate 
the work of civil society groups in the country. Ndegwa’s (1993) summarised the concerns of 
the NGOs thus; the Act bestowed enormous powers in the Minister in-charge of NGO affairs 
in matters relating to registration and general operations, demanded that NGOs renew their 
registration every five years, a matter that would negatively affect NGO stability in terms of 
planning and resource mobilisation, recommended that an NGO be suspended or deregistered 
for actions of its officers, the Act was unclear on the relations between the Board and the 
Council, the Act remained unclear on the previous privileges such as tax exemptions that had 
been enjoyed by the NGOs and that the Act was vague on the status of some organisations, such 
as churches and self-help groups among others. After a series of meetings, lobbying, and intense 
negotiations, the government eventually bowed to pressure and agreed to amend certain crucial 
sections of the Act. The government also waived the NGO Board powers to suspend civil 
society organisations, but the deregistration powers remained. The amendments granted civil 
society organisations the right to challenge the Board’s decisions in a court of law and increased 
membership of NGO representation on the Board from 5 to 7 which represented one-third of 
the maximum members including senior government officials (Ndegwa, 1993).  
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Over the years, the government used the NGO board and the vague grounds provided 
in the Act to deny registration and to deregister several NGOs which it perceived to be critical 
of its policies and actions. It also used the Act to intimidate NGOs with threats of deregistration 
as a way of controlling their activities. For example, on February 20th, 1995, the Centre for Law 
and Research International was deregistered by the NGO Board for allegedly publishing 
materials that “damaged” the credibility of the government.99 After the first democratic regime 
change in 2002, the use of NGO legislation to control the activities of civil society groups 
considerably reduced. Both the NARC (2002-2007) and the Grand Coalition governments 
(2008-2012) had a somewhat collaborative relationship with civil society organisations as these 
groups had closely worked with the leaders from both administrations for a very long period in 
the opposition. Equally important was the fact that civil society groups played a critical role in 
the formation of the NARC coalition and both administrations appointed a considerable number 
of advocacy group leaders into their bureaucracies. However, in 2013, there was a resurgence 
of the use of NGO legislation to curtail the activities of advocacy groups after the Jubilee 
administration came to power. The new administration adopted a systematic anti-civil society 
strategy disproportionately targeting advocacy groups, which it perceived to be anti-Jubilee 
administration.  
Although the new Public Benefits Organisations Bill was enacted in 2013, the 
government is yet to operationalize the new legal regime for NGOs, while it continues to use 
the more intrusive NGO Coordination Act (1990) that the PBO Act of 2013 replaced. The 
tension between the Jubilee administration and advocacy groups in Kenya peaked when both 
the President and his deputy were charged with crimes against humanity at the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, following the Post-Election violence in 2007-2008 which 
killed over 1, 333 people and displaced over 650,000 people. Most advocacy groups gave 
submissions to the commission that investigated the cases and supported the court processes. 
The ICC eventually suspended the cases for lack of cooperation from the Kenyan state. 
However, the confrontational relationship between the government and advocacy groups 
continued having been rooted in the historical antagonism between advocacy groups and the 
                                                             
 
99 Kaberia T (2014) “Uhuru’s Threat to NGOs is reminiscent of Moi’s Crackdown in 1995,” the star, October 27, 
2014. 
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KANU regime. Most of the Jubilee leaders were former Kenya African National Union 
(KANU) members, who served in the Moi regime, which had a profound distrust for advocacy 
groups. Moreover, it was not lost on the Jubilee administration that advocacy groups worked 
closely and supported the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) which defeated President 
Uhuru Kenyatta, the current leader of the Jubilee political party in the 2002 general elections. 
The Jubilee administration has thus frequently used the NGO Coordination Board to target and 
clamp-down on advocacy groups that it perceived to have supported the ICC process. This 
antagonism has further strained its relationship with advocacy groups.  
In 2013, several Jubilee-allied Members of Parliament introduced the Statute Law 
Miscellaneous (Amendment) Bill 2013 to the PBO Act 2013, which sought to regulate the 
finances and activities of NGOs. The Bill was presented under the guise of limiting the 
interference of foreign governments in the country’s sovereignty and internal affairs and 
proposed to cap the amount of funds that NGOs receive from external sources at 15 percent of 
their total budget.100 An exception was to be allowed only if an NGO proved that it required the 
funds because of “an extraordinary circumstance” and even if approved, the extra fund would 
go through the NGO federation. The 15 percent cap was proposed despite the Kenyan NGO 
receiving more than 90 percent of their funding from external sources. Additionally, the 
legislators argued that these amendments would ensure the accountability and integrity of 
NGOs. However, several NGOs opposed these amendments noting that they would 
considerably stifle the operations of civil society groups in the country and that international 
donors already had a framework for ensuring NGO accountability.101 The Kenyan parliament 
eventually rejected the amendment Bill.102 In December 2014 alone, the state deregistered 15 
NGOs for allegedly funding terrorist activities,103and in 2015 another 510 charitable 
organisations were deregistered for failing to file their audited reports as required by law.  
                                                             
 
100 It is important to note that almost 90 percent of civil society organizations funding in Kenya is foreign. 
101 Daily Nation, October 27, 2014 “NGO Council Opposes the Amendment to PBO Act” 
102 Global Legal Monitor (2013) Kenya: Rejection of the Bill Capping NGO Funding and Giving Spy agency 
broadened surveillance Powers” 
103 Daily Nation, September 15, 2015 and IRIN “NGOs in Kenya Protest threatened deregistration of 959 
organisations” October 31, 2015 
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Further, the NGO Coordination Board threatened 959 local organisations with 
deregistration for failure to account for their funding sources.104 These threats of deregistration 
were finally suspended, and the affected NGOs given time to comply with the regulations of 
the board.105 There were also cases where several advocacy groups were shut-down by the 
government without notice. Although the new PBO Act of 2013, is yet to be operationalised, 
most advocacy groups view it as far much better than the NGO Coordination Act of 1990. It 
allows PBOs to express their views on issues debated or discussed during political campaigns106 
but not directly engage in political fundraising or campaigns to support any political party or 
candidate for public office nor propose or register candidates for election in public office.107 
The Act establishes the National Federation of PBOs (NFPBOs), which replaces the NGO 
Council in the current legislation. The mandate of NFPBO is to serve as the self-regulation 
forum for registered PBOs (Section 21). The Federation comprises all PBOs registered under 
the Act, and its function is to promote higher standards of work ethic and legality by PBOs, to 
facilitate the building of capacity of PBOs for their effectiveness and to monitor the 
performance of the self-regulation forums.  
The PBO Act also establishes the PBO Regulatory Authority (PBORA) with most of its 
members being ex-officio civil servants and its chairman appointed by the Cabinet Secretary. 
Its roles include the registration and deregistration of PBOs, receiving and reviewing annual 
reports of PBOs and instituting inquiries on the activities of PBOs to comply with the Act.  The 
Act is also different from the NGO Coordination Act (1990), in that the registration of civil 
society groups under the new legislation is no longer mandatory, though necessary if the 
organisation wishes to claim benefits associated with being a PBO.108 The registration 
procedures seem to be reasonable and straightforward, and the PBORA is given the power to 
request any additional information if necessary, for registration purposes.109  
                                                             
 
104 http://www.irinnews.org/report/102174/ngos-kenya-protest-threatened-deregistration-959-organisations 
105 Hussein Mohamed “Devolution CS Waiguru revoke deregistration of NGOs” Citizen TV, October 30, 2015 
106 PBO Act 2013, (section 66 (2) (a) 
107 PBO Act 2013, section 66 (3) (a) 
108 PBO is defined in the law as organizations constituted nationally, regionally or internationally to carry out 
activities for the public benefit in a wide variety of areas (PBO Act, 2013) 
109 PBO Act 2013, Section 8 
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However, the Act does not specify any grounds for denial of registration, which is a 
grey area, which could be abused by the state to refuse registration for certain types of civil 
society groups. The Act makes it mandatory for the PBORA to decide on the application within 
60 days after receipt of the application.110 If PBORA denies registration, it must notify the 
applicant in writing and give reasons for the denial within the number of days remaining in the 
original 60 days period for making a decision.111 Applicants not satisfied with PBORA 
decisions may appeal within 30 days of receiving a written notice of denial to the tribunal. The 
Act gives the cabinet secretary on a recommendation from PBORA the power to make 
regulations, which can limit the rights of civil society organisations and this could be used to 
curtail the freedom of assembly and association enjoyed by civil society groups in the country. 
The PBO Act also establishes an independent PBO Dispute Tribunal to hear and determine 
complaints arising out of any breach of the Act and any matter or appeal made to it under the 
provisions of the Act.112 The Chief Justice appoints the tribunal members upon approval by the 
national assembly. It comprises a chairperson, two advocates of the high court and two persons 
of specialized skills and knowledge necessary for the discharge of the functions of the tribunal.  
In the case of Zambia, NGO legislation has prominently been used to curtail the 
activities of advocacy groups since the political transition in 1991. The Chiluba administration 
that took over power in 1991 after the re-introduction of multi-party general elections continued 
with authoritarian tendencies under a democratic political setting (Bartlett 2000; Ihonvbere, 
1996) and aggressively used NGO legislation to silence advocacy groups that it perceived to be 
critical of its policies and actions. Additionally, the conflict between advocacy groups and the 
Chiluba administration emanated from the group's fierce opposition to the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes and the stalled constitutional review process, which the Chiluba 
administration had promised the electorate during the campaigns. The confrontation reached its 
peak in 2001, when advocacy groups and opposition parties publicly opposed the quest for the 
third term by President Chiluba, a move that was contrary to the Zambian constitution, which 
enshrines a two-five-year term limit for the presidency. (Zambia: Author interviews, 29: 2012; 
30: 2012; 32: 2012).   
                                                             
 
110 PBO Act, Section 9 (1). 
111 PBO Act 2013, Section 9 (5) (b). 
112 PBO Act 2013, Section 51 
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Civil society groups under the Oasis Forum mounted a formidable campaign dubbed 
the “Anti-Third Term Campaign,” and organised protests and demonstrations all over the 
country. President Chiluba eventually bowed to pressure and shelved the idea. Successive 
MMD administrations continued with the same pattern of authoritarian tendencies in a 
democratic political environment, which exacerbated confrontational relationship with 
advocacy groups. For example, in 2004, the government of President Levy Mwanawasa used 
the Societies Act to deregister the Southern Africa Centre for the Constructive Resolution of 
Disputes (SACCORD)113because the organisation was considered a “danger to state 
security”114without explaining the specific activities of the organisation, which constituted that 
danger.115The organisation appealed its deregistration, a process that went through the Zambian 
court system up to the highest court of the land, the Zambian Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court eventually reinstated SACCORD's registration certificate. The Court found that the state 
had not proven their case against SACCORD as a “danger to state security.”  Other 
organizations deregistered during this time included the Citizens Committee and the Forum for 
Leadership Search (Zambia: Author interviews, 34: 2012, 37: 2012, 40: 2012). 
Under the Banda administration that took over power after the sudden death of President 
Mwanawasa in 2008, the use of NGO legislation to control and curtail the activities of advocacy 
groups intensified. The administration made the boldest attempt in 2007 to curtail the activities 
of advocacy groups when it proposed an NGO legislation Bill that was considered draconian 
and overly intrusive in the registration and operations of civil society groups in the country. 
The then Minister for Information justified the necessity of the Bill when he stated; 
“It is old-fashioned to set up an NGO so that you are going to be at variance with the 
government…with the people, who have been elected. When you are going against 
the government, you are becoming a political party.”116  
 
 
                                                             
 
113 SACCORD is an independent human rights, governance and conflict resolution organisation that had been 
critical of the government’s lack of commitment to political reforms. 
114 Times of Zambia “SACCORD Looses Appeal”, March 4th, 2010 from  
http://allafrica.com/stories/201003040558.html 
115 CAP 119 Societies Act of the laws of Zambia empowers the Minister to proscribe a registered society 
116 IRIN-Humanitarian News and Analysis found at www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx? reportid=85860 
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The statement from the Minister was in sharp contrast to what NGOs laws are supposed 
to accomplish, that is, facilitate the functions and operations of civil society groups. The 
proposed NGO Bill was however suspended after it provoked widespread protests by civil 
society groups and opposition political parties across the country. In 2009 the Banda 
administration re-introduced the NGO Bill, which again provoked outrage within the civil 
society sector, who made the case that rather than facilitate and support the work of civil society 
groups, the Bill was aimed at controlling, stifling and curtailing the operations of these groups. 
Advocacy groups also argued that the NGO Bill undermined the autonomy, independence, and 
freedom of advocacy groups, and instilled fear and intimidation on its members and officials.  
However, the Banda administration was determined to pass the Bill as proposed and used 
threats and intimidation on any group that appeared to oppose the Bill. Several respondents 
cited the 2009 case when the Public Order Act was used to disrupt a peaceful meeting organised 
by the Zambia Episcopal Conference to debate and submit recommendations to the government 
on the NGO Bill. The leaders of the group were harassed, intimidated and arrested but later 
released without charges (Zambia: Author interviews, 29: 2012; 32: 2012). 
Despite all the protests and opposition to the NGO Bill for two years, parliament 
eventually passed the Bill in 2009, and it became the official law governing NGO registration 
and operations in Zambia. Most advocacy groups in Zambia view the NGO Act of 2009 as a 
repressive law that is meant to target and silence organisations that are critical of the 
administration (Zambia: Author interviews, 30: 2012, 37: 2012, 38: 2012, 40: 2012). This view 
is backed by several clauses in the Act and the pronouncements that were made by government 
officials when the Bill was passed in 2009.  Mandeep (2009) has identified several contentious 
clauses in the Act that could easily impede the registration and operations of civil society groups 
in Zambia. These include; the compulsory registration of all NGOs, a requirement that could 
be debilitating for Community-Based Organisations, which may not be able to produce annual 
reports and audited accounts, the lack of time limit on application processing, creating 
uncertainty in NGO work and unclear grounds for refusal of registration, creating conditions 
for prejudicial decisions against which civil society groups have no legal recourse.   
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The NGO Act 2009 states that the discretionary power of the Minister for denial of 
registration can be based on; failure to contribute to “public interest” which is not defined in 
the Act and upon recommendation by the NGO Council, a body created by the Act to oversee 
the registration process of NGOs. Other contentious clauses include the requirement to specify 
administrative districts, divisions, and locations that NGOs intend to conduct their activities as 
well as indicating the proposed sources of funding. This clause could impede civil society future 
expansion and effectiveness. All NGOs are also required to re-register every five years and 
supply annual reports on all their activities, accounts, funding sources and individual assets of 
their officials. Mandeep (2009) argues that this clause ignores the principle of continued 
existence for public entities. The Act also establishes a 16-member government-dominated 
NGO Board with broadly defined powers over NGO operations and consisting of not less than 
8 government officials and a minimum of 2 representatives from civil society to “receive, 
discuss and approve the code of conduct for NGOs and  provide policy guidelines to NGOs for 
harmonising their activities to the National Development Plan of Zambia.”  
These clauses clearly indicate that the Zambian government’s interest in this Act is that 
of excessive and unwarranted control of the civil society sector and not statutory support and 
facilitation as envisaged in such NGO legislations. Civil society groups are concerned that the 
Act will be used to punish and disband civil society groups for publicly expressing critical views 
on human rights and governance issues. Most respondents interviewed for this study noted that 
the fear of the implementation of the NGO Act 2009 has already led some civil society groups 
to register as limited companies under the Companies Act.  Some of the groups which have 
already registered as limited companies include the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) and 
PANOS Institute of Southern Africa. Such organisations can only be dissolved by the process 
of winding down of limited companies as provided in the Companies Act. They also do not 
need to renew their certificates of operations every five years as required by the NGO Act. 
When the Patriotic Front came to power in 2011, it was very receptive of advocacy 
groups concerns about the NGO Act and organised a meeting between the government and civil 
society groups on April 2012 in which the PF government promised to consider the civil society 
groups concerns with the NGO Act and bring the necessary amendments to parliament which 
address these concerns and would improve the Act for the benefit of civil society groups in the 
country. However, advocacy groups were sceptical about the new administration promises, 
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especially after March 2012 when the Minister for Home Affairs announced that 8 NGOs were 
under investigations for alleged money laundering and other illegal activities and that the 
Registrar of Societies was also scrutinizing other NGO mandates. Since then the relationship 
between advocacy groups and the government has deteriorated as the government has 
backtracked on its promises over the NGO Act and authorised its operationalisation. Following 
renewed complaints from civil society groups and boycott by some groups to register under the 
Act, the Lungu administration, which came to power in 2015 has suspended the implementation 
of the Act and committed to reviewing and amending controversial sections of the Act through 
consultation with civil society groups.  
5.4. Dancing with the state: Advocacy groups and Political Appropriation in 
Kenya and Zambia 
The relationship between advocacy groups and the state is complex, and the boundaries 
between the two actors are sometimes blurred. There are also strong incentives for both political 
actors to enter an alliance with each other (Forbrig, 2003; Stanslava, 1997, Throup and Hornsby, 
1995). For the state, such alliances with advocacy groups help it strengthen and extend its 
legitimacy, hegemony, and patronage within society through advocacy groups’ support, while 
for advocacy groups, the close alignment with the state can improve their competitiveness and 
preferential treatment in access to information and public resources, which are critical for their 
operations, sustainability and organisational survival (Forbrig, 2003).  In theory, the alliance 
between the state and advocacy groups should, therefore, be a symbiotic relationship. However, 
in practice, that is not usually the case as the relationship easily become political appropriation 
of advocacy groups by the state due to the power imbalance between the two political actors.  
Political appropriation means that advocacy groups are incorporated into the state 
bureaucratic control apparatus, where the groups end up functioning as quasi-governmental 
institutions. Most emerging democracies such as Kenya and Zambia, therefore, have used 
political appropriation as a major strategy to control and restrict the activities of advocacy 
groups to their advantage. In the post-independent Kenya, political appropriation has always 
been an instrument of state control of advocacy groups. The most notable examples during the 
authoritarian period were the appropriation of both the Central Organisation of Trade Unions 
(COTU) in 1988 and the national women’s organisation, Maendeleo ya Wanawake (MYW) in 
1989 by the Moi administration (Fowler 1991, p. 69). The two organisations became part of the 
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ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), despite continuing to exist as 
legitimate civil society organisations. While undermining the autonomy and independence of 
these organisations, KANU got the political support of their leadership and their large 
membership base countrywide (Fowler, 1990: 32). In Zambia, the Kaunda administration 
politically appropriated the cooperative movement, the Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF) 
from the 1970s, partly to neutralise the political influence of white farmers, but more 
importantly to extend political patronage and support base to the rural areas of the county, 
through ZCF networks of cooperative organisations (Chiwele et al., 1996, p. 65). In return for 
its support, ZCF received government agricultural subsidies. 
With the democratic transitions in the early 1990s in both Kenya and Zambia, the study 
found that the new democratic governments which came to power through the multi-party 
elections have continued with a pattern of political appropriation as a strategy for controlling 
the activities of advocacy groups. The new administrations have employed the strategy to 
extend political patronage, broaden their political support base and to limit the demands for 
democratic deepening from advocacy groups (Chweya, 2004). Habib and Taylor (1999) have 
referred to politically appropriated NGOs as “Now Government Official,” meaning that despite 
nominally remaining as civil society organisations, these NGO become appendages of the state 
and support the state. This section uses the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) 
and the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) as case studies to demonstrate how the 
democratic states in both Kenya and Zambia have used political appropriation in the new 
political and institutional environment to undermine the autonomy and independence of these 
groups and consequently their ability to effectively contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation.  Surprisingly, both NCCK and ZCTU were considered the lead organisations in 
the prodemocracy movements, which significantly contributed to the restoration of democracy 
and pluralism in both countries in the early 1990s (Bratton, 1994) 
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5.4.1. The National Council of Churches of Kenya and the new democratic state 
in Kenya: From “principled opposition to principled cooperation.”117 
 
Religious organisations are critical components of civil society in Kenya and have 
continued to play a significant role in the democratisation process in the country (Mati, 2015). 
Bratton (1990, p. 7), claims that “religious organisations are the most important institutions in 
Kenya’s civil society.” However, their relationship with the state and involvement in politics 
has always been complex (Parsitau, 2011), contentious and largely influenced by their theology. 
Some churches, like the African Inland Church (AIC) view involvement in politics as being 
outside of their institutional interests and interpretation of their Christian mission (Kasomo and 
Naila, 2013), while others like the NCCK pursue a liberal theology based on social justice and, 
therefore, perceive their involvement in politics as a social calling and part of their Christian 
mission (Gifford, 2009). Ngunyi (1995, p.146) has also noted the “proximity between the 
traditional political class and the activist clergy, the political interest of ethno-regional elites 
have often found expression through the church.” 
The National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) is an umbrella Christian 
organisation that was founded in 1913 in Thogoto, near Nairobi and has become the World’s 
largest Council of churches.118It is a fellowship of Protestant churches and Christian 
organisations in Kenya, whose mission is to “facilitate the united missions of the Christian 
church in Kenya, promote fellowship, partnership, unity and ecumenism, nurture a common 
understanding of the Christian faith and mission, build the capacity of membership and enhance 
the creation of just and sustainable society.”119By 1990, the organisation had thirty-two-
member churches and associations and a total staff of 370 at its headquarters and regional 
offices.120In 2006, NCCK membership comprised 37 mainline churches and Christian 
associations in Kenya with a membership of about 6 million people (Parsitau, 2012) spread all 
over the country. 
                                                             
 
117 Gifford (2009) uses this phrase to describe the relationship between NCCK and the Moi regime versus NCCK 
relationship with the Kibaki regime. 
118 See http://globalministries.org/africa/partners/national-council-of-churches.html 
119 http://www.ncck.org/newsite2/index.php/about-ncck/who-we-are, accessed on 05/08/2016 
120 Weekly Review, January 12, 1990 
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NCCK has a long-standing and chequered history in the process of democratisation in 
Kenya. After the outlawing of opposition political parties in 1982 and a fierce crackdown on 
secular governance advocacy groups by the Moi administration, only the church clergy and 
church organisations could confront and criticise the authoritarian one-party state due to their 
credibility, large organised constituencies and elaborate international and foreign links 
(Ndegwa, 2001; Sabar-Friedman1997: 29). According to Sabar-Friedman (2002, p. 291), the 
church, “provided the only available public stage for protesting against the government abuse 
of power and discussing the need to change the rules of the political game.” NCCK, therefore, 
played a prominent role in the clamour for the return to democracy and political pluralism in 
Kenya from the early 1980s. It was a progressive, national organisation with strong 
organisational, grassroots presence and an international support network (Klopp, 2009). A 
small cadre of NCCK clergy led the clamour for political change and the return to multi-party 
politics. They were referred to as the “famous four” (Knighton, 2008, p.ix) and, consisted of 
Bishop Henry Okullu, Rev. David Gitari, Rev. Timothy Njoya, and Bishop Alexander Muge.121 
(Mue 2011; Chacha 2010; Gifford 2009) 
In 1986 the ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KANU) introduced the 
queuing system for its primaries. This method of voting required voters to physically line up 
behind their preferred candidate and be physically counted. The system was used to transmit 
the choices of the President for there was no guarantee that the candidate with the longest line 
would win the primaries. In practice, therefore, the process was marred by manipulations, 
irregularities, and rigging (Gifford, 2009; Sabar-Friedman, 1997). NCCK perceived the 
queuing system as dangerous and putting undue pressure on voters thus diminishing their 
confidence in the elections and called for the abolition of the system, besides threatening to 
boycott the elections (Sabar-Friedman, 1997). In response, the state accused NCCK of 
disloyalty and urged its member churches, which did not agree with its position on the queuing 
system to quit the organisation. The African Independent Pentecostal Church (AIPC) left the 
organisation.122 Under pressure from advocacy groups and other stakeholders, KANU 
eventually abolished the queuing system in 1990.   
                                                             
 
121 These clergy also confronted excesses of the state and abuse of power such as corruption, state instigated 
violence and violation of human rights. 
122 Daily Nation, 25th March 1986. 
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In 1986, Rev. Timothy Njoya of the Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA), a 
member of NCCK was one of the first leaders to call on Kenyans to reclaim their humanity, 
sovereignty, and freedom through the introduction of multi-partyism (Njoya, 2013). In 1989, 
Bishop Henry Okullu, Rev. David Gitari, and Rev. Timothy Njoya together called for the repeal 
of Section 2 (A) of the Constitution that had outlawed opposition political parties. Bishop 
Okullu further pushed for a constitutional change that would allow for a two-term limit on 
presidential tenure (Sabar-Friedman, 2012).  Following these calls, NCCK together with other 
churches called for a national debate on the future of the country dubbed “The Kenya We Want.” 
These pronouncements by NCCK and its affiliated individual clergy inspired the agitation for 
multipartyism and the struggle for democratisation from 1989 to 1991. In 1990, as the clamour 
for multi-party politics gathered momentum with the formation of the Forum for the Restoration 
of Democracy (FORD), the church in Kenya, including the NCCK gave spiritual and moral 
support to the opposition and became the lead organization in the pro-democracy movement.  
In 1991, NCCK again called for political pluralism and an end to detention without trial, 
restricting presidential powers, two terms presidential limit, speeding up of political reforms 
and holding up a national convention to discuss the future of Kenya (Sabar 2002; NCCK, 1991). 
In 1992, NCCK became the convener of the pro-democracy movement and the lead 
organisation during the transition process (Kanyinga, 2004; Nzomo, 2003; Ngunyi, 1999; 
Bratton, 1994). It organized and co-ordinated the activities, and the work of the pro-democracy 
movements contributed financial support for the movement and provided sanctuary for 
opposition leaders, who were threatened by the incumbent regime. It also created a space for 
opposition leaders to discuss emerging political issues (Sabar, 1997). NCCK attempted to unite 
the opposition in 1991 but failed, (Mati, 2013; Mutua, 2008; Mutunga, 1999) and used its 
resources, countrywide membership, networks, and branches for outreach and political 
mobilisation for the opposition movement. 
However, KANU and President Moi won both the 1992 and 1997 multi-party general 
elections against a divided opposition, besides the use of rigging, manipulation of electoral 
boundaries, intimidation, and violence during the electioneering period. Despite these setbacks, 
NCCK continued to work with other groups towards democratisation in the country. In 1997, 
the government established the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) to lead the 
constitutional review process. Most civil society groups in the country did not trust the 
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government process (Andreasen and Tostensen, 2006) and instead initiated their own process 
in 1999 called the Ufungamano Initiative led by NCCK. Additionally, NCCK joined the 
National Ecumenical Election programme (NECEP) which spearheaded massive civic 
education in the country before the 1997 general elections (Mutua, 2008; Mutunga, 1999). In 
2000, the Ufungamano initiative formed the Peoples Commission, which drew up proposals for 
the new Constitution. After intense negotiations between the government and the civil society 
groups, the two constitutional review initiatives were merged, and a new commission formed, 
which led the country through the constitutional review process. In 2010 the country 
promulgated a new Constitution. It must be noted that from 1991 to 2002, the relationship 
between the Moi administration and NCCK remained confrontational as the state perceived the 
organisation to be subversive and anti-government (Owuoche, 2011). 
However, after the 2002 general elections, which saw the National Rainbow Coalition 
(NARC) ascend to power through the victory of the National Rainbow Coalition led by Mwai 
Kibaki over the Kenya African National Union’s (KANU) candidate Uhuru Kenyatta, the 
political landscape dramatically changed. NCCK led by Rev. Mutava Musyimi as the Secretary-
General was presented with a strategic dilemma on how to relate with the new NARC-
government, which it had closely worked with and supported while in the opposition. NCCK 
consciously made a policy decision which its then Secretary-General, Rev.Mutava Musyimi 
described as “principled collaboration” with the government. Its leadership at the time believed 
that NARC, unlike KANU, was committed to the institutionalisation of democracy. This 
decision to co-operate with the NARC administration marked a significant turning point for the 
transformation of the organization’s relationship with the state and its role in the 
democratization process in the country. NCCK became lenient, cordial with the state and 
gradually retreated from the public space, adopting an unusual silence on matters of political 
and social justice. By 2004, NCCK had acquiesced entirely to the whims of the state and became 
less vocal on national issues, less political and less visible in the public space (Mue, 2011). It 
dropped its critical approach to the reform agenda and aligned its support with the NARC 
administration on major national issues. 
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Several reasons can be advanced to explain this fundamental change in the 
organization’s approach to the state and the reform agenda in the post-transitional political 
environment.  Firstly, NCCK found it difficult to criticise the same leaders it had closely worked 
with and supported in the opposition for many years to remove KANU from power-a regime 
that it considered illegitimate. Oloo (2005) for example notes that NCCK had been partners 
with NARC against KANU and thus perceived the NARC victory as its own victory. It, 
therefore, felt obligated to support and defend the NARC administration. Moreover, Kibaki-the 
President under the NARC administration had a very cordial relationship with NCCK and had 
defended the organisation against fierce attacks by Moi and the KANU regime, while in 
opposition (Knighton, 2009; Gifford, 2009).  
Secondly, most of the respondents interviewed for this study attributed NCCK dalliance 
with the state to ethnicity. One prominent advocacy group leader described the appropriation 
of NCCK by the state as the “tragedy of ethnicity” (Kenya: Author interview, 9:2012). The 
Kikuyu ethnic community dominated the top leadership of NCCK in 2002 when NARC came 
to power, the same ethnic group as that of President Kibaki, and, therefore, most respondents 
interviewed for this study claimed that this relationship significantly informed the decision by 
the organization to support the government. The association of ethnicity and the appropriation 
of NCCK by the NARC administration is unsurprising since all the major mainstream churches 
in Kenya reflect political and ethnic divisions within the country (Gifford, 2009). NCCK, 
therefore, was not immune to the forces of tribalism and neopatrimonialism.123 
Thirdly, several respondents interviewed for this study also stated that the quasi-co-
optation of NCCK leadership into state bureaucracy by the NARC administration played a 
significant role in the organisation’s decision to support the government. In May 2004, the then 
NCCK Secretary-General, Reverend Mutava Musyimi was appointed the chairman of the Anti-
Corruption Steering Committee by President Kibaki-a position that created a serious conflict of 
interest and compromised his ability to comment openly on national issues (Parsitau, 2012). 
Additionally, the appointment of Rev. Mutava Musyimi into government weakened NCCK 
effectiveness as an alternative voice in the democratisation process and a watchdog for public 
                                                             
 
123 See Wamanji, E (2008) “Ethnicity in the church comes of Age”, Standard, 27th, February 2008 
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accountability. Reverend Musyimi found it extremely difficult to criticise the government in 
which he served. One advocacy group leader interviewed for this study noted that; 
“Rev. Musyimi found himself in a serious conflict of interest when he agreed to be appointed 
into government while serving as NCCK Secretary-General. How do you bite the hand that 
feeds you? How do you publicly criticise a government in which you serve?” (Kenya: Author 
Interview, 14:2012) 
 
In March 2007, Rev. Musyimi resigned his position in government and contested a parliamentary 
seat on the President’s party in the 2007 general elections and won.  
Finally, the political appropriation of NCCK by the state can be attributed to its new 
brand of leadership, who took over from the firebrand leaders like Bishop Henry Okullu, Rev. 
David Gitari, Bishop Alexander Muge, and Rev. Timothy Njoya. These new leaders are less 
vocal, less controversial and less political than their predecessors (Oloo, 2005). Most 
respondents interviewed for this study noted that the political environment had fundamentally 
changed, and the state was no longer viewed as illegitimate and authoritarian. This new 
generation of leaders at NCCK may have viewed cooperation as a new way of relating to the 
new democratic state. Several respondents also noted that NCCK failed to craft a new strategy 
for contributing to the process of democratic consolidation, and, therefore, was forced to retreat 
from the public space.  
The attitude, behaviour, and actions of NCCK during the 2005 Constitutional 
conference demonstrated that it had become part of the institutions of the state.  Its then 
Secretary General Rev. Mutava Musyimi, who was a pro-government representative at the 
constitutional conference attempted to unseat the chair of the review commission through a 
motion after they disagreed on several constitutional issues. When he failed, he resigned his 
position as a delegate to the conference on February 2004 and NCCK abandoned the Bomas 
process.124 It appeared that NCCK which had fought for the constitutional review process for 
many years was no longer interested in the process. The Bomas draft that came out of the 
Constitutional Review Conference and which was highly considered as reflecting the views of 
the populace was re-drafted by the then Attorney-General, Mr. Amos Wako and dubbed the 
“Wako draft.”  
                                                             
 
124 “Musyimi Quits Constitutional Review Talks,” Daily Nation February 8, 2004 
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The new draft had retained a strong presidency and watered down the devolution 
chapter. When the “Wako draft” was presented to the referendum and supported by the 
government, NCCK under Rev. Mutava Musyimi decided not to take a stand on the draft 
Constitution and instead asked its members and supporters to “vote with their conscience” 
(Mue, 2011; Chacha, 2010, Gifford, 2009). This decision created uncertainty and confusion 
among its members and supporters. The move was unprecedented given that NCCK had built 
its reputation, credibility, image, and legitimacy by taking strong positions on national issues, 
especially regarding the constitutional review process, human rights, governance, and 
democratisation.125The Wako draft constitution was defeated at the referendum in 2005. 
As the 2007 general elections approached, advocacy groups and opposition political 
parties called for the enactment of minimum electoral reforms by parliament to ensure free, fair 
and a level-playing field for all political players in the general elections, pending comprehensive 
constitutional reforms after the elections. Majority of the mainstream advocacy groups 
supported the idea of minimum reforms, including the Kenya National Human Rights 
Commission (KNHRC), the Federation of Women Lawyers-FIDA-Kenya and the Council of 
Imams and Preachers in Kenya among others. However, to the surprise of most citizens, the 
NCCK and the Catholic Church, both of which had been ardent supporters of the constitutional 
reforms, opposed these critical minimum reforms, because there was not enough time to enact 
such electoral reforms before the elections. By this time NCCK was already compromised and 
was willing to support any position taken by the state (Kenya: Author interviews 2: 2012; 9: 
2012; 12: 2012; 19: 2012).126During the 2007 election period, NCCK was mostly viewed as 
partisan and serving narrow parochial and ethnic interests at the expense of broader national 
interests. It had lost credibility and legitimacy among advocacy groups and the citizenry at 
large. Additionally, several respondents interviewed for this study pointed out that NCCK 
political partiality had alienated sections of its membership and, therefore, reduced its 
grassroots support and voice on national issues (Kenya: Author interviews, 9: 2012; 14: 2012; 
19: 2012).  
                                                             
 
125 The Standard, 25th October 2005 “Raila says NCCK is a state mouthpiece” 
126 It is important to note that NCCK officials refused an interview for this study 
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The Post-Election violence, which occurred after the bungled 2007 general elections, 
was, therefore, partly blamed on civil society groups such as the NCCK, which had publicly 
taken partisan positions on the elections. NCCK and the church, in general, were roundly 
criticised and condemned for failing to provide national leadership and moral direction during 
the campaigns.127The organization was no longer viewed as the champion of constitutional 
review and democratisation process in the country. In 2008, Retired. Arch Bishop David Gitari 
lamented that “the state and the church have gone to bed together. The church has been 
compromised…the conscience of society has been wounded.”128 In the same year, NCCK led 
other church groups on a repentance mission. It acknowledged its failures and apologized to 
Kenyans stating that; 
“We regret that we as church leaders were unable to effectively confront these issues because 
we were partisan. Our efforts to forestall the current crisis were not effective because as 
members of NCCK we did not speak with one voice. We were divided in the way we saw the 
management of the elections; we identified with our people based on ethnicity; and after the 
elections, we are divided on how to deal with the crisis.”129 
 
According to Mue (2011, p. 182), NCCK apologized for failing to maintain its 
“Christian identity” and instead elevated “ethnic identities” during the elections.  In the second 
referendum in 2010, NCCK joined the Evangelical and Pentecostal groups in opposing the Draft 
Constitution, mainly on the grounds of a language that approved emergency abortion in cases 
where the mother’s life was threatened and the inclusion of the Kadhi or Islamic courts in the 
Draft Constitution. These groups executed a well organised and funded open campaign through 
“prayer rallies” with other politicians that were opposed to the Draft Constitution. Despite such 
campaigns, the Draft Constitution passed with an overwhelming majority during the 
referendum. This outcome further dented the image, legitimacy, and credibility of NCCK. One 
respondent interviewed for this study pointed out that “the flock left behind the herdsmen” 
(Kenya: Author interview, 12: 2012), meaning that the members of NCCK and other church 
groups which belong to the organization had broken ranks with their leaders and 
overwhelmingly voted for the Draft Constitution. 
                                                             
 
127 Nation, 3rd January 2008 “Churches Blamed for Silence” 
128 Thatiah, P (2008) “Arch-Bishop David Gitari: The conscience of society is wounded, The Standard, July 8, 
2008 
129 Daily Nation, 18th, August 2008. 
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 From 2009, NCCK struggled to regain its lost autonomy and independence. It fully 
participated in the Inter-Religious Forum (IRF) which proposed a peace plan and helped in the 
process of reconciliation among communities affected by the post-electoral violence. However, 
it strategically avoided the discussion of justice for the victims of post-election violence. 
According to Kahura (2017), under the leadership of Rev. Peter Karanja, who is a Kikuyu as 
President Uhuru Kenyatta, NCCK continued with a pattern of silence on critical national issues 
and is mostly perceived as an apologist for a “Kikuyu state.” As one of the largest, progressive, 
credible, well-resourced and more experienced organisation in the country, the political 
appropriation of NCCK by the NARC administration was quite puzzling given its history and 
prominent role in the process of democratization from the late 1980s. Its close cooperation with 
the state in the post-transitional political and institutional environment did not promote the 
process of democratic consolidation. On the contrary, the cooperation undermined its autonomy 
and independence and considerably reduced its ability to effectively contribute to the process 
of democratic consolidation. It was no longer the custodian of democratic values, the 
conscience of society and the voice of the voiceless.  NCCK was sucked into narrow, parochial, 
partisan and tribal politics, which muted its “prophetic voice.” It lost credibility, legitimacy, 
and support of the masses to push any reforms aimed at democratic consolidation and reflected 
the same politico-structural deficiencies of the broader Kenyan politics and society.  
The political appropriation of NCCK had significant ramifications for the whole of civil 
society’s contribution to the process of democratic consolidation.  Firstly, NCCK had for a long 
time coordinated the activities of advocacy groups involved in issues of governance and 
democratisation and more specifically, the constitutional reform process. Its appropriation by 
the state, therefore, not only robbed the sector of a leader and a convener of the group but also 
the resources, the capacity, the experience and the countrywide network of support that the 
organisation commands.  As pointed out by several advocacy group leaders interviewed for this 
study, civil society participation in the constitutional review process both in 2004 and 2009 was 
lackluster, disjointed and considerably disorganised due to the absence of a strong national 
coordination body (Kenya: Author interviews, 2:2012; 9: 2012; 12:2012; 19:2012). The 
constitutional review process in the country was, therefore, mostly controlled by the political 
class through representation by political parties. 
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Secondly, NCCK support for the state contributed to a lack of focus by civil society on 
the constitutional review process and led to social fragmentation along various cleavages such 
as ethnicity and religion. This fragmentation weakened the strength and influence of civil 
society groups in the constitutional review process. Moreover, having become ethnically 
partisan and serving narrow parochial interests, NCCK failed to play the integration role that it 
had played during the push for democratic transition in the early 1990s. Several respondents 
interviewed for this study also noted that the extension of state patronage to NCCK countrywide 
networks impeded grassroots support for the necessary reforms for democratic consolidation 
(Kenya: Author interviews, 1: 2012, 2: 2012, 9: 2012). Consequently, the messy electoral 
process in 2007 that led to the post-election violence was partly attributed to groups like NCCK, 
which had failed to provide moral leadership for the country but also refused to support 
minimum constitutional reforms before the elections, which would have levelled the electoral 
playing field (Kenya: Author interviews, 1:2012, 2:2012, 9:2012, 19: 2012).  
The partiality of groups like NCCK and the leadership of the Catholic church through 
Cardinal John Njue divided the country along ethnic lines and fuelled the Post-Election 
violence, which was a serious dent and a setback to the process of democratic consolidation in 
the country. The findings of this study are consistent with other previous findings by various 
authors. Throup (1995) for instance found that the cordial relationship between a Faith-Based 
Organisation (FBO) such as the NCCK and the state is usually for the fulfillment of each other’s 
interests and does not necessarily aim at democratization. In other words, cooperation leads to 
the loss of a Faith-Based Organization’s political activism, which is critical for democratic 
reforms. Mamdani (1995) has also noted that it is only when a Faith-Based Organization exist 
as a “contradictory construct” to the state that one can be able to explain its contribution to the 
democratic struggle. Similarly, Owuoche (2015) has concluded that the contribution of a Faith-
Based Organization to the democratisation process is highest when the relationship between the 
FBO and the state is hostile and lowest when the relationship is cordial and co-operative. The 
“principled collaboration” between NCCK and the state has thus constrained its ability to 
contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in Kenya. 
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5.4.2. The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions and the new democratic state in 
Zambia in the process of democratic consolidation 
 
Labour movements are crucial organisations within civil society and have played 
significant roles in the process of democratisation in several African countries including South 
Africa, Senegal, Ghana, Zimbabwe and Nigeria (Kraus, 2007). The Zambia Congress of Trade 
Unions (ZCTU) is credited for having initiated and led the pro-democracy movement that 
resulted in the political transition in the country in 1991. The Movement for Multi-party 
Democracy (MMD) which came to power that year was formed and led by former ZCTU former 
leaders, including, President Fredrick Chiluba. The ZCTU was founded in 1964 under the Trade 
Union and Dispute Act of 1964, which was based on the principle of “One Industry, One 
Union” (Akwetey and Kraus, 2007), thereby giving the organization enormous powers and 
influence both within the political system and the Zambian economy. With the establishment 
of the one-party system under the 1973 Constitution, all opposition political parties were 
banned, and ZCTU became the de facto opposition to the ruling party UNIP (Woldering, 1984). 
The organization had to maintain a modicum of independence and autonomy, through a delicate 
balancing act between cooperation with UNIP and fighting for the interests of workers. It voiced 
various national concerns about political governance and socio-economic development in the 
country. 
In 1973, the government established numerous parastatals in various sectors of the 
economy, which led to 80 percent growth of the trade union membership, besides the emergence 
of professional leadership and union autonomy (Akwetey and Kraus, 2007). These processes 
tremendously increased the ZCTU membership, organizational revenue, professional 
leadership with deep roots spread in the whole of the Zambian society. The economic crisis of 
the 1970s forced the Zambian government to adopt Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
to access loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The measures 
included wage freezes, cuts in social spending, civil servant retrenchment and reduction in 
government subsidies.  ZCTU publicly opposed these measures on the basis that they would 
lead to deleterious effects on its members, the marginalized and the poor. This position created 
tension with the government with ZCTU organizing countrywide strikes and protests against 
SAPs, which had significant effects on the political system and the economy.  
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Although the UNIP government responded to these strikes with intimidation, arrests, 
and co-optation, the strikes continued. With constant opposition from the ZCTU on its policies, 
the government proposed in 1988 to amend the 1971 Industrial Act to break up ZCTU rules of 
affiliation that had made its membership mandatory but failed to win the support from both the 
ZCTU and the Federation of Employers (Akwetey and Kraus, 2007). Through intense lobbying 
of Members of parliament, the government finally succeeded in amending the Act in 1990, 
marking a crucial turning point in the relationship between UNIP and ZCTU. The amendment 
also created opportunities for the emergence of other national federations of unions, therefore, 
weakening ZCTU. As the effects of SAPs continued to have devastating effects on workers, the 
poor and the marginalized, resulting in widespread poverty and inequality in the country, the 
labour unions realized that their ability to organise and push for the interests of the workers 
required fundamental freedoms under a democratic society. 
In 1989 as the economic crisis deepened, Fredrick Chiluba became the first national 
leader to publicly call for a return to multiparty democracy (Larmer, 2005). This call was 
followed by a formal statement from ZCTU endorsing the urgent need for the restoration of 
democracy in the country and a declaration to campaign for the same in 1990. By this time, 
ZCTU had become strategic in the economy, having developed substantial independence, 
autonomy, enormous resources, effective organizational structure and strong links with 
alienated elites and other groups within civil society and the masses (Bratton and Van de Walle, 
1997; Van Doepp, 1996). Additionally, the organization had a rich history of confronting the 
Kaunda regime with experience in campaigns. ZCTU was, therefore, “the most coherently 
organized and unified political force” in the country (Akwetey and Kraus, 2007, p.134). It 
initiated the campaigns for democratisation in Zambia through protests and demonstrations and 
led the pro-democracy movement. Most respondents interviewed for this study noted that 
ZCTU was the most credible and respected organization with high levels of legitimacy among 
Zambians since it represented matters that touched on the socio-economic development and 
livelihood of most working Zambians (Zambia: Author interviews 24: 2012; 26: 2012; 27: 
2012). As one respondent interviewed for this study stated; 
“ZCTU was the face of the working man and woman in Zambia, and it articulated issues of 
economic livelihood and survival that were a concern for every Zambian” (Zambia: Author 
interview. 27:2012). 
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In the struggle for democratization, ZCTU squarely blamed the Kaunda administration 
for the gross mismanagement of the economy, the poor standards of living fuelled by SAPs 
policies and lack of political accountability. Equally importantly, ZCTU linked the poor 
governance to the one-party system in the country. These views easily found resonance within 
the public, which had suffered under the consequences of SAPs such as reduction in social 
spending on health, education and food subsidies, which created serious discontent within the 
population (Larmer, 2005). Majority of Zambians, therefore, readily joined the campaigns for 
multi-party democracy. In 1991, officials of ZCTU spearheaded the formation of the Movement 
for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) as a pressure group for political pluralism. It was composed 
of a diverse group of leaders, which included business and church leaders, intellectuals, former 
UNIP Ministers and ZCTU leaders (Van Doepp, 1996). MMD was later joined by students, 
professional organisations, and women groups among others. Once the constitution was 
amended to allow multi-partysm, MMD was transformed into a political party and relied 
heavily on the organisational structures, networks, resources, and links with ZCTU to campaign 
and eventually won the October 31st, 1991 multi-party general elections, with Fredrick Chiluba, 
who had been the Chairman of ZCTU, as the President.   
The new political and institutional environment presented ZCTU with an “acute 
strategic dilemma” (Alexander, 1993) on how to relate with the new MMD administration, 
having played a significant role in the formation of the ruling party, the crusade for political 
change and MMD victory in the elections. Moreover, most of the rank and file members of 
MMD were former ZCTU leaders, including, President Fredrick Chiluba. The situation was 
compounded for ZCTU given that the Chiluba administration had adopted SAPs policies as the 
blueprint for economic recovery, policies which ZCTU had fiercely opposed during the Kaunda 
regime as detrimental to the livelihood of its members, the poor and the marginalized in the 
country. The policies also posed an existential threat to the organization itself. Although, 
Chiluba had argued during the campaigns that, “economic restoration is the restoration of our 
salaries and wages” (Chanda, 1993, p. 24-27), the reality of SAPs was quite different.  Despite 
all these potential dangers posed by the Structural Adjustment policies to the health and survival 
of ZCTU, its top leadership decided to cooperate with and support the Chiluba administration 
and its policies largely because they believed that, “they were the government” (Larmer, 2005). 
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The President of ZCTU at the time, Mr. Fackson Shamenda justified ZCTU support for the state 
when he stated: 
“We are not interested in partisan politics. We only have a soft spot for MMD in that 
we must work with the government. You cannot antagonize the man you will work 
with tomorrow. Many people of Zambia belong to no party, and MMD government is 
for all people” (Sunday Times of Zambia, August 15, 1993). 
 
The Chiluba administration, on the other hand, embraced the support of ZCTU, which 
was crucial if the administration was to implement SAP policies. Majority of respondents 
interviewed for this study attributed the close relationship between ZCTU and the Chiluba 
administration with the realisation by the administration that there was likely to be strong 
opposition from the labour movement against the neo-liberal reform programmes that the 
administration had adopted.130The state, therefore, deliberately employed various strategies to 
appropriate the Zambia Congress for Trade Unions for its own advantages. Firstly, the state 
used market strategies, which involved restrictive legislation to decentralise bargaining to 
weaken unions (Akwetey and Kraus, 2007). MMD passed the Industrial and Labour Relations 
Act of 1993, which abolished mandatory unionisation of workers and compulsory dues check-
off system. It also restricted workers right to strike and banned inter-sectoral solidarity strikes. 
As a result, more unions emerged, while some disaffiliated from ZCTU, leading to divisions in 
the labour movement and weakening of ZCTU through the loss of membership and revenues.  
Secondly, SAPs led to state retrenchment of employees, which substantially reduced 
union membership and revenue and ultimately weakened their bargaining power (Kraus, 2007), 
support base and the ability to mobilize and effectively contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation. Additionally, SAPs led to lower incomes for workers, a decline of agricultural 
production, and consequently lower standards of living for most citizens in the country. 
Privatization and implementation of civil service reform further reduced union membership 
from 358,000 in 1990 to less than 240,000 in 2005 (Larmer, 2005). By this time, ZCTU 
cooperation with MMD administration had almost paralyzed the organization, and it could not 
defend the interests of its members, which undermined its authority and the ability to mobilize 
its membership for policies in support of the process of democratic consolidation. 
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 In September 1996, the Zambian state ratified the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) convention No.87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to organise 
(FAPRO). The convention, in article 2 states that “workers and employers’ without distinction 
whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation 
concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing without previous authorisation.”131 
Akwetey and Kraus (2007) have noted that labour union experts in Africa have argued that this 
article undermines the fundamental principles of trade unionism of unity and solidarity. The 
ratification of the convention by the Zambian state was, therefore, meant to divide further 
ZCTU and in the process weaken the labour movement. 
 Secondly, the state also used corporatist strategies by incorporating ZCTU within the 
regime interests and granting benefits to the union in exchange for state limitations on trade 
union behaviour (Akwetey and Kraus, 2007). By accepting such benefits, ZCTU conduct had 
become inimical to its own interests and survival. The organization could not stand the pressure 
of the state because it, “lacked both a coherent ideological position and institutional 
representation to shape its relationship with the state.” (Larmer, 2007, p. 172). The post-
transitional ZCTU was disorganised and had no agenda of what it wanted from its cooperation 
with MMD. It continued to support policies that were detrimental to its own survival as a labour 
union and against the interests of its own membership. For example, SAP policies such as 
public-sector retrenchment and privatization had devastating effects on the union regarding its 
membership and resource base.  
Thirdly, the state used direct interference in the internal affairs of ZCTU to co-opt and 
select union leadership, which reduced internal union democracy (Kraus, 2007), caused 
divisions, internal conflicts and further weakened the union as a force in the process of 
democratic consolidation. The ZCTU 9th Quadrennial Congress held in Livingstone in 1994 
was a turning point in its relations with the state since it worsened the organization’s 
predicament in the country. Members of ZCTU executive board contested against each other 
for the position of the President and the Secretary-General, creating confusion and distrust of 
the election outcome.  Although both the incumbent President and Secretary General retained 
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their seats, their deputies disaffiliated after that, accusing the winners of electoral malpractices 
such as rigging, vote buying, and manipulation orchestrated by MMD to have friendlier officials 
with the state. Following the acrimonious elections, four other unions disaffiliated from 
ZCTU,132 leading to a substantial drop in its membership and revenues since the Mine Workers 
Union (MUZ) and the Zambia National Union of Teachers (ZNUT) two of the organizations 
which disaffiliated from ZCTU accounted for 80 percent of ZCTU revenue (Akwetey and 
Kraus, 2007). The faction that disaffiliated from ZCTU registered as the Federation of Free 
Trade Unions of Zambia (FFTUZ) under the Societies Act, becoming an alternative labour 
confederation to ZCTU. These divisions damaged the unity of ZCTU and further weakened it 
making it unable to play any significant role in the process of democratic consolidation.  
When MMD politically appropriated ZCTU, the organisation became a pliant trade 
union that was willing to dance to the tune of the state at all costs to the detriment of its own 
survival, membership interests and the role in the process of democratic consolidation. The 
complete capitulation of ZCTU to the state was evident throughout MMD reign from 1991 to 
2002. On December 1991, when MMD removed subsidies on maize-the staple food for most 
Zambians, it was reported in the media that ZCTU had been informed in advance about this 
action and had supported the idea.133 ZCTU had claimed that the removal of food subsidies, 
helped lessen the suffering of workers.134 Most Zambians were surprised by this change of tune 
on the effects of the removal of food subsidies by ZCTU which had all along opposed the same 
policy during the Kaunda regime (Kydd 1989, p. 135) on the basis that it would have 
devastating effects on ordinary Zambians livelihoods. The removal of food subsidies resulted 
in an enormous price increase of almost 700 percent for a 25kg bag of maize, whose price 
increased from K225 to K1800 from October 1991 to October 1992 (Seshamani, 1996). In 
1997, President Chiluba declared a state of emergency, following accusations against UNIP 
Members of parliament of an attempted coup (Bartlett 2000), ZCTU did not condemn the 
declaration, which was roundly condemned by most advocacy groups in the country. 
                                                             
 
132 The unions that disaffiliated included the Mine Workers Union of Zambia (MUZ), the National Union of 
Building, Engineering and General Workers (NUBEGW), the Zambia Union of Financial and Allied workers 
(ZUFAW), the Zambia National Union of Teachers (ZNUT) and the National Union of Commercial and Industrial 
Workers (NUCIW) 
133 Times of Zambia, December 14, 1991 
134 Times of Zambia, December 17, 1991 
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The dominant narrative among respondents interviewed for this study was that ZCTU 
had become an “appendage of the state and was willing to do anything that MMD wanted” 
(Zambia: Author Interview, 29:2012). A prominent advocacy group leader interviewed for this 
study summarised what had happened to ZCTU in the new political dispensation in Zambia: 
“President Chiluba could only liberalise the economy if ZCTU was weakened and this 
is exactly what he did. He deliberately introduced legislation that would divide the 
labour movement, imposed leaders on ZCTU through bribery and manipulation and 
his economic policies finally destroyed the movement. ZCTU has never fully 
recovered since then” (Zambia: Author interview 33: 2012).  
 
By 2002, new leaders had emerged within ZCTU who were not beholden to MMD 
administration, comparatively confrontational towards the state and gradually started to revive 
and assert the autonomy and independence of the organisation, union interests and challenged 
MMD on SAPs and political accountability (Akwetey and Kraus, 2007). This was mainly in 
response to protests and disappointment by the rank and file members of the organisation whose 
interests had been neglected by ZCTU for over a decade and suffered from the massive failures 
of the economic recovery through SAPs. As Simon (2005) has noted, the new leadership in 
both ZCTU and FFTUZ135intensified opposition to MMD on issues such as corruption, 
economic failures, flawed national elections, violence against the opposition political parties 
and the failed constitutional review process. In 2004, ZCTU called for a one-day national strike 
by all public servants in opposition to the new taxes, wages and housing allowance freeze in 
the budget. The call was followed by demonstrations and protests outside parliament. MMD 
threatened to arrest the workers but later bowed to pressure and rescinded the decision.136 In 
2005, ZCTU joined other civil society groups in demanding for a constitutional assembly to 
approve the draft constitution. In 2006, ZCTU distanced itself from MMD and supported an 
opposition political party (Akwetey and Kraus, 2007).  
The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions was the strongest, credible and the most vocal 
labour union in Zambia before the political transition in 1991. With the outlawing of opposition 
political parties, it became the sole opposition group to the one-party political system and built 
a history of resistance and credibility with the workers and the Zambian populace. It established 
                                                             
 
135 Leonard Hikaumba and Joyce Nonde were elected as Presidents of ZCTU and FFTUZ respectively. 
136 Times of Zambia, February 11, 2004. 
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and led a political party to victory in the first multi-party general elections in Zambia. However, 
in the post-transitional political and institutional dispensation, ZCTU was politically 
appropriated by MMD administrations from 1991 to 2002, which undermined its autonomy and 
independence and circumscribed its ability to contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation during that time. Although the newly elected leaders of ZCTU have revived the 
organisation, it will take a long time for ZCTU to regain its previous autonomy, legitimacy, 
trust with the population, and resources to rebuilt and become a significant political force in the 
process of governance and democratic consolidation in Zambia.  
5.5. Political propaganda and Selective harassment of Advocacy groups in Kenya 
and Zambia 
 
Although both Kenya and Zambia can be considered as electoral democracies, the 
administrations that took over power after the transitions in the early 1990s have continued to 
employ state propaganda and selective harassment as strategies to undermine and control the 
activities of advocacy groups. Political propaganda directed at advocacy groups by the state is 
aimed at tarnishing the reputation of these groups with the public to weaken their legitimacy 
and credibility as representatives of public interests. Selective harassment, on the other hand, is 
used by the state to intimidate, threaten and silence voices from advocacy groups that are 
perceived to be critical of state policies, actions, and governance style. The use of these 
strategies by the state emanates from the fear of activists’ challenge to state policies, legitimacy, 
and autonomy. Both countries have also employed the Public Order Acts and Sedition laws to 
justify their actions of harassment and intimidation of advocacy groups, while the actual 
objective of such actions is the curtailment of advocacy groups’ activities.  The use state 
propaganda to restrict the activities of advocacy groups take various forms, including, branding 
advocacy groups as “agents of foreign interests” serving “imperial agenda” since most of these 
groups depend on external funding for their activities. The groups have also been branded as 
“unpatriotic,” “evil society,” and in some cases referred to as “mercenaries” of foreign agents.  
In extreme cases, selective harassment has taken the form of police brutality in breaking up 
demonstrations and protests, killing of journalists and civil society activists, raids into advocacy 
group offices and confiscation of essential documents and equipment, besides arbitrary arrests 
and detention without charges. 
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In Kenya, the use of state propaganda and state-sanctioned harassment of advocacy 
groups was rampant during the authoritarian regime until 2002 when the country witnessed the 
first regime change through free and fair and democratic elections. However, state propaganda 
and the onslaught on advocacy groups peaked up and intensified from 2013 when the Jubilee 
administration took over power from the Grand Coalition government. The deep-seated 
mistrust between advocacy groups and the new Jubilee administration stem from the historical 
relationship between the two groups during the one-party system and the first two terms of the 
multiparty system when most of the Jubilee leaders were part of the Moi administration under 
the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Advocacy groups were opposed to the 
authoritarianism and economic mismanagement under the one-party system and continued to 
oppose the policies of the Moi administration under the multi-party system (1992-2002).  This 
created a frosty and conflictual relationship with the regime.  
Secondly, the relationship between Jubilee administration and advocacy groups was 
further strained over the International Criminal Court (ICC) charges against President Uhuru 
Kenyatta and his deputy, for their alleged role in the 2007/2008 post-election violence in which 
an estimated 1,333 people were killed and over 650,000 displaced. The administration accused 
advocacy groups of providing faulty evidence to the Commission that investigated and 
recommended the cases to the ICC, conspiring with the ICC over the trials through coaching of 
witnesses and supporting the ICC process.137 In March 2013, the President’s Director of Digital 
Media and Diaspora published a list of names of representatives of civil society organisations 
and members of opposition political parties in the social media and referred to them as “evil” 
backers of the ICC.138The list exposed these representatives of civil society and political parties 
to possible harassment, danger and, physical harm by supporters of the Jubilee administration 
and injured their credibility and reputation. Despite protests from these representatives of civil 
society and political parties, the Jubilee administration did not take any action against the 
official. In May 2013, advocacy groups organised a demonstration over Kenya’s MPs demands 
for a 60 percent salary increase from $6,300 per month to $10,000 per month. Advocacy groups 
had argued that the country was unable to afford such high salaries amid rising debts, ballooning 
                                                             
 
137 Daily Nation, October 24th, 2014 “State Targeting us over support for Hague Case, civil society protests 
138 Daily Nation, “ICC Judges warning over revealing identity of witnesses,” 26th February 2015 
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wage bill, increasing inequality and widespread poverty in the country. The groups used pigs 
and blood to symbolize the greediness of the Members of parliament. The demonstrations were 
broken up with tear gas and sheer police brutality.139 During this time, the government had 
adopted a pattern of political propaganda campaign, profiling and vilifying advocacy groups 
and individuals on social media and demonizing civil society as a “web of evil society,” 
representing and pursuing foreign interests.140 Advocacy groups were also accused of being 
agents of the Open Society Institute, local UNDP staff and the British, Finish, Dutch and 
German governments.141  
The Jubilee administration, further, accused advocacy groups of using human rights 
campaigns to advance western interests and values. The propaganda campaign was aimed at 
discrediting advocacy groups’ activities and legitimacy with the public, especially on issues of 
the ICC process and to promote a discourse that paints these groups as agents of external forces 
bent on compromising the country’s security and sovereignty. Additionally, the government 
put pressure on International donors to stop funding groups which it perceived to be supporting 
the ICC process and critical of the Jubilee administration policies. This strategy was clearly 
articulated by the President on October 20th, 2014  when he addressed the nation on Mashujaa 
day (Hero’s Day). The President castigated western donors for funding civil society 
organisations for their own economic and geopolitical interests at the expense of Kenya’s 
domestic interests and characterized civil society groups as “unelected, and unaccountable 
institutions that answer to foreign powers.”142Following the same pattern, in 2016, the President 
condemned NGOs working in the field of civic education, accusing them of providing civic 
education tailored to influence the electoral outcome in the interests of their foreign funders and 
threatened to stop them from receiving foreign funding143. 
 
                                                             
 
139 BBC, 14th May 2013, Kenya: Nairobi City hit by pig protests over MP pay. 
140 Daily Nation, 18th March 2013 “Foreign interests funding civil society to compromise Kenya’s Sovereignty by 
James Kimalel. 
141 Daily Nation, 18th March 2013 “Foreign interests funding civil society to compromise Kenya’s Sovereignty by 
James Kimalel. 
142 President Uhuru Kenyatta Mashujaa Day Speech, October 20th, 2014 available from 
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The situation in Zambia is no different from that of Kenya. Successive MMD 
administrations have effectively used political propaganda and selective harassment of 
advocacy groups as a strategy to control and restrict the activities of these groups. The post-
transitional Chiluba administration use of political propaganda and selective harassment of 
advocacy groups, the media and opposition political parties was similar to President Kaunda’s 
one-party system years. Several examples illustrate the state propaganda and harassment 
campaign. In February, 1996, the Speaker of the Zambian parliament ordered for the immediate 
arrest of three Post editorial staff for contempt of parliament for failing to withdraw and 
apologise to the speaker about an article published by the paper, which the speaker claimed to 
be “inflammatory” and meant to lower the dignity of the house (HRW, 1996, p. 19-21). The 
editors were arrested and spent three nights in jail until the high court ordered for their release. 
In the same year, police raided the offices of the Zambia Independent Monitoring Team 
(ZIMT), the Committee for a Clean Campaign (CCC) and the Inter-Africa Network for Human 
Rights and Development (AFRONET) for declaring the elections “not free and fair.” They 
seized computers, files, and financial records and later charged the directors of the organisations 
with “receiving funding from foreign countries” under a 30-year-old law that prohibited NGOs 
from receiving foreign funding without written permission from the President (Amnesty 
International, 1997).  
In December 1996, President Chiluba accused some NGOs of working in the interest of 
their foreign funders to the detriment of Zambia’s domestic interests. He noted that; 
“We must have regulatory systems in place to ensure that Zambia does not become a breeding 
ground for ‘mercenaries.’ We have to know who funds these NGOs to ensure our internal 
safety.”144  
 
The President was conveying a message to the country that advocacy groups were agents of 
foreign interests with the goal of tarnishing the reputation, legitimacy, and credibility of these 
groups in the eyes of the public. FODEP concluded in its report that the 1996 general elections 
were “neither free nor fair” and faced vicious attacks from the government including charges 
of tax evasion which were created to freeze its accounts (Dwyer and Zeilig, 2012). In January 
1997, while opening parliament, President Chiluba accused the local election monitors, who 
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had declared the 1996 general elections as illegitimate of being “unpatriotic” and informed 
parliament that a new law would be introduced for state regulation of election monitoring 
groups and NGOs. The same year, President Chiluba declared a state of emergency following 
accusations against UNIP members of parliament of an attempted coup (Bartlett 2000). The 
state used the emergency regulations to clamp down on opposition political parties, the media 
and civil society groups perceived to be anti-government and banned all public gatherings. 
President Levy Mwanawasa, who succeeded Chiluba on January 2002 continued with the 
pattern of political propaganda and selective harassment of the media, opposition political 
parties, and advocacy groups. He additionally, used police brutality and arbitrary arrests 
towards these groups (IPI, 2005, p. 12) and continuously questioned civil society accountability 
thus; 
 “The government can be called to account for funding. These NGOs just chew the donor money 
and carry on with business as usual. No one asks them anything.”145  
 
In 2004, Mwanawasa complained that civic groups were operating like opposition 
political parties rather than partners in development with the government (Geloo, 2004). The 
same year, he banned the activities of the Oasis Forum-the coalition of advocacy groups that 
had spearheaded the Anti-Third Term campaign against President Chiluba in 2001.146President 
Rupiah Banda who took over the presidency after the sudden death of President Mwanawasa in 
2008 is considered the worst President in the treatment of advocacy groups in Zambia. He 
employed high-handed strategies to control and curtail the activities of advocacy groups and is 
credited for introducing and passing the most restrictive and intrusive NGO legislation in the 
country. Additionally, he frequently relied on the use of the Public Order Act to intimidate, 
threaten, brutalize and arrest advocacy group activists to muzzle any voices which he perceived 
as critical to his government policies and actions. For example, during the debate in parliament 
on the controversial NGO Bill in 2009, several advocacy groups led by CARITAS organised a 
forum to discuss the Bill and submit their views to the government. However, the meeting was 
violently disrupted by the Zambian police and several advocacy group leaders arrested under 
                                                             
 
145 Health-Zambia: NGOs in the hot seat, available at www.ipsnews.net/2004/03/health-zambia-ngos-in-the-hot-seat/ 
146 Zambia: Mwanawasa needs to change Attitude towards Civil Society, The Post, 12th July 2004. 
292 
 
the Public Order Act (Zambia: Author interview, 32:2012). The leaders were later released 
without charges.   
During Michael Sata’s presidency, there was an alarming increase in the enforcement 
of the Public Order Act (POA) against advocacy groups, the media, and opposition political 
parties. Civil society groups questioned the interpretation and manipulation of the Act by the 
police and the violence involved in stopping public meetings, protests, and demonstrations. The 
administration effectively used the POA to curtail the freedom of association, expression, and 
assembly of political parties and advocacy groups. In 2012, the Law Association of Zambia 
(LAZ) filed a petition in the high court to challenge the constitutionality of certain provisions 
of the POA on the grounds of its susceptibility to misinterpretation and manipulation.  LAZ 
argued that by using the Act in the manner in which the Sata administration was doing, the state 
was manipulating the law to prevent members of opposition parties from holding meetings and 
sometimes arresting and imprisoning them for several days without charges. The meetings were 
also violently disbanded if held without police approval. The high court dismissed the petition 
for lacking merit and wrongly taken to court.147The use of selecting harassment and state 
propaganda on advocacy groups has, therefore, been rampant in both Kenya and Zambia 
throughout the post-transitional political and institutional dispensation as a strategy by the 
newly democratic states to control and restrict the activities of advocacy groups and this has 
reduced the ability of these groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation. 
Table 5. 1: Summary of State Strategies in Kenya and Zambia 
State 
Strategy 
Co-optation Use of NGO 
Legislation 
Political 
appropriation 
Selective 
harassment 
Political 
Propaganda 
Kenya ++ +++ ++ ++ ++ 
Zambia -+ ++ ++ -+ ++ 
 
Source: Author created from qualitative data obtained through field research in Kenya and 
Zambia 
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5.6. Implications for democratic consolidation in Kenya and Zambia 
 
The democratic states that emerged in Kenya and Zambia and several other African 
countries in the early 1990s have continued to perceive advocacy groups in purely political 
terms and, therefore, competitors for legitimacy, territorial hegemony, resources, and 
autonomy. Just like their authoritarian predecessors, the newly democratic states have 
deliberately employed strategies of direct and quasi-co-optation, the use of NGO legislation, 
political appropriation, political propaganda and selective harassment to control and restrict the 
activities of advocacy groups in the new political and institutional dispensation. These strategies 
have led to the shrinking civic space for the operations of civil society groups and constrained 
the ability of advocacy groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation. The study found that the use of direct and quasi-co-optation by the state to control 
the activities of advocacy groups has been more popular in Kenya than Zambia. The new 
democratic regime in Kenya after 2002 dramatically expanded the scope of co-optation to 
include both direct and quasi-co-optation of advocacy groups’ leadership into state bureaucracy. 
Both types of co-optation have constrained advocacy groups ability to effectively contribute to 
the process of democratic consolidation in several ways.  
Firstly, direct co-optation has depleted advocacy group sector’s critical human resource 
capacity in the form of skills, knowledge, experience, and leadership by absorbing most of its 
luminaries into state bureaucracy, a resource, which is crucial if the sector is to effectively 
contribute to the institutionalization of democracy. The new political and institutional 
dispensation needs advocacy groups’ active involvement in policy discussions which require 
technical skills, knowledge, and capacity, which advocacy groups have substantially lost to the 
state through co-optation. The majority of those co-opted had worked in the advocacy sector 
since the early 1990s, created crucial networks and relationships within the political system and 
the international donor community and accumulated a wealth of experience from their 
participation in the pro-democracy movement that pushed for the restoration of democracy and 
political pluralism. They thus understand the issues and the strategies for achieving political 
change much better than the young, inexperienced generation of advocacy group leaders who 
have taken over after their movement into state bureaucracy. Some of the new leaders have not 
bothered about political activism.  
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Advocacy groups are thus experiencing a leadership transition from the first generation 
of advocacy group leaders to the second generation of new leaders who are struggling to steer 
these organisations at the most critical time when the country is undergoing a significant social 
and political transformation in its governance structures and processes. The two quotations 
below from advocacy group leaders interviewed for this study illustrate the feeling of enormous 
loss within the sector; 
“Some of the co-opted advocacy groups’ leaders by the government are simply irreplaceable, 
regardless of what we may think of their performance while in government” (Kenya: Author 
interview, 20: 2012). 
 
“The political revolution swallowed some of its most ardent soldiers from civil society, who 
have all but turned their backs away from the ideals of the democratic struggle. We did not see 
this coming” (Kenya: Author interview, 2:2012) 
 
Holmquist (2005) has captured this situation when he writes, 
 “Civil society thus experienced the shock of victory. Organizations depended on one or two 
leaders were ‘decapitated’ when those leaders departed for government offices. Organizations 
were further hobbled when funding from some donors declined. Remaining civil society leaders 
and groups were uncertain about an appropriate role to play with the Kibaki state.” 
 
The effect of the loss of leadership by the advocacy sector was evident during the 
constitutional review process, which was mainly controlled by the political class. Civil society 
groups only acted as a reference group with a lacklustre contribution to the process. Advocacy 
groups were disorganized, divided and thus lacked a coherent voice on most of the issues 
discussed at the constitutional review conference. Secondly, for a period after the regime 
change in 2002, the intense lobbying for government positions by advocacy group leaders 
created an environment of anxiety, uncertainty, and tension within the sector, which paralyzed 
the focus and activities of advocacy groups towards the process of democratic consolidation. 
Advocacy leaders who were still expecting government appointments retreated from criticising 
the government and ensuring public accountability in anticipation of such appointments. 
Responses by advocacy groups to national issues like corruption, and impunity became muted. 
The process of co-optation, therefore, depleted advocacy groups’ dynamism in tackling national 
issues and distracted their focus from their core mandates and missions.  
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Thirdly, the abrupt departure of most of the former advocacy group leaders into 
government had a disruptive and destabilising effect on advocacy groups in the country. Apart 
from losing experienced leaders, these groups also lost some of their funding from international 
donors who had built crucial goodwill and relationships with their former leaders over a long 
period. As Maina (1998) has noted, key international donors in Kenya consider the reputation 
of the leaders of civil society groups to be a critical factor in funding an organization. 
Organisations whose leadership left abruptly to join government included the Centre for 
Governance and Development (CGD), the Centre for Law Reform International (CLARION) 
and the NGO Council-the civil society umbrella statutory body, which all but collapsed under 
leadership wrangles and loss of funding. The collapse of the NGO Council had enormous 
ramifications for the civil society sector in the country, regarding its leadership, organisation, 
and coordination of NGO activities and consequently the ability of advocacy groups to 
effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation.  
Additionally, so much time was lost as the new leaders struggled to find their footing in 
the political scene and for some time crucial issues to the process of democratic consolidation 
such as public transparency and accountability and strengthening democratic institutions took 
a backseat. Moreover, co-optation of advocacy group leadership occurred at a critical time when 
the country was debating the formulation of a new constitution that would be the foundation 
for democratic consolidation and which required the contribution of advocacy groups. 
Advocacy groups, therefore, lost a crucial window of opportunity to contribute to the deepening 
of democracy in the country. Fourthly, advocacy groups’ contribution to the process of 
democratic consolidation was made worse since the majority of former advocacy group leaders, 
who were absorbed into the government abandoned the ideals, the values, and the principles 
they once championed while in civil society. They became conformists and the staunchest 
defenders of the status quo, thus slowing down the momentum for democratic reform in the 
country.  
The behaviour, the actions, and the poor performance of this group of former advocacy 
leadership, broadly tainted the image, the reputation, the credibility, and the legitimacy of the 
advocacy sector and civil society in the country thus constraining their capacity to mobilise 
public support for critical issues and interests that were crucial to the process of democratic 
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consolidation. One advocacy group leader interviewed for this study summarised the 
implications of the behaviour and actions of the co-opted advocacy groups leaders thus,  
“In the eyes of the public, the whole civil society was guilty of betraying the democratisation 
process because of these leaders” (Kenya: Author interview, 18:2012).  
 
Furthermore, the contribution of these former advocacy group leaders within the 
government was deplorable. They continuously supported retrogressive laws and policies that 
undermined the prospects for democratic consolidation, while some of them were implicated in 
cases of corruption and mismanagement of public funds. Musambayi (2004) argues that the 
behaviour of these former civil society leaders, while in government engendered 
disillusionment and loss of confidence in the democratisation process by the public. 
Additionally, the lack of support for the deepening of democracy by these leaders led to 
fundamental questions about the commitment and conviction of advocacy group leaders to the 
causes they claim to represent and champion. This waning influence of advocacy groups in the 
post-transitional dispensation was vividly captured by Mr. Cyprian Nyamwamu, the Executive 
Director of the New Democracy Foundation in Kenya when he wrote; 
“When NARC took over power in 2003, advocacy groups rapidly lost substantial influence and 
power over the constitutional review process and other governance issues in the country due to 
the loss of part of their leadership to government bureaucracy and the misguided belief that 
NARC was a civil society friendly government, turning them into mere spectators in the process 
of consolidating our democracy”148 
 
Finally, advocacy group leaders who simultaneously held both government and civil 
society positions found themselves in a precarious position of conflict of interest, which 
undermined their independence and autonomy to criticize the government in which they served. 
Moreover, civil society and government exist to serve very different purposes in society and 
are driven by very different logics. Merging both purposes in one individual was an impossible 
mission. Advocacy group leaders who served simultaneously as state commissioners became 
irrelevant as leaders of advocacy groups. The commissions in which they served such as the 
Kenya National Human Rights Commission (KNCHR) were doing much of the work that was 
previously done by advocacy groups, using similar strategies as advocacy groups, leading to 
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duplication of work, competition for scarce international donor resources and more importantly 
crowding out advocacy group from the civic space and, therefore, contributing to the closing 
civic space for civil society groups in both countries and undermining the ability of these groups 
to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation.  
The use of intrusive and restrictive NGO legislation by the newly democratic states of 
Kenya and Zambia to control and restrict the activities of advocacy groups had a significant 
effect on the ability of advocacy groups’ to effectively contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation. The intensity of using NGO legislation depended on each administration and the 
obtaining political and institutional environment. The use of intrusive NGO legislations created 
barriers to entry, operational activity, and self-regulation, therefore, constraining advocacy 
groups’ ability to contribute to the process of democratic consolidation and posing an existential 
threat to these groups. Firstly, barriers to entry are restrictions in the NGO Acts, which 
discourage the formation and registration of advocacy groups. Both the NGO Coordination Act 
of 1990 and the NGO Act of 2009 in Kenya and Zambia respectively, provided for the 
establishment of government-dominated boards with broadly defined discretionary powers over 
civil society registration processes. These boards have made arbitrary and prejudicial decisions 
on registration outcomes for advocacy groups based on vague grounds of denial of registration 
as discussed in this chapter.  Both legislations lack time limits in the application process, which 
creates uncertainty in the operations of advocacy groups.  Besides, the Zambia legislation has 
increased burden to advocacy groups by requiring compulsory registration and the need to 
specify administrative district and locations that organisations intend to conduct their activities 
as well as proposed sources of funding. This type of information impedes future expansion and 
effectiveness of these groups. Mandeep (2009) has argued that stringent conditions for 
registration of civil society groups are likely to stop new advocacy groups from registering and 
reduce the number of existing organisations.  
Secondly, barriers to operational activity are restrictions in the Acts that constraint 
legitimate activities of advocacy groups. In both countries, the government-dominated, and 
controlled boards have the powers to deregister any advocacy group based on undefined and 
vague grounds. For example, SACCORD was deregistered in Zambia in 2004 for posing a 
“danger to state security.” A phrase that is not explicitly defined in the Act.  This power was 
frequently used in both countries as discussed in this chapter to instill fear in advocacy groups 
298 
 
through intimidation, threats of deregistration and deregistration. It created an atmosphere of 
fear and mistrust that was not conducive to any constructive engagement between advocacy 
groups and the state. Additionally, the Zambian NGO Act had more restrictions on operations, 
including the requirement of re-registration after every five years, which affect advocacy 
groups’ stability, planning, and resource mobilisation and ignores the principle of the continued 
existence of public entities (Elone, 2010).  
The re-registration clause limits the number of small, locally-based advocacy groups in 
rural areas, which find it extremely difficult to meet the requirements for re-registration such 
as providing annual reports, audited accounts, funding sources and individual assets of their 
officials. It also makes advocacy groups vulnerable to manipulation by the government. Such 
interference is likely to reduce advocacy groups’ effectiveness in the process of democratic 
consolidation by distracting them from the reform agenda and destabilising their operations and 
programmes. Further, the requirement in both countries that advocacy groups must harmonize 
their activities with those of government’s national development plans, a process of 
administrative co-optation, forces, advocacy groups to fit into the rigid and bureaucratic 
governmental procedures of development administration. As explained by Fowler (1991), this 
process leads to the subordination of advocacy group choices by state organs, reduces advocacy 
groups’ effectiveness by interfering with their local sensitivity and comparative advantages, 
such as flexibility of operations, agenda setting, innovation and capability to reach the most 
vulnerable and the marginalised citizens in society.  
Thirdly, the barrier to self-regulation emanates from the requirement that the codes of 
conduct developed by civil society groups must be approved by the government-dominated 
NGO boards. In both countries, the code of conduct developed by advocacy groups must be 
discussed and approved by the government-controlled NGO board. This requirement 
undermines self-regulation by advocacy groups and extends control by the administrations. Due 
to these restrictive and intrusive provisions in the NGO legislations in both countries, some 
advocacy groups have re-oriented their work by shifting their programs to less sensitive areas 
of advocacy, while other groups such as the Legal Resources Foundation and PANOS Institute 
of Southern Africa in Zambia have registered as limited companies to avoid the complicated 
and restrictive burdensome bureaucratic procedures and control by the NGO board. These 
decisions and processes distract advocacy groups from their core mandates and focus, creating 
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a political and an institutional environment which is not conducive nor supportive of their 
efforts towards the process of democratic consolidation. The intrusive provisions discourage 
advocacy group-state engagement and partnership to promote democracy and development. 
The provisions also violate constitutional guarantees such as freedom of association, assembly 
and expression and other legal obligations under international laws, which support the work of 
advocacy groups. Overall, as discussed above, NGO legislation in both Kenya and Zambia are 
mostly aimed at controlling, restricting and curtailing the activities of advocacy groups rather 
than providing a facilitative and regulatory framework, which creates an enabling environment 
that supports the work of advocacy groups in promoting the democratization process in both 
countries.  
 The NGO legislations in both countries also undermine the autonomy, independence, 
and ability of advocacy groups to form coalitions and strategic partnerships that are crucial for 
articulating demands for democratic consolidation. The legislations repress critical voices 
through fear and intimidation by the powerful NGO Boards, which continually threaten 
advocacy groups with deregistration, besides the requirement for re-registration every five 
years. When advocacy groups involved in governance and democracy operate in a political 
environment of fear and intimidation, they cannot meaningfully hold the governments 
accountable, provide critical analysis of government policies nor push for crucial reforms that 
are necessary for democratic consolidation. Additionally, such NGO legislations cripple the 
enjoyment of fundamental freedoms and civil liberties by civil society groups, freedoms that 
are critical for democratic consolidation.  Elone (2010), therefore, concludes that “increasing 
regulation indicates a return to autocratic practices and a backlash against democratisation.” 
The political appropriation of NCCK and ZCTU in Kenya and Zambia respectively, due 
to personal, political and institutional factors in the post-transitional political and institutional 
environment as discussed in this chapter was unexpected as both organisations had provided 
leadership for the prodemocracy movements in their countries, which significantly contributed 
to the restoration of democracy and pluralism. Both organizations are umbrella organisations 
with a large membership, countrywide networks and control substantial amounts of resources. 
They also have a long history of democratic reform, credentials for defending social justice and 
human rights and acted as the sole opposition groups during the authoritarian period. 
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In Kenya, the political appropriation of NCCK led the organization to retreat from the 
public sphere and engagements in national issues. Its voice became muted, and the organization 
was no longer the custodian of democratic values, the conscience of society and the voice of 
the voiceless. NCCK abandoned its aggressive fight for democratic reforms and became an 
appendage of the state. Its continued alignment with the state also alienated most of its members 
and supporters. Most respondents interviewed for this study stated that the political 
appropriation of NCCK led to disagreements with some of its affiliate members over the 
organization’s mission and goals.149In the broader process of democratic consolidation, NCCK 
became irrelevant and insignificant by its failure to provide leadership and direction to civil 
society groups and the citizens in the constitutional review process and other important national 
issues from 2002 to 2008. The organization also got sucked into narrow, parochial, partisan and 
tribal politics, which muted its prophetic voice and damaged its credibility, reputation, 
legitimacy, and respect which it had built for many years of agitating for democratic reforms in 
the country. (Kenya: Author interviews, 9: 2012; 14: 2012; 15: 2012). Additionally, the 
appropriation of NCCK had enormous ramification for the whole of civil society in Kenya since 
it was the convener and coordinator of the governance and democracy civil society groups 
involved in the constitutional review process. These groups now lack a lead organization around 
which to organize to influence the process of democratic consolidation. 
In Zambia, political appropriation neutralized the ZCTU as a force for democratic 
consolidation (Burnell, 2000) and the organization ended up supporting SAPs policies such as 
privatization, civil servant retrenchment, removal of food and agricultural subsidies, reduction 
in social spending, all of which were detrimental to its own survival and the interests of its 
members. Aligning itself with the government prevented it from representing its members’ 
interests against SAP policies, which led to widespread poverty, inequality, and unemployment.  
ZCTU became weak, pliant and infiltrated by government operatives to the extent that it could 
hardly contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in the country.  Chibale (2009) has 
noted that the effects of SAPs almost killed the labour movement in Zambia through massive 
job losses, which led to a reduction of its membership and with-it reduction in revenues. 
Additionally, several unions disaffiliated from ZCTU and further weakened it.  
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These members established other national trade unions (Zambia: Author Interviews, 31:2012, 
32: 2012), which fragmented labour union movement in Zambia and further weakened their 
voices and contribution to the process of democratic consolidation. It must be noted that a trade 
union that cannot defend the interests of its members will not defend the interests of democracy. 
ZCTU, therefore, played a marginal role in the process of democratic consolidation in Zambia 
and by 2002, a decade after the transition to democracy, it had achieved very little in terms of 
democratic reforms. The years after 2002 have primarily been devoted to rebuilding the 
organization. 
The political appropriation of NCCK and ZCTU weakened and undermined these 
organisations’ autonomy, credibility, independence, and considerably constrained their ability 
to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. Through appropriation, 
both organizations were neutralized, compromised and almost destroyed.150Political 
appropriation sacrificed advocacy groups’ ability to hold the state accountable to democratic 
norms and procedures and compromised their ability to criticise the government and its policies. 
Additionally, state control of NCCK and ZCTU led to alienation of large sections of their 
membership from active and meaningful participation in their activities geared towards the 
process of democratic consolidation. The loss of such membership significantly reduced their 
resources and mobilization capacity. Political appropriation of both organizations had 
enormous and adverse effects on civil societies in both countries. It significantly affected civil 
society coordination, focus, and organization in both countries and therefore, their efforts 
towards democratic consolidation.  
Finally, political appropriation of the two organizations broadened and extended 
political patronage throughout both countries and weakened the unity of purpose that had 
helped galvanize advocacy groups during the democratic transition in both Kenya and Zambia. 
It is also difficult to achieve democratic consolidation in emerging democracies such as Kenya 
and Zambia when such large, well-established, well organised, well- resourced and influential 
organisations are appropriated by the state. Their appropriation by the newly democratic states 
demonstrates that there is no guarantee that organisations, which supported the democratic 
transition will necessarily support the process of democratic consolidation. In other words, 
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organizations that make the democratic transition possible can undermine the process of 
democratic consolidation.  
The study found that the use of state propaganda and selective harassment have also 
been significant strategies employed by the newly democratic states of Kenya and Zambia to 
control and restrict the activities of advocacy groups in the post-transitional and institutional 
environment. Although both countries are electoral democracies, their governments continue to 
view advocacy groups on purely political terms as competitors for legitimacy, resources, 
territorial hegemony, security, and autonomy. State propaganda is channelled through the 
media and other official platforms and framed advocacy groups as “foreign agents” serving 
imperial agenda, “evil society,” “sell-outs” and “unpatriotic” to undermine advocacy groups’ 
reputation, legitimacy, credibility, image, and role in the process of democratic consolidation. 
The use of state propaganda against advocacy groups in both countries led to deep mistrust and 
suspicion between advocacy groups and the state and thus undermined state-advocacy 
engagement in the policy-making processes and eroded public trust for advocacy groups. 
Additionally, state propaganda undermined advocacy groups’ efforts for public mobilisation 
and support for policies geared towards the process of democratic consolidation. It tarnished 
the image, reputation, and credibility of advocacy groups as representatives of the poor and the 
marginalized sections of society. 
The newly democratic states in both countries have also employed selective harassment 
as a strategy to control and curtail the activities of advocacy groups in the post-transitional 
political and institutional environment. Selective harassment has taken various forms, 
including, police brutality to break up peaceful demonstrations and protests, raids into advocacy 
group offices, arbitrary arrests, detention without charges and in extreme cases imprisonment. 
Additionally, both governments have used draconian laws such as the Public Order Acts and 
Sedition laws to harass advocacy groups perceived to be critical of the administrations’ policies 
and actions. While both governments have argued that the application of such laws is to 
maintain order and security, most respondents interviewed for this study reported that the real 
motivation behind the application of such laws is to control and curtail the activities and 
operations of advocacy groups based on suspicion and mistrust.  Selective harassment has 
created an environment of fear and intimidation for advocacy groups and, therefore, undermine 
their efforts towards the process of democratic consolidation.  
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Selective harassment also renders any meaningful engagement with the state in the 
process of democratic consolidation impossible and has distracted advocacy groups focus on 
reforms, wasted their resources, and time and impeded their efforts at holding the state 
accountable. In both countries, selective harassment by the state has forced several groups to 
engage in self-censorship by with-holding criticism of the government for fear of reprisals. 
Finally, the application of selective harassment of advocacy groups in both countries has 
continued to violate fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression, association, and 
assembly and thus undermine the process of democratic consolidation. 
5.7. Summary 
Using a modified framework of Fowler’s (1991) model on the strategies employed by 
the African authoritarian states to control and restrict the activities of NGOs, as explained in 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation, this chapter has analysed the various strategies employed by the 
newly democratic states in both Kenya and Zambia in the post-transitional and institutional 
dispensation to control and restrict the activities of advocacy groups. It has also examined and 
the implications of such strategies on the ability of these groups to effectively contribute to the 
process of democratic consolidation. The chapter has noted that the newly democratic states in 
both countries have continued to view advocacy groups in purely political terms as competitors 
for legitimacy, territorial hegemony, and autonomy. They have, therefore, replicated the same 
strategies that were used by their authoritarian predecessors to control and restrict the activities 
of these groups. The strategies include direct and quasi-co-optation, political appropriation, the 
use of NGO legislation, selective harassment and political propaganda.  
It is evident that direct and quasi-co-optation has been more dominantly used in Kenya 
than Zambia. Although the authoritarian state used administration co-optation to control the 
activities of advocacy groups, the newly democratic regimes in Kenya have expanded the scope 
of co-optation to include both direct and quasi-co-optation of advocacy leaders into state 
bureaucracy, and the numbers of co-opted advocacy group leaders have also exponentially 
increased. The first wave of direct and quasi-co-optation occurred during the National Rainbow 
Coalition (NARC) term in office. The government, which came to power with the support of 
advocacy groups co-opted large numbers of advocacy group leaders into its bureaucracy and 
various state commissions and task forces. 
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The chapter analyzed several competing motivations behind this wave of co-optation of 
advocacy leaders. Firstly, most advocacy groups had worked closely with NARC leaders while 
they were in opposition for many years and created close relationships and partnerships. 
Moreover, most advocacy groups had supported and campaigned for NARC during the 2002 
general elections. It was, therefore, apparent that NARC would look to civil society as a source 
of skills, knowledge, and experience in governance. Secondly, the study found evidence that 
direct and quasi-co-optation was a deliberate attempt by the NARC administration to weaken 
civil society to consolidate state power, while some respondents interviewed for this study saw 
it as a public relations exercise to please and attract international donor funding. Thirdly, other 
reasons given by respondents for direct and quasi-co-optation of advocacy group leaders into 
the state bureaucracy included personal ambitions of advocacy leaders to access state power, 
economic livelihood, genuine belief in democratic transformation and lack of commitment of 
advocacy leaders to democratic ideals, which they purport to represent and champion while in 
civil society. The chapter also discussed the view that the large scale direct and quasi-co-
optation of advocacy groups after the regime change in Kenya was as a consequence of elite re-
alignment after decades of exclusion from the state by the Moi administration. The chapter also 
noted that advocacy group leaders are not victims of co-optation but active participants in the 
process through lobbying for positions in the state bureaucracy. 
The chapter noted that the performance of co-opted advocacy group leaders while in 
government had little impact on the process of democratic consolidation.  The idealists within 
the group were frustrated with the commitment and the pace of reforms by the administration 
and resigned within two years in office, while the moderates achieved incremental reforms. The 
conformists who comprised the largest group of co-opted advocacy group leaders easily 
abandoned the ideals, values, and principles of democratic reforms, which they had championed 
while in civil society and capitulated to the whims of the state, becoming the staunchest 
defenders of the status quo. Their behaviour led to fundamental questions about the 
commitment and conviction of advocacy group leaders to the causes and values that they claim 
to represent while in civil society.  The second wave of direct and quasi-co-optation which was 
much larger than the first wave occurred during the Grand Coalition government (2008-2012) 
tenure after the promulgation of the new constitution in 2010 which created hundreds of 
constitutional offices and independent constitutional commissions.  
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In Zambia, direct and quasi-co-optation as strategies to control the activities of advocacy 
groups were not as popular as was in the case of Kenya for several reasons. Firstly, the 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), which took over power in the first multi-party 
general elections in 1991 was dominated by business people and labour, and, therefore, 
excluded civil society groups. Secondly, while the Chiluba administration embraced the 
business community to implement SAPs, he deliberately alienated advocacy groups, since they 
had long opposed the SAPs. Thirdly, the lack of commitment to democratic reforms and the 
authoritarian tendencies of successive MMD administrations contributed to the marginalization 
of advocacy groups from policy-making and the governance processes. The Patriotic Front (PF) 
government, which took over power in 2011 showed some signs of commitment to working 
with advocacy groups, but soon reneged on its promises to amend the NGO Act of 2009. 
However, the Sata administration co-opted several advocacy group leaders into its bureaucracy 
and the technical committee of the constitutional review commission.   
The chapter also examined the use of NGO legislation in both countries to control and 
restrict the activities of advocacy groups in the post-transitional and institutional political 
environment. It noted that both Kenya and Zambia have significantly relied on the use of NGO 
legislation to control the activities of these groups leading to the shrinking civic space for the 
operations of advocacy groups and, therefore, constraining their ability to effectively contribute 
to the process of democratic consolidation.  The use of NGO legislation is motivated by a deep 
sense of suspicion, and mutual mistrust between advocacy groups and the newly democratic 
states due to advocacy groups challenge to the state’s legitimacy, autonomy, and territorial 
hegemony.  In Kenya, the government enacted an intrusive NGO Coordination Act in 1990 to 
control the growing civil society calls for the restoration of democracy and pluralism in the 
country. The Act established the NGO Co-ordination board, a government-controlled board 
with enormous discretionary powers over civil society groups’ activities. The board was used 
to deregister any organization that was perceived to be critical of the government.  
The use NGO legislation to control and restrict the activities of advocacy groups 
considerably reduced during the NARC administration (2002-2007) and the Grand Coalition 
Government (2008-2012) but peaked in 2013 when the Jubilee administration assumed power 
and adopted a systematic anti-civil society strategy, which disproportionately targeted advocacy 
groups. The anti-civil society campaign emanated from the historically frosty relationship 
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between advocacy groups and the Jubilee party leadership, who were part of the Moi’s 
authoritarian regime and the support of advocacy groups for the ICC process, which had 
charged President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy for their alleged involvement in the post-
election violence of 2007/2008. The administration has thus used the NGO legislation to 
deregister hundreds of advocacy groups and threatened others with deregistration. 
 In the case of Zambia, NGO legislation has prominently been used to control and 
restrict the activities of advocacy groups since the political transition in 1991. All the MMD 
administrations which ruled the country for two decades until 2011 continued with authoritarian 
tendencies under the democratic setting and used NGO legislation to target advocacy groups 
which they perceived to be critical of their policies and the governance style. However, the 
study found that most respondents considered the Banda administration (2008-2011) as the 
worst in terms of using NGO legislation to curtail the activities of advocacy groups. It made the 
boldest step and enacted one of the most restrictive and intrusive NGO legislation in 2009. Most 
advocacy groups viewed the Act as repressive and meant to undermine NGOs autonomy and 
independence, besides instilling fear and intimidation on its members and officials. The Act 
includes several contentious clauses, which could constrain the registration and operations of 
NGOs in the country. 
The chapter also discussed the strategy of political appropriation using the case of the 
NCCK and ZCTU in Kenya and Zambia respectively, to illustrate the effects of political 
appropriation on the ability of advocacy groups to contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation. Both organizations played a significant role in the process of democratic 
transition in their countries but were faced with a strategic dilemma when the political parties 
which they had closely worked with and supported in the opposition assumed power. Both were 
politically appropriated but for different reasons. NCCK made a policy decision to embrace 
“principled collaboration” with the NARC government, which its leadership believed was 
committed to the institutionalization of democracy. This decision marked a significant turning 
point for the transformation of the organization’s relationship with the state and its role in the 
democratization process. Other factors that influenced NCCK decision to co-operate with the 
state included ethnicity, co-optation of its Secretary-General into state bureaucracy and its new 
brand of leaders who were less vocal and political than their predecessors. NCCK acquiesced 
to the whims of the state and retreated from the public space. It became lenient and cordial with 
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the state, less vocal on national issues and adopted an unusual silence on matters of democratic 
governance and consolidation. 
The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), which was behind the formation of 
MMD found itself in the same predicament as the NCCK in Kenya after the democratic 
transition. It supported the new administration as its leaders believed that they were the 
government. The state, on the other hand, used both market and corporatist strategies to 
appropriate ZCTU to consolidate power and to implement SAPs which had long been opposed 
by ZCTU during the Kaunda years. The state also directly interfered in the internal affairs of 
the union to select and co-opt union leaders who were friendly to MMD. These maneuvers 
weakened the ZCTU by causing splits and divisions and leading to the emergence of other 
national federations of unions. Market strategies used by the MMD included the passing of 
restrictive legislation which abolished mandatory unionization of workers and led to the 
proliferation of many unions, thus weakening ZCTU. Privatization and public-sector 
retrenchment under SAPs also significantly reduced ZCTU membership and revenue base, thus 
further weakened the organization. Political appropriation undermined ZCTU autonomy, 
independence, authority and mobilization strategies. The organization supported policies that 
were detrimental to its own survival and hardly contributed to the process of democratic 
consolidation.  
Finally, the chapter analyzed the use of state propaganda and selective harassment to 
control and restrict the activities of advocacy groups in the post-transitional countries of Kenya 
and Zambia. In Kenya, the use of state propaganda and state-sanctioned harassment of advocacy 
groups has intensified since 2013 after the Jubilee administration took over power from the 
Grand Coalition government. The deep-seated mistrust between advocacy groups and the 
Jubilee administration stem from the historical relationship between the two groups during the 
one-party system when most of the Jubilee leaders were part of the Moi administration and 
KANU. Advocacy groups were opposed to authoritarianism and the one-party system. The 
relationship between advocacy groups and the administration was further strained over the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) charges against President Kenyatta and his deputy for 
alleged role in the 2007/08 post-election violence. The administration accused advocacy groups 
of providing evidence to the ICC, coaching witnesses and supporting the ICC process. The 
state, therefore, resorted to the use of selective harassment and political propaganda to control 
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and restrict the activities of advocacy groups. The state has also employed police brutality, 
arbitrary arrests, and detention and in some cases imprisonment. The government also engaged 
in a sustained campaign of vilification of advocacy groups. The situation in Zambia was no 
different from that of Kenya. Successive MMD administrations have effectively used political 
propaganda and selective harassment of advocacy groups as a strategy to control and restrict 
the activities of these groups. The state has targeted advocacy groups with arbitrary arrests and 
detention,  police brutality in breaking up protests and demonstrations and police raids of 
advocacy groups offices and confiscation of equipment. Advocacy groups have also been 
described as “mercenaries,” “unpatriotic,” “foreign agents,” “unaccountable” and unelectable 
groups, which are a danger to state security and sovereignty.  
The chapter concluded by examining the implication of state strategies on advocacy 
groups’ ability to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in Kenya 
and Zambia. The strategies employed by the newly democratic states in both countries have led 
to the shrinking political space for the operations of advocacy groups and, therefore, limited 
their activities meant to support the consolidation of democracy. The use of direct and quasi-
co-optation of advocacy group leadership robbed the sector of critical human resource capacity, 
skills, experience, and leadership that is crucial if the sector is to contribute to the process of 
democratic consolidation. The intense lobbying of political appointments within the advocacy 
sector created tensions and anxiety which distracted the groups from focusing on and supporting 
the process of democratic consolidation. Moreover, the abrupt departure of former advocacy 
group leaders into government disrupted and destabilized most advocacy groups in the country 
at a critical time of the constitutional review process. Co-optation depleted the dynamism of 
advocacy groups leading to muted and discordant voices within the sector. The failure of most 
of the co-opted leaders to support democratic consolidation while in government has dented the 
image, reputation, credibility, and legitimacy of the advocacy sector, reducing its capacity to 
mobilize public support for issues and interests that are crucial to the process of democratic 
consolidation. The use of intrusive NGO legislations have created barriers to entry, barriers to 
operational activity and barriers to self-regulation thus constituting not just severe constraints 
on the ability of advocacy groups to contribute to the process of democratic consolidation but 
also posing an existential threat to these groups.  
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The NGO legislations enacted in both countries have established a government-
dominated and controlled board with broadly defined discretionary powers over civil society 
registration processes, leading to arbitrary and prejudicial decisions on registration outcomes 
for advocacy groups. There are also vague grounds for denial of registration and lack of time 
limits on application decisions, creating uncertainty, and discouraging new advocacy groups 
from registering. The legislations have also created barriers to the operational activity of 
advocacy groups through the tight control of activities, intimidation and reporting procedures. 
These measures have violated fundamental rights and freedoms and created an environment of 
fear, mistrust, and intimidation that is not conducive to effective engagement in the process of 
democratic consolidation. This kind of environment has also affected advocacy groups’ 
stability, planning, and resource mobilization. The requirement of harmonization of advocacy 
group activities with those of the national government’s development plans has affected their 
choices, local sensitivity and comparative advantages such as flexibility of operations, agenda 
setting, innovation and reaching the poor and the marginalized. NGO legislation has also 
affected advocacy groups’ self-regulation by insisting that the government body must approve 
codes developed by advocacy groups. Advocacy groups have reacted to these constraints by re-
orienting their work to fewer sensitive areas, scaling back their activities and registering as 
limited companies, among other responses. These decisions and processes have reduced the 
ability of these groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation 
besides discouraging advocacy group-state partnership to promote democracy and 
development. The legislations have undermined the autonomy, independence, and ability of 
advocacy groups to form coalitions that are crucial for articulating demands for democratic 
consolidation.  
The political appropriation of NCCK and ZCTU in Kenya and Zambia respectively 
compromised their autonomy, independence, and credibility and, thus, undermined their 
freedom and efforts at contributing to democratic consolidation.  In Kenya, NCCK retreated 
from the public sphere, and its voice on national issues became muted. It was no longer the 
custodian of democratic values, the conscience of society and the voice of the voiceless. In 
Zambia, the ZCTU was thoroughly neutralized as a force for democratic consolidation. It could 
not defend the interests of its members and supported SAPs policies that were detrimental to its 
membership interests and its own survival.  The movement became extremely weak and played 
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a marginal role in the process of democratic consolidation in Zambia. Political appropriation of 
NCCK and ZCTU alienated large sections of society from active and meaningful participation 
in the process of democratic consolidation. The appropriation of both organisations also 
affected the focus and commitment of civil society to democratic consolidation as these groups 
were the lead organisations within civil society. The political appropriation of NCCK and 
ZCTU by the state demonstrates that it is not a guarantee that organisations that make the 
democratic transition possible will play a significant role in the process of democratic 
consolidation.  
Finally, the use of state propaganda has eroded the credibility, image, trust, reputation, 
and legitimacy of advocacy groups with the public and thus undermined their efforts for public 
mobilization and support for the process of democratic consolidation. Selective harassment, on 
the other hand, has created an environment of fear, intimidation, and mutual mistrust between 
civil society and the state, therefore, undermining any meaningful engagement in the process 
of democratic consolidation. It has distracted advocacy groups focus, operations, wasted their 
resources, and time and thus undermined their contributions to the democratization process. It 
also violates fundamental rights of advocacy groups such as freedom of association, assembly, 
and expression which are an essential part of a democratic system, thereby weakening the 
prospects for democratic consolidation in both countries. The next chapter examines the process 
of popular disengagement from advocacy groups and their effects on the ability of advocacy 
groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in both Kenya and 
Zambia. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ADVOCACY GROUPS AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION: FROM 
ENCHANTMENT TO DISILLUSIONMENT AND POPULAR 
DISENGAGEMENT IN KENYA AND ZAMBIA 
 
“There is no greater threat to democracy than indifference and passivity on the part of citizens” 
(Bronislaw Geremek, 1992, p. 11) 
 
“Disengagement is highly relevant to the whole democratic project. The institutions of 
democracy can be created by fiat, regardless of the disengagement of many, but the 
institutionalisation of democracy necessitates engagement” (Baker, 2001, p. 195) 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Active citizen participation sustained commitment and support for the pro-democracy 
movements in both Kenya and Zambia in the early 1990s were critical for the success of these 
movements in dislodging authoritarian systems from power. Citizens participated in these 
movements through various means, including attendance to political rallies, demonstrations and 
mass protests, which forced authoritarian regimes to accept democracy and pluralism. The 
people were thus at the core of Africa’s “second liberation” struggle151or what Ranger (2008) 
refers to as the “second democratic revolution.” The people constituted the “pressure from 
below” which helped push for the collapse of authoritarian regimes, which had entrenched 
economic mismanagement and poor governance in the continent. (Kraus, 1995; Bratton, 1994; 
Bayles and Szeftel, 1992). Mass protests, therefore, played a critical role in the political 
liberalization in the continent (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). Equally important was the fact 
that advocacy groups which were part of the prodemocracy movements were as strong as their 
active membership participation in their activities, contributing their skills, values, and 
experience to the prodemocracy movement. The level of participation and political efficacy of 
individual membership of advocacy groups, therefore, determine their relative health and 
strength. It is the membership in such groups which makes them become the “people's 
organisations” (Duthy and Duthy, 2003). 
                                                             
 
151 Ali Mazrui, “Kenya: Between Two Liberation Struggles” West Africa, 2-8, September 1991, p.1450 
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 Cohen and Arato (1992, p. ix) have thus concluded that ordinary people are agents of 
modern civil society, creating it through “forms of self-constitution and self-mobilization.” 
Moreover, “public interest groups” (Berry, 1977) such as advocacy groups derive their 
legitimacy from their membership and support from ordinary citizens. 152 In Zambia, Chanda 
(1995, p. 127) noted that the “people were prepared for change, and all that MMD153 had to do 
was to present itself as the legitimate alliance of people, who provided that alternative.” 
Similarly, Sachikonye (1995, p. viii) has argued that the rise of MMD to power “represented a 
new context in which people's role was more representative and decisive, therefore, making a 
new level of state organisation and political consciousness.” Similarly, in Kenya, it was the 
masses through their active participation in the pro-democracy movement, which sustained 
political protests and demonstrations for the restoration of democracy and pluralism amid 
violent and fierce police brutality, threats, intimidation and arbitrary arrests and detention by 
the incumbent regime.  
The direct involvement of the masses in the political transition revived a sense of 
collective purpose (Holmquist 2005) and created a high level of “hope capital” (Mungui-
Pappidi 2002), which is an essential political and social resource for the process of democratic 
consolidation. This situation led to the building of unrealistic expectations by the masses on the 
assumption that the political transition would lead to both economic development and the 
institutionalization of democracy. However, Havel (1985) believes that without such hope, 
freedom and democracy would not be possible. Two decades later, citizens have become 
sceptical of the very possibility of democracy in both Kenya and Zambia with increasing 
unemployment, inequality, corruption and poverty and they are blaming both the state and 
advocacy groups, a process that has led to disillusionment, discontent, disappointment, and 
ultimately popular disengagement from advocacy groups in both Kenya and Zambia, impacting 
on their ability to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. 
                                                             
 
152 Legitimacy refers to the “perceptions by key stakeholders that the existence, activities and impacts of civil 
society groups are justifiable and appropriate in terms of central social values and institutions” (Brown and 
Jagananda, 2007) 
153 MMD is the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy-the opposition political party that dislodged the United 
National Independence Party of former President Kenneth Kaunda after the re-introduction of multi-party 
democracy in Zambia in 1991. 
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This chapter, therefore, shifts our attention and focus of analysis from the constraints 
confronting advocacy groups emanating from state actions and the post-transitional political 
and institutional context as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 to the dynamics of the interaction of 
advocacy groups with their own membership in the rapidly changing process of democratization 
in both Kenya and Zambia. The chapter employs an experiential approach154 to examine the 
nature, the pattern, and the significance of popular disengagement on advocacy groups’ ability 
to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. It argues that the 
experiences, the choices, and the reactions of individuals towards advocacy groups performance 
in the selected countries, provide the best way to assess, understand and explain their 
relationship with advocacy groups in a comparative perspective in the process of democratic 
consolidation.  
The core assumption here is that people’s experiences and how they interpret those 
experiences inform and shape their behaviour and reaction towards advocacy groups’ 
performance in the process of democratic consolidation. The chapter draws from a detailed 
analysis of qualitative data obtained from both Kenya and Zambia through in-depth semi-
structured personal interviews with ordinary citizens. The chapter proceeds as follows; section 
one discusses the nature of popular disengagement from advocacy groups focusing on macro, 
meso and micro-scale factors, while section two is devoted to analysing the pattern of 
disengagement from advocacy groups, focusing on individual and collective responses, social 
clustering, selectivity of the process of disengagement and forms of popular disengagement in 
both countries. The chapter concludes by analysing the implications of popular disengagement 
from advocacy groups on their ability to effectively contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation. A summary of the chapter then follows.  
 
 
                                                             
 
154 People's subjective assessment of social, political and economic changes on their lives over-time (Howard 2003) 
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6.2. The nature of popular disengagement from advocacy groups in Kenya and 
Zambia  
In reference to popular disengagement from the state, Azarya (1988, p. 13) has argued 
that “the degree of favourable or unfavourable attitude shown to the state is not necessarily 
correlated with the degree of activism of response.” In other words, satisfaction or frustration 
with government performance is not synonymous with political consciousness and action. 
Baker (2001) has cited an insightful and informative study by Inkeles (1969) which 
demonstrated this point through a comparative study of Nigeria and the then East Pakistan. The 
author found that those who scored highly on participant citizenship in Nigeria were more often 
dissatisfied with government performance than non-participants. This finding was in complete 
contrast to East Pakistan (Bangladesh), where the most active citizens were also the most 
consistently satisfied with government performance. Further, in a more recent study of South 
Africa’s twenty years of democracy, Booysen (2013) found that dissatisfied South Africans 
were most likely to join protests and demonstrations than those who were satisfied with 
government performance. 
These findings, therefore, demonstrate that the decision of citizens to engage or 
disengage from the institutions of governance such as the state and even advocacy groups is a 
complex process that is dependent on numerous contextual and individual factors. The study, 
therefore, proposed that popular disengagement is a responsive or adaptive strategy employed 
by citizens towards advocacy groups and influenced by macro, meso, and micro-scale factors, 
which advocacy groups work across as explained in Figure 2.4 in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
Macro-scale factors are numerous external and uncontrollable factors that influence advocacy 
groups’ decision making, performance, and strategies to achieve their goals. They include the 
availability of strategy of disengagement, political and economic conditions, cultural norms and 
spatial distribution of advocacy groups. Meso-scale factors are the intermediate factors between 
the macro and the micro scale factors which shape the framework and operations of advocacy 
groups. These include structural factors such as advocacy groups’ level of membership and 
participation, legitimacy, agenda and representation. Finally, micro-scale factors are individual 
factors, such as the availability of resources, personal efficacy, personal norms and assessment 
of utility. The macro, meso and micro scale factors, all affect popular disengagement from 
advocacy groups.  
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6.2.1. Macro-Scale factors 
The study considered the availability of strategy of disengagement, political and 
economic conditions and the spatial distribution of advocacy groups as the major macro-scale 
factors that influence the process of popular disengagement in both Kenya and Zambia. 
6.2.1.1. Availability of Strategy of disengagement 
 The study found that most citizens in both countries, who were dissatisfied with 
advocacy groups’ performance in the post-transitional political dispensation were most likely 
to disengage than those who were satisfied with advocacy groups’ performance. Of those 
interviewed for this study, 64 percent in Kenya and 75 percent in Zambia stated that they were 
no longer members of an advocacy group.  The three quotations below from in-depth personal 
interviews with a mechanic in Kenya, a businesswoman and a teacher both in Zambia, are 
representative of the various reasons given by respondents for disengagement from advocacy 
groups; 
“I am disappointed with many advocacy groups, which have not only failed to hold the 
government accountable but have also been compromised by the same government. I am no 
longer a member of any advocacy group” (Kenya: Author interview, 44: 2012) 
 
“I was an active member of several advocacy groups, but I lost interest because there were no 
tangible benefits both at my level and at the national level. It was a waste of time, especially in 
these tough economic times. I joined a self-help group, where I can enjoy direct economic 
benefits from the group” (Zambia: Author interview, 97: 2012). 
 
“We in Zambia continue to experience extreme levels of poverty, poor governance and 
inequality, despite the existence of hundreds of advocacy groups. What are they supposed to 
do? Moreover, what are they doing? For me, I gave up on these groups and even participation 
in Zambian politics” (Zambia: Author interview, 92: 2012) 
 
These findings are consistent with Baker (2001), who in a study of several types of 
disengagements in Africa found that popular disengagement was the most likely choice for 
most citizens, who felt dissatisfied with the state. It appears that citizen dissatisfaction with 
social power in Africa is most likely to lead to popular disengagement than engagement. Several 
factors could explain these findings. Firstly, according to Baker (2001), disengagement is an 
easier option for most citizens because it offers relief, is within reach, low in resource demand 
and with minimal risk of sanctions.  
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Additionally, Walzer (1992, p. 89) has noted that “Civil society is the space for the un-
coerced human association.” In other words, the institutions of civil society have no jurisdiction 
over individuals that those individuals cannot avoid. Individual members of these groups can 
thus easily initiate and withdraw from advocacy groups without the risk of sanctions. Advocacy 
groups, therefore, have no powers to coerce individuals to remain their members if those 
individuals chose to disengage. This means that disengagement is a readily available option for 
individuals dissatisfied with the performance of advocacy groups in the process of democratic 
consolidation. 
Secondly, popular disengagement is an invisible, quiet, private and passive strategy of exit, 
which makes it an attractive means of protest for individuals disappointed with advocacy 
groups’ performance. The study found that disengaging individuals from advocacy groups did 
not discuss their decision to disengage with anyone such as friends and relatives. They quietly 
just dropped out of advocacy group membership. This feature of popular disengagement was, 
therefore, a crucial factor for most individuals disengaging from advocacy groups in both Kenya 
and Zambia in the post-transitional and institutional environment. Hirschman (1970) also 
believes that popular disengagement or “exit” is a most likely response to the failures of 
voluntary associations as opposed to “voice” or engagement, which is a most likely response to 
basic social organisations such as the family, the church and the state in which the exit outlet is 
less available.  
Additionally, Azarya and Chazan (1988) have argued that “exit” is a residual category when 
voice is unavailable or ineffective. As this study demonstrates, most of the respondents who 
chose disengagement from advocacy groups felt that their “voices” were ineffective. For this 
group of respondents, there appeared to be a deep sense of collective hopelessness that “nothing 
will ever change” even if citizens actively engaged in advocacy groups’ activities. Regarding 
the reasons for withdrawal from advocacy groups, most citizens interviewed for this study in 
both Kenya and Zambia cited disappointment with the performance of advocacy groups in the 
process of democratic consolidation as the most important reason that informed their decision 
to disengage. The second most important reason cited by most respondents was the lack of time 
in hard economic times, when citizens’ most critical concern is an economic livelihood. while 
other reasons cited by respondents included lack of trust and loss of interest in participating in 
advocacy group activities.  
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These findings are consistent with both Animashaun (2009) and Osaghae’s (1999) findings 
on disengagement from the state that the declining capacity of the state in Africa to provide 
social services creates the context in which citizens withdraw from the state. When advocacy 
groups are unable to fulfill citizens’ needs and expectations in the process of democratic 
consolidation, citizens easily withdraw from such groups and seek membership in other groups 
such as self-help groups, which they view as providing tangible and immediate benefits to them 
in a time of declining economic development.  
6.2.1.2. Political and Economic disappointment in Kenya and Zambia 
 
In Kenya, the incumbent regime retained power in the first two multi-party general 
elections and the agenda of civil society groups, the international donors, and opposition 
political parties shifted to the constitutional review process. However, little success was made 
until 1997 when the government agreed to negotiate with the opposition political parties on 
minimum political reforms before the elections that year.155 The negotiations culminated in the 
signing and implementation of several legal, administrative and constitutional reforms. These 
reforms included freedom of assembly, repeal of oppressive laws, the nomination of candidates 
to parliament by opposition political parties, fair and balanced coverage of all political parties 
by the state broadcasting corporation, provision for a coalition government and legislation 
establishing the Kenya Constitutional Review Commission (KCRC) that was to propose further 
constitutional changes (Mutunga, 1999).   
In 2002 a coalition of several opposition political parties, the National Rainbow 
Coalition (NARC) won the elections. It was the first time that the country had experienced 
peaceful, free and fair elections that resulted in a regime change since independence. The 
NARC political mandate came with high hopes and expectations from the masses and other 
stakeholders for social, economic and political transformation (Wolf et al. 2004) after many 
years of poor governance and economic decline. The high hopes were reflected in a 2003 Gallup 
International Survey poll which showed that 87 percent of Kenyans believed that the rest of the 
year was going to be better than the previous year, making Kenyans the most optimistic people 
                                                             
 
155 The minimum reforms were negotiations through the Inter-Party Parliamentary Group before the 1997 general 
elections. 
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in the World (Gallup International, 2003). The NARC administration introduced judicial and 
administrative reforms and established several state commissions with mandates to support 
social, economic and political development. By 2005, the government had reviewed the 
proposed constitutional draft that had come out of the Bomas Constitutional conference and 
came up with a synthesized draft dubbed the “Wako draft.”156 The Bomas draft had 
substantially captured the popular sentiments and views of the people of Kenya and drastically 
reduced the powers of the presidency. However, the Bomas draft was significantly watered 
down by the government in the Wako draft, which caused deep divisions within the NARC 
coalition. These divisions played out during the campaigns for the referendum on the draft 
which took place on November 21, 2005, with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) wing of the 
coalition opposing the draft while the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK), supporting the 
draft. The opposition side defeated the ‘Wako draft’157at the referendum by 58 to 41percent of 
the total votes cast.158  
The intra-party power struggles between the Liberal Democratic Party and the National 
Alliance Party of Kenya intensified after the defeat of the Wako draft and stagnated the NARC 
agenda including its development initiatives. The contention arose over the implementation of 
the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the two coalition partners to pass a 
new constitution within 100 days in office, which was to reduce the powers of the presidency 
and create the position of a Prime Minister to be occupied by the Liberal Democratic Party. The 
power struggles were detrimental to the coalition’s support and legitimacy in the country. By 
October 2004, only 29 percent of Kenyans thought that the future would be better, a dramatic 
drop from 58 percent in March 2003 opinion polls (Gallup International, 2004). On November 
23, 2005, President Kibaki dismissed all Cabinet Ministers from the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) wing of the coalition, who had campaigned against the “Wako draft.” He reorganised 
his government by reconstituting the cabinet and appointing opposition MPs from KANU and 
other smaller political parties. The NARC coalition and its dream had ended, and so did its 
programs, popularity, support, and legitimacy, leading to political realignments in the country. 
                                                             
 
156 The draft was named after the then Attorney-General who had led the committee that drafted the document. 
157 The Draft Constitution was named after the then Attorney-General Amos Wako 
158 Africa Elections database found at http://africanelections.tripod.com/ke.html#2002_Presidential_Election 
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LDP MPs and others who had opposed the ‘Wako draft’ became the Orange Democratic 
Movement (ODM) and assumed the role of the opposition in parliament.  
The Government of National Unity (GNU) rapidly degenerated into a “bureaucratic-
executive” state and increasingly relied on a network of patron-client relationships for 
governance (Branch and Cheeseman, 2006). The entrenched centralised presidential powers, 
which had been left intact following the failed referendum in 2005 supported this system of 
governance, besides a well-established structure of informal networks of clientelism and neo-
patrimonialism. The result was politics of the exclusion and ethnic domination which had been 
perfected by former Presidents Kenyatta and Moi in the post-colonial period in Kenya. 
Corruption scandals and extra-judicial killings increased, freedom of the press was curtailed, 
and ethnic tensions intensified. Despite these political changes, civil society organisations and 
opposition political parties pushed back relying mainly on the accumulated political reforms 
gained since the political transition in the early 1990s and the political culture that was gradually 
becoming more critical of state authority. The President refused to negotiate minimum electoral 
reforms before the 2007 general elections, and the country entered the election campaign highly 
divided and ethnicised, leading to highly charged campaigns which revolved around issues of 
devolution, land reforms, appointments in government and redistribution of national resources.  
On 30 December 2007, the general elections were held, and soon violence broke out 
amid allegations of vote rigging and manipulation of vote tallying by the Electoral Commission 
of Kenya. The violence spread very quickly to other parts of the country and claimed 1, 133 
lives, while over 650,000 people were displaced.  With the intervention of the international 
community, including the African Union (AU), the United States and the United Nations (UN), 
negotiations opened-up between the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and the Party of 
National Unity (PNU). These negotiations culminated in the signing of the peace accord on the 
28th of February 2008 between the two largest political parties, ODM and PNU creating the 
Grand Coalition Government with Mwai Kibaki of PNU as the President and Raila Odinga of 
ODM as the Prime Minister. The coalition government is mainly credited for restoring peace 
in the country and delivering a new constitution, promulgated on the 28th of August 2010-a 
milestone in the country’s democratisation and governance process.  
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On the economic front, the Moi administration continued to perform dismally even after 
the re-introduction of multi-partyism in 1991 with the partial continuation of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that had been introduced in 1986 as part of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank conditionality for new concessional loans and support. 
SAPs were meant to restructure the country’s economy through policies such as privatisation 
of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), reduction of expenditure on social services such as health 
and education, trade liberalisation and removal of state subsidies. The Moi administration 
cautiously implemented SAPs, and the country experienced consistently low and erratic 
economic growth as shown in Figure 6.1. below.  
Figure 6 1 Kenya's Real GDP Growth rate: 1991-2001 
 
Source: Author’s construction using IMF-World Economic Outlook-October 1999 and the 
Government of Kenya Budget 2000-2001 data 
 
The weak economic growth was reflected in the social indicators during this period. In 
line with SAPs measures, the government significantly reduced its expenditure on health, 
education and other social services. For instance, its share of health in the total expenditure 
steadily declined from a high of 6.5 percent in 1986 to 5.4 percent in 1992 and only 5.2 percent 
in 1997 (Owino, 1997). Real expenditure on all essential services as a percentage of the 
government’s total budget plummeted from 20 percent in the 1980s to 12 percent in 1995 to 
only 10.9 percent in 1997 (GOK, 1996). These cuts deeply affected the majority poor, who had 
no access to essential social services such as education, healthcare, and sanitation, therefore, 
deepening poverty and inequality in the country.  
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According to the 1997 Welfare Monitoring Survey (WMS), the incidence of rural and 
urban food poverty was 51 and 38 percent, respectively, while overall rural poverty stood at 53 
percent and urban poverty at 49 percent. The national poverty was 52 percent, an increase of 6 
percent from 1996 (GOK, 1996a). The total number of the absolute poor also rose from 11.5 
million in 1994 (45 percent of the population) to 12.6 million in 1997 and exceeded 13 million 
by the end of 1998 (Kenya Human Development Report, 1999).  By the time President Moi left 
office in 2001, absolute poverty159had reached about 47 percent, meaning that almost half of 
the population was living below the poverty line. Regarding inequality, the top 10 percent 
income earners, were making 36 times more than the bottom 10 percent, making the country, 
one of the top unequal countries and the 17th poorest in the World with a per capita income of 
$340 (Country Strategy Paper, 1998-2001) 
When the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) took office in 2002, economic growth 
was negative 0.3 percent, and 56 percent of the population were living below the poverty line 
(ERS, 2003). The government developed the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and 
Employment Creation (ERSWEC) as its strategy for economic recovery and reconstruction. 
ERSWEC focused on job creation and expansion of economic opportunities for resource-poor 
farmers, informal enterprise, and economically disadvantaged communities. The strategy was 
also meant to create 500,000 jobs annually, reduce poverty by at least five percentage points, 
implement free primary education, achieve a high real GDP growth rate of 2.3 percent in 2003 
and 7 percent by 2006 among others (NARC Manifesto, 2002). The government introduced 
free primary education, giving almost a million children the opportunity to receive basic 
education and developed popular programmes such as the Constituency Development Fund 
(CDF), besides establishing the National Economic and Social Council to guide and advise the 
country on economic policies and development. Legislatively, the NARC coalition passed the 
Public Procurement and Disposal Act 2005 among other vital legislations. It also embarked on 
national infrastructural development across the country and revived some collapsed industries 
such as the Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC).  
                                                             
 
159 Absolute poverty is defined as “the cost of food expenditure necessary to attain a recommended food intake of 
2250 kcal per day and an allowance according to the standard of living in the country for non-food items” (UNSD, 
2004) 
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Despite these crucial economic successes and international donor support for ERSWEC, 
the resurgence of corruption during the NARC administration led international donors to 
withhold funding for some of the development initiatives under NARC’s Economic Strategy 
and thus partially disrupted its implementation. The Grand Coalition government economic 
performance (2008-2012) was not much different from the NARC administration. Figure 6.3 
below shows the country’s real GDP growth rate from 2002-2012. 
Figure 6 2 Kenya's Real GDP Growth rate: 2002-2012 
 
Source: Authors own construction using IMF World Economic Outlook-April 2012 data 
As shown in figure 6.3 above, which covers the economic performance of both the 
NARC and the Grand Coalition government, the country experienced sustained economic 
growth from 2002 to 2007, which sharply dropped between 2008 and 2009 likely due to the 
economic disruptions caused by the 2007/2008 post-election violence. By 2010, the economy 
had recovered and resumed over 5 percent economic growth in 2010, 2011 and 2012. In 
reviewing the economic performance of the NARC administration, Ndii (2014) concludes that 
the referendum defeat in 2005 ended both the politics of inclusion and a people-centered 
economic agenda. The economic strategy gradually shifted from growth with distribution to a 
free market system, which was encapsulated in a new development strategy called “Vision 
2030.” The hands-off governance style of the President led to the growth of crony ethnic 
capitalism with the benefits of economic growth accruing to a few corporate institutions and 
the President’s inner-circle of ethnic elites. The relatively high economic growth experienced 
during this time, therefore, failed to reduce poverty and inequalities in the country. The majority 
poor did not, therefore, share in NARC’s and the Grand coalition government economic growth.  
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compared to 40 percent for high-income groups. Twenty percent of farmers purchasing power 
as measured in agricultural terms of trade was also eroded.160 In 2006, towards the end of the 
NARC administration, out of an estimated population of 35.5 million, about 16.7 million were 
still categorised as poor (Jones et al. 2008), representing about 47 percent of the total 
population, 
Unlike Kenya, Zambia had one of the most peaceful, free and fair elections that led to 
rapid political transition on October 31, 1991, that resulted in a regime change. The Movement 
for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) defeated the United National Independence Party (UNIP) 
of former President Kenneth Kaunda in a landslide victory with President Chiluba receiving 
75.8 percent of the Presidential vote and 125 out of the 150 seats in the National Assembly.161 
The country was then hailed as a trailblazer in the democratisation process in Africa (Bonnick, 
1997; Joseph, 1992; Bratton, 1992) and considered one of the most successful competitive 
electoral democracies in the continent (Manning, 2005; Burnell, 1994). The Movement for 
Multi-Party Democracy was a broad-based political coalition composed of several groups with 
different ideological leanings. These included the labour movement, the business community, 
former UNIP MPs, the intellectuals, the progressives, and the students. The popularity and 
support for MMD were primarily due to UNIP’s poor economic and political governance 
(Erdmann and Simutanyi, 2003). The economy was on the brink of collapse, recording negative 
economic growth rates in three consecutive years before the multi-party general elections in 
1991.162 Zambians, therefore, had extremely high hopes and expectations on MMD for socio-
economic recovery and political development.  
The first Chiluba administration came to power through a negotiated constitution 
between MMD and UNIP that had only repealed article 4 of the 1973 Constitution to allow for 
the formation of opposition political parties but left the entire one-party constitution intact with 
a powerful presidency and the executive. MMD had promised broad constitutional reforms that 
included changing the constitution from a presidential to a parliamentary system (MMD, 1991) 
that would guarantee democratic governance in the country. The MMD manifesto also outlined 
the protection of fundamental rights and freedom of the press, the rule of law, the promotion of 
                                                             
 
160 Ndii, David “Why you are Struggling to make Ends Meet,” Daily Nation, January 3, 2014 
161 African Election Database found at http://africanelections.tripod.com/zm.html, [accessed on 24/10/2013] 
162 The economic growth was negative 1.1 in 1989, negative 0.4 in 1990 and negative 4.0 in 1991 (IMF, 1992) 
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justice and equality, establishment of checks and balances as critical components of democratic 
governance (MMD, 1991). However, once in power, it soon became apparent that President 
Chiluba had reservations about the “dual reform” process. He maintained that democratic 
disputes would disrupt economic development that his government was focused on (Erdmann 
and Simutanyi, 2003).  
Despite this position, he appointed the Mwanakatwe constitutional review Commission 
on November 1993, which presented the draft Constitution and a report to the government in 
1995. However, the government paper on the review of the report rejected almost 70 percent of 
the recommendations, including both the formation of a constituent assembly to spearhead the 
constitutional review process and the use of a referendum to ratify the Draft Constitution 
(Mphaisha, 1996, p. 71). It also rejected the provisions for an independent judiciary and 
Electoral Commission, but retained the Public Order Act, the Emergency Power Act cap 108 
and the Preservation of Public Security Act cap 112, provisions which had been used by the 
previous regime to suppress political opposition (Erdmann and Simutanyi, 2003). The 
constitution that parliament passed in 1996 also abolished the absolute majority requirement 
for a presidential win and replaced it with a plurality system. It was, therefore mostly a replica 
of the one-party constitution with vast powers invested in the presidency and the executive, 
besides restricting political participation and competition. Corruption became a crisis in the 
country leading to the resignation of some reform-minded ministers from the cabinet in 
protest.163  
Regarding economic reforms, the MMD had in 1991, campaigned on a platform of 
economic reforms based on Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). It emphasised in its 
manifesto that the government would “restrict itself to rehabilitating and building economic 
infrastructure with a small public sector amid a private enterprise economy” (MMD, 1991, p. 
14). Ironically, the party had opposed SAPs when President Kaunda had attempted to 
implement the same in the late 1980s, leading to protests and riots in the country (Erdman and 
Simutanyi, 2003). Once in power, MMD introduced the Economic Reform Programme (ERP), 
which was based on SAPs and supported by the World Bank and the International Monetary 
                                                             
 
163  In 1993, Stanford Hlazo, MMD member of parliament from Mumbwa resigned citing corruption (Weekly Post, 
12, November 1993). Mwanawasa also resigned as Chiluba’s Vice President citing corruption in the government 
(Lewanika, 2005) 
330 
 
Fund (IMF). The policies included rapid liberalisation, privatisation, devaluation of the 
Kwacha, removal of food and agricultural subsidies, public sector retrenchment and reduction 
in social spending among others. The administration viewed the neo-liberal policies of SAPs as 
a way of resolving both social and economic problems in the country.164 There was little 
opposition to the implementation of SAPs from the political society as UNIP had supported the 
same policies. Although advocacy groups and churches opposed SAPs because they were 
bound to exacerbate unemployment, inequality and increase poverty, the government was 
committed and determined in the implementation of SAPs. As part of the liberalisation process, 
by 1992, all consumer subsidies had been removed (Larmer, 2009). Agricultural and food 
subsidies were also substantially reduced. The government earmarked 275 State-Owned 
Enterprises for privatization within a decade. Three years later, 83 percent of the earmarked 
state-owned companies had been privatized (Fashoyin 2008, p. 392).  
The government also embarked on Public Sector Reform and drastically reduced the 
size of the civil service. In 1992 alone, 15,000 employees were retrenched (Rakner et al., 2001, 
p. 560). The effects of SAPs were devastating to the economy and the citizens of Zambia. The 
removal of food subsidies resulted in an enormous price increase of almost 700 percent for a 
25kg bag of maize, whose price increased from K225 to K1800 from October 1991 to October 
1992 (Seshamani, 1996). A severe drought in 1992 coupled with the reduction in farm subsidies 
reduced agricultural production by 39.3 percent (GRZ, Budget Address, 1993, p. 3). The 
privatisation of State-Owned Enterprises led to substantial job losses in the country. The 
reduction of social services spending, especially in health and education and the introduction 
of user fees in those services had a devastating effect on the majority poor. In July 1993, just 
about two years after President Chiluba came to power, the Catholic Bishops gave a withering 
critique of SAPs in a Pastoral Letter titled “Hear the Cry of the Poor.” They squarely blamed 
the sufferings of Zambians on the government’s Structural Adjustment economic policies. They 
argued that these policies were leading towards “economic apartheid” by continuously 
widening the gap between the rich and the poor, besides rising food prices, poor health care, 
the high cost of transport, high levels of mortality and malnutrition, declining school enrollment 
and rising poverty levels. They noted that the declining social indicators were “not only a moral 
                                                             
 
164 The Guardian, 3rd March 1991 
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scandal but also a dangerous threat to our democratic stability.” From January to October 1995 
alone, 7000 employees lost their jobs from 310 companies because of SAPs. These losses were 
concentrated in transport, manufacturing, wholesale, retail and financial sectors (Chibale, 
2009). During the 1990s, employment in mining, manufacturing, and agriculture fell by 40 
percent and total formal employment by 15 percent besides declining wages (Burger et al. 
2004). In reviewing Chiluba’s time in office just two years after the transition, Mwiinga (1994, 
p. 60) captured the mood of the country when he wrote, “Increasingly, Zambians are beginning 
to feel that the Chiluba establishment has short-changed them. Most are now beginning to 
regard Kaunda years with nostalgia.” Similarly, at the end of the first Chiluba administration, 
Mphaisha (1996: 65) writes.“ the “Hour Has Come” slogan of the MMD has been replaced by 
general disillusionment.”  
In his second term in office from 1996-2001, the Chiluba administration slowed down 
the implementation of the SAPs (Rakner, 2003). However, by the end of 1997, 224 out of 275 
state-owned enterprises earmarked for privatisation had been sold off (Rakner et al. 1999). 
Between 1991 and 1996, median wages declined by 26 percent in the public sector and 34 
percent in the private sector (Nielson and Rosholm, 2001, p. 171). Industrial production 
dropped by 28 percent from 1990 to 1998 (Bass, 2011). Privatisation and competition from 
other countries due to liberalisation almost collapsed the Zambian manufacturing industry 
(Tangri, 1999) and the situation was made worse by the declining copper prices in the World 
market in the 1990s (Osei-Hwedie, 2003). SAPs dramatically increased unemployment, 
inequality, and poverty in the country, despite the economic growth that had been achieved 
since 1996. In 1997,165President Chiluba declared a state of emergency and suspended all civil 
liberties and political rights because of an alleged “coup,” by leaders of the United National 
Independence Party (UNIP). During this time there were also arbitrary arrests and detention of 
UNIP leaders (Erdmann and Simutanyi, 2003) and harassment and intimidation of the media, 
opposition leaders and civil society groups (Bauer and Taylor, 2005; Gould, 2002; Burnell 
2001c). In 1998, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI)166 ranked the country at 52 out of 177 
countries. On civil liberties and political rights, the country slipped from being categorised as 
                                                             
 
165 Freedom in the World Report (1993), available from www.freedomhouse.org/[Accessed on 24/08/2015] 
166 Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International ranks countries based on how the country’s public 
sector is perceived to be corrupt 
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“free” to “partly free.” Due to several unfulfilled promises, the MMD administration fractured 
into different factions. A Caucus for National Unity (CNU) emerged within MMD and 
demanded a stronger commitment to democratic reforms and proper conduct of governance 
(Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003). Zambia’s social and economic indicators drastically declined 
under MMD. GDP declined by an average of 0.2 p.a. between 1992 and 1998 and the number 
of individuals living in poverty increased from 70 percent in 1991 to 73 percent in 1998 
overtime with rural poverty standing at 83 percent and urban poverty at 56 percent (GRZ, 2006). 
By this period the country was ranked the 10th poorest in the World (Burnell 2000). By 1999, 
those living below the poverty line had increased to 84.6 percent (Seshamani, 1999. The 
International Labour Organisation (2002, p. 1 quoted in Ngoma, 2008) summarised the effects 
of Chiluba’s economic reforms as follows;  
“The (Zambian) economy remained virtually stagnant during Chiluba’s presidency (1991-
2001), copper production fell sharply. Average economic growth was negative. GDP per 
capita declined from US$375 in 1980 to US$305 in 1990 and then to US$257 in 1995. In 
1998, the economy contracted by 2 percent, thus lowering income per capita by around 5 
percent.” 
 
The evaluation of President Chiluba’s ten-year term in office was remarkably harsh with a failed 
democratic reform and devastating economic reforms under SAPs.  By the end of Chiluba’s 
term, Zambia had slipped into “political closure,” (Joseph, 1996), economic collapse and 
renewed authoritarianism (Larmer, 2009). For Mphaisha (1996, p. 65) Zambia had become a 
“mild authoritarian” system in an apparent democratic environment, while Bratton and Posner 
(1998) noted that Zambia had regressed due to authoritarian tendencies and coercive machinery 
used by Chiluba to silence opposition and civil society. The optimism that had greeted the 
political change in 1991 had finally faded away.  
The Mwanawasa administration that took over from President Chiluba in January 2002 
promised a “New Deal” that would lead to faster economic growth and social development for 
all Zambians. However, President Mwanawasa did not define nor give any clear explanation of 
the policy contents of the New Deal (Ngoma, 2008). In practice, the administration cautiously 
continued with the implementation of SAPs despite its rhetoric of the New Deal, which was 
later explained as a deal focusing on human-centered development, good governance, 
development of a vibrant private sector, food security and improvement of access to healthcare 
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and education.167The administration is credited for jump-starting the economy, introducing free 
basic education, attaining the IMF-World Bank completion point of the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) initiative in April 2005 (Wood, 2005) which led to international donor 
organisations writing off Zambia’s debts of US$3.8 billion and reviving the copper industry 
and agricultural production. However, “unemployment, which was 87 percent in 2001, only 
reduced to 75 percent by 2007.”168 By 2004, formal sector employment had fallen from 544,200 
in 1991 to 436, 066 (Chibale, 2009), a 20 percent reduction.  
 Regarding political reforms, the President appointed the Mungomba Constitutional 
Commission in 2003 to complete the constitutional review process. After two years, the 
Commission presented its report to the President. However, he suspended the process.  In 2006, 
President Mwanawasa unveiled a new roadmap to the constitutional review process that was to 
take five years. By the time Mwanawasa died in 2008, the constitutional review process was 
ongoing. The Mwanawasa administration emphasized “zero tolerance to corruption” and fared 
better on this front than the two Chiluba administrations before. However, a Transparency 
International (TI) Zambia report notes that “embezzlement of public funds continued unabated 
under President Mwanawasa’s administration.”  In 2005, Zambia’s ranking in the Transparency 
Corruption Index stood 107 out of 177 countries.169   
Although Mwanawasa’s style of leadership was similar to that of Chiluba, repressive 
attitudes of the state slightly declined but intolerance to criticism and the use of police to 
intimidate and silence opposition political parties and civil society organisations continued.  
President Banda took over after Mwanawasa’s death in 2008 and received the Constitutional 
Commission report in January 2010, but by the time elections were held in September 2011, 
the process had not been completed. Banda’s governance style became more authoritarian in a 
democratic setting as MMD continued to lose political support and legitimacy. The 
administration curtailed civil liberties and political rights for civil society, the media and 
opposition political parties. It is also credited for having passed one of the most restrictive NGO 
laws in Africa in 2009, which NGOs in Zambia fiercely opposed.  
                                                             
 
167 The Post, March 2, 2002, Times of Zambia, March 2, 2002, Daily Mail, March 2, 2002 
168 The Post, September 3, 2007) 
169 CPI report 2005, Transparency International-www.transparency.org 
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During the Banda administration, corruption skyrocketed, and the country slipped from 
the rank of 107 in 2005 to 123 out of 177 in 2007 in the Corruption Perception Index of 
Transparency International. Although economic growth continued on a positive trend, the 
benefits of growth were not shared by all Zambians, and President Michael Sata won the 2011 
general elections based on his populist appeal which found purchase among the majority poor 
and disillusioned Zambians. His nationalist policies fed into the popular discontent with the 
neoliberal policies which had been implemented by successive MMD administrations for two 
decades and which had failed to reduce poverty and improve the standards of living of most 
Zambians. The Sata administration jump-started the constitutional review process in November 
2011 by appointing a new technical committee, which presented its final Draft Constitution to 
the President on 31 October 2013. However, entrenched interests and disagreements among 
political players delayed the process once again. The stagnation in the process of constitutional 
review left the country with a one-party constitution in a democratic setting. 
Figure 6 3 Zambia's Real GDP Growth rate: 1991-2012 
 
Source: Authors construction using the Central Statistics Office and World Economic Outlook, 
2012 data 
As shown in figure 6.3 above, economic growth in Zambia was erratic from 1991 to 
1996 and declined from 1996 to 1998. However, the country experienced impressive growth 
from 1998 onwards. Although, SAPs improved economic growth, the policies failed to promote 
broad-based development that benefitted all Zambians.  By the late 1990s, the widespread hopes 
of ordinary Zambians of economic recovery and improved standards of living were largely 
dashed (Bartlett, 2000). Cheelo and Zulu (2007, p. 5), noted that the impressive growth 
witnessed between 1998 and 2005 was concentrated in mining, trade, and construction, all 
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
335 
 
capital-intensive urban-based sectors that failed to create sufficient jobs due to their weak 
linkages with the rest of the economy.  
In the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) Report 2010, Zambia remained 
one of the least developed countries in the World and was ranked 150 out of 169 countries. It 
was also one of the two nations that regressed on HDI since 1990. In 2011, Zambia was ranked 
164 out of 187 countries in the HDI with a score of 0.43, which was lower than the Sub-Saharan 
Africa average HDI of 0.46 (HDI Report, 2011). Most Zambians continued to live in poverty. 
The 2010 Living Condition Monitoring Survey (LCM) showed that poverty levels remained 
high with 60.5 percent living below the poverty line and those living in extreme poverty stood 
at 42.3 percent. Poverty in Zambia is a rural phenomenon with the level of poverty in rural areas 
being three times that of urban areas. In 2010 rural poverty was estimated at 77.9 percent 
compared to the urban level of 27.5 percent (Zambia Census, 2010) 
It is clear from the detailed analysis above that both Kenya, and Zambia have experienced 
considerable levels of economic growth since the political transition period, yet these levels of 
economic growth have not improved the standard of living of the majority of the citizens. The 
study found that there are widespread disappointment and disillusionment with both the 
political and economic performance of the newly democratic states and surprisingly the citizens 
are blaming both the government and advocacy groups for their predicament. Most citizens, 
therefore, perceive advocacy groups as ineffective in meeting their needs and expectations. 
They view these groups as having convinced them to support the current regimes during the 
transition process, regimes which have not only failed them politically and economically but 
also compromised advocacy groups in the process. This is unsurprising given that most 
advocacy groups in both countries had aligned with opposition political parties which defeated 
the authoritarian regimes during the democratic transitions.  
The disappointment and disillusionment by most citizens with political and economic 
performance in both countries have led to popular disengagement from advocacy groups. These 
findings fit into the marginalization theory of disengagement in Africa, which posits that 
individuals and groups, who feel excluded from economic development and unable to influence 
state policies are most likely to withdraw into parallel systems (Osaghae, 1999). In this case, 
individuals who feel politically and economically disappointed by advocacy groups in the post-
transitional political and institutional dispensation in Kenya and Zambia and have chosen 
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disengagement from these groups. The findings are consistent with the previous findings by 
Howard (2003) who in a study of the weaknesses of civil society in Post-Communist Europe, 
found that the widespread disappointment and disillusionment of most citizens with the political 
and economic systems that replaced the communist system led to unusually low levels of public 
participation in civil society groups. Moreover, the demand for democratic change in Africa 
was primarily driven by the high levels of poverty, inequality and poor standards of living 
(Adejumobi, 2002, Abrahamsen 2000, Widner 1994) and, therefore, the new democratic 
governments were expected foremost by citizens to address economic growth and redistribution 
of development dividends. The failure to do so has resulted in disappointment, discontent, and 
disillusionment, leading to popular disengagement from advocacy groups.  
The post-transitional economic reforms implemented by both countries had devastating 
effects on the majority poor, while political reforms were slow, arduous and stagnated due to 
lack of political will and disagreements among the political elites. The Afro-barometer surveys 
from 2003 to 2011 have shown a trend of steady increase in the number of people who believe 
that their living conditions are “very bad.” This negative perception of the economy affects the 
levels of participation in the political processes and increases the propensity to disengage from 
advocacy groups. This study found that political disappointment appeared to be relatively 
higher in Zambia than Kenya for at least two factors.  Firstly, in Zambia, the smooth and swift 
transition in 1991, heightened citizens’ expectations for faster economic recovery and 
development compared to Kenya, where the transition stagnated and thus tempered 
expectations. Secondly, Zambia’s transition occurred at the backdrop of a relatively profound 
economic crisis compared to Kenya. Both factors created overly high hopes and expectations 
from the masses, which have remained unfulfilled. 
There are several possible explanations for the failures of economic reforms undertaken by 
democratic administrations in both Kenya and Zambia. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), have 
noted that most African countries such as Kenya and Zambia experienced relatively high levels 
of exclusive economic growth and poor redistribution of the benefits of growth. For example, 
Zambia is considered one of Africa’s fastest growers with the worst performance at turning 
economic growth into economic development. The country “has improved only half as much 
as it should have, given its growth in GDP per capita” (Beal at al., 2013). Secondly, most 
African countries such as Kenya and Zambia, have relied on narrow “commodity-driven 
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growth” which produce “limited” social benefits. The African Progress Panel Report (2011) 
has concluded that,  
“Little of the continents high GDP growth translates into social development and tangible 
improvements in people’s lives. Driven by capital-intensive sectors…growth has a little positive 
impact on employment and income levels and virtually no effect on employment-intensive sectors 
such as agriculture. Although Africa has experienced a decade of strong economic growth, poverty 
remains pervasive throughout the continent.”170 
 
Thirdly, Crawford and Abdulai (2012) noted that excessive or sustained elite control within 
many democracies in Africa negate the theoretical assumption of the pro-majority outcome. 
These democracies serve elite interests at the expense of majority needs and expectations. There 
is a high degree of insensitivity to the suffering of the masses, leading to a culture of 
hopelessness, and cynicism, and eventual withdrawal from the political system. Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006) contend that political and economic elites acceded to demands for democratic 
reforms from social movements as a way of preventing the potential loss of wealth and status. 
This point is echoed by Ake (2005) when he writes, “for the elite, support for democratization 
is highly instrumental. It is merely a means to access power, privilege, and status.” The elites 
in Africa, Kenya, and Zambia included have thus continued to control democratic institutions 
for their own benefits using private wealth to influence electoral outcomes, patron-client 
relationships (Lockwood, 2005), the concentration of media ownership in a small number of 
private hands and exploitation of ethno-regional identities to win elections.  
Fourthly, the type and degree of democracy account for the lack of positive impact of 
democracy on poverty and inequality. Both Kenya and Zambia are “hybrid regimes,” 
combining both formal democratic procedures with authoritarian tendencies (Diamond, 1996; 
Collier and Levitsky, 1997). This means that democratic procedures are only applied in 
choosing leaders, but policy contents remain an open question (Crawford and Abdulai, 2012). 
When these kinds of processes are combined with elite control, the political and economic 
policies that are implemented are unlikely to benefit the majority poor.  Finally, the influence 
of international financial institutions through economic strategies such as Structural Adjustment 
                                                             
 
170 This type of growth is what Samir (2002) referred to as “growth without development.”  
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Programmes in Zambia, have taken over economic sovereignty from these supposedly 
democratic governments and prevents them from implementing economic policies geared 
towards the reduction of poverty and inequality (Crawford and Abdulai, 2012). IFIs extensively 
determine economic policies for such countries as a conditionality for concessional loans and 
support. Similarly, Mkandawire (2004, p. 143) has noted that “the first victim of globalization 
has been the state’s power to intervene in the economy to ensure certain social outcomes such 
as equity and poverty alleviation.” The continued failure of political and economic reforms in 
the post-transitional Kenya and Zambia have left most citizens deeply disappointed, 
disillusioned and cynical, leading to a decline in civic participation in the political processes.  
6.2.1.3. Spatial distribution of Advocacy Groups 
Regarding the spatial distribution of advocacy groups and popular disengagement, the 
study found that most advocacy groups in both Kenya and Zambia are located in urban centres, 
specifically the capital cities of Nairobi and Lusaka, despite 74.8 percent of Kenyans (KPHC, 
2009) and 60.5 percent (ZPC, 2010) of Zambians living in rural areas. In Kenya, the capital city 
of Nairobi has the highest number of NGOs compared to other regions of the country (NGO 
Sector Report, 2014), while in Zambia, 49 percent of civil society organisations are located in 
the capital city of Lusaka compared to other regions in the country as shown in Figure 6.4 
below. Advocacy groups find it convenient to be located in capital cities in both countries, 
where they can easily lobby governments and access international donor organisations. 
Figure 6 4 Regional distribution of CSOs in Zambia (2010) 
 
Source: ZCSD: Sectoral and Regional Distribution of Civil Society Organisations in Zambia: Case 
Study Report, 2010 
Lusaka
49%
N. Western
13%
Central
4%
Western
11%
Southern
10%
Eastern
5%
Luapula
3%
Copperbelt
3%
Northern 
2%
339 
 
The study provides evidence showing that popular disengagement from advocacy 
groups is much more experienced in rural than urban areas in both Kenya and Zambia, although 
the process is much more profound in rural Zambia than rural Kenya. The variation is partly 
due to the higher levels of poverty experienced in rural Zambia standing at 77.9 percent (Zambia 
Population Census, 2010) compared to rural Kenya’s 51 percent (Kenya Population Census. 
2009). The spatial divide between urban and rural areas regarding advocacy group presence has 
created both a physical and ideological disconnection between advocacy groups and rural 
residents, who, therefore, find it easier to withdraw from such groups, when they perceive them 
as being incapable of meeting their needs and expectations. The weak ties that rural residents 
have with advocacy groups in both countries have made it easier for them to disengage more 
than urban residents in the face of disappointment with the poor performance of advocacy 
groups in the process of democratic consolidation. These findings are consistent with several 
other findings from previous studies, which found that the physical presence of civic groups in 
a region is fundamental to participatory democracy (Albers, 1998; Font and Galais, 2011; 
Canel, 2010; Goldfrank, 2010). Font and Galais (2011) have argued that the proximity of civic 
groups to the people is critical because it creates a partnership effect, enhances the degree of 
cooperation and gives civic organisations the desired legitimacy for their programmes. 
Secondly, given the disconnection between advocacy groups and rural population in 
both countries caused by the distance and sporadic contact with rural populations, rural 
residents express feelings of exploitation by these groups for funding opportunities from 
international donors. Consequently, rural residents have higher levels of mistrust for advocacy 
groups which appeared to have contributed to higher levels of disengagement, compared to the 
urban population. Finally, as mentioned earlier, poverty levels in both Kenya and Zambia take 
a spatial dimension with rural residents experiencing higher levels of poverty and economic 
hardship compared to urban dwellers. Rural residents, therefore, have reprioritized the use of 
their time and other resources, allocating more time on subsistence activities for economic 
survival than participating in advocacy groups’ activities compared to the urban population. 
However, these findings differ substantially from a study of civil society in Kenya by Kerr 
(2008) who found that participation in the voluntary association was much higher in rural areas 
than urban areas. The difference could have come from the fact that the author studied civil 
society as a sector in Kenya, which is broader and composed of various organisations, including 
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service delivery organisation, which are dominant in rural areas where there are higher levels 
of poverty compared to urban areas. Moreover, advocacy groups constitute a small percentage 
of civil society organizations in the country and are even fewer in rural areas. Service delivery 
organisations are likely to attract greater participation of the rural population because they 
provide immediate social and economic needs such as healthcare and education compared to 
advocacy groups’ long-term goals and objectives of human rights, civic education, citizen 
participation in governance and policy-making and the broader process of democratic 
consolidation. Finally, the study found that those disengaging from advocacy groups for their 
poor performance in the process of democratic consolidation have mainly joined self-help 
organizations and kinship groups, which the author may have included in his study, and 
therefore, found a higher level of participation. 
6.2.2. Meso-Scale factors 
This study proposed that several meso-scale factors influence popular disengagement 
from advocacy groups. These include advocacy groups’ structural weaknesses regarding the 
level of their membership, the intensity of citizen participation in their activities, legitimacy, 
agenda, and representation. The study found that institutional weaknesses of advocacy groups 
in both Kenya and Zambia have contributed to popular disengagement from these groups in the 
post-transitional political and institutional environment. 
6.2.2.1. Advocacy group Membership and Citizen participation 
Membership in civil society groups is crucial since it is the people, who manage, work 
and participate in civil society, thus making these groups more than a structure (Anheier, 2004). 
It makes advocacy groups a system of consciously coordinated activities. Participation in civil 
society organizations also offers citizens information and ideas on public policy issues and leads 
to public support for planning decisions, avoidance of protracted conflicts, a reservoir of 
goodwill and the spirit of cooperation and trust between the organisations and the public (Cogan 
and Sharpe, 1986, p. 284). Additionally, membership makes civil society groups viable and 
functional players in the political sphere, through financial and attitudinal support, allocation 
of time for participation in organisational activities, agenda setting and implementation and 
organisational leadership (Smith 2000). It must be noted that civil society groups are not elected 
by the people, and, therefore, derive their legitimacy from their membership or support from 
the public. It is the basis of their claim of representation of their constituencies or the public 
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interest. The extent of advocacy group membership, therefore, strengthens their legitimacy, 
functions and representative claims.  
Regarding advocacy groups’ membership, the study found that only 36 percent and 25 
percent of those interviewed in Kenya and Zambia, respectively stated that they were members 
of an advocacy group. On the other hand, 58 percent and 62 percent of those interviewed in 
Kenya and Zambia respectively, stated that they were no longer members of an advocacy group. 
These respondents cited frustrations and disappointment with the performance of advocacy in 
the process of democratization as the primary cause of their non-membership. Surprisingly, the 
lower levels of membership in advocacy groups in Kenya and Zambia were in sharp contrast 
with the unprecedented growth of civil society organisations in both countries in the post-
transitional period. This finding is consistent with the finding by Callaghy (1994) that the 
proliferation of associational life indicates only the potential not the realization of a 
strengthened civil society. Additionally, the finding suggests that most of the newly established 
civil society groups in both countries in the post-transitional dispensation are most likely to be 
non-membership NGOs and professional groups. Moreover, a considerable number of 
registered civil society groups are functionally inactive, for example in Kenya, out of 9,728 
registered civil society organizations in 2013, only 7, 258 were active, representing 74 percent 
of all registered groups in the country.171 This means that although thousands of civil society 
groups are formally registered with the governments, not all of them are functional on the 
ground. 
Regarding citizen participation in advocacy groups’ activities, the study found that in 
both Kenya and Zambia about 68 percent of those interviewed indicated that they had not 
attended a community meeting in the last one year, while 72 percent and 79 percent indicated 
that they had not attended a protest or a demonstration in the last one year in Kenya and Zambia 
respectively. Some of the reasons for non-attendance to community meetings, protests, and 
demonstrations reported by respondents are illustrated by the selected direct quotations below; 
“Attending community meeting is a waste of time. We just talk, and at the end of the day, 
nothing changes. Things just remain the same” (Kenya; Author interview 46: 2012) 
 
“Protests and demonstration do not yield any positive development. You go there, make noise, 
get harassed and beaten by the police, but nothing changes” (Kenya: Author interview 24:2012) 
                                                             
 
171 NGO Sector Report, 2013/14, NGO Coordination Bureau, Nairobi, Kenya. 
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“The same advocacy groups that are now calling for protests and demonstrations are the same 
ones, which convinced us to support MMD, a party which has failed us politically and 
economically for 20 years. I cannot attend a demonstration” (Zambia: Author interview 95: 
2012) 
 
The majority of those interviewed for this study have shunned demonstrations and 
protests and participation in community meetings in both countries due to lack of interest, time, 
and information. The most dominant reason for non-attendance to such meetings given by 
respondents was the frustration and disappointment with the utility of such meetings. Citizens 
appeared to be more critical about the utility of community meetings, protests and 
demonstrations and, therefore, view these activities as a waste of time.  Additionally, some 
respondents interviewed for this study said that they were unable to afford the costs of protests 
such as transport to protest venues, while others were discouraged from protests by police 
violence and brutality in breaking up protests and demonstrations. The study also revealed that 
there were cases where citizens were demanding allowances to attend advocacy group 
meetings. These findings were surprising given the expanded democratic space, widespread 
implementation of civic education and improvement in civil liberties and political rights in both 
countries, since the political transitions in the early 1990s. These are conditions that should be 
enabling the growth and vibrancy of civil society groups and improved citizen participation in 
civil society activities and other political processes. 
The findings of unusually low levels of membership in advocacy groups in both 
countries are consistent with the reported trends of the steady decline of membership in 
voluntary associations over the last decade in both Kenya and Zambia by the Afro-barometer 
surveys from 2003 to 2011 and other available studies. By 2011 the Afro-barometer surveys 
showed that about half of the citizens of Kenya were non-members of a voluntary association, 
while 7 out of 10 Zambians reported being non-members of voluntary associations. In a recent 
study of devolved governance in Kenya, Mitullah (2016) found that only 31 percent of citizens 
were active members of voluntary associations. Similarly, Otieno (2013) in a study of 
democracy at the grassroots in Kenya, found that only 17 percent of citizens reported having 
attended public fora in the past one year. Similarly, a recent Pew Research study in 2017 found 
that only 10 percent of Kenyans stated that they have participated in a protest or a 
demonstration.  
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However, these findings are in sharp contrast to studies that have found a strong 
correlation between the number of civic organisations and the level of membership in such 
groups. For instance, Nie, Powell, and Prewitt (1969) found that as the density and complexity 
of economic and secondary organisations increases, political participation in such organisations 
also increases. Several scholars have argued that the decline in membership and participation 
in civil society groups is due to the establishment of more channels of democratic participation 
with the re-introduction of pluralism in most African countries (Pickvance 1992; Canel 1992; 
O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). These channels include the return of political parties, which 
have pulled political interests and participation away from civil society groups. However, this 
explanation is problematic in at least two ways. Firstly, most African countries have weak 
political parties characterised by fragmentation, ethnicity, tenuous roots in society, low 
ideological basis, high volatility and a lack of organisational infrastructure (Mozaffar and 
Scarritt, 2005; Van de Walle. 2003; Ottaway 1999), thus creating room for civil society groups’ 
role in interest aggregation, articulation, and representation in the political system. Secondly, 
democratic transitions in most African countries were partial transitions, leading to “hybrid 
regimes” which exhibit authoritarian tendencies and thus call for the active role of civil society 
in the process of democratic consolidation. Popular disengagement, is, therefore, a critical 
process that has contributed to the decline of advocacy groups’ membership in the post-
transitional political and institutional environment in both Kenya and Zambia.  
The low levels of membership and citizen participation in advocacy groups’ activities 
can also be explained by the decline of euphoria of change after the political transitions. A study 
by the Zambia Council for Social Development found that citizen participation declined from 
its peak in the early 1990s when there was a massive mobilisation in support of multi-party 
democracy (ZCSD, 2012). Similarly, this study found that citizen participation in advocacy 
groups activities has consistently declined over the years in both countries. However, Booysen’s 
(2013) study of twenty years of South Africa’s democracy found that there was a growing and 
widespread trend of citizen involvement in “service delivery protests.” The author argues that 
citizens in South Africa endorsed protests and demonstrations because they believed that it 
attracted the attention of public authorities more effectively than lobbying elected 
representatives. Moreover, South Africa has a long history and culture of protests and 
demonstrations compared to both Kenya and Zambia.  
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Despite these findings, almost two decades of declining membership and citizen 
participation in advocacy groups’ activities in both Kenya and Zambia need an additional 
explanation, which this study, suggests being popular disengagement from advocacy groups as 
a result of disillusionment with their performance in the process of democratic consolidation. 
6.2.2.2. Advocacy groups’ Legitimacy, Representation, and Agenda 
Legitimacy is the most critical justification for the existence and operations of advocacy 
groups in the public sphere and influence their effectiveness in the process of democratic 
consolidation. Advocacy groups claim performance legitimacy based on tangible deliverables 
that they provide to various stakeholders (Edwards, 2000). Such deliverables include specific 
outputs or creating conditions that meet their members’ interests, needs, and expectations. The 
groups also claim normative legitimacy based on widely held social values, norms, and 
standards (Edwards, 2000). In principle, advocacy groups are supposed to pursue norms and 
values which promote democratic governance such as the promotion of tolerance, democratic 
inclusion, diversity, trust, social justice, accountability, and human rights. Democratic stability 
requires that the citizenry embrace and practice these kinds of norms and values (Putnam 1993; 
Inglehart 1977; Almond and Verba 1963). Civil society groups are, therefore, tasked with the 
institutionalization of essential social values, norms,  and attitudes which promote democratic 
consolidation (Parsons 1951).  
As unelected representatives of the people, civil society groups owe their legitimacy to 
the standards and values that they represent and champion (Brown and Jagananda 2007). 
Participation of citizens in civil society groups has positive consequences for democracy as it 
helps individuals develop positive civic virtues, norms, values, skills, and attitudes, which 
promote democratic citizenship. This study, therefore, assessed both performance and 
normative legitimacy of advocacy groups in Kenya and Zambia and their relationship to the 
process of popular disengagement.  The performance of advocacy groups means the efficiency 
and effectiveness by which these groups can solve perceived problems for their membership or 
the public. Effectiveness depends on advocacy groups’ capacity and commitment to their goals 
and objectives (Brown and Jagananda, 2007). Effective performance of advocacy groups helps 
them mobilise both the people and the resources for the causes they represent and champion. 
The notion of performance, therefore, applies to both membership and non-membership 
advocacy organisations. 
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Regarding the performance of advocacy groups in the process of democratic 
consolidation, the study found that 60 percent and 74 percent of those interviewed for this study 
in Kenya and Zambia respectively, stated that advocacy groups have not performed to the level 
of their expectations in the process of democratic consolidation. This finding demonstrates that 
support for advocacy groups’ in both countries has a strong instrumental perspective. In other 
words, without clear and direct benefits, citizens are unlikely to invest their time and energy 
into advocacy groups. Citizens, therefore, extend their support to advocacy groups in large part 
based on the level of their satisfaction with their performance in the delivery of desired goods 
and in this case, an effective contribution to the process of democratic consolidation. When 
citizens feel that advocacy groups are not performing to their expectations, they are most likely 
to withdraw from such groups than engage with them. The instrumental view of advocacy 
groups’ performance by citizens in both countries demonstrates conditional allegiance to these 
groups. This finding is consistent with  the finding of a study by the Zambia Council for Social 
Development on the performance of advocacy groups, which showed that only 54 percent of 
civil society organisations reported taking part in advocacy for policy change, and only 20 
percent of those groups recorded being successful in their attempts at policy change (ZCSD, 
2012).  
Regarding the normative legitimacy, this study found that most citizens have a 
problematic relationship with the values and norms pursued and practiced by advocacy groups 
in both Kenya and Zambia in the post-transitional political and institutional environment. The 
study found that in Kenya, 48 percent of respondents did not agree with the values and norms 
represented by advocacy groups, while only 28 percent fully agreed with such values and 
norms. In Zambia, 66 percent of respondents did not agree with the values and norms 
represented by advocacy groups, and only 24 percent fully agreed with such values and norms. 
Citizens in both countries believe that advocacy groups’ leadership lives a life of privilege and 
comfort, which is distant from a lifestyle of struggle by most of their members and supporters. 
This class difference alienates them from their members and supporters and limits their reach 
to the poor and the marginalized in society. Odinkalu (2000, p. 4) has emphasized this point 
when he argued that, “far from being a badge of honor, human rights activism is increasingly a 
certificate of privilege.” The following selected quotations from respondents further illustrate 
these sentiments; 
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“Nairobi-based advocacy group leaders do not share our norms and values. They earn high 
salaries, drive high-end cars, live in palatial homes and attend international meetings and 
conferences in expensive hotels. The truth is that they are middle-class elitists representing 
elitist values and norms” (Kenya: Author interview, 46:2012) 
 
“Most of these advocacy groups are led by individuals from the middle-class and largely serve 
elite interests with little connection to the common man” (Zambia: Author interview, 86:2012) 
 
The study also analyzed institutional trust, which is an integral part of the norms and 
values that advocacy groups are supposed to promote and the basis from which they derive their 
moral authority to challenge the state. Citizens’ trust also improves advocacy groups’ 
legitimacy and credibility within the political sphere. The study found that citizen trust in 
advocacy groups is strikingly low in both countries. Only 18 and 14 percent of those 
interviewed for this study in Kenya and Zambia respectively, stated that they fully trusted 
advocacy groups. The deep distrust for advocacy groups was attributed to their poor 
performance in the democratization process, lack of internal democracy, lack of transparency 
and accountability, and lack of consultation with their members and supporters on decision-
making and agenda setting. The declining trust in advocacy groups has contributed to 
disillusionment and ultimately disengagement from these groups.  
It thus appeared that most citizen’s norms, and values, especially those living in rural 
areas in both countries, hardly resonate with the norms and values represented and pursued by 
advocacy groups in the post-transitional political and institutional environment. Most 
respondents in this study view advocacy groups in both countries as elite-dominated and 
professionalized groups with weak or tenuous grassroots connections. The social character of 
most advocacy groups in both countries is mainly middle class, giving them a class interest, 
which has shaped the nature of their engagement with the political process (Ngunyi 1999). 
Fatton (1995) refers to these types of civil society groups as quasi-bourgeoisie civil society, 
representing and pursuing interests of the middle-class as opposed to the poor and the 
marginalized majority, whom they claim to represent. In the same vein, Saul and Ley (1999) 
have argued that the achievements of advocacy groups’ activism in Africa, have benefitted the 
middle class rather than popular interests.  
Most advocacy groups in both Kenya and Zambia are, therefore, professionalized, non-
membership groups, lacking internal democracy with a tendency for “founder syndrome,” 
which has led most citizens to view them as not representing their interests, norms, and values. 
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Skocpol (1999) has referred to such groups as “advocates without members.” The groups, 
therefore, have a normative disconnection with most citizens and this disconnection has 
significantly contributed to the process of popular disengagement from the groups. It must be 
noted that advocacy groups, whose norms and values are at variance with the citizens they claim 
to represent cannot meaningfully aggregate and articulate demands of those citizens, and, 
therefore, cannot effectively influence the process of democratic consolidation. Regarding 
representation, the study found that 64 percent and 72 percent of those interviewed in Kenya 
and Zambia respectively, stated that they did not feel represented by advocacy groups. The 
statements below illustrate some of the views on representation. 
“I do not believe that advocacy groups represent me. They formulate their agenda without 
consulting us and later present that agenda for us to endorse. They hardly listen to us” (Zambia: 
Author Interview, 25:2012) 
 
“Advocacy groups in this country are not accountable to their members, citizens, and supporters, 
so how can we feel represented by them? In some cases, they may pursue policies that benefit 
us, but it does not come from us. In most cases, they pursue whatever they want.” (Kenya: 
Author Interview, 98:2012) 
 
Most respondents interviewed for this study in both Kenya and Zambia did not believe 
that advocacy groups represented them in the pursuit of their agenda. The reasons for this 
position included the lack of consultation by advocacy groups, lack of internal democracy in 
most advocacy groups and lack of accountability to their members and supporters. Advocacy 
groups are, therefore, unable to effectively channel the discontents of the poor and the 
marginalized to the political system. Their efforts to speak on behalf of the “masses” are thus 
limited, and most of them operate as intermediaries between the people and the government 
rather than representatives of the people. These findings are consistent with Fioramonti (2005) 
who found that lack of internal democracy affects advocacy groups’ role in promoting 
democratic culture and social capital formation. However, Schmitter (1997) disagrees with this 
position and argues that lack of internal democracy within advocacy groups does not inhibit 
these groups from advancing democracy provided there is pluralism, and democratic space for 
the organisation of various interests. Mutua (2009) agrees with this position and argues that 
advocacy groups must be accountable and transparent but not necessarily democratic since 
democracy is slow, cumbersome and prone to gridlock. However, these arguments apply to 
professionalized non-membership advocacy groups. Membership advocacy groups, on the 
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other hand, need to practice internal democracy to allow active participation of their members 
in the agenda-setting and other activities of the organization.  
Regarding the advocacy groups’ agenda, it must be noted that these groups aggregate 
and articulate the demands of their members or the public to influence public policy. Their 
agenda is, therefore, crucial to the process of democratic consolidation. In principle, this agenda 
should reflect the agenda of their members or in the case of public interest advocacy groups, 
the agenda supported by the general citizenry. Citizen agreement with advocacy groups’ agenda 
is, therefore, vital because it shows that advocacy groups are meeting their claim to pursue the 
public good or the interests of their membership. It also indicates interest, support, and 
participation in the activities of these groups. The study found that 65 percent and 70 percent 
of respondents in Kenya and Zambia respectively stated that they did not agree with the agenda 
pursued by advocacy groups in their countries.  
Most respondents who disagreed with the agenda of advocacy groups cited lack of 
consultation of members and supporters on agenda setting and control of the advocacy groups 
agenda by international donors, who fund their programs as the main reasons for their position. 
The selected quotations below illustrate some of their views; 
“Advocacy groups have their own agenda from Nairobi and just want us to embrace and support 
that agenda. They do not know what we want neither do they care to ask us what we want” 
(Kenya: Author Interview, 34:2012) 
 
“These groups keep on talking about civil and political rights, while all that we need are jobs, 
affordable education for our children, better housing and better healthcare facilities. We cannot 
eat human rights” (Zambia: Author interview, 22: 2012) 
 
“Advocacy groups’ agenda in this country (Zambia) is defined by the agenda of international 
donors, who fund the programs that they implement. It is thus neither their agenda nor our 
agenda” (Zambia: Author Interview, 82:2012) 
 
 
Regarding the agenda of advocacy groups, this study made three crucial findings. 
Firstly, the study found that most advocacy groups have continued to pursue the discourse of 
the liberal version of human rights focused on civil liberties and political rights which 
dominated the global development agenda in the 1990s. Although this agenda was instrumental 
in framing the democratic transition politics in terms of rights in both countries, this study found 
that citizens in both countries appear to have moved onto an agenda of socio-economic 
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emancipation, based on tangible improvements in their livelihoods in the post-transitional 
dispensation. Advocacy groups’ agenda, therefore, does not resonate with the agenda that most 
citizens would want them to pursue. Most respondents interviewed for this study contested the 
language and practice of human rights by advocacy groups. This group of respondents views 
the liberal version of human rights as advocated by most advocacy groups as abstract and 
secondary to their immediate material needs, which are more pressing concerns than civil 
liberties and political rights. The human rights agenda as currently pursued by most advocacy 
groups, has, therefore, failed to resonate with most citizens in both countries in the face of poor 
governance and failure of economic reforms by the new democratic regimes, leading to 
widespread poverty, manifested by lack of food, healthcare, and poor housing. The citizens 
appear to prioritize social and economic rights in the post-transitional dispensation in both 
countries. 
Secondly, the study found that most respondents felt that advocacy groups’ agenda was 
largely shaped by the agenda of international donors than the needs, and expectations of 
grassroots communities, whom they claim to represent, a situation that this study describes as 
“advocacy group grassroots gap.” This gap is due to the chronic dependency of advocacy 
groups on international donor funding in both Kenya and Zambia. The international donor 
“calls for proposals” mechanism of funding advocacy groups has ensured that advocacy 
groups’ agenda mirror international donor priorities. Most advocacy groups, therefore, 
prioritize donor accountability rather than grassroots accountability, a form of “extroversion,” 
that is, mobilisation of resources through the unequal relationship with the external 
environment” (Bayart and Ellis, 1999, p. 21-22). Advocacy groups draw on their external 
connections using the internal domestic environment as a justification for such resources. These 
groups, end up pursuing an agenda that does not represent the needs and expectations of those 
whom they claim to represent, leading to disillusionment and popular disengagement. Mutua 
(2009) has argued that the neglect of social, economic and cultural rights by advocacy groups 
is based on the fear of the redistributive logic in such rights, which is at odds with liberalism 
and free market culture. 
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Thirdly, the study found that most respondents in both countries appeared to have 
moved away from the politics of liberation, which was tied to the liberal version of human 
rights agenda pursued by advocacy groups from the late 1980s. The liberation politics appeared 
to have been replaced with “politics of bread and butter” in both urban and rural areas. Citizens 
are more concerned with economic livelihood and survival than civil and political rights. 
Advocacy groups, are, therefore, finding it difficult to implement the liberal version of human 
rights in the face of declining social, political and economic conditions in both countries. 
Despite this discordance between the advocacy groups agenda of civil and political rights and 
the citizens’ agenda of social and economic development, most advocacy group leaders 
interviewed for this study, stated that they have continued to pursue the liberal version of the 
human rights agenda to align their programmes with the priorities of international donor 
organizations to access donor funding needed to sustain the operations of their organizations.  
One advocacy group leader interviewed for this study in Nairobi, Kenya, noted that;  
“Our projects usually follow what most international donors propose in their call for proposals 
and most international donors have prioritized the liberal version of human rights as their 
agenda. We have no choice as international donors hardly consult us on their agenda setting. 
We do not have much flexibility on that” (Kenya: Author interview, 12:2012) 
 
Although the liberal version of human rights was equated to the fight against despotism with 
the support of international donors and led to the rapid growth of human rights groups in the 
developing countries and democratic transition in the 1990s, the study found that it is losing 
currency with the public in both Kenya and Zambia in the post-transitional political and 
institutional environment. These findings are consistent with Englund’s (2006) ethnographic 
study of civil society organisations in Malawi in which he found that the dominance of a liberal 
definition of rights focused on civil liberties and individual political rights rather than collective 
socio-economic rights impeded the capacity of these organisations to represent the concerns of 
the country’s poor adequately. Further, the author argues that the human rights discourse of 
freedom and democracy pursued by most advocacy groups in Malawi disempowered the 
impoverished people whom they are supposed to empower. Englund observes in his study that 
Africans are getting impatient with abstractions of “human rights and freedoms” and instead 
want an agenda focused on material and economic needs. 
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 Similarly, Gabay (2011) has demonstrated the extroverted nature of Malawian civil 
society organisations. He argues that while civil society in Malawi claims to promote the 
interests of Malawians, they are driven by an external agenda that influence the working of the 
Malawian state and its governing elite. He concludes that the structural relationship between 
civil society and international donors impede them from working for the majority poor and the 
marginalized in Malawi. Newburry (1994) has captured a similar discordance when she writes 
about liberal democracy in Africa. She argues that there is a clear disconnect of democracy of 
content versus democracy of procedure in the continent since the redistribution in the economic 
sphere and responses to the needs of social classes have not been part of liberal democracy as 
implemented in Africa. This situation contrasts with the goals of the democratic struggles of 
the African people.   
Booysen (2013) in a study of democracy in South Africa found that post-apartheid South 
Africans are continuously taking their human rights for granted and instead emphasizing more 
tangible socio-economic needs manifested through their active participation in service delivery 
protests and demonstrations. Additionally, it is a paradox to expand civil liberties and political 
rights in a context of declining social and economic rights. In Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of 
needs, civil liberties and political rights are higher needs that can only be fully enjoyed once 
basic needs have been met. It is, therefore, contradictory to pursue civil liberties and political 
rights in an environment of widespread poverty, inequality and poor standards of living such as 
Kenya and Zambia. Once democratic transitions were achieved through the liberal framework 
of human rights in both Kenya and Zambia, citizens have turned their focus and attention to 
basic needs. The extent to which advocacy groups reflect the popular agenda supported by most 
citizens and domestic interests is thus limited and reduce their ability to effectively contribute 
to the process of democratic consolidation. 
6.2.3. Micro-Scale Factors 
The micro-scale factors that influence the process of popular disengagement from 
advocacy groups in Kenya and Zambia are numerous and complex. They include the 
availability of resources, cynicism, normlessness, and psychological factors. This study focused 
on the availability of resources and cynicism as these could easily be captured through personal 
in-depth qualitative interviews.  
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6.2.3.1. Availability of Resources 
The resource perspective or theory of popular disengagement emphasizes the level of 
education and income as variables that significantly influence political participation. In other 
words, the level of participation in civil society activities depends on socio-economic status. 
This study, therefore, defined resources broadly given that some resources such as civic and 
organizational skills can be learned in associations, irrespective of one’s socio-economic status 
(Brady et al., 1995). Moreover, political activities require specific resources to be effective, and 
such resources vary from one type of association to another and from one socio-economic status 
to another. In this study, resources, therefore, included time, money, civic, and organisational 
skills. The study found that lack of resources due to pervasive and widespread poverty in both 
Kenya and Zambia had significant influence in the process of popular disengagement from 
advocacy groups. The increasing levels of poverty limit the ability of most Kenyans and 
Zambians to meet the functional costs of participation and have forced individuals, who were 
once members of advocacy groups to disengage. The increasingly poor economic conditions in 
both countries have left most citizens without employment, money and time for involvement in 
activities of advocacy groups.172 Most citizens, therefore, spend most of their time in activities 
of economic survival and livelihood. These findings are consistent with Simon’s (2002) study 
of the effects of poverty on Zambia political participation in the first five years of the country’s 
democracy. Relying on the analysis of district-level data and individual-level survey data of 
1996 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS) of Zambia, the author found that 
microeconomic improvements promote political participation, while poverty depressed 
participation in at least two ways. 
 Firstly, poverty affects the functional costs of participation like transportation and 
forgone income for a missed day at work. Secondly, economic frustration leads to 
disillusionment and finally withdrawal from political participation. Poverty, therefore, has a 
disproportionate effect on participation in advocacy groups’ activities. Similarly, a study by the 
Zambia Council for Social Development found that poverty erodes the time for voluntary 
activities (ZCSD, 2012) and, therefore, depress participation in activities of such groups. This 
                                                             
 
172 Most respondents reported that some advocacy groups in both Kenya and Zambia were forced to pay 
individual citizens to participate in their activities such as meetings, workshops and seminars. 
353 
 
study also found that most poor citizens found it difficult to participate in activities of advocacy 
groups due to lack of time because they use most of their time in economic activities. This 
finding is consistent with Carothers (2005) finding that political participation declines in a 
context of poverty, inequality, and corruption, characteristics exhibited by both Kenya and 
Zambia in the post-transitional dispensation. In such a context, citizens become increasingly 
distrustful of democratic institutions, and, therefore, shun participation in their activities. 
Broadly, studies of political attitudes and alienation have emphasised the subjective evaluation 
of political interests, political ideals, personal trust, system performance and cynicism among 
others (Verba, 1972; Easton 1975; Kaase, 1988) as crucial factors in political participation. 
Such studies claim that a negative evaluation of the political system is associated with low 
levels of political participation. With most respondents evaluating the performance of advocacy 
groups in the process of democratic consolidation negatively, they are most likely to disengage 
from such groups. 
6.2.3.2. Cynicism and personal efficacy 
This study found that there is a growing sense of cynicism among the citizens of both 
Kenya and Zambia expressed as “nothing will change,” whether they participate in advocacy 
groups’ activities or not based on their past lived experiences and subjective interpretation of 
those experiences. This conclusion is based on their past lived experiences and subjective 
evaluation of advocacy groups’ performance in the process of democratic consolidation. There 
appeared to be a deep sense of collective hopelessness within a section of the population, which 
significantly contributed to the process of popular disengagement from advocacy groups in both 
Kenya and Zambia in the post-transitional political environment. Ibalema (2008. p. 45) has 
referred to this sense of hopelessness as civic cynicism in Africa and argued that it, “bears 
negatively on the viability and consolidation of democracy.” This study found that cynical 
individuals were most likely to disengage from advocacy groups than those who were hopeful 
that things would one day change for the better. Cynical citizens believe that they have received 
no rewards for participation in advocacy group activities in the past and, therefore, have no 
expectations of any rewards for doing so in the future (Baker, 2001). This study found that 
individuals in this group had extremely low levels of trust for advocacy groups, which they 
perceive as self-interested, exploitative and serving the interests of the middle class and the 
state. They thus have low personal efficacy, which is the feeling that an individual can and does 
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influence political decisions and that their involvement, individually or collectively does make 
a difference (Baker 2001). Cynicism combined with low personal efficacy, therefore, has 
played a significant role in the process of popular disengagement from advocacy groups in both 
Kenya and Zambia and some cases led to anti-politics.  
6.3. Patterns of popular disengagement from Advocacy groups in Kenya and 
Zambia  
Regarding the patterns of disengagement, the study proposed that popular 
disengagement from advocacy groups is both an individual and a collective response to the 
failure of advocacy groups to meet the needs and expectations of its members and supporters 
in the process of democratic consolidation. The study suggested that popular disengagement 
from advocacy groups’ cuts across social categories and spatial divides (Rural/urban divides) 
and lead to spillover effects on other types of voluntary associations. From the analysis of in-
depth personal interviews with ordinary citizens from both Kenya and Zambia, the study found 
that popular disengagement from advocacy groups is much more an individual response, rather 
than a collective response to the poor performance of advocacy groups in the process of 
democratic consolidation. It is an individual deliberate choice and action based on an 
individual’s lived experiences and subjective interpretation of those experiences. Additionally, 
the process of disengagement from advocacy groups is a means of adapting to or protesting the 
perceived failures of advocacy groups in the process of democratic consolidation in the post-
transitional political and institutional environment. This finding is consistent with Baker’s 
(2001) study of various types of disengagement from the state in Africa, which found that 
disengagement from the state was an individual response to perceived failures of the state to 
meet their needs and expectations. 
6.3.1. Social Clustering 
Regarding social clustering, the study found that citizens in rural areas were most likely 
to pursue a strategy of disengagement from advocacy groups than those living in urban areas in 
both countries as shown in Figure 6.6. below. Moreover, the poor and the marginalised 
population in the rural areas were most likely to disengage from advocacy groups than those 
living in urban areas in both countries, although the general level of withdrawal of these groups 
from advocacy groups was much higher in Zambia than in Kenya for several reasons which are 
discussed in this section. 
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Figure 6 5 Location and Membership in Advocacy groups in Kenya and Zambia 
 
Source: Author created from qualitative interview data  
The pattern of the rural-urban divide in terms of popular disengagement from advocacy 
groups depicted in Figure 6.5 above is influenced by higher levels of poverty in rural areas in 
both countries compared to urban areas. It means that in the face of declining economic 
conditions in Kenya and Zambia, the rural citizens are disproportionately affected and, 
therefore, prioritize participation in activities of economic livelihood more than the urban 
citizens. Rural citizens are, therefore, most likely to withdraw their participation and 
membership from advocacy groups. Additionally, the study found that most advocacy groups 
are located in urban areas, and, therefore, have tenuous ties and links with the rural population. 
It is thus much easier for rural citizens to disengage from such groups in the face of their poor 
performance in the process of democratic consolidation.  
Finally, the differences between the values, and norms of rural residents with the values 
and norms represented and pursued by most advocacy groups in both countries have contributed 
to the disproportionate disengagement from advocacy groups in the rural areas than urban areas. 
These findings are consistent with Booysen’s (2013) finding in a study of South Africa’s 
democracy that people of lower economic status are disproportionately affected by poor 
economic performance, leading to low levels of participation in democratic institutions. 
Regarding gender, the study found that women were most likely to disengage from advocacy 
groups than men in both countries. The pattern was replicated in urban and rural areas as shown 
below in Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8 for Kenya and Zambia results respectively. There seems to 
be a tendency of more dissatisfied women withdrawing from advocacy groups than men in the 
post-transitional political and institutional environment in both countries.  
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Figure 6 6 Male and Female Membership in Advocacy groups in Kenya 
 
Source: Author created from qualitative interview data  
Figure 6 7 Male and Female Membership in Advocacy groups in Zambia 
 
Source: Author created from qualitative interview data 
These findings are consistent with several studies that have reported a general “gender 
gap” regarding various forms of political participation in both developed and developing 
countries. In established western democracies, several studies have found that men are most 
likely to engage in politics than women (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Fraser and Macdonald 
2003; Burns et al., 2001; Schlotsman et al. 1994; Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Verba, Nie, and Kim, 
1978). Recent studies on political participation have confirmed these findings (Merian et al., 
2010; Vecchione and Caprara, 2009; Stolle and Hooghe, 2009; Burns 2007; Conway, 2001).  
There have also been a growing number of studies on gender and participation specific to 
developing countries, which have found similar results (Bawa and Sanyare, 2013; Bratton et 
al., 2010; Anderson, 2010; Isaksson 2010; Beck, 2003; Fraser and Macdonald, 2003). Similarly, 
Bratton’s (1999) study of political participation in Zambia found that gender was one of the 
most consistent determinants of unequal political participation.  
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Additionally, Logan and Bratton (2006) analysed political gender gap in Africa, based 
on the 2005 Afro-barometer survey results and concluded that women were less active than 
men at least in relation to formal categories of political participation. In terms of membership 
in civil society groups, a study commissioned by the Zambia Council for Social Development 
found a gender divide in politically oriented civil society organisations, where 60 percent of 
members were men, while only 40 percent of members were women (ZCSD, 2012). In Latin 
America, Anderson (2010) in a comparative study of Nicaragua and Argentina found that men 
were most likely to join organisations than women. Other studies have found that men are most 
likely to engage in collective forms of participation than women (Coffe and Bolzendahl 2010; 
Burns, 2007).  
There are several possible explanations for the gendered nature of popular 
disengagement from advocacy groups in both Kenya and Zambia in the post-transitional 
political and institutional environment. Inglehart and Norris (2003) identify cultural, structural 
and agency perspectives as predominant explanations for the gender disparities in political 
participation. Cultural explanations of the gender gap in political participation emphasise the 
level of motivation and interest in politics, which are mainly shaped by the dominant culture, 
social norms, beliefs, and values in society. In Africa, the substantial gender gap in political 
participation can be explained by the traditional patriarchal perception of women as inferior to 
men, leading to unequal power status between men and women and the rigid gender roles that 
assign women domestic work with the consequence of subordination and a weak sense of 
political efficacy among women. The patriarchal system that is dominant in both Kenya and 
Zambia also prescribes the private domestic sphere as the female domain and the public sphere 
as the male domain. These norms and values are mediated through the socialization process 
(Burns 2007, Verba et al. 1997).  Inglehart and Norris (2003) have emphasised that the critical 
importance of culture is that women and men adopt these traditional attitudes, values, and norms 
as appropriate within society. Similarly, Adhiambo-Oduol (2003) has also identified socio-
cultural beliefs, attitudes, and stereotypes as significant barriers to women’s political 
participation in Kenya. Men, therefore, dominate social, political and economic spheres in 
society (Geisler 2004; Beck, 2003; Bratton, 1999).  
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Secondly, structural explanations focus on how gender is closely related to the unequal 
distribution of civic resources in society such as time, education, money, political knowledge, 
and skills. These resources facilitate political participation. In both Kenya and Zambia, there is 
a considerable gap between men and women, regarding access to socio-economic resources 
such as income and education with men most likely to access these resources than women. 
Additionally, women are most likely to be burdened with domestic work that places more 
demands on their time and resources, leaving them less available for political participation 
(Burns et al. 1997). Furthermore, gender is a significant determinant of poverty in Africa, where 
women make a significant portion of the poor and the marginalised population in social, 
political and economic spheres (IMF, 2005). 
Thirdly, agency explanations focus on the mobilising roles of social networks and 
organisations to which men typically have greater access than women. These include the role 
of news media and informal social networks. Here again, men dominate women in such spheres 
in society in both Kenya and Zambia. The above explanations for the disproportionate levels of 
political participation of women compared to men mean that if the few women who have 
overcome these social, political and economic barriers and joined advocacy groups perceive 
these groups as incapable of meeting their needs and expectations, then they would much more 
easily disengage from such groups compared to men. This study found that most women who 
disengaged from advocacy groups in both countries joined the more traditionally accepted 
informal social organisations in society such as self-help groups, while others who were already 
members of such groups maintained their membership in the groups.  
6.3.2. Levels of Education 
The study found that the level of education measured on a scale of years of education 
of respondents had a strong positive relationship with membership in advocacy groups. In 
Kenya, only 2 percent of respondents with no education in both urban and rural areas indicated 
that they were members of an advocacy group, while 28 percent and 35 percent of respondents 
in urban and rural areas respectively with a primary level of education stated that they were 
members of an advocacy group. For respondents with secondary education and above, 30 
percent in urban areas and 38 percent in rural areas stated that they were members of an 
advocacy group. Similarly, in Zambia, only 2 percent of respondents with no education in both 
urban and rural areas stated that they were members of an advocacy group, while 24 percent 
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and 32 percent of respondents with primary education in urban and rural areas respectively 
stated that they were members of an advocacy group. For respondents with secondary education 
and above, 26 percent in urban areas and 36 percent in rural areas said they were members of 
an advocacy group. This means that most of those who disengaged from advocacy groups in 
both countries in the post-transitional political dispensation had low levels of education. 
Education appears to be a strong proxy for socio-economic status in both Kenya and Zambia 
since it is correlated with income. The results of this study showed that citizens with no 
education or low socio-economic status were most likely to disengage from advocacy groups 
than those with primary, secondary, or higher levels of education. In other words, those who 
were most likely to disengage from advocacy groups had low socio-economic status, and were, 
therefore, disproportionately affected by the poor economic performance in both countries. 
A vast literature of contemporary scholarship has long credibly established education as 
a significant predictor of civic engagement in political studies in both developed and developing 
countries (Henderson and Chatfield, 2011; Persson, 2011; Sondheimer and Green, 2010; Stolle 
and Hooghe, 2009; Putnam, 1996; Verba et al 1995; Almond and Verba 1963; Lipset, 1959). 
The relationship between education and political participation is so strong to the extent that 
there is almost a widespread consensus on the universal, robust and positive relationship 
between education and multiple forms of civic engagement. La Due Lake and Huckfeldt (1998, 
p. 567), for example, argue that the positive correlation between education and political 
participation is “one of the most reliable results in empirical social sciences.”  
Similarly, Hillygus (2005, p. 25) has noted that the idea that education is a primary 
driver of increased political participation is “largely uncontested,” while Putnam (1993, p. 68) 
posits that education “is the best individual-level predictor of participation.” In his analysis of 
trends in social capital in the United States in his book, Bowling Alone, Putnam (2000) reiterates 
the striking link between education and participation and concludes that education is a highly 
powerful predictor of many forms of social participation of both men and women, including 
participation in associational groups. In their seminal book, the Civic Culture (1963, p. 315-
316) Almond and Verba noted that the level of education “appears to have the most important 
effect on political attitudes...of all the demographic variables, none compared to educational 
variables in the extent to which it seems to determine political attitudes.” March and Kaase 
(1979) have also noted the strong empirical linkage between education and civic engagement. 
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Similarly, Smith and Shen (2002, p. 101) have concluded that “higher average levels of formal 
education in a nation tend to make people in that nation more ready and able to participate in 
associations as individuals on average, leading to a greater associational prevalence in the 
aggregate.” Studies more specific to developing countries have also made the same conclusions. 
In a comparative study of Nicaragua and Argentina, Anderson (2010) found that the more one 
was educated, the most likely that they belonged to a civic organisation. Similarly, Vecchione 
and Caprara (2009) found that education significantly affects political participation levels. 
Specifically, they found that people who were more educated were most likely to engage in 
political activities compared to those who were less educated.  
However, critics have questioned the precise nature of the causal mechanisms between 
education and political participation. The debate has partly taken the form of education as a 
cause versus education as a proxy for participation. Campbell (2009) for example, has 
attempted to explain the linkage by developing different models. In his absolute education 
model, he notes that the individual-level of education is the driving mechanism for 
participation, while in the sorting model; the author views education as a determinant of social 
status, which then leads to increased levels of participation. However, Spence (1973) argues 
that isolating the effects of education on participation from the innate ability is extremely hard. 
Jennings and Niemi (1968) support this position and submit that it is hard to isolate education 
from socio-economic status, while Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry (1996) recognize the same 
difficulty with family background. Still, others have provided evidence to show that not all 
types of schooling increase participation (Berisnsky and Lenz 2011; Kam and Palmer 2008). 
Wattenberg (2002) study of the industrialised World, for example, has demonstrated the 
puzzling falling levels of participation, despite rising levels of education, a notable example of 
what Brody (1978) referred to as the “paradox of participation.” 
Although the explicit nature of the linkage between education and participation remain 
contested, there are several ways in which education can influence participation. Firstly, formal 
education increases critical capacities of an individual, such as civic and cognitive skills, 
political knowledge, opportunities to discuss social and political issues, habits of associational 
involvement such as trust and tolerance, political awareness and support for democracy (Delli, 
Carpini and Keeter 1996; Milner, 2002). Secondly, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) have argued 
that education may lead to value-change with more educated people expressing democratic 
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values such as tolerance much more than uneducated people. These values facilitate political 
participation. Thirdly, education also increases political motivation and interest, and politically 
interested citizens can accurately assess government performance and are, therefore, most likely 
to believe that their participation can affect political change. This means that highly educated 
citizens have high political efficacy than those who are less educated. 
6.3.3. Selective disengagement and Incorporation 
This study found that popular disengagement from advocacy groups is a selective 
process with disengaging citizens either maintaining membership in self-help groups and 
kinship associations or joining such groups as they withdraw from advocacy groups. Popular 
disengagement from advocacy groups, therefore, has a spill-over effect on other types of civil 
society groups, especially self-help groups, and kinship associations. Citizens appear 
sophisticated and deliberate in their decisions to withdraw from advocacy groups in both 
countries in the new political and institutional environment and join other groups that they feel 
are crucial in the prevailing social and economic environment. They mainly join these new 
groups to cope with new and unfamiliar social and political realities. The study also found that 
most citizens who disengaged from advocacy groups were most likely to join service delivery 
organisations and self-help associations. The movement towards these groups was due to the 
declining economic conditions experienced in both Kenya and Zambia in the post-transitional 
political and institutional dispensation.  
This movement signified a dual process of disengagement from advocacy groups and 
re-incorporation into other types of civil society organisations. Popular disengagement from 
advocacy groups, therefore, involved, the break-up of old attachments to advocacy groups and 
establishment of new solidarities with self-help associations and kinship groups. In other words, 
the construction of new forms of solidarities as a result of disillusionment with old forms of 
attachments, which have redefined the landscape of social formations in both countries. This 
process is being witnessed in both urban and rural areas. These findings are consistent with a 
study commissioned by the Zambia Council for Social Development which found that about 80 
percent of Zambians were members of a socially oriented civil society organisation with over 
50 percent of people stating that they have no participation in a politically oriented civil society 
organisations (ZCSD, 2012). 
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6.4. Forms of popular disengagement from Advocacy groups 
 
 Regarding the forms of popular disengagement, the study found that popular 
disengagement from advocacy groups in the post-transitional political and institutional 
environment manifests in two significant forms; suffer-manage and self-enclosure strategies. 
In their study of state-civil society disengagement, Azarya and Chazan (1987, p. 116) identified 
these forms of disengagement from the state. They noted that the suffer-manage strategy of 
disengagement, “encompasses an array of activities aimed at reconciliation to a declining 
standard of living and learning to manage in these circumstances.” In the case of the state, it 
involves finding ways of coping with economic problems or means of economic survival. 
Similarly, this study found that individuals who disengaged from advocacy groups are adjusting 
to an environment, where they perceive advocacy groups to have failed to effectively meet their 
needs and expectations. Most of those disengaging from advocacy groups are, therefore, 
reprioritizing their time and other resources by engaging in activities that support their basic 
socio-economic needs and survival, instead of participating in advocacy group activities. In 
other words, in the face of increasing economic hardship, disengaging individuals are being 
pragmatic by managing the new reality where advocacy groups have become irrelevant through 
joining self-help organisations such as community-based organizations, hawkers’ associations, 
street traders’ groups, women micro-finance groups, credit unions, and farmers associations to 
meet their socio-economic needs. The suffer-manage form of disengagement is both a rural and 
urban phenomenon in both countries. 
The second form of popular disengagement from advocacy groups in both countries is 
the self-enclosure strategy of disengagement, which is an attempt to “insulate oneself from the 
state, thereby gaining protection from its uncertainties.” (Azarya and Chazan, 1987, p. 126). 
This strategy involves the reduced use of states channels, moving back from export to 
subsistence crops, urban-rural migration, and retreat to traditional forms of solidarity. This 
study found that individuals who have disengaged from advocacy groups are also attempting to 
insulate themselves from the inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of these groups from meeting 
their expectations by withdrawing into kinship associations that provide them with norms of 
solidarity and mutual support (Osaghae, 1999). The incorporation into kinship organisations 
has been manifested by the proliferation of ethnic and kinship associations in both Kenya and 
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Zambia in the post-transitional political and institutional period. This movement into kinship 
associations fit into the theory of indigenousness, which attributes popular disengagement with 
the “resilience of African norms of social organisation” (Osaghae, 1999). These indigenous 
groups have become a fall-back position for the failures of advocacy groups to meet citizen 
expectations, norms, values, and needs, therefore, reinforcing the need for kinship-based self-
help structures. 
6.5. Implications of Popular disengagement to democratic consolidation 
Regarding the implications of popular disengagement from advocacy groups, the study 
proposed that the nature and scale of disengagement affect legitimacy, credibility, and capacity 
of advocacy groups to effectively influence the process of democratic consolidation. The 
findings of this study confirmed the above propositions. Although popular disengagement from 
advocacy groups is an invisible, passive and adaptive response, resulting from macro, meso, 
and micro-scale factors related to advocacy groups, it significantly undermines advocacy 
groups’ capacity to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in several 
ways. The mutually reinforcing relationship between the levels of participation in civic and 
political activities and membership in voluntary organisations is well established in political 
research (Baker 2001, Bratton 1997; Bratton, Alderfer and Simutanyi 1997; Putnam 1996; 
Bratton and Katundu 1994). Further, Almond and Verba (1963) have examined survey data of 
five nations and concluded that a member of an organisation was most likely to consider himself 
competent as a citizen to be a more active participant in politics than a non-member. 
 The authors have noted that any membership passive or active in a voluntary 
association has an impact on political competence. Additionally, Inglehart (1997) has found 
that organisational membership does show a statistically significant linkage with changes in 
levels of democracy. Popular disengagement from advocacy groups in both Kenya and Zambia, 
therefore, not only reduce advocacy groups’ capacity to contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation, but also impede the overall participation of citizens in the formal political 
processes such as voting and involvement in civic activities between elections, which some 
scholars consider more crucial in the process of democratic consolidation than one-off 
processes such as voting. The low level of both formal and informal political participation 
created by popular disengagement from advocacy groups is, therefore, extremely detrimental 
to the overall process of democratic consolidation in both countries. It must also be noted that 
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democratic consolidation requires meaningful and active citizen participation in the formal 
political processes to ensure democratic legitimacy (Bratton et al., 2005) choice and public 
accountability of leadership in government (Simon, 2005). Moreover, active participation 
increases the influence that citizens have on public policy decisions, besides improving civic 
skills and virtues, which ultimately maintain the vitality, stability, and quality of democracy 
(Osaghae, 1999). 
 Advocacy groups derive their legitimacy from their membership and from public 
support for the causes, the values and the norms they represent and champion. Popular 
disengagement leads to the withdrawal of support and resources, which are critical to the 
performance of these groups in the process of democratic consolidation. It thus erodes their 
legitimacy and credibility, which are critical if they are to engage the state and be taken 
seriously by other political actors.  In other words, popular disengagement from advocacy 
groups undermines the legitimacy, the moral authority and the ability and capacity of advocacy 
groups to effectively mobilize support, engage and influence state policies on issues which 
support the process of democratic consolidation. Additionally, popular disengagement 
significantly reduces the ability of advocacy groups to influence democratic values, citizenship, 
and attitudes in the public sphere that contribute to the institutionalization of democracy. 
Popular disengagement from advocacy groups weaken these groups and make them vulnerable 
to state criticism on their representative capacity to aggregate and articulate demands from their 
constituencies and the public at large. It makes it easier for the state to use political propaganda 
to label these groups as “unelected” and “agents of foreign interests,” which lack domestic 
constituencies and support and only accountable to international donors. Such propaganda has 
dented advocacy groups’ image, legitimacy, and credibility with the public.  
As Baker (2001, p. 182) has noted: “Loss of legitimacy is an effect, as well as a cause 
of disengagement.” It undermines the very foundation of the existence of advocacy groups in 
the political sphere in both Kenya and Zambia. The promotion of popular participation is a 
critical purpose of advocacy groups in the political process as it ensures democratic citizenship, 
which is a key cornerstone of democratic consolidation. Popular participation requires active 
and informed citizenry with the skills and desire to express themselves and hold public officials 
accountable (Warren, 2009). The level and quality of participation of citizens in the democratic 
process, is, therefore, an essential barometer for democratic consolidation and a crucial goal for 
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democratizing countries such as Kenya and Zambia. Popular disengagement from advocacy 
groups erodes the level and quality of citizen participation in the democratization process, and 
therefore, significantly reduce the ability of advocacy groups to ensure such quality of 
participation to support the process of democratic consolidation.  
Moreover, scholars associated with the concept of social capital hold that voluntary and 
active participation of citizens in civil society groups, including, advocacy groups have positive 
consequences for democracy (Putnam 2001; 2000; 1993; Tocqueville 1835). It promotes 
democratic values, norms, and attitudes of tolerance, moderation and a willingness to 
compromise and respect opposing views (Diamond 1999). Participation in civil society groups 
also helps citizens develop political interest, efficacy, and skills of democratic citizenship that 
ensure responsive, democratic institutions that can address societal concerns and their interests. 
These processes are critical to the institutionalization of democracy. Popular disengagement 
has lowered the propensity of citizens to participate in advocacy groups’ activities actively and, 
therefore, develop such positive civic skills, norms, values and attitudes that are critical to the 
process of democratic consolidation. As Linz and Stepan (1996a) have argued, participation in 
civil society ensures attitudinal support of most citizens for the democratic procedures and 
values. 
It must be noted that advocacy groups provide “the basis for the limitation of state 
power, hence for the control of the state by society, and hence for democratic polit ical 
institutions as the most effective means of exercising that control” (Huntington 1984:204). This 
function of advocacy groups is critical for hybrid regimes such as those of Kenya and Zambia, 
which are struggling with the process of democratic consolidation. Advocacy groups are 
supposed to check, monitor and restrain the exercise of state power by holding governments 
transparent, accountable and strengthening state institutions to be responsive to the needs of the 
citizens (Diamond 1999, Bratton 1994). However, popular disengagement from advocacy 
groups undermines the capacity of advocacy groups to effectively conduct these functions in 
both countries without the commitment and support of their citizens and the public to ensure 
transparency and accountability and to act as a bulwark against perceived abuses of state 
authority and violations of democratic principles and practices. Moreover, without members, 
advocacy groups cannot effectively mobilize support for policies which help guard against 
excesses of the state and the process of democratic consolidation.   
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Advocacy groups in both Kenya and Zambia are also supposed to structure various 
channels for interest aggregation, articulation, representation, and mediation in the process of 
democratic consolidation. This role of advocacy groups is critical for democratic consolidation 
given the weakness of political parties and democratic institutions that were established after 
the political transitions in the early 1990s. Without membership and support, advocacy groups 
cannot effectively perform this function. Additionally, advocacy groups aggregate and mediate 
competing and sometimes conflicting interests, values and beliefs, and provide platforms for 
democratic deliberations of national issues and interests of various social groups (Forbrig 2002, 
Diamond 1999). These functions improve political and social equality, ensure responsive 
governments, legitimacy, and democracy (Waylen 1994). Popular disengagement from 
advocacy groups in both Kenya and Zambia, make it extremely difficult for these groups to 
aggregate and articulate demands or speak on behalf of the masses, bridge social and political 
cleavages or mediate competing and conflicting interests. This situation undermines advocacy 
groups’ role in the process of democratic consolidation in both countries as they are unable to 
channel citizen discontents about social, economic and political problems into a coherent 
political agenda. 
Advocacy groups in both Kenya and Zambia also engage in the recruitment and training 
of new political leaders to help drive the process of democratic governance in the new political 
and institutional dispensation. The groups conduct training for parliamentarians and other 
elected leaders on issues of democratic principles, civil liberties and political rights, public 
transparency and accountability, checks and balances, leadership and even technical skills. 
Additionally, Diamond (1999) has noted that advocacy group leaders acquire organisational, 
leadership and advocacy skills in the process of leading these groups, skills which help them 
qualify for both state bureaucratic roles and participation in party politics. A considerable 
number of advocacy group leaders have been co-opted into state bureaucracy in both countries 
with the democratic transition process, while others have joined the government through 
elective politics. However, popular disengagement from advocacy groups diminishes this role 
by making the recruitment of advocacy groups membership difficult, and, therefore, creating 
groups with no members to train as future political leaders in the democratization process. It 
also erodes the legitimacy, trust and even credibility of advocacy groups with public officials 
whom they intend to train as new political leaders.   
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Since the political transitions in both Kenya and Zambia, advocacy groups have 
developed various programs targeted at building governance and democratic institutions that 
support the process of democratic consolidation. Such programs have targeted civic education, 
electoral reforms, election monitoring, democratising political parties, strengthening various 
democratic institutions such as the legislature and the judiciary and improving budget 
participation and monitoring among others. However, for these programs to be effective, they 
need public support and commitment. Popular disengagement impedes the capacity of 
advocacy groups to mobilise public support for critical programs, which support the process of 
democratic consolidation in both countries.  
6.6. Summary 
This chapter has analysed the dynamics of the interaction of advocacy groups with their 
membership in the process of democratic consolidation. It has presented the findings from the 
in-depth personal qualitative interviews with ordinary citizens and comparatively analysed 
popular disengagement from advocacy groups in Kenya and Zambia regarding its nature, 
pattern and its effects on advocacy groups’ ability to effectively contribute to the process of 
democratic consolidation. The chapter suggests that people’s experiences and their subjective 
interpretation of those experiences inform and shape their behaviour and actions towards 
advocacy groups. The membership of citizens in advocacy groups and their active participation 
sustained the momentum of the pro-democracy movements in both countries and led to 
democratic transitions in the early 1990s. Citizens were, therefore, at the core of the transition 
process and this created unrealistically high expectations built around the assumption that the 
transitions would lead to economic development and the institutionalization of democracy.  
However, these hopes and expectations have remained unfulfilled in the post-
transitional political and institutional dispensation, leading to disappointment, disillusionment 
and significantly contributing to popular disengagement from advocacy groups in both Kenya 
and Zambia. Regarding the nature of popular disengagement in both countries, the chapter 
argued that satisfaction or frustration with government performance is not synonymous with 
political consciousness and action. The chapter, therefore, provided evidence which 
demonstrated that the decision of citizens to engage or disengage from the institutions of 
governance such as the state and advocacy groups is a complicated process that is dependent 
on numerous contextual factors, which include macro, meso, and micro-scale factors. 
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Regarding the macro-scale factors, the chapter provided evidence demonstrating that most of 
those dissatisfied individuals with the performance of advocacy groups in the process of 
democratic consolidation were most likely to choose popular disengagement than engagement 
as a means of protest  and adaptation because the strategy offers them immediate relief, is within 
reach to most citizens, low in resource demand and has minimal risks of sanctions from 
advocacy groups. Additionally, disengagement is an invisible, quiet, private and a passive 
strategy of exit, which makes it more attractive and readily available means of protest to 
individuals. It is also a crucial residual category when citizens feel that their voices are 
ineffective, which apply to the cases in this study, where most citizens felt that their voices were 
ineffective with the refrain that “nothing will ever change,” signifying a deep sense of collective 
hopelessness within the populace.  
The chapter analysed the political and economic reforms in both Kenya and Zambia 
since the transitions in the early 1990s and concluded that most citizens in both countries were 
disappointed and disillusioned with both political and economic performance of the newly 
democratic regime in both countries and blame both their governments and advocacy groups. 
The disillusionment with the failures of political and economic reforms have significantly 
contributed to the process of popular disengagement from advocacy groups. The chapter 
provided evidence showing that popular disengagement appears to be relatively higher in 
Zambia than Kenya due to extremely high hopes and expectations for economic development 
in the country during the swift transition in 1991 at the backdrop of a relatively deeper economic 
crisis compared to Kenya.  
The chapter noted that these findings fit into the marginalization theory of 
disengagement in Africa, which is premised on the fact that individuals and groups who feel 
excluded and unable to influence the formal institutions of governance are most likely to 
withdraw into parallel systems. In this case, individuals who are disappointed with the 
performance of advocacy groups in the process of democratic consolidation are most likely to 
withdraw from these groups and join other types of civil society groups. Regarding the spatial 
distribution of advocacy groups, the chapter showed that most advocacy groups are located in 
the capital cities of both countries for convenience in accessing government offices and 
international donor agencies. This has created both a physical and an ideological disconnection 
between advocacy groups and rural residents, who, therefore, find it much easier to withdraw 
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from such groups, when they perceive them to be ineffective in meeting their needs and 
expectations. Regarding the reasons for withdrawal from advocacy groups, most citizens 
interviewed in both Kenya and Zambia cited disappointment with the performance of advocacy 
groups in the process of democratic consolidation, lack of time, lack of trust and loss of interest 
in the activities of advocacy groups. Higher levels of poverty and economic hardship in rural 
areas than urban areas in both countries also contributed to higher levels of popular 
disengagement from advocacy groups in rural areas than urban areas.  
The second section of the chapter analysed the meso-scale factors related to advocacy 
groups and focused on the institutional weaknesses of advocacy groups which influence the 
process of popular disengagement in Kenya and Zambia. These included advocacy groups’ 
levels of membership, citizen participation, legitimacy, representation, and agenda. The chapter 
noted that advocacy group membership is the foundation that makes these groups more than a 
structure besides being the source of their legitimacy and support as political actors within the 
political system. Citizen participation in advocacy groups also offers citizens information, 
inculcates democratic values and norms and the ability to influence government policies and 
ensure public accountability. The chapter provided evidence that showed that there is an 
unusually low level of advocacy group membership in both countries in the post-transitional 
political environment and most respondents indicated having disengaged from advocacy groups 
due to their disillusionment with the performance of these groups in the process of democratic 
consolidation.  
Additionally, the chapter provided evidence demonstrating that there are low levels of 
citizen participation in advocacy groups activities due to lack of interest, time and information. 
Citizens appear to be more critical about the utility of their participation and believe that 
participation in advocacy groups hardly impact their lives or the process of democratic 
consolidation. This finding is in sharp contrast to the expanded democratic space and the rapid 
growth of civil society groups in the post-transitional dispensation in both countries. The low 
levels of citizen participation in advocacy groups could be explained by the decline of euphoria 
of change and the establishment of more channels and institutions of democratic participation 
in the post-transitional political environment. However, two decades of continuous declining 
levels of citizen participation call for a different explanation, which this chapter suggests being 
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the process of popular disengagement due to disillusionment with advocacy groups’ 
performance in the process of democratic consolidation.  
 Legitimacy is the most important justification for the existence of advocacy groups 
within the public sphere and significantly influence their effectiveness in the process of 
democratic consolidation. Regarding performance legitimacy which is based on advocacy 
groups’deliveries of tangible desirables to their members and supporters, the chapter provided 
evidence that showed that most respondents indicated that advocacy groups have not performed 
to the level of their expectations in the process of democratic consolidation in the post-
transitional political and institutional environment. This finding means that support for 
advocacy groups in both countries has a strong instrumental perspective. Without any clear and 
direct benefits, citizens are unlikely to invest their time and energy in advocacy groups. In other 
words, citizens extend their support to advocacy groups in large part based on the level of their 
satisfaction with their performance in the delivery of desired goods. 
 Regarding the normative legitimacy, which focuses on the norms and values pursued by 
advocacy groups, the chapter provided evidence which showed that most respondents had a 
problematic relationship with the norms and values represented and pursued by advocacy 
groups in both countries. The citizens also have an unusually low level of institutional trust of 
these groups due to their poor performance in the process of democratic consolidation, lack of 
internal democracy, transparency and accountability. Most respondent view advocacy groups 
as elite dominated, professionalized groups with a weak and tenuous relationship with their 
members and supporters, creating a normative disconnection between advocacy groups and 
their membership and contributing to the process of popular disengagement. The chapter also 
provided evidence that showed that most respondents did not feel that advocacy groups 
represented them, due to lack of consultation, downward accountability, and internal 
democracy. Advocacy groups are, therefore, unable to channel the discontents of their 
membership to the political system significantly contributing to the process of popular 
disengagement. 
The chapter noted that advocacy groups’ agenda was critical to the process of 
democratic consolidation and the fact that such an agenda should reflect the agenda of their 
members and supporters, which shows that these groups are meeting the claim that they are 
pursuing the interests of their members. However, the chapter presented evidence which 
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showed that most respondents did not agree with the agenda pursued by most advocacy groups 
in the post-transitional political and institutional environment in both Kenya and Zambia due 
to lack of consultation and control of the advocacy groups agenda and priorities by international 
donors. This gap between advocacy groups agenda and the citizens significantly contributed to 
the process of popular disengagement from these groups. The chapter noted that most advocacy 
groups have continued to pursue the liberal version of human rights agenda based on civil 
liberties and political rights, which no longer resonates with most citizens who appear to have 
moved on an agenda of economic, social and cultural rights based on tangible improvements in 
their livelihoods. The discourse of liberation politics has been replaced by “politics of bread 
and butter” in both urban and rural areas.  Further, most respondents felt that the advocacy 
group agenda was primarily shaped by the agenda of international donors than the needs and 
expectations of the grassroots communities, which they claim to represent.  
Regarding micro-scale factors of popular disengagement, the chapter focussed on the 
availability of resources and cynicism, which could easily be captured by personal in-depth 
qualitative interviews. The resources were broadly defined to include time, money, civic and 
organizational skills. The chapter presented evidence which showed that lack of resources due 
to widespread poverty in both countries has significantly influenced the process of popular 
disengagement from advocacy groups. Poverty has limited the ability of most Kenyans and 
Zambians to meet the functional costs of participation forcing them to disengage. A section of 
the population has become cynical about their participation in advocacy groups activit ies 
contributing to disengagement from advocacy groups and anti-politics.  
Regarding the pattern of popular disengagement in both Kenya and Zambia, the chapter 
provided evidence that showed that popular disengagement from advocacy groups was much 
more an individual than a collective response to perceived failures of advocacy groups in the 
process of democratic consolidation. Individuals deliberately choose to disengage based on 
their lived experiences and their subjective interpretation of those experiences. The chapter 
demonstrated that popular disengagement from advocacy groups has a higher incidence among 
women than men, the poor and the marginalized in rural areas than urban areas in both 
countries. Most respondents attributed the gendered pattern of popular disengagement to 
poverty, cultural and structural explanations. Most women who have disengaged from advocacy 
groups have joined self-help groups. The chapter also provided evidence that showed that the 
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level of education measured on a scale of years of education of respondents has a strong positive 
relationship with membership in advocacy groups and, therefore, most of those who have 
disengaged from advocacy groups in both countries have a lower level of education and lower 
socio-economic status in both countries. 
The chapter demonstrated that popular disengagement from advocacy groups in both 
Kenya and Zambia is a selective and deliberate process with spill over to other types of civil 
society organizations. Most citizens who have disengaged from advocacy groups have either 
maintained membership in self-help associations and kinship groups or joined such groups, 
signifying a process of disengagement from advocacy groups and re-incorporation into other 
forms of associational life. Popular disengagement thus involves the break-up of old 
attachments to advocacy groups and the establishment of new solidarities in self-help and 
kinship groups, which has redefined the landscape of social formations in both Kenya and 
Zambia. The selective process of popular disengagement has taken two significant forms of 
disengagement; suffer-manage syndrome and self-enclosure. The suffer-manage strategy 
involve disengaging individuals from advocacy groups finding ways of coping with the 
declining capacity of advocacy groups to meet their needs in the process of democratic 
consolidation, while self-enclosure involve attempts by disengaging individuals to insulate 
themselves from the ineffectiveness of advocacy groups by withdrawing and joining other 
groups such as kinship associations which provide them with norms of solidarity and mutual 
support. 
Finally, the chapter discussed the implications of popular disengagement from advocacy 
groups on the ability of these groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation in both countries. Although disengagement from advocacy groups is almost an 
invisible and passive response resulting from macro, meso, and micro-scale factors related to 
advocacy groups, it significantly undermines advocacy groups’ capacity to effectively 
contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in several ways in both Kenya and 
Zambia. Popular disengagement from advocacy groups affects the overall participation of 
citizens in the formal political processes such as voting and involvement in political processes 
between elections. The low level of both formal and informal political participation is 
detrimental to the overall process of democratic consolidation.  
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Popular disengagement also means the withdrawal of expressed consent of a significant 
part of both the public and advocacy group membership, which undermines the moral authority, 
acceptability, credibility and the ability and capacity of advocacy groups to effectively engage 
and influence state policies on issues concerning democratic consolidation. It also undermines 
the capacity of advocacy groups to mobilize support and influence values and attitudes which 
are supportive of democracy in the public sphere. Popular disengagement from advocacy 
groups lowers the propensity of citizens to develop positive civic skills, norms, values, and, 
attitudes that are critical to the process of democratic consolidation in both Kenya and Zambia. 
It also undermines public confidence, and, therefore, the capacity of advocacy groups to 
mobilize citizens’ support and commitment against the perceived abuse of state authority and 
violations of democratic principles and practices such as the rule of law, civil liberties, and 
political rights. 
 Finally, popular disengagement makes it extremely difficult for advocacy groups to 
bridge social and political cleavages, mediate competing and conflicting interests and aggregate 
and articulate the interests of various social groups thus undermining their role of representation 
in the process of democratic consolidation. The next chapter summarises the most pertinent 
results that have emerged from the study’s two-fold aim of investigating and critically 
examining the constraints confronting advocacy groups in the post-transitional countries of 
Kenya and Zambia and their effects on the ability of these groups to effectively contribute to 
the process of democratic consolidation. It concludes with suggestions for further research on 
advocacy groups and the process of democratic consolidation in Africa and other developing 
countries 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
The primary purpose of this study was to conduct a comparative investigation and 
critical examination of the constraints confronting advocacy groups in the post-transitional 
states of Kenya and Zambia. It also examined the effects of such constraints on the ability of 
advocacy groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. The study 
employed a domestic politico-institutional approach, which posits that institutions, whether 
formal or informal, interests and strategic behavior of political actors such as advocacy groups, 
shape political outcomes within specific contexts. The study proposed that the principal 
constraints confronting advocacy groups in the new political environment in both countries 
emanate from the uncertain post-transitional political and institutional environment, deliberate 
state strategies meant to limit the activities of advocacy groups and the process of popular 
disengagement from advocacy groups. 
The study has shown that political transitions in Africa are a double-edged sword for 
advocacy groups, creating both opportunities and significant constraints which circumscribe 
the groups’ ability to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. The 
establishment of democratic systems in both Kenya and Zambia from the early 1990s presented 
advocacy groups with new sets of opportunities and constraints that are critical for the process 
of democratic consolidation. The new political environment has relatively improved civil 
liberties and political rights, thus, opening up more spaces and platforms for advocacy work 
and making organizing much easier due to respect for freedom of expression, assembly, and 
association. It has also broadened and deepened the levels of citizen participation in the 
democratic process and helped advocacy groups create their own spaces beside significantly 
increasing the groups’ latitude for participation and engagement with the state in formal policy-
making processes, which can influence the process of democratic consolidation.  
However, the study has also shown that the new political and institutional environment 
has led to significant constraints to advocacy groups’ operations, which have left them in a 
quandary and near paralysis, leading to mounting doubts about their ability to effectively 
contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. Advocacy groups have found it extremely 
difficult to adapt to the new political and institutional environment and are facing a three-fold 
dilemma, which includes, re-defining their roles, crafting new strategies for articulating 
388 
 
demands for democratic consolidation and developing a constructive relationship with the 
newly democratic states and other political actors. These findings suggest that advocacy groups 
were unprepared for the post-transitional political environment as they were highly consumed 
in the national politics of the struggle for the restoration of democracy in the pre-transition 
period and had no agenda of their own to pursue in the post-transitional dispensation.  
The relationship between advocacy groups and the state in both countries has continued 
to be inconsistent and depends on the nature of the regime in power. The relationship between 
the two groups in the pre-transitional period was defined by deep suspicion, mutual mistrust, 
antagonism, and conflict. This type of relationship continued in Kenya from 1992 to 2002, when 
it dramatically transformed to a more collaborative relationship but became confrontational 
again from 2013. In Zambia, the conflictual relationship between advocacy groups and the state 
has defined the post-transitional dispensation due to authoritarian tendencies by the successive 
regimes and the implementation of the Structural Adjustment policies.  
Advocacy groups in both countries have abandoned the “extra-institutional tactics” 
which helped them dislodge the authoritarian regimes and embraced the “in-system tactics” 
which have had little impact on the process of democratic consolidation since there has been 
no framework for such engagement. The state and international donors have entirely controlled 
both the agenda and the process. This has led to the exclusion of advocacy groups considered 
to be anti-government and informal grassroots groups, the reproduction of the neoliberal agenda 
of international donors in the policy-making process and the exclusion of these groups from 
macro-economic discussions. The pattern of formal engagement between advocacy groups and 
the state has, therefore, limited representation of interests, meaningful engagement, and 
compromised advocacy groups’ autonomy and independence with the groups merely 
legitimizing government-international donor agenda. Additionally, it has led to 
bureaucratization and a decline of activism. The study found that while democratic transition 
has engendered pluralism within advocacy sector in both countries, it has given the state the 
latitude to cherry-pick, which groups to engage in the policy-making process and which ones 
to ignore, thus alienating and marginalising the groups the state perceives to be critical of its 
policies and actions and leading to the representation of parochial and narrow interests in the 
policy-making process, and thus undermining the ability of advocacy groups to effectively 
contribute to the process of democratic consolidation.  
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Moreover, pluralism has created discordant voices within the sector, competing visions 
of democratic reforms and proliferation of disreputable advocacy groups. All these have led to 
fragmentation, which has complicated consensus on national issues, coordination, strategic 
alliance building for the process of democratic consolidation. The legacy of authoritarianism 
has also impacted advocacy groups’ effectiveness in the process of democratic consolidation. 
The unity of purpose for the restoration of democracy, which galvanized advocacy groups 
against the authoritarian state has collapsed, leading to fragmentation and lack of consensus on 
a national agenda in the process of democratic consolidation. Moreover, the advocacy groups 
now must deal with multiple issues besides regaining their autonomy as social organizations, 
which must primarily focus on achieving the socio-economic interests of their members. This 
transformation has complicated national efforts by advocacy groups at democratic 
consolidation. The study has also shown that advocacy groups in Kenya have gradually moved 
from the “civic” to the “primordial” arena due to the influence of national politics; thus crippling 
democratic politics, leading to ethno-regional interests within the sector and undermining their 
integration and mediation functions.  
The study has also established that the chronic dependency of advocacy groups on 
international donor funding has shaped advocacy groups agenda, and values and led to the 
reproduction of donor priorities, assumptions, practices, and ideas at the expense of domestic 
needs and expectations. This neoliberal orientation has limited advocacy groups focus on the 
control of state power rather than the transformation of the state, which is critical to the process 
of democratic consolidation. The relationship has also undermined advocacy groups autonomy 
and independence as the groups have become implementors of donor priorities through donor 
frameworks which have prevented them from developing indigenous roots in society and the 
relationship with the constituencies and the people whom they claim to represent. The study 
has also shown that international donors’ frequent shifting of funding from advocacy groups to 
government and from one agenda to another without consultations with the groups hardly lead 
to timely, predictable and sustainable support to advocacy groups causing instability, and 
unpredictability of funding thus forcing these groups to miss critical windows of opportunities, 
stretch their agenda and mandates to undertake available projects leading to lack of commitment 
and influence in the process of democratic consolidation. The study has also shown that 
international donors in both countries do not fund advocacy groups which directly challenge 
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governmental authority, as they believe that such an approach creates tension between them 
and the host governments and interfere with their national, diplomatic and strategic interests. 
Their insistence on political neutrality for advocacy groups undermine the very activist 
orientation that advocacy groups require to empower citizens and influence the process of 
democratic consolidation. The study has shown that although advocacy groups worked with 
opposition political parties to dislodge authoritarian regimes in both Kenya and Zambia, their 
relationship in the post-transitional dispensation is contentious, weak and defined by mutual 
mistrust, suspicion, and divergent political agenda. Most political parties believe that advocacy 
groups activities overshadow them in the political process, thus undermining strategic 
cooperation on the process of democratic consolidation. Moreover, political parties’ immediate 
interests in capturing political power have compromised their long-term engagement with 
advocacy groups in the process of democratic consolidation. Finally, the nature of political 
parties in both countries characterized by elitism, fragmentation, un-institutionalization, 
ethnicity, and lack of ideological basis has hindered constructive collaboration with advocacy 
groups in the process of democratic consolidation.  
The study has also shown that the newly democratic states in both Kenya and Zambia 
have continued to perceive advocacy groups in purely political terms and, therefore, 
competitors for legitimacy, territorial hegemony, resources, and autonomy. The states have thus 
deliberately employed strategies of co-optation, the use of NGO legislation, political 
appropriation, political propaganda and selective harassment to control and restrict the activities 
of advocacy groups in the new political and institutional dispensation. These strategies have led 
to the shrinking of the civic space for the operations of civil society groups and thus constrained 
the ability of advocacy groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation. The use of direct and quasi-co-optation has been more prominent in Kenya than 
Zambia, where the successive regimes have continued with the confrontational relationship 
with advocacy groups. The NARC administration which took over power in 2002 in Kenya 
dramatically expanded the scope of co-optation by directing absorbing several advocacy group 
leaders into state bureaucracy and appointing others into government service while still serving 
as advocacy groups leaders. These types of co-optation have undermined advocacy groups 
autonomy and depleted their human resource capacity and thus reduced their ability to 
effectively participate in policy-making and contribute to democratic consolidation.  
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The lobbying process for government positions and the abrupt departure of advocacy 
group leaders created an environment of anxiety, uncertainty, instability, loss of funding and 
distracted advocacy groups’ focus from activities which support the process of democratic 
consolidation. Moreover, most of the co-opted advocacy group leaders abandoned the ideals, 
the values, and the principles they once championed while in civil society and became the 
staunchest defenders of the status quo, thus slowing down the momentum for democratic 
reform, tarnishing the credibility, and the legitimacy of civil society, and thus constraining their 
ability to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. 
The new democratic states in both countries have also used NGO legislation to control 
and restrict the activities of advocacy groups, which has created barriers to entry, operational 
activity, and self-regulation and therefore significantly undermine the ability of advocacy 
groups’ to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. The establishment 
of the government dominated boards with excessive discretionary powers over advocacy groups 
operations has led to arbitrary and prejudicial decisions on registration outcomes and created 
uncertainty in the operations of advocacy groups besides instilling fear on advocacy groups 
through intimidation, threats of deregistration and deregistration. This atmosphere of fear and 
mistrust has not supported constructive engagement between advocacy groups and the state in 
the process of democratic consolidation, while the requirement of administrative co-optation 
has forced advocacy groups to fit into the rigid and bureaucratic governmental procedures of 
development administration, leading to subordination of advocacy group choices by state 
organs, local sensitivity and comparative advantages, such innovation and capability to reach 
the most vulnerable and the marginalised citizens in society. Some of the provisions in both 
NGO legislations have violated advocacy groups’ freedom of association, assembly, and 
expression and other legal obligations under international laws, which support the work of 
advocacy groups.  
The study has also shown how the newly democratic states in both countries 
appropriated the lead organizations and considerably reduced their ability to contribute to the 
process of democratic consolidation. In Kenya, NCCK was appropriated by the state due to its 
close working relations with the NARC leaders while in the opposition, ethnicity, and co-
optation of the organizations Secretary-general. The organization thus retreated from the public 
sphere, and its voice became muted on democratic reforms, and social justice issues. 
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 It got sucked into narrow, parochial, partisan and tribal politics, which alienated most 
of its members, robbed civil society of its leadership and damaged its credibility, reputation, 
legitimacy, and respect. In Zambia, the state used market and corporatist strategies to 
appropriate the ZCTU besides direct interference into its internal affairs. Moreover, ZCTU 
leadership believed that they were “the government.” Political appropriation neutralized the 
organization as a force for democratic consolidation, and it almost ended its existence through 
SAPs policies. The study has also shown that the use of state propaganda and selective 
harassment of advocacy groups in both countries to control and restrict the activities of 
advocacy groups has undermined advocacy groups’ reputation, legitimacy, credibility, image, 
and created an atmosphere of mistrust, self-censorship, fear, and intimidation. All these have 
reduced advocacy groups ability to effectively contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation. 
The study has shown that although the masses in both Kenya and Zambia were at the 
core of the “second liberation” with high hopes of economic prosperity and the 
institutionalization of democracy, they have been disappointed and disillusioned in the post-
transitional political dispensation with their social and economic conditions worsening and 
leading to popular disengagement from advocacy groups in both countries. The study has shown 
that most of those dissatisfied with the performance of advocacy groups in the process of 
democratic consolidation have chosen disengagement since the strategy offers them immediate 
relief, is within reach to most citizens, invisible, quiet, private, passive, low in resource demand 
and has minimal risks of sanctions from advocacy groups. Secondly, the spatial distribution of 
advocacy groups with most of them being located in urban areas in both countries has created 
a physical and an ideological disconnection with rural residents, who, therefore, find it much 
easier to withdraw from such groups, when they perceive them as ineffective in meeting their 
needs and expectations. The study has also demonstrated that institutional weaknesses of 
advocacy groups such as low levels of membership and participation in their activities, lack of 
legitimacy, poor representation and agenda setting have significantly contributed to the process 
of popular disengagement from advocacy groups. 
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 The study has established that advocacy groups have continued to pursue the liberal 
version of human rights agenda, which does not resonate with most citizens who emphasize 
collective economic, social and cultural rights focused on substantive and tangible 
improvements in their livelihoods. Widespread poverty has also limited the ability of most 
citizens to meet the functional costs of participation, forcing them to disengage from advocacy 
groups. The study has also shown that the pattern of popular disengagement in both countries 
is individual, gendered, disproportionately affect the poor, influenced by the level of education, 
selective, deliberate, and more prominent in rural than urban areas in both countries. It is also 
specific and targeted at advocacy groups with spill-overs to other types of civil society 
organizations. Most citizens who have disengaged from advocacy groups have either 
maintained membership in self-help groups or joined other associations, signifying a process 
of disengagement and incorporation into other forms of associational life, leading to the break-
up of old attachments to the creation of new forms of solidarities, which have redefined the 
landscape of social formations in both countries. The new groups have addressed disengaging 
Individuals’ pressing needs of economic survival, social support and a sense of belonging.  
Popular disengagement in both countries has taken two significant forms of 
disengagement; suffer-manage syndrome, which involve disengaging individuals from 
advocacy groups, finding ways of coping with the declining capacity of advocacy groups to 
meet their needs in the process of democratic consolidation, and self-enclosure which involve 
attempts by disengaging individuals to insulate themselves from the ineffectiveness of 
advocacy groups. The study has shown that popular disengagement has significantly impeded 
advocacy groups’ ability to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation by 
reducing the level of citizen participation in their activities and the formal political processes, 
which has affected their legitimacy and undermined their moral authority, acceptability, 
credibility, capacity and the ability to effectively engage the state on policy issues concerning 
democratic consolidation. It has also reduced their capacity to mobilize the public and influence 
democratic norms, values, and attitudes in the public sphere that support democratic citizenship. 
Finally, popular disengagement undermines public confidence and, support for retraining the 
state from violation of democratic principles and practices.  
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 The following major conclusions can be drawn from the study’s findings.  Firstly, the 
new political and institutional environment in both Kenya and Zambia has posed significant 
constraints to advocacy groups, which have led to the gradual decline of their influence in the 
process of democratic consolidation. The experiences of advocacy groups in both Kenya and 
Zambia, as documented in this study, therefore,  best fit in the trajectory of the political process 
model of social movements’ experiences in the process of democratization the African context 
as opposed to the civil society model. Advocacy groups’activism in both countries was low 
during the authoritarian period due to repression but rose to their highest peak during the 
liberalization phase when the groups mobilized the citizens to force the authoritarian regimes 
for further democratization. This study found evidence that advocacy groups’ influence has 
declined as democratization has progressed due to the establishment of other democratic 
institutions, co-optation, success, repression, fatigue, internal conflicts, the disillusionment of 
the masses and institutionalization. This conclusion is unsurprising since advocacy groups fall 
into the nexus between social movements and civil society and act as social movements when 
they mobilize the masses for social and political change. Social movement theory, therefore, 
provides a convincing and robust explanation on the trajectory of advocacy groups in the 
democratization process in both Kenya and Zambia. 
Secondly, the evidence presented by this study has shown that advocacy groups have 
found it extremely difficult to redefine their new roles, craft new strategies and develop a new 
constructive relationship with the newly democratic states in both Kenya and Zambia to 
effectively influence the process of democratic consolidation, demonstrating that advocacy 
groups are not always as flexible and adaptable in the process of democratization as previously 
portrayed in the literature of civil society and democratization. Democratization is a rapidly 
changing process that requires flexibility and adaptation. The inability of advocacy groups to 
adapt to the new political environment is due to the uncertainty of the new political 
dispensation, the effect of state strategies to control and restrict their activities, popular 
disengagement, their internal contradictions which is defined by power, inequality, 
competition, struggle, cooperation and their strategic interests, choices and interaction with 
other political actors. 
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Thirdly, this study has established that advocacy groups are not immune to the venality 
of politics, neopatrimonialism, patronage and the capture by narrow and parochial ethno-
regional interests, which have further constrained their ability to effectively contribute to the 
process of democratic consolidation. Advocacy groups have thus gradually moved from the 
civic space to the primordial arena, a process which has eroded the democratic gains in the civic 
sphere and circumscribed their capacity to perform both the integrative and representational 
roles in the process of democratic consolidation. The evidence from this study shows that 
advocacy groups in Kenya are increasingly reflecting the pathologies of ethnicity, class, 
religion, and power, which have permeated their agenda and operations and left them deeply 
politicized, highly polarised, ethnicized, parochial and fragmented. Associational life in the 
country has, therefore, reinforced and exacerbated social and political cleavages within the 
socio-political context and thus impeded the process of democratic consolidation. The groups 
are, therefore, a microcosm of society, which at times reflect the same structural deficiencies 
associated with the practice of politics and thus fail to provide an alternative platform, to support 
the realization of democratic consolidation. 
Fourthly, the study has found that the enabling conditions for the success of advocacy 
groups in the process of democratic transitions through the pro-democracy movements have 
become the confining conditions in the process of democratic consolidation in both Kenya and 
Zambia. For instance, the authoritarian mobilising ideology, which galvanized the pro-
democracy movements under the unity of purpose for the restoration of democracy has 
dissipated in the post-transitional dispensation, leading to divisions and fragmentation within 
advocacy groups, which have impeded efforts at strategic coalition building and consensus on 
the national agenda to support the process of democratic consolidation. Moreover, as 
authoritarianism ended with the political transitions, the impetus to mobilize declined as 
advocacy groups turned to more institutionalized forms of engagement with the state. Advocacy 
groups in both Kenya and Zambia have, therefore, been weakened by the transition process in 
which they played a significant role to bring about. Fifthly, the study has established that the 
rapid and the unprecedented growth of advocacy groups witnessed in both Kenya and Zambia 
since the political transitions in the early 1990s has not translated into advocacy groups’ 
strength and vibrancy capable of effectively contributing to the process of democratic 
consolidation.   
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Most of the new advocacy groups have been established due to the availability of 
international donor funding and priorities rather than the domestic needs and priorities of the 
citizens. Additionally, there has been the proliferation of hundreds of disreputable advocacy 
groups, which have tarnished advocacy groups credibility, trust, legitimacy, and public image, 
thus complicating citizen mobilization for the process of democratic consolidation. Finally, 
most of the new advocacy groups are functionally inactive. The results of these study, therefore, 
suggest that the effectiveness of advocacy groups in the process of democratic consolidation is 
not necessarily a function of their numbers but a function of their content, capacity, character, 
agenda and the strategies. The number of advocacy groups is, therefore, a poor indicator of their 
strength and effectiveness in the process of democratic consolidation. 
Sixthly, the study has shown that despite the domination of African politics and 
development by the neoliberal political discourse since the early 1990s, which emphasized the 
reduction of the role of the state in the development process, the state remains an indispensable 
agent of social, political and economic transformation and perhaps the most crucial player in 
the process of democratic consolidation in both Kenya and Zambia. The state retains enormous 
control and leverage over advocacy groups by shaping and guaranteeing the institutional 
framework for their operations, which has significantly influenced their character, nature, and 
effectiveness in the process of democratic consolidation. The state and civil society are, 
therefore, intricately linked in the process of democratization and the strength, performance, 
and latitude of these groups significantly depend on the nature of the state and the practice of 
politics. Conversely, the activities of advocacy groups shape the practice of politics and their 
relationship with the state. This study, therefore, supports studies which have emphasized the 
need for a capable, responsible and functional state for advocacy groups to achieve their 
democratic goals. 
Seventhly, this study has demonstrated that state-advocacy groups' partnership in 
policy-making processes within the neoliberal framework in the post-transitional and political 
environment has had little impact on the process of democratic consolidation due to the pattern 
of the incorporation of advocacy groups into the governance processes, which has limited 
representation of interests, effective engagement,and led to bureaucratisation and decline of 
advocacy groups’ activism. Moreover, the state-advocacy groups' engagement has 
compromised advocacy groups autonomy and independence with the groups merely 
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legitimizing government-international donor agenda. The process and the agenda of 
engagement are entirely controlled by the government and international donors. Advocacy 
groups are also excluded from macro-economic discussions, and most of them lack the capacity 
and technical knowledge to effectively engage in the process. The process has, therefore, led to 
the reproduction of the neoliberal agenda of international donors in the policy-making process, 
which is limited to restraining the state than transforming the state. There is thus the need to 
anchor the process in law and develop institutional mechanisms to assist in an effective 
partnership which should be pragmatic and complementary with shared terms of engagement 
and common set of desired goals. 
Eighthly, international donor support for advocacy groups in both countries has had 
little impact on the process of democratic consolidation for several reasons. Firstly, the study 
has established that international donors view advocacy groups as “convenient partners,” which 
they can use to implement their neoliberal agenda and abandon at any time provided that the 
governments show signs of commitment to the institutionalization of democracy. Secondly, the 
frequent shifting of funding and agenda of international donors without consultation with 
advocacy groups provides unpredictable and sometimes contradictory support, which 
hamstrung long-term commitment to an arduous process of democratic consolidation. Thirdly, 
international donors’ neoliberal agenda of reform is limited to restraining the exercise of state 
power rather than the transformation of the state in the process of democratic consolidation.  
Additionally, international donors are afraid to fund activities which confront 
governmental authority for fear of jeopardizing their relationship with the host government and 
causing instability, while in both Kenya and Zambia protests and demonstrations have proved 
potent strategies which have contributed to the democratic gains in the countries. Moreover, the 
discourse and influence of the liberal version of the human rights agenda supported by 
international donors are waning in Africa. It does not resonate with most citizens who now 
emphasize collective economic, social and cultural rights focused on substantive and tangible 
improvements in their livelihoods. The study established that citizens in both countries have 
moved on from the liberation politics, which was framed in terms of human rights and freedom 
during the political transition to “politics of bread and butter.” Finally, international donors’ 
insistence on political neutrality and non-partisanship for advocacy groups distance the groups 
from politics and limits their ability to advance citizen interests. It must be noted that advocacy 
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groups work is necessarily political, since policy-making, which they strive to influence is a 
political process involving interests, preferences, and negotiations.  
International donors, therefore, play an ambiguous role in the process of democratic 
consolidation, where they support the process when their interests converge with those of 
advocacy groups and undermine the process when their strategic, diplomatic and geopolitical 
interests are threatened. The study also provided evidence which has shown that the support for 
advocacy groups in both countries has a strong instrumental perspective. In other words, 
citizens extend their support to advocacy groups in large part based on the level of their 
satisfaction with their performance in the process of democratic consolidation and the 
improvement in their standards of living. Advocacy groups derive their legitimacy from citizen 
support and their membership, and therefore, popular disengagement as explained in this study 
poses one of the most significant challenges from below to these groups in the process of 
democratic consolidation. Moreover, the disillusionment experienced in both Kenya and 
Zambia is not just because citizens hopes, and expectations of the democratic transition have 
not been met but also because citizens conditions have worsened since the political transitions. 
Ninthly, the study has shown that institutions matter, whether formal or informal, 
present or past in understanding the constraints confronting advocacy groups in the process of 
democratic consolidation in both Kenya and Zambia. They generate sets of opportunities and 
constraints for political actors in the process of democratic consolidation and at the same time 
shape and are reshaped by the strategic choices, interests, and interaction of political actors 
within the political system. This study, therefore, challenges the notion that African states lack 
effective political institutions and are solely governed through patronage, clientelism, and neo-
patrimonialism. The study has demonstrated that for Kenya and Zambia, it is impossible to 
understand the socio-economic and political processes such as democratic consolidation 
without taking into consideration the role of formal institutions. 
Tenthly, the study has established that the newly democratic states in both Kenya and 
Zambia continue to view advocacy groups in purely political terms as competitors for 
legitimacy, territorial hegemony, and autonomy. They have, therefore, reproduced the same 
strategies that were employed by their authoritarian predecessors to control and restrict the 
activities of advocacy groups, which has led to the “closing civic space” in both countries. The 
closing civic space, is, therefore, a deliberate process by the newly democratic states to 
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consolidate power, continue with the domination of society and avoid the transformation of the 
state through the democratization process. There appears to be a resurgence of authoritarian 
tendencies in the democratic settings in both Kenya and Zambia, which are constraining the 
ability of advocacy groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. 
Additionally, the study provided evidence showing that the state is gradually reclaiming the 
political space through the establishment of state commissions, which are doing much of the 
work that was previously done by advocacy groups using the same strategies, and, leading to 
duplication of work and competition for international donor funding with advocacy groups. 
This process, has, therefore, undermined the work and ability of advocacy groups to effectively 
contribute to the process of democratic consolidation.  
Eleventhly, the study has shown that the appropriation of NCCK and ZCTU-two large, 
well-established, umbrella organizations which led the pro-democracy movements in their 
respective countries by the newly democratic states in both Kenya and Zambia demonstrates 
that there is no guarantee that organizations which supported the democratic transition will 
necessarily support the process of democratic consolidation and vice-versa. In other words, 
organizations that make the democratic transition possible can undermine the process of 
democratic consolidation. The support or lack of support for the process of democratic 
consolidation by advocacy groups largely depends on their strategic choices, interests, capacity, 
the institutional context and their interaction with other political actors within the rapidly 
changing political environment. Moreover, the mere fact that there is a window of political 
opportunity does not mean that advocacy groups will take up that opportunity to advance 
democratization. Additionally, advocacy groups are not victims of state co-optation and 
political appropriation but active participants with strong incentives to improve their 
competitiveness and access to information and public resources, for their operations, 
sustainability and organizational survival.  
Twelfthly, the study has established that a dominant party system (KANU 1992-2002, 
MMD 1992-2011) is more likely to lead to the employment of NGO legislation, selective 
harassment, and political propaganda to control and restrict the activities of advocacy groups, 
while the transfer of power (Kenya 2002, Zambia 2011) is more likely to lead to the 
employment of co-optation and political appropriation. Dominant political parties in 
government tend to claim popular mandate and legitimacy from the people and, therefore, 
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question and in some cases dismiss the representative role of advocacy groups. They, therefore, 
tend to rely on heavy-handed strategies to control the activities of advocacy groups, while the 
transfer of power through elections lead to co-optation of advocacy group leadership into 
government bureaucracy due to advocacy groups close re-alignment with opposition political 
parties. However, the transfer of power in Zambia in 1992 did not result in co-optation of 
advocacy groups’ leadership, since the pro-democracy movement was dominated by business 
people and former UNIP members of parliament, who side-lined advocacy groups in the 
transition process. Once in power, MMD continued to marginalize advocacy groups in the 
policy-making process to implement Structural Adjustment programs, which had long been 
opposed by most of these groups. 
Finally, the contribution of advocacy groups to the process of democratic consolidation 
is ambiguous. There are times when the groups support the democratization process, and times 
when they pursue contradictory goals which undermine the process. The enormous constraints 
confronting advocacy groups in the new political dispensation in both Kenya and Zambia 
demonstrates that the prognosis of their potential and effectiveness in the process of 
democratization in the early 1990s was overly exaggerated. This study, therefore, suggests that 
we must be cautious in volarization or idealization of the potential and positive contributions 
of advocacy groups in the process of democratic consolidation. However, advocacy groups 
remain critical players in the governance and the democratization process in both Kenya and 
Zambia with the potential to transform the state. They have continued to exert some influence 
in restraining the exercise of state power, extending and protecting civil liberties and political 
rights, promoting political participation, broadening and democratizing public policy-making, 
demanding transparency and public accountability and providing spaces for democratic 
deliberation, among other functions  To be effective in the process of democratic consolidation 
and remain relevant in the new political and institutional environment in both Kenya and 
Zambia, advocacy groups will have to take fundamental institutional and strategic 
transformation by evolving new relevant objectives, developing new visions and strategies of 
political engagement, broadening their constituencies, developing professional competence and 
cultivating constructive and productive relationships with the state and other principal political 
actors, thus, becoming autonomous sphere of social power.  
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As this study has shown, advocacy groups alone have limited effects on the process of 
democratic consolidation due to their lack of social roots, chronic dependency on external 
funding, lack of technical capacity among others. Democratic consolidation is a broader societal 
process, which needs the effective participation of all social forces including citizens, social 
movements, political parties, and other stakeholders’ reminiscence of the prodemocracy 
movement. Advocacy groups, will, therefore, need to build this broader strategic coalition to 
advance the process of democratic consolidation. 
The findings from this study make several noteworthy contributions to the current 
literature on advocacy groups and democratic consolidation. Firstly, the findings from this study 
add substantially to a growing body of literature on comparative democratization in Africa and 
the broader research agenda on the relationship between civil society and democratic 
consolidation. The findings significantly advance our knowledge of the dynamics of political 
change, and their effects on the role of political actors in the process of democratic consolidation 
and provide a more in-depth understanding and insights into the contingent connections 
between constraints confronting advocacy groups and the political and institutional 
environment in which they operate. The findings of this study, are, thus relevant to most 
democratizing countries in Africa, which share historical, cultural, socio-economic and political 
conditions and could inform experiences of advocacy groups in other democratising countries, 
around the world, while offering useful functional guides to students of comparative 
democratization, scholars, policymakers, local and international stakeholders, who are keen on 
gaining a deeper understanding of advocacy groups and the process of democratic consolidation 
in post-transitional Africa. 
Secondly, the findings of this study fundamentally shift the focus of political analysis 
from issues of civil society and democratic transition, which have dominated political and 
academic discourse in the last two decades in Africa, to problems of democratic consolidation, 
which many democratizing African countries are struggling with and which are still less studied 
and understood. They, thus, broadly contributes to the growing comparative literature on 
democratic consolidation studies in Africa and significantly advances our knowledge of civil 
society in the post-transitional political and institutional environment by providing a systematic 
and excellent in-depth understanding of the challenges and dilemmas confronting advocacy 
groups after the re-introduction of democracy in Africa.  
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The findings thus enhance our understanding of an area of research that has not received much 
attention in democratization studies, and, therefore, could serve as a basis for future studies on 
advocacy groups and democratic consolidation. 
Thirdly, the findings from this study extend our knowledge of advocacy groups, and 
democratic consolidation to a non-western context since the literature of civil society and 
democratization has been dominated by studies on Eastern and Central Europe and Latin 
America. Although the findings are about the experiences of advocacy groups in Kenya and 
Zambia, they have a broader relevance to developing countries experiencing democratic 
transformation, and thus, help us gain a better and more insightful understanding of the 
constraints that popular organizations face in the post-transitional political and institutional 
environment in developing countries and the effects of such constraints on advocacy groups’ 
ability to effectively contribute to the institutionalization of democracy. This broader and a 
more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between advocacy groups and 
democratic consolidation has significant benefits to advocacy groups, activists, scholars and 
development agencies involved in the democracy promotion in Africa and other developing 
countries.  
Fourthly, the findings from this study complement and support earlier studies which 
established that while economic development is not necessary for political transition, it appears 
to be critical in the process of democratic consolidation. This study establishes that democratic 
consolidation in Africa requires not just economic growth per se but the redistribution of the 
benefits of growth to most citizens. If democracy fails to deliver tangible opportunities and 
improvement in people’s lives, they become disillusioned and discouraged from political 
participation, and ultimately disengage from such participation, which is detrimental to the 
advancement of democracy. The study, therefore, suggests that a minimum level of economic 
development is a necessary, though not sufficient condition for democratic consolidation. As 
demonstrated by evidence from this study Africans want freedom, but more importantly, they 
want concrete political, social and economic rights. They want a democracy that invests in 
economic development to improve their standards of living in line with their demands for 
democratic change in the early 1990s. 
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Fifthly the findings from study advance our understanding and insights into one of the 
political players which has been considered as the vanguard of change and an agent of 
democratization. Having played a significant role in the process of democratic transition in 
Africa, advocacy groups have attracted much attention and political interests to perform several 
functions that would sustain democracy in the continent. The groups are, therefore, 
indispensable in understanding political change and democratic development in the continent. 
The findings, therefore, give us a rare insight on how the groups are performing in the post-
transitional political and institutional environment in the process of democratic consolidation 
in Africa 
Sixthly, the findings from this study will serve as a basis for future studies on horizontal 
dimension of popular disengagement within society, which this study systematically employs 
to understand the constraints confronting advocacy groups in the process of democratic 
consolidation in both Kenya and Zambia in the post-transitional political and institutional 
environment. Most studies on democratization employing the concept of popular 
disengagement have solely focused on state-civil society relations and ignored the fact that civil 
society itself, as a component of society, has its own internal dynamics and relations with other 
components of society resulting in a variety of cross-cutting authorities within society. The 
findings from this pioneering study on the horizontal dimension of popular disengagement, 
therefore, offers fresh insights into the dynamics of the relationship between citizens and their 
own organizations in the transformation process.  
The findings thus significantly contribute to an area of research that is far less studied 
and understood through the expansion of the breadth of the social and political expression of 
popular disengagement. Moreover, the findings broaden our understanding of how social 
processes beyond the state in African societies affect popular organizations in the process of 
democratic consolidation and how individuals exercise agency in social and political processes 
pointing away from the more visible political processes and towards invisible dynamics of 
popular disengagement that otherwise may have a more significant impact on the capacity of 
advocacy groups to influence the process of democratic consolidation. Seventhly, the findings 
from this study improve our understanding of the interactions of advocacy groups, their 
behavior, and institutions, in shaping political outcomes within the African contexts, through 
the employment of domestic politico-institutional approach. 
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 The approach demonstrates that institutions, whether formal or informal matter for 
advocacy groups contribution to the process of democratic consolidation. The findings also help 
us understand structured contingency in terms of how inherited rules and institutions both 
formal and informal impose limits on what is possible for advocacy groups in the process of 
democratic consolidation. The constraints confronting these groups thus primarily emanate 
from the domestic politico-institutional environment and historical legacies, strategic choices, 
behavior, and interests of advocacy groups and their relationships with principal political actors 
within the political system. The findings thus contribute to both comparative theory building, 
testing, and literature on civil society and democratization in Africa as they emphasize the role 
of institutions and allows for a comprehensive understanding of domestic considerations for 
democratic consolidation. The findings are thus about political actors, who fundamentally and 
ultimately shape, the pace, and the direction of democratic progress. The findings from this 
study also advance our knowledge by shifting the focus of analysis from concerns with 
preconditions and agents only driven explanations in studying the dynamics of civil society and 
democratization to the incorporation of the structure into the analysis of agency, which has 
gained much attention in the recent past. The findings from this study thus offer us a better 
chance of an in-depth understanding of the constraints confronting one of the major political 
actors in the process of democratic consolidation and how such constraints have impacted on 
their ability to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation.  
Eighthly, the findings from this study are based on an empirical-analytical approach 
which focuses on the purpose of activity of advocacy groups rather than their form of 
organization. They, therefore, helps understand “real civil society organizations,” and, offer 
significant insights into how advocacy groups perform their functions in the real world. The 
study views civil society as a societal sphere and focuses on the purpose of the activity of 
advocacy groups rather than their form of organization, which is mostly influenced by cultural 
and historical processes. The findings from this study are therefore much more realistic and 
practical as they focus on, “what existing civil societies are doing” as opposed to “what civil 
society ought to do. The findings from this study thus contribute both to the current literature 
on civil society and offer an insight into conducting comparative case studies of civil society 
groups by employing an empirical-analytical approach besides improving our knowledge and 
understanding of ‘real civil societies’ in Africa in the process of democratic consolidation. 
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 They point to the fact that the prospects for democratic consolidation are best explained 
by the strategic behavior, choices, interests and the interaction of domestic actors and factors. 
Finally, the findings from this study are also significant in that they based on a realistic 
conceptualization of democracy in Africa and thus helps understand how Africans conceive 
democratic consolidation. The study employs Ake (1996a) conceptualization of democracy, 
which provides a better basis for comparative analysis in Africa since it closely reflects the 
understanding of democracy by most Africans. It is a social democracy, which emphasizes the 
concrete political, social and economic rights of the African people as opposed to a liberal 
democracy, that emphasizes abstract political rights. It is a democracy that invests heavily in 
the improvement of people’s health, education and capacity for democratic citizenship. It is 
also a democracy where people must have real decision-making power, beyond the formal 
consent through regular elections. Finally, it is a kind of democracy that must emphasize both 
individual and collective rights and engenders an inclusive level of political participation, 
equitable access to state resources and ensures special representation in the legislatures of mass 
organizations and marginal groups. 
 Further research needs to be done to establish the relationship between the modes of 
transition and advocacy groups’ effectiveness in promoting democratic consolidation. During 
the third wave of democratization in Africa, different countries took different paths in the 
process of transition from authoritarian and dictatorial regimes. These modes of transition 
mainly influenced the post-transitional political and institutional environment in which 
advocacy groups operate. It is, therefore, important to find out the effect of these various modes 
of transition on the effectiveness of advocacy groups in the process of democratic consolidation. 
Secondly, a further study could assess the strategies that advocacy groups are developing in 
response to the identified constraints in this research, including the strategies for countering the 
“closing civic space” as the newly democratic states continue to deliberately employ various 
strategies which restrict the activities of advocacy groups, particularly in Africa. It is critical 
that advocacy groups find effective means and methods of creating a social, political and 
economic environment in which they can effectively contribute to the process of democratic 
consolidation. Finally, future research could extend these types of questions to other 
democratizing countries around the world and possibly employ various research methodologies, 
including mixed method approaches. 
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APPENDIX A: THE CASE STUDY PROTOCOL 
 
Introduction: The primary purpose of this study was to conduct a comparative investigation 
and critical examination of the constraints confronting advocacy groups in the post-transitional 
states of Kenya and Zambia. The researcher examined the effects of such constraints on the 
ability of advocacy groups to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. 
 
I) INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR KEY EXPERT RESPONDENTS 
I would like to start by asking you some general questions about yourself. 
Name (Optional)………………………………………………………………… 
Position/Occupation………………………………………………………… 
Organization………………………………………………………………………… 
Level of education………………………………………………………………… 
Age……………………………………………………………………………………… 
Gender……………………………………………………………………………………… 
City…………………………………………………………………………………… 
General Questions 
Q1. In your opinion, what are the opportunities for advocacy groups in the new political and 
institutional environment in Kenya/Zambia? Explain. 
 
Q2. In your opinion, what are the major constraints confronting advocacy groups in the new 
political and institutional environment in Kenya and Zambia? 
 
Q3. What are the implications of these constraints on the ability of advocacy groups to 
effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation? 
 
Specific Questions. 
Q4. How have advocacy groups adjusted to the new political environment in terms of their role 
and strategies for democratic consolidation in Kenya/Zambia?  
 
Q5. After the transition, several advocacy group leaders were appointed into government 
bureaucracy, while others joined parliament.  
i)What do you think motivates advocacy group leaders to join state bureaucracy? 
ii) What are the effects of these appointments into government on advocacy groups?  
ii) In your own assessment, how have these leaders performed while in government? 
 
Q6. How has the relationship between advocacy groups and the state evolved overtime from 
the pre-transition to the post-transitional dispensation? 
 
Q7. International donors have encouraged state-advocacy groups’ partnership in policymaking. 
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i)What is your opinion of such partnerships? 
ii) What challenges do advocacy groups face in such state-advocacy group partnerships? 
iii) In your own opinion, to what extent do advocacy groups influence public policy making 
through such formal partnerships or participation in formal state forums? 
Q7. Are there any attempts by the state to control advocacy groups in Kenya/Zambia? Explain. 
 
Q8. What effect do these attempts by the state to control advocacy groups have on advocacy 
groups’ ability to contribute to the process of democratic consolidation? 
 
Q.9. Are there any effects of authoritarian legacy on advocacy groups role in the process of 
democratic consolidation? Explain. 
 
Q10. Since the transition, there has been the rapid growth of advocacy groups in terms of 
numbers and issues. What are the effects of this growth on advocacy groups’ role in the process 
of democratic consolidation? 
 
Q11. Have the dynamics of social cleavages like ethnicity and class, affected advocacy groups 
role in the democratization process? Explain. 
Q12. How has the relationship between advocacy groups and international donors evolved from 
the pre-transition period to the post-transitional dispensation? 
Q13. In 2005, most international donors adopted basket funding as a new framework for 
delivering aid to advocacy groups. What are the effects of basket funding on advocacy groups’ 
role in the process of democratic consolidation? 
Q14. After the transition, international donors shifted most of their funding to the state. What 
effects did this change have on advocacy groups? 
Q15. In your opinion, what are the challenges of international donors funding to advocacy 
groups? 
Q16. How has advocacy groups relationship with political parties evolved overtime from the 
pre-transition to the post-transitional period? 
Q17. Do you any other comments on advocacy groups and democratic consolidation in 
Kenya/Zambia? 
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II) INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL DONORS 
Name:………………………………………………….. 
Position:……………………………………………….. 
Organization:………………………………………. 
 
QUESTIONS 
 
General Questions 
Q1. In your opinion, what are the opportunities for advocacy groups in the new political and 
institutional environment in Kenya/Zambia? Explain. 
 
Q2. In your opinion, what are the significant constraints confronting advocacy groups in the 
new political and institutional environment in Kenya and Zambia? 
 
Q3. What are the implications of these constraints on the ability of advocacy groups to 
effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation? 
 
Specific Questions. 
Q4. How have International donors adjusted to the new political environment in terms of their 
role and strategies in the process of democratic consolidation in Kenya/Zambia?  
 
Q5. After the transition, most international donors shifted their funding to the new democratic 
state of Kenya/Zambia.  
i) What motivated this change of strategy on funding? 
ii) What are the effects of this change of funding strategy on advocacy groups?  
 
Q6. How has the relationship between international donors and advocacy groups evolved 
overtime from the pre-transition to the post-transitional dispensation? 
 
Q7. Are there any attempts by the state to control advocacy groups in Kenya/Zambia? Explain. 
 
Q8. Most international donors emphasized and encouraged the partnership between the state 
and advocacy groups. 
i) What is the rationale for partnership between the state and advocacy groups? 
ii) In your view, have these partnerships worked? 
iii) What is the role of international donors in such partnerships? 
iv) What are the challenges of such partnerships? 
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Q.9. International donor funding modalities have changed over time and more so with the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 to include ownership, harmonization, alignment, and 
coordination through basket funding. 
i) In your opinion what are the advantages of basket funding to international donors and to 
advocacy groups? 
ii) What are the challenges associated with basket funding for international donors and 
advocacy groups? 
iii) What do international donors consider when deciding on which organizations to be included 
in basket funding? 
iv) Has basket funding improved donor-advocacy relations? State-advocacy group relations? 
 
Q10. In your opinion, has the dynamics of social cleavages like ethnicity and class, affected 
advocacy groups role in the democratization process? Explain. 
 
Q12. How has the relationship between advocacy groups and international donors evolved from 
the pre-transition period to the post-transitional dispensation? 
Q13. In 2005, most international donors adopted basket funding as a new framework for 
delivering aid to advocacy groups. What are the effects of basket funding on advocacy groups’ 
role in the process of democratic consolidation? 
Q14. Are there any other comments you have on advocacy groups and democratic consolidation 
in Kenya/Zambia? 
III) INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR CITIZENS 
 
Name: .................................................................... 
Gender: ................................................................. 
Country…………………………………………. 
Location: .............................................................. 
Age……………………… 
Level of education……………………………... 
Questions 
Q1. Are you a member of an advocacy group?  Explain. 
Yes  
No 
Q2. In your own assessment, to what extent have advocacy groups contributed to the process 
of democratic consolidation in Kenya/Zambia? Explain 
A lot 
Somewhat 
Not at all 
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Q3. In your own opinion, to what extent do you agree with the values and norms represented 
by advocacy groups?  Explain. 
A lot 
Somewhat 
Not at all 
 
Q4. In your own opinion, to what extent do you trust advocacy groups? Explain. 
A lot 
Somewhat 
Not at all 
 
Q5. In your own opinion, to what extent do you generally, agree with the advocacy groups 
agenda? Explain 
A lot 
Somewhat 
Not at all 
 
Q6. In your opinion, to what extent do you feel that advocacy groups in Kenya/Zambia 
represent you? Explain 
Yes 
No 
 
Q7. Have you attended any community meeting for the last one year?  Explain 
Yes 
No 
 
Q8. Have you attended any demonstration or protest in the last one year? Explain 
Yes 
No 
 
Q.9. In your assessment, how do advocacy groups get affected when members leave the groups 
in terms of their contributing to the process of democratic consolidation? 
 
Q10. What did you expect with the establishment of democracy in Kenya/Zambia? Would say 
that your expectations for the new democratic system have been fulfilled? If no whom do you 
blame? 
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IV) INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM 
 
                                                                                      Department of International Politics     
                                                                                      Phone: +44 (0)20-7040-8500 
                                                                                      Email:   socialsciences@ city.ac.uk 
Chief Investigator’s Name: Bonfas Owinga 
Supervisors Names: Dr. Sara Silvestri and Dr. Tom Davies 
 
The principal constraints confronting Advocacy Groups in the process of democratic 
consolidation in post-transitional Africa: A Comparative Study of Kenya and Zambia 
 
The purpose of this study is to comparatively investigate and examine the major constraints 
confronting advocacy groups in post-transitional states of Kenya and Zambia and how such 
constraints have impacted on these groups’ ability to effectively contribute to the process of 
democratic consolidation. The study is being conducted by Mr. Bonfas Owinga to meet the 
requirements of Doctor of Philosophy under the supervision of Dr. Sara Silvestri and Dr. Tom 
Davies- Department of International Politics-City University of London. 
 
Please read this form carefully and sign it, if you decide to participate in the research study. Your 
participation is entirely voluntary. You may withdraw from the study at any time even if you 
choose to participate without having to give a reason and without any consequences. The study 
involves asking you questions related to the topic for approximately one hour. Your permission 
to audio-record the interview is also sought with this form, and the tape recordings will only be 
listened to by the Researcher. Any information gathered in the course of this study are 
confidential, and you will not be identified in any publication of the results. The results of this 
research will be published in my dissertation and possibly in subsequent journals or books. A 
summary of the results of the data can be made available to you on request by email. If you have 
any questions about any aspect of this study, please speak to Bonfas Owinga before signing this 
form. Two copies of this informed consent form have been provided. If you choose to participate 
in this study, please sign both, indicating you have read, understood and agreed to participate in 
this research. 
 
I, .................................................. have read and understood the information above and any 
questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction.  I agree to participate in this 
research, knowing that I can withdraw from further participation at any time without 
consequence.  I have been given a copy of this form to keep. 
Participant’s Name:                                                                                                          
Participant’s Signature: ___________________________ Date:                                     
Investigator’s Name:                                                                                                         
  Investigator’s Signature: __________________________ Date:                                    
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The ethical aspects of this study have been approved by the Department of International 
Politics, Research and Ethics Committee at City, University of London.  If you have any 
complaints or reservations about any ethical aspect of your participation in this research, you 
may contact the  Committee through the Chair, Research Ethics (tel. Number: +44 (0) 20-7040-
8500).  Any  complaint you make will be treated in confidence and investigated, and you will 
be informed of  the outcome. 
 
V) THE INTERVIEW PROCESS 
 
Staging of the Semi-Structured Interviews 
The interview process was systematic and thorough and was guided by a case study interview 
protocol. Step 1: Arrival and introduction of the Research Agenda 
The first few minutes were used for introduction, exchange of contacts and brief general 
conversation about the interviewee organization or general news. The Researcher presented 
himself in an objective and neutral way, displaying independence, confidence, and integrity in 
the process but also sensitivity to non-agenda opportunities to expand interaction to develop a 
rapport with the respondent.  The Researcher thanked the respondent for taking the time to do 
the interview, introduced the research agenda and explained the nature and purpose of the 
research interview. He also explained why the interviewee was selected for the interview 
(Expertise/Experience/knowledge), suggested some ways that the research outcome could be of 
use or interest to the interviewee or their organization and informed the interviewee that the 
interview would take approximately one hour. This positive interaction, engagement, and 
openness created rapport through a relaxed atmosphere of trust, credibility and greater degree 
of confidence between the researcher and the interviewee. 
The Researcher then requested the respondent for permission to tape-record the 
interview, which provided accurate and verbatim recording of the interview, presented and 
explained to the respondent the information and consent form {Conditions of anonymity of 
respondent and Privacy and confidentiality of the information collected, No potential Risk or 
Harm associated with participation in the study and the voluntary nature of the interview}. The 
respondent was then given time to read, understand and sign the information and consent form. 
Once both the respondents and the Researcher signed the form, the Researcher handed the 
respondent a copy of the form and informed him/her that there were no right or wrong answers 
to the questions and encouraged them to freely express and share their views, perceptions, and 
insights on the issues under study. 
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Step 2: The Interview Process 
The Researcher used the interview protocol developed in the planning phase of data 
collection to guide the interview process and closely followed the sequence and phraseology of 
the questions. The interview started with the general/contextual information (background 
information-age, location, employment), which were straightforward and easy to answer 
specific questions about the study agenda. This sequence helped ease the respondents into the 
research topics but also ensured that interviews were approached in a standardized way for 
comparative purposes.  The process involved asking questions, listening patiently and taking 
field notes to make sure that all the interviewee responses were adequately captured. The 
Researcher used eye contact and a confident manner to set the tone of the interview, express 
interest and attention. Each question was explored in-depth, and in cases where the answers 
were too brief or vague, the Researcher used a series of follow-up questions, approving nods, 
probes, encouraging responses or directly asking for clarifications and repetitions to get more 
details about the question. The Researcher also provided transitions between major topics and 
avoided asking leading questions. He occasionally checked the audiotape to ensure that it was 
recording the interviews. 
The interview combined structure with flexibility to allow all topics to be covered 
sufficiently, allow responses to be fully probed and the researcher to respond to issues raised 
by the respondent. The Researcher maintained “a stance of unconditional positive regard” 
throughout the interview towards all respondents regardless of whether or not the researcher 
agreed with their statements or ideological positions. He made every effort to manage his 
subjectivity for it not to become a burden through data collection, analysis, and 
interpretation.  The interviews captured the respondents’ views, actions, opinions, lived 
experiences, perspectives and ideas about the constraints confronting advocacy groups in the 
post-transitional countries of Kenya and Zambia and how such enfeeblement had impacted on 
the groups’ ability to effectively contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. 
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Step 3: Ending the interview 
The researcher reviewed key points and confirmed accuracy with the respondents and 
ended the interview on a positive note by asking the respondents about their views and 
suggestions on the future of advocacy groups and democratic consolidation. They were also 
given an opportunity to add anything that they felt was relevant to the study agenda. 
Step 4; After the Interview 
The Researcher thanked the interviewee for his/her time for the interview and explained 
how his/her contribution was valuable to the study, besides seeking permission for any future 
contact.  He further reassured the Interviewee of the confidentiality of the data and answered 
questions raised by the interviewee during the interview. A thank you note was sent to each 
interviewee, and after going through the audiotapes of the interviews, electronic follow-up 
through email were sent where necessary to secure additional information or clarification. 
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APPENDIX B: NAMES AND LOCATION OF KEY EXPERT 
INTERVIEWEE ORGANIZATIONS IN KENYA AND ZAMBIA (MAY 
TO OCTOBER 2012) 
 
COUNTRY LOCATION GENDER ORGANIZATION 
Kenya Nairobi M SUNY Parliamentary Support Program 
Kenya Nairobi F Kenya Debt Relief Network 
Kenya Nairobi M Centre for Governance and Development 
Kenya Nairobi M Centre for Law and Research International 
Kenya Nairobi F Africa Research and Resource Forum 
Kenya Nairobi M International Centre for Policy and Conflict 
Kenya Nairobi F Kituo Cha Sheria 
Kenya Kisumu F Kenya Female Advisory Organization 
Kenya Nairobi M Media Council of Kenya 
Kenya Nairobi M National Council of Churches of Kenya 
Kenya Nairobi M USAID 
Kenya Nairobi F Human Needs Project 
Kenya Nairobi M Kenya Parliament 
Kenya Nairobi M Centre for Social Sector Reform 
Kenya Kisumu M Community Initiative Action Group-Kenya 
Kenya Mombasa M Ujamaa Centre-Mombasa 
Kenya Kisumu F Gender and Reproductive Health Solutions 
Kenya Nairobi M National Convention Executive Council 
Kenya Nairobi M United Nations Development Program 
Kenya Nairobi M Kenyans for Peace and Justice 
Kenya Nairobi M Kikuyu Change Advocates 
Kenya Nairobi M Bunge La Mwananchi 
Kenya Nairobi M Netherlands Embassy 
Kenya Kisumu M Nyanza Youth Coalition 
Kenya Nairobi M Ufadhili Kenya 
Kenya Nairobi M University of Nairobi 
Zambia Lusaka M Centre for Policy Dialogue 
Zambia Lusaka F Zambia Civic Education Association 
Zambia Lusaka M Anti-Voter Apathy Project 
Zambia Lusaka M University of Zambia 
Zambia Lusaka F Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis/Research 
Zambia Lusaka F Zambia Media Women Association 
Zambia Lusaka M NGOCC 
Zambia Lusaka M University of Zambia 
Zambia Lusaka M USAID 
Zambia Lusaka F Legal Resources Foundation 
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Zambia Lusaka F Civil Society for Poverty Reduction 
Zambia Lusaka M SACCORD 
Zambia Lusaka F DFID 
Zambia 
Zambia 
Lusaka 
Lusaka 
M 
M 
Caritas-Zambia 
Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) 
Zambia Lusaka M PANOS Institute of Southern Africa 
Zambia Lusaka F Zambia Council of Trade Unions (ZCTU) 
Zambia Lusaka M Zambia Community Media Forum 
Zambia Lusaka F The Post Newspaper 
Zambia Lusaka F Times of Zambia 
Zambia Lusaka M Yatsani Radio 
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APPENDIX C: Thematic Map: Data Analysis: the principal constraints confronting 
advocacy groups in the process of democratic consolidation in Kenya and Zambia 
 
 
 
Source: Author created from the thematic analysis process 
       Constraints confronting advocacy groups 
Uncertain political environment State Actions Popular disengagement 
Unclear roles 
Unclear 
strategies 
Unclear 
relationship with 
the state 
Co-optation Legislation Repression and 
propaganda 
Breakdown of homogeneous effect 
Establishment of new institutions 
Lack of a national agenda  
Institutionalization/Bureaucratization of 
advocacy groups 
Lack of funding-shifting of funding to the state 
Suspicion advocacy groups and the state 
Legitimacy deficit 
Coordination of development 
National security 
Transparency and Accountability 
Historical ties 
Public Relations purposes 
Skills and experience 
Political disappointment with political and 
economic reforms 
Discordant agenda with the masses 
Rural-Urban divide 
Inadequate understanding of advocacy groups 
role 
Paradox of pluralism 
Fragmentation/ social cleavages 
Poor coordination 
Poor relationship with political parties 
and the state 
 
Depletion of human resource capacity of 
advocacy groups 
Constraint on advocacy  
Lack of autonomy and independence 
Loss of legitimacy and credibility 
Performance legitimacy deficit-advocacy 
groups 
Lack of trust for advocacy groups 
Easy target of the state on issues of 
representation of the masses 
 
Consequences for Democratic consolidation 
Lack of effective strategies and lobbying skills  
Fluid relationship with state and International donors 
Lack of capacity to hold the state accountable 
Lack of information for advocacy purposes 
Lack of unity of purpose 
Lack of leadership and experience with governance and 
democracy 
Advocacy groups without citizens 
 
 
Selective 
disengagement 
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APPENDIX D: ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEW DATA WITH ORDINARY 
CITIZENS IN KENYA AND ZAMBIA 
 
A.THE NATURE OF POPULAR DISENGAGEMENT FROM ADVOCACY GROUPS 
IN KENYA 
The first group of questions in the interview protocol for ordinary citizens focused on the nature 
of popular disengagement from advocacy groups in Kenya.  
1. Organizational Membership in Advocacy groups in Kenya 
The study sought to find out if respondents were members of an advocacy group and 
explanations for such membership or non-membership. The selected representative quotations 
from respondents below illustrate different perspectives on advocacy group membership. 
Q1. Are you a member of an advocacy group/organization? Explain 
Figure 1: Membership in advocacy groups in Kenya 
    
Member 
36% 
 “I am a member of an advocacy group because I believe that these groups have a 
significant role to play in holding the government accountable to the people” 
(Author interview 38: 2012) 
“Advocacy groups are the only channels, where we can freely express our views 
and try to influence public policy through participation” (Author interview 
26:2012)   
     
 Not a 
Member 
 64% 
  “I am disappointed with many advocacy groups, which have not only failed to 
hold the government accountable but have also been compromised by the same 
government, I am no longer a member of any advocacy group” (Author interview 
44:2012) 
 “I was an active member of several advocacy groups, but I lost interest. There 
was no gain. It was almost a waste of time, especially in these tough economic 
times. I now belong to a self-help group where I can see direct economic benefits 
from the group” (Author interview 54: 2012)  
 
2. Assessment of Advocacy Groups Performance 
The study sought to find out citizens’ assessment of advocacy groups broad impact or 
performance in the process of democratic consolidation regarding policy influence, public 
awareness, voice, transparency, and public accountability. A positive assessment would 
indicate that respondents view advocacy groups as contributing to the process of democratic 
consolidation, while a negative assessment would suggest that respondents see these groups as 
having less impact or influence on the process of democratic consolidation in the country. 
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Q2. In your assessment, to what extent have advocacy groups contributed to the 
process of democratic consolidation in Kenya? Explain 
Figure 2: The impact of advocacy Group activities on Democratic Consolidation in Kenya 
 
A lot 
24% 
 
 
“Advocacy groups have contributed a lot to the process of democratic 
consolidation in this country. They helped push for the new constitution, 
contributed to the peace process in 2008 and have continuously acted as a 
watchdog on governance and development issues” (Author interview 60:2012) 
 
Somewhat 
16% 
 “Advocacy groups have performed moderately. While they contributed to the   
establishment of the new and progressive constitution, they have not done the 
same regarding public accountability and the implementation of the new 
constitution” (Author interview 24:2012)  
 
No at all 
60% 
  “Advocacy groups are so divided on different cleavages, have no national agenda 
and paralyzed by the transition to the extent that they have not contributed 
much to the process of democratic consolidation. We do not see any tangible 
benefits from them” (Author interview 41:2012)   
 “Advocacy groups have lost the people and therefore unable to mobilize the 
people, to influence policy-making process including the process of democratic 
consolidation” (Author interview 29:2012)   
 
3. Norms and Values 
The present study also sought to find out if the values and norms championed by 
advocacy groups resonated with the citizens of Kenya 
Q3. In your opinion, to what extent do you agree with the values and norms represented 
by advocacy groups in Kenya? Explain.  
Figure 3: Advocacy Group Norms and Values in Kenya 
 
A lot 
28% 
 “Advocacy groups do represent norms and values that I agree with such as 
tolerance, diversity, freedom, equity, social justice and democracy” (Author 
interview 48:2012) 
“In a country where public norms and values do not matter, advocacy groups 
have done well in trying to institutionalize integrity, transparency, and 
accountability in public institutions” (Author interview 30:2012) 
 
Somewhat 
24% 
 “To some extent, they do represent my norms and values, though there are cases 
where they champion Western values that have nothing to do with our African 
norms and values” (Author interview 24:2012) 
 
 
Not at all 
48% 
  “Nairobi-based advocacy group leaders do not share our norms and values. They 
drive big cars, live in palatial homes and attend international meetings in 
expensive hotels” (Author interview 46:2012) 
 “Advocacy groups have become extremely ethnicized, politicized and divided. 
This was partly the cause of the post-election violence in 2007. They do not 
represent my norms and values” (Author interview 35:2012) 
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4. Institutional trust 
The study also sought to find out to what extent citizens trusted advocacy groups. Trust 
is an essential basis for citizen membership support, commitment, and participation in advocacy 
groups’ activities. In this study, institutional trust is measured as perceived trustworthiness of 
advocacy groups as experienced by individual citizens. 
Q4. In your opinion, how much do you trust advocacy groups? Explain 
Figure 4: Advocacy Groups and Citizen Trust in Kenya 
 
    A lot 
     18% 
 “I do trust advocacy groups. Government and political parties have failed to honor 
their promises repeatedly” (Author interview 56:2012) 
“These groups speak on behalf of millions of Kenyans who have no voice on 
governance issues” (Author interview 42:2012) 
 
Somewha
t 
20% 
 “I cannot say that I fully trust them, but they have done some good things for this 
country, especially pushing for a new constitution and trying to hold the 
government accountable” (Author interview 36:2012) 
     
 
 Not at 
all 
62% 
  “I do not trust them because they use the masses to get rich and hardly consult us 
on any agenda. They are also not accountable to us” (Author interview 58:2012)    
 “After the transition, most of these groups are now quiet and have forgotten about 
the poor. Some have joined the government and now enjoying huge salaries and 
packages” (Author interview 27:2012)  
 
5. Advocacy Group Agenda 
The study also sought to find out whether citizens agreed with the broad agenda being 
pursued by advocacy groups in the post-transitional dispensation in Kenya.  
Q5. In your opinion, to what extent do you agree with the advocacy groups agenda?  
Explain 
Figure 5: Advocacy group Agenda vs. Citizens Agenda in Kenya 
 
    A lot 
      20% 
 “Advocacy groups do speak for me on issues of transparency, accountability, 
and human rights” (Author interview 22:2012) 
“Advocacy groups are the only groups that have honestly attempted to hold 
the government accountable on issues of corruption and governance” 
(Author interview 50:2012) 
Somewhat 
       15% 
 “Advocacy groups do represent some of my values including tolerance, civil 
and political rights but not when they push for the rights to abortion” (Author 
interview 27:2012) 
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 Not at all 
       65% 
  “The groups {Advocacy groups} come with their own agenda from Nairobi and 
just want us to embrace and support that agenda. They do not know what we 
want. (Author interview 34: 2012) 
 “They (Advocacy groups) talk about freedom and human rights, while all we 
need are jobs, affordable education for our children, better housing and better 
health care facilities” (Author interview 22: 2012) 
“Advocacy groups do not have any representatives here (rural areas). They 
only call us for workshops and seminars and then we do not hear from them 
again” (Author interview 39:2012) 
 
6. Representation 
 The study also sought to find out to what extent respondents felt that advocacy groups 
represented them in the pursuit of their roles in the process of democratic consolidation. 
Q6. In your opinion, to what extent do you feel that advocacy groups in this 
country represent you? Explain 
Figure 6: Advocacy groups and Representation in Kenya 
 
    A lot 
      22% 
 “I fully feel that advocacy groups represent me given that they bring to 
debate issues that are concerning to me in this country” (Interview 33:2012) 
“As a member of an advocacy group, I feel fully represented by the 
organization given I participate in its deliberations” (Author interview 
46:2012) 
Somewhat 
       14% 
       
 “In some cases, they do, especially if they pursue issues that I hold important 
such as public accountability” (Author interview 37:2012) 
 
 
 Not at all 
64% 
  “I do not believe that advocacy groups represent me. They make their agenda 
and do what they feel they want to do. They do not consult any of us in the 
formulation of their agenda” (Author interview 25:2012) 
 “Advocacy groups in this country are guided by donor priorities. They do not 
represent us per se, and we have no say on their leadership.  If our needs 
coincide with donor needs, then we benefit” (Author interview 48:2012) 
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7. Community Meeting Attendance  
 The study sought to find out the level of citizen civic action by focusing on attendance 
to community meetings in Kenya in the last one year. 
Q7. Have you attended any community meeting in the last one year? Explain 
Figure 13: Community Meeting Attendance in Kenya 
      
Attended 
     32% 
 “With the establishment of devolution through the new constitution, I believe 
that we as a community can have some influence on policies that directly affect 
us” (Author interview 32:2012) 
“It is the only space that we have as a community to plan, share our views and 
push for our common interests” (Author interview 23:2012) 
 
     Not 
attended 
     68% 
  “No one listens to what we plan and do. Everything is done at the county level 
without our input and consultation” (Author interview 54:2012) 
 “Attending community meetings is a waste of time. We just talk, and at the end 
of the day, nothing changes. Things just remain the same” (Author interview 46: 
2012) 
8. Attending demonstrations and Protests 
     The study also sought to find out if respondents have attended any demonstrations or 
protests in the last one year.  Attendance would indicate how active respondents are in 
participating in advocacy groups activities. 
Q8. Have you attended a demonstration or protest in the last one year? Explain 
Figure 8: Protest and Demonstration Attendance in the last one year in Kenya 
 
Attended 
28% 
 “Demonstrations and protests are the only languages that this government 
understands” (Author interview 32:2012) 
“Citizens have a right to protest when they feel aggrieved by the authorities. It 
is entrenched in the Constitution and helped in bringing about democracy that 
we enjoy today in Kenya” (Author interview 28:2012) 
 
 
Not 
attended 
72% 
  “I do not have time to attend protests and demonstrations. Most of my time is 
consumed working to feed my family. I do not have interest in demonstrations” 
(Author interview 57:2012) 
 “Protests and demonstration do not yield anything. You go there, make noise, 
get harassed and beaten by the police, but nothing changes” (Author interview 
28:2012) 
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B.THE PATTERNS OF POPULAR DISENGAGEMENT FROM ADVOCACY 
GROUPS IN KENYA 
The second set of questions focused on the pattern of popular disengagement for a 
comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of popular disengagement in the new political 
dispensation. The study specifically focused on the influence of location and trust, location and 
membership and location and educational levels, which is also an excellent proxy for the 
socioeconomic status of the respondents in this study. 
 
1. Location, Membership, and Institutional Trust 
Figure 5: Location vs. Trust                                                             Figure 6: Location vs. Membership 
 
 2. Location, Level of Education and Membership in Advocacy Groups 
The study also analyzed the relationship between Location, the level of education and 
membership in advocacy groups. 
Figure 7: No Education and Membership in advocacy groups Figure 8: Primary education and Membership in advocacy 
groups 
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Figure 9: Secondary and above Educational Level and Advocacy Group Membership in Kenya 
 
 
 
3. Gender and Membership in Advocacy Groups in Kenya 
Figure 10: Male Respondents Membership in advocacy groups   Figure 11: Female Respondents Membership in Advocacy 
groups 
 
 
C.THE SIGNIFICANCE OF POPULAR DISENGAGEMENT FROM ADVOCACY 
GROUPS 
The study sought to find out citizen views on the importance of popular disengagement 
from advocacy groups to the process of democratic consolidation. This result would indicate 
whether citizens feel that disengagement affect the role of advocacy groups in the process of 
democratic consolidation or not and explain their responses. 
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1. In your assessment, is popular disengagement from advocacy groups significant to 
the process of democratic consolidation? Explain 
Figure 15: Significance of popular disengagement to democratic consolidation 
 
 
Significant 
  86% 
 “It is the people who make these organizations what they are. Without the 
people, which issues of democratic consolidation are they going to present to 
the government?” (Author interview 36:2012) 
“Advocacy groups derive their legitimacy and credibility from the people whom 
they represent. Without this, the government will not take them seriously on 
policy issues that concern democratic consolidation (Author interview 26:2012) 
“Democratic Consolidation requires democratic citizenship, which is exercised 
through participation in advocacy groups and other democratic channels” 
(Author interview 31:2012) 
    
Not 
significant            
14% 
  “Most of these groups just claim to represent us, which they do not and still get 
donor funding to champion issues that donors want them to champion” 
(Author interview 56: 2012)  
 “We participate in advocacy groups or not; things just keep on getting worse. It 
is the political parties that need to lead the change process” (Author interview 
48:2012) 
 
A.THE NATURE OF POPULAR DISENGAGEMENT IN ZAMBIA 
The first set of questions in the interview protocol for ordinary citizens focused on the 
nature of popular disengagement in Zambia.  
1. Organizational Membership in advocacy groups in Zambia 
The study sought to find out if respondents were members of an advocacy group and 
explanations for both membership and non-membership to such groups. The selected 
statements below represent different perspectives on advocacy group membership in Zambia. 
Q1. Are you a member of an advocacy organization? Explain 
Figure 16: Membership in Advocacy groups in Zambia.  
 
Member 
  25% 
 “Advocacy groups do excellent work in civic education by reminding all of us of 
our role as citizens in the governance and democratic process” (Author 
interview 86:2012) 
“With weak institutions and poor governance in this country, advocacy groups 
are the only institutions that give us hope that things can change for the better” 
(Author interview 112:2012) 
      “I used to be a member of an advocacy group, but now I do not have much time 
as I am busy trying to find ways and means of feeding my family” (Author 
interview 97: 2012)  
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   Not a 
Member 
   75% 
 “We in Zambia continue to experience high levels of poverty, poor governance 
and inequality, despite all efforts by advocacy groups. For me, I have given up 
on politics and participation” (Author interview, 92:2012) 
2. Assessment of Advocacy Group Performance 
The study also sought to find out respondents’ assessment of advocacy groups 
performance in the process of democratic consolidation in the post-transitional period 
regarding policy influence, public awareness, voice, and public accountability. 
Q2. In your assessment, to what extent have advocacy groups contributed to 
democratic consolidation in Zambia? Explain 
Figure 17: Assessment of Advocacy Groups and Democratic Consolidation in Zambia 
 
A lot 
 16% 
 “Without advocacy groups, President Chiluba could have gone for a third term 
and rolled back the gains of democracy we had achieved” (Author interview 
120:2012) 
“Opposition parties are weak and divided, advocacy groups have stepped in to 
fill this gap and hold the government accountable” (Author interview 84:2012) 
Somewhat 
10% 
 “I think that advocacy groups’ performance is mixed. They have kept the 
constitutional review process alive but failed to hold the PF government 
accountable to its lofty promises of 2011” (Author interview 103:2012) 
 
 
 
Not at 
all 
74% 
 
 
 
  “Advocacy groups in this country are extremely reactionary and have not done 
much regarding consolidating the gains of democracy. Ad-hoc means of 
handling national issues during crises have not worked for the long-term” 
(Author interview 85:2012) 
 “Advocacy groups worked tirelessly to bring down the authoritarian regime. 
However, now it seems they are just there for donor money” (Author interview 
81:2012) 
“The most powerful advocacy group in this country-ZCTU has become part of 
the system. It has done almost nothing regarding democratic consolidation” 
(Author interview 98:2012) 
 
3. Norms and Values 
The study sought to find out if advocacy groups represented values and norms that 
resonated with citizens of Zambia. This connection is necessary because advocacy groups in 
principle either represent a section of the population or champion some issues of public interest. 
A strong connection between citizens’ norms and values and those represented by advocacy 
groups is likely to be an essential basis for membership, support, and commitment of citizens 
to the agenda of advocacy groups. 
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Q3. In your opinion, to what extent do you agree with the values and norms 
represented by advocacy groups in Zambia? Explain 
Figure 18: Citizen Values vs. Advocacy Group Values in Zambia 
 
A lot 
   24% 
 “They (advocacy groups) do represent values that I support and believe in such 
as democracy, equality, human rights, transparency and accountability” 
(Author interview 106: 2012) 
 
“All they want is a better society, where people live with dignity and respect. I 
believe in that too” (Author interview 94:2012) 
Somewhat 
20% 
 “I am divided on this. Advocacy groups represent some values that I agree with 
like the rights of citizens and some values that I do not agree with” (Author 
interview 83:2012) 
 
Not at all 
66% 
  “Most of these advocacy groups are elite organizations serving elite interests 
with little connection to the common man” (Author interview 86:2012) 
 “These groups are based in Lusaka and led by people who live in Lusaka. They 
do not understand how we live down here in Kabwe” (Author interview 
102:2012) 
 
4. Institutional Trust 
Citizens’ trust of advocacy groups is critical for the legitimacy of advocacy groups but 
also improves citizens’ commitment, support, and participation in advocacy group activities.  
The study, therefore, sought to find out to what extent citizens trusted advocacy groups in the 
post-transitional period in Zambia.  
Q4. In your opinion, how much do you trust advocacy groups? Explain  
Figure 20: Citizen Trust vs. Advocacy Groups in Zambia 
 
A lot 
  14% 
 “I do trust advocacy groups, especially the church, which has stayed honest in 
trying to ensure democracy and public accountability in this country” (Author 
interview 96:2012) 
“Advocacy groups always side with the people. They fight for our interests, and 
that is why I trust them” (Author interview 109:2012) 
Somewhat 
      18% 
 
 “I somehow trust them because there are some things that they have gotten right 
but, on some issues, they have been way off, for example, many of them did not 
condemn the state of emergency” (Author interview 84: 2012) 
     
 
  “I do not trust them. They (advocacy groups) use us for their own selfish gains. 
They are not transparent, not consistent, and we do not see any changes in our 
lives despite their work” (Author interview 88: 2012) 
428 
 
 Not at all 
   68% 
 “I do not trust them. They mislead us in supporting opposition parties, which 
get to power do not deliver on their promises. They have not done much to stop 
the removal of food subsidies” (Author interview 105:2012) 
 
“I do not trust them because they take rural people for granted. They only work 
with people in Lusaka.” (Author interview 96: 2012) 
 
5. Advocacy Groups Agenda 
The study also sought to find out whether advocacy groups agenda resonated with what 
citizens felt should be the agenda of these groups in the post-transitional dispensation. Citizens 
are likely to support advocacy groups if they agree with the group's agenda.  
Q5. In your opinion, to what extent do you agree with advocacy groups broad agenda?  
Explain 
Figure 19: Advocacy group agenda Vs. Citizens Agenda in Zambia 
 
A lot 
   18% 
 “Advocacy groups do focus on issues that directly affect people like us such 
as land reform, taxation, poverty and democracy” (Author interview 
116:2012) 
“Advocacy groups put on the agenda critical issues neglected by the 
government and thus speaks for me” (Author interview 97:2012) 
Somewhat 
13% 
 “Most advocacy groups agenda resonate with me, but sometimes they push 
for issues that I do not agree with like gay marriage and my dress-my choice 
campaign” (Author interview 90:2012) 
 
 
 
 
Not at all 
 70% 
  “Advocacy groups’ agenda in this country is defined by international donors 
who fund the projects that they implement. It is thus neither their agenda nor 
our agenda” (Author interview 82:2012) 
 
“Advocacy groups in Zambia do not care about what we want. They care 
about what donors want and facilitate our participation in such an agenda. 
They need to start focusing on economic rights” (Author interview 88: 2012) 
 
 “Some advocacy groups have even started championing lesbian and gay rights. 
These are issues that our society do not support at all. It is not our agenda” 
(Author interview 108:2012) 
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6. Representation 
 The study also sought to find out how much respondents felt that advocacy groups 
represented them in the pursuit of their roles in the process of democratic consolidation. 
Q6. In your opinion, to what extent do you feel that advocacy groups in this 
country represent you? Explain 
Figure 20: Advocacy groups and Representation in Zambia 
 
    A lot 
      15% 
       
 “Advocacy groups represent me because they pursue issues that I feel need to 
be championed in this country for better governance and democracy” 
(Author interview 116:2012) 
“As an active member of an advocacy group, I feel fully represented because I 
can express my views within the organization” (Author interview97:2012) 
Somewhat 
      13% 
 “There are quite some issues that they raise that I feel are important though in 
some cases they (advocacy groups) are just being used by other actors like the 
state, donors, and political parties” (Author interview 88:2012) 
 
 
 Not at all 
 
72%  
 
  “Advocacy groups in this country are very self-interested and only tackle 
issues that donors support leaving out crucial issues” (Author interview 
110:2012) 
“I do not feel represented by advocacy groups in this country because they do 
not select their leaders through elections” (Author interview 82:2012) 
“Advocacy groups are not accountable to us so how can we feel represented 
by them? “(Author interview 98:2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Community Meetings attendance 
The study sought to find out the level of citizen civic action by focusing on attendance 
to community meetings in Zambia in the last one year. 
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Q7. Have you attended any community meeting in the last one year? Explain 
Figure 21: Attendance to Community Meetings in Zambia in the last one year 
     
Attended 
     32% 
 “Attendance to community meetings gives me an opportunity to share my views 
on our development issues” (Author interview 83:2012) 
“They are important because we get information about development issues from 
the government” (Author interview 110:2012)  
 
 Not 
attended 
     68% 
  “Community meetings are ineffective because they are  dominated by traditional 
chiefs and local elites, who have their own agenda” (Author interview 87:2012) 
 “What is the point of attending community meetings? They do not affect policies 
that are implemented by the government” (Author interview 84:2012)  
 
8. Attendance to protests and demonstrations 
Attendance to protests and demonstrations by members of advocacy groups demonstrate 
commitment and support. 
Q8. Have you attended a demonstration or protest in the last one year? 
Figure 22: Attendance to demonstration and protests in the last one year in Zambia 
 
Attended 
21% 
 “We must continue pushing the government to do the right thing, and 
demonstrations and protests are ways of doing that” (Author interview 92:2012) 
“Demonstrations are the only method that has worked in this country. We 
stopped Chiluba’s quest for a third term through demonstrations” (Author 
interview 114:2012) 
 
 
 
Not 
attended 
79% 
  “The same advocacy groups that are now calling for protests and 
demonstrations are the same ones, which convinced us to support MMD, a 
party which miserably failed us politically and economically for 20 years. I 
cannot thus attend a demonstration” (Author interview 95: 2012) 
“How do you attend a demonstration, when you have nothing to eat at home, 
and you do not know how you will pay for your kids’ school fees?” (Author 
interview 94:2012) 
 “What has protests, and demonstrations changed in this country? We are still 
living in poverty with poor health facilities, poor roads, and dilapidated schools. 
Most of us are just disappointed and disillusioned” (Author interview 87:2012) 
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B. PATTERNS OF POPULAR DISENGAGEMENT FROM ADVOCACY GROUPS 
IN ZAMBIA 
1. Location, Membership and Institutional Trust in Advocacy groups in Zambia 
Figure 23: Location vs. Trust                                        Figure 24: Location vs. Membership 
 
2. Levels of Education and Membership in Advocacy Groups 
Figure 25: No Education and Membership                             Figure 26: Primary Education and Membership  
 
Figure 27: Secondary and above educational level Vs. Advocacy group Membership in Zambia 
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3. Gender and Membership in Advocacy Groups in Zambia 
Figure 28: Male Membership                                                        Figure 29: Female Membership  
 
 
C. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF POPULAR DISENGAGEMENT FROM ADVOCACY 
GROUPS IN ZAMBIA 
The study also sought to find out citizen views on the significance of popular 
disengagement from advocacy groups to the process of democratic consolidation. The results 
would indicate whether citizens feel that popular disengagement affect the role of advocacy 
groups in the process of democratic consolidation and how it does so. 
1. In your assessment, is popular disengagement from advocacy groups significant to 
the process of democratic consolidation? Explain 
Figure 30: Significance of Popular disengagement to democratic consolidation 
  
 
Significant 
 92% 
 “Advocacy groups can only be effective if we support the causes that they champion. 
That is how their efforts helped to stop the third term that Chiluba wanted.” 
(Author interview 36:2012) 
“If the people do not support advocacy groups, they will not be able to influence the 
process of democratic consolidation because the government believe that they are 
unpatriotic and championing foreign interests” (Author interview 26:2012) 
“Withdrawal of support and resources from advocacy groups, impair their capacity 
to influence policies that deepen democracy” (Author interview 31:2012) 
   
Not 
significant            
8% 
 “Advocacy groups have not done much even with our support, especially after the 
transition. Most of them have become too close to the regime to act autonomously” 
(Author interview 56: 2012) 
 “I just feel that this country needs more than advocacy groups to deepen democracy. 
The state and its institutions like parliament needs to do more” (Author interview 
48:2012) 
 
